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Supreme Court Case No. 38528
38704
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
HONORABLE THOMAS F. NEVILLE







         
   
 
 
   
 
     
 
    
                 
    
       
      
    
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THE MATIER OF THE MOTION FOR )
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND )
CONSOLIDATION. )
-------------------------------------------------------- )






STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND
CONSOLIDATION
Supreme Court Docket No. 38704-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085
Ref. No. 11-192
A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION with attachments,
was filed by counsel for Petitioner on March 29, 2011, requesting permission to appeal, pursuant to
I.A.R. 12, from the district court's written Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to
Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order issued February 23, 2011 in Ada
County case no. CV PC 2008-03085. Petitioner requests that the Court consolidate this case with
the original Motion for Permission to Appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 38528. The Court is
fully advised; therefore, after due consideration,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
AND CONSOLIDATION be, and hereby is, GRANTED and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by
permission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the
Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, filed February 23, 2011.
Petitioner shall file a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21)
days from the date of this Order, which appeal shall proceed as if from a fmal judgment or order
entered by the district court.
IT FURTHER ORDERED that appeal no. 38528 and 38704 shall be CONSOLIDATED FOR
ALL PURPOSES under 38528, but all documents filed shall bear both docket numbers.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a LIMTED
CLERK'S RECORD, in Docket No. 38704 which shall include the documents requested in the
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION -
Docket No. 38704-2011 000002
         
         
     
  
 






    
 
  
    
    
 
     
     
   
          
                
               
              
               
                
      
           
               
              
              
                 
                   
     
             
             
             
              
         
   
Notice ofAppeal (to be filed by counsel for Petitioner), together with a copy ofthis Order which shall
be due on July 22, 2011.
DATED this ). 0 day ofApril, 2011.
By Order of the Supreme Court
------=......;.8tee~ ~~ _
Stephen w. Kenyon,~
cc: Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Thomas F. Neville
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDAnON -
Docket No. 38704-2011
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Date: 10/4/2011 
Time: 12:53 PM 
Page 1 of 5 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-PC-2008-03085 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
2/14/2008 NCPC CCSTROMJ New Case Filed - Post Conviction Releif District Court Clerk 
CHJG CCSTROMJ Change Assigned Judge Thomas F. Neville 
CERT CCBURGBL Certificate Of Mailing Thomas F. Neville 
3/11/2008 ANSW CCSTROMJ State's Answer and Response to Petition for Post Thomas F. Neville 
Conviction Relief (Bennetts for State of Idaho) 
MOTN CCSTROMJ Motion for the Production of Documents and Thomas F. Neville 
Motion for an Order Permitting State to Discuss 
This Case With Trial Counsel 
MOTN CCSTROMJ Motion for Order Waiving The Attorney-Client Thomas F. Neville 
Privilege 
MOTN CCSTROMJ Motion for SchedUling Order Thomas F. Neville 
5/7/2008 HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Thomas F. Neville 
06/09/2008 04:00 PM) Notice of Scheduling 
Conference 
NOTC TCORTEJN Notice of Scheduling Conference (06/09/08 at Thomas F. Neville 
4:00pm) with JUdge Neville 
5/12/2008 PROS PRBARRDE Prosecutor assigned JAN BENNETTS Thomas F. Neville 
6/9/2008 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Thomas F. Neville 
06/09/200804:00 PM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
6/10/2008 HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/14/2008 03:00 Thomas F. Neville 
PM) 
DCELLlSJ Notice Of Status Conference Thomas F. Neville 
7/14/2008 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 07/14/2008 Thomas F. Neville 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/08/2008 11 :00 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) 
7/15/2008 DCELLlSJ Notice Of Status Conference RE: transcripts Thomas F. Neville 
8/7/2008 HRVC DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 08/08/2008 Thomas F. Neville 
11:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
1/27/2009 HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/03/2009 10:30 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) 
NOTH DCELLlSJ Notice Of Hearing For Entry of Scheduling Order Thomas F. Neville 
2/2/2009 ORDR DCELLlSJ Scheduling Order for Post Conviction Thomas F. Neville 
Proceedings 
2/3/2009 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 02/03/2009 Thomas F. Neville 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 







Date: 10/4/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 12:53 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-PC-2008-03085 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
2/3/2009 HRSC DCELLlSJ 
DCELLlSJ 
4/1/2009 STIP DCELLlSJ 
ORDR DCELLlSJ 
4/7/2009 PETN DCELLlSJ 




8/5/2009 ANSW CCAMESLC 
8/10/2009 MOTN CCGARDAL 
8/17/2009 MOTN DCHOPPKK 




9/22/2009 OBJT CCAMESLC 
MEMO CCAMESLC 
10/9/2009 MISC DCHOPPKK 
MISC DCHOPPKK 
10/20/2009 MISC DCHOPPKK 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/24/2009 09:00 
AM) 
Notice Of Status conference 
Stipulation For Extension of Time to File 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Order For Extension of Time to file amended 
Petition for post conviction relief pursuant to 
stipulation 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Hearing result for Status held on 07/24/2009 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/28/2009 11 :00 
AM) 
Notice Of Status Conference 
Notice of Hearing (08/28/2009 at 11 :OOam) with 
Judge Neville 
Answer to Amended Petition (Bennetts for State) 
Respondent's Motion for Discovery (Hall II) 
Motion for Discovery 
Hearing result for Status held on 08/28/2009 
11:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
10/30/2009 09:00 AM) 
Petitioner/Respondent's Stipulation for 
Amendment of Scheduling Order 
Amended Scheduling Order for Post Conviction 
Proceedings 
Objection to Motion for Discovery 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to 
Discovery 
Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery 
and Petitioner's Request for A Protective Order 
Petitioner's Reply to the State's Memorandum in 
Support of the State's Objection to the Motion for 
Discovery (Hall II) 
State's Specific Response to Petitioner's 
Discovery Reqeusts and Reply to Petitioner's 
Response to State's Motion for Discovery and 
State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order (Hall 
II) 
Judge 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-PC-2008-03085 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
10/28/2009 MISC DCHOPPKK Reply to State's Specific Responses to Thomas F. Neville 
Petitioner's Discovery Requests (Hall II) 
10/30/2009 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
10/30/2009 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
4/15/2010 NOTC DCDANSEL Notice of Change in Status of Counsel Thomas F. Neville 
HRSC DCDANSEL Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/22/2010 09:00 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) 
NOTC TCORTEJN Notice of Status Hearing (04/22/2010 at 9:00am) Thomas F. Neville 
with Judge Neville 
4/22/2010 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 04/22/2010 Thomas F. Neville 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SUE WOLF 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/04/2010 09:00 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) 
4/23/2010 CONT DCELLlSJ Continued (Status 06/11/2010 11 :00 AM) Thomas F. Neville 
4/30/2010 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order RE: Respondent's Motions for Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
and for waiver of attorney client privilege 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Discovery Order (Hall II) Thomas F. Neville 
5/6/2010 MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion for Standing Order Directing the Thomas F. Neville 
prepartion of Transcripts in All Post Conviction 
HEarings 
5/13/2010 ORDR DCELLlSJ Standing Order to Produce Transcripts Thomas F. Neville 
5/21/2010 MOTN CCSIMMSM Motion for an Order Taking Judicial Notice of Thomas F. Neville 
Record in Case No. CR-FE-03-0000624 
6/9/2010 MOTN DCELLlSJ Renewed Moton to Release Redacted Juror Thomas F. Neville 
Questionnaires 
6/11/2010 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 06/11/2010 Thomas F. Neville 
11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SUE WOLF 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/06/2010 10:30 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) 
NOTC TCORTEJN Notice of Status Conferrence (08/06/2010 at Thomas F. Neville 
10:30am) with Judge Neville 
6/12/2010 ORDR TCORTEJN Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Thomas F. Neville 
Case No. CRFE030000624 (Hall II) 
6/29/2010 NOTC DCELLlSJ Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest Thomas F. Neville 
(UNDER SEAL) 
Document sealed 
7/28/2010 MOTN DCHOPPKK Exparte Motion (Filed Under Seal) Thomas F. Neville 
Document sealed 000006
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Time: 12:53 PM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 5 Case: CV-PC-2008-03085 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
7/30/2010 MOTN CCMASTLW Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict Thomas F. Neville 
8/6/2010 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 08/06/2010 Thomas F. Neville 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SUE WOLF 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/26/201002:30 Thomas F. Neville 
PM) 
MISC DCELLlSJ Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Thomas F. Neville 
Possible SAPD Conflict (Halll!) 
8/13/2010 MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Support of Motion for Inquiry in Thomas F. Neville 
to Possible SAPD Conflict 
8/20/2010 MISC DCHOPPKK Reply to Memorandum In Support of State's Thomas F. Neville 
Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict 
(Hall II) 
8/26/2010 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Motion held on 08/26/2010 Thomas F. Neville 
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SUE WOLF 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
09/01/201002:00 PM) 
8/30/2010 NOTC DCELLlSJ Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest Thomas F. Neville 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice Of Limited Appearance of Dennis Thomas F. Neville 
Benjamin 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice of Filing Under Seal Thomas F. Neville 
AFFD DCELLlSJ Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin Thomas F. Neville 
Document sealed 
9/1/2010 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
09/01/201002:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hell 
Court Reporter: SUE WOLF 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
10/19/201001:30 PM) 
10/4/2010 NOTC DCHOPPKK Notice of Filing Under Seal Thomas F. NeVille 
MISC DCHOPPKK State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Thomas F. Neville 
Possible Conflict ad Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin 
Document sealed 
10/19/2010 DCHH DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
10/19/201001:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hell 
Court Reporter: SUE WOLF 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
12/27/2010 MEMO DCHOPPKK Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Thomas F. Neville 
Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel 







Date: 10/4/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 12:53 PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 5 Case: CV-PC-2008-03085 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
1/10/2011 MOTN DCELLlSJ 
MOTN DCELLlSJ 
1/11/2011 MISC DCELLlSJ 
1/25/2011 MISC DCELLlSJ 
MISC DCELLlSJ 
MISC DCELLlSJ 
2/1/2011 MISC DCELLlSJ 
2/23/2011 DEOP DCELLlSJ 
3/4/2011 DEOP DCELLlSJ 
3/7/2011 MOTN DCHOPPKK 
3/10/2011 RSPS CCRANDJD 
3/15/2011 DEOP DCELLlSJ 
3/23/2011 DEOP DCELLlSJ 
4/13/2011 APSC CCTHIEBJ 
STAT DCELLlSJ 
6/14/2011 APSC CCTHIEBJ 
9/16/2011 NOTC DCELLlSJ 
9/30/2011 NOTC CCTHIEBJ 
Motion For Permission to Appeal 
Motion For Court to Take Judicial Notice 
Amendment to Motion for Permission to Appeal 
State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Judicial Notice 
State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration 
State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Permission to Appeal 
Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion 
for Judicial Notice 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying The 
Motion to Reconsider, and supplementing The 
Original Decision and Order 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the 
Motion for Permission to Appeal 
Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental 
Order 
Response to Petitioners Motion for Permission to 
Appeal Supplemental Order 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Motion For Per mission To Appeal Supplemental 
Order 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Pet's 
Motion for Judicial Notice Without Prejudice 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: inactive PENDING 
APPEAL IN SUPREME COURT 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Notice Of Change in Status of Counsel 
Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court 
Docket No. 38528 and 38704 
Judge 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
Thomas F. Neville 
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~It:A.Mp.M~
MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. #4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
FEB 14 2008
PAULA M. SWENSEN, ISB #6722
NICOLE OWENS, ISB #7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
J. DAVID NAVAHRO, Clerk
By M. STROMER
DEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,


















Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate
Public Defender (SAPD), petitions this Honorable Court for post-conviction relief from the
conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth Judicial District, in State v. Hall,
Ada County Case No. H0300624, on January 3, 2008. This Court has jurisdiction over the action
pursuant to I.C. §19-2719; §§19-4901 et seq.; I.C.R., Rules 35 and 57; and Article I, Sections 1
and 5 of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho. Petitioner relies on Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8, 13,
17 and 18 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as International Human Rights
Law in support of this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein "Petition").
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1
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I. BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(1) through (a)(6))
1. Petitioner was charged with first degree murder and rape of Cheryl Ann Hanlon on
May 20,2003. (R., pp.l4-15.)
2. Petitioner was represented by the Ada County Public Defender's office, Amil Myshin
and D.C. Carr, until January 20, 2005. (R., pp.404-408.)
3. Petitioner was thereafter represented by conflict counsel, Robert Chastain and Deborah
Krista!.l
4. Petitioner pled NOT GUILTY and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the crimes
charged.
5. Judgment and sentence were pronounced by Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge
of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in Ada County, Boise, Idaho.
6. Petitioner stands convicted in Ada County Case No. H0300624 of the crimes of:
Count I, Murder in the First Degree
Count II, Rape
7. The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 3rd day of January, 2008:
Count I, for Murder: Death
Count II, for Rape: Life in Prison without possibility of parole
8. Other than post-trial motions and any prematurely filed NOTICE OF APPEAL, which
cannot be litigated under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are concluded, this
is Petitioner's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from the convictions and sentences
herein challenged.
1 Conflict counsel was assigned following Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Lynn Beth Henneman, Ada
County Case No. H0300518, and following the filing of post-conviction petition in Case No. SPOT0500155 which
contained allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel involving the same attorneys from the Ada County Public
Defender's Office. (See R., ppA04-408 (Stipulations for Substitution of Counsel, dated January 20, 2005).)
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 2
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9. Petitioner was previously convicted of murder in the first degree, as well as kidnapping
and rape ofLynn Henneman, Ada County Case No. H0300518. Petitioner was sentenced
to death for the murder, and is currently in post-conviction proceedings in Ada County
Case No. SPOT0500155. The SAPD represents Mr. Hall in that post-conviction and
appeal.2
10. Petitioner is in the custody of the State ofIdaho Department of Correction, detained at the
Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI) near Boise, Idaho.
II. ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY
Petitioner is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State of Idaho,
under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at the Idaho
Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. This restraint is pursuant to the following
conviction and sentence imposed on January 3, 2008 by this Court presiding in the Fourth
Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300624: Murder in the First Degree
and Rape. This restraint is illegal in that the convictions and sentences were obtained in
violation of the constitutions of the United States and of the State of Idaho and in violation of
court rules, statutes and other law as set forth below.
III. LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND
This Petition is filed according to the time constraints of I.C. § 19-2719, giving Petitioner
only forty-two (42) days within which to file an initial petition for post-conviction relief. Due to
these time constraints, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a petition which complies with
I.C. §§ 19-4901, et seq., § 19-2719 and I.C.R. 57, because of the following factors, among
others:
2 Hereinafter, Ada County Case No. H0300518 will be referred to as "Hall I," and Ada County Case No. H0300624,
the subject of this post-conviction, will be referred to as "Hall II."
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 3
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1. As required by I.C.R. 44.2 and I.C. § 19-870(1)(c), the Court appointed Petitioner's
present counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings on January 8, 2008;
2. Present counsel did not represent Petitioner in the underlying criminal matter, and
have limited knowledge of the criminal proceedings leading to the conviction and
sentences herein challenged;
3. Present counsel has not yet received a copy of the reporter's transcript and has not
had a meaningful opportunity to conduct an independent investigation and to engage
in discovery as of this time.3
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires review of the trial transcript and the
entire record to determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors, Hoffman v. Arave,
236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001), in addition to a thorough investigation for claims outside the
record. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (recognizing that even a thorough
investigation of the record may not reveal all claims since often "the record is unclear or the
errors are hidden" and noting that reliance solely on the record would likely render post-
conviction proceedings "a meaningless ritual.") This investigation must be both diligent and
exhaustive, aimed at including all possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise all possible
claims may result in a procedural bar. See I.C. § 19-2719 (3), (5); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho
469; 903 P.2d 58 (1995); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). Further, the
investigation can neither rely solely on the assistance and investigation of trial counsel, see
Hoffman, supra (recognizing the inability or difficulty of trial counsel's objective examination of
their own performance); I.C.R. 44.2 (requiring the appointment of at least one attorney other than
3The Clerk's Record in this case was received by the SAPD on January 25, 2008. However, assigned counsel have
not had sufficient time to thoroughly review the Clerk's Record, which consists of seven volumes and over is
thirteen hundred pages long in addition to numerous sealed documents. Additionally, in order to fully understand
the Clerk's Record, it is necessary to review the record in conjunction with the Reporter's Transcripts, which have
not yet been prepared and provided to counsel.
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 4
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trial counsel to represent the defendant in post-conviction), nor upon the discovery provided by
the prosecutor or law enforcement during the underlying criminal proceedings.
See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498 (1991).
Petitioner has not had sufficient time to conduct this independent investigation, yet alone
adequate time to review the volumes of material that trial counsel had in their possession during
their trial representation. In fact, at this time Petitioner has not yet received any documents from
trial counsel, but is in the process of obtaining their files. Nevertheless, Petitioner has acted with
diligence in preparing this petition. Petitioner has already taken the following steps: conducted
cursory interviews with Petitioner, the mitigation specialist, and trial counsel. Among the steps
remaining to be taken include the following: obtain and review trial counsels' files, obtain and
review the defense investigator's files, obtain and review the Reporter's Transcript, review the
Clerk's Record in conjunction with the transcripts, identify and request relevant records, conduct
comprehensive interviews with all members of the defense team and potential witnesses,
determine which experts would be appropriate for case development, and otherwise re-
investigate the crime and surrounding events. See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines
for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (herein "ABA
Guidelines"), Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties Of Post-Conviction Counsel,,).4
Accordingly, Petitioner will seek this Court's leave to amend his Petition pursuant to
I.C. § 19-4906(a) and I.C.R. 15 from time to time as development of his case in post-conviction
4 The Commentary to this Guideline provides in part: "Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are
required. One involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client. Reinvestigating the case
means examining the facts underlying the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's
performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating the client means assembling a more-
thorough biography of the client than was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was not
presented previously, but also to identify mental-health claims which potentially reach beyond sentencing issues to
fundamental questions of competency and mental-state defenses."
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 5
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progresses. Nevertheless, in support of his petition for post-conviction relief from the conviction
and sentence entered against him, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:
IV. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
The convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of
laws of the United States and ofIdaho, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 13, 17, and 18, of the
Constitution of the State of Idaho, provisions of the Idaho Code and the Idaho Criminal Rules as
well as international law.
Petitioner alleges that all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel herein satisfy both
prongs of the Strickland analysis, specifically, that the claims show (l) a deficiency in trial
counsel's performance, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In addition, Petitioner alleges that he has
demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct and the necessary level of prejudice for this Court to
grant him relief. Finally, Petitioner alleges that even if the claims do not meet the governing
level of prejudice on their own, that when cumulatively considered, the accumulation of error
creates prejudice entitling Petitioner to relief Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992).
A. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND/OR
FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONALLY
ADEQUATE JURY SELECTION PROCESS AND UNBIASED JURY
Petitioner has not been afforded the opportunity to review the jury selection proceedings
in this case due to a lack of access to the trial transcripts which have not yet been prepared.
After further investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or reserve the right to
withdraw the claim if supporting evidence is not discovered upon further investigation.
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1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance In Failing To Strike
Biased Jurors For Cause Or Utilize Preemptory Challenges And/Or
The District Court Erred In Denying Motions To Strike For Cause
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance In Failing To Conduct
A Meaningful Voir Dire
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
3. The District Court Erred In Denying Trial Counsel's Renewed
Motion for Change Of Venue And/Or Trial Counsel Rendered
Ineffective Assistance In Failing To Adequately Argue And Support
The Motion
Due to extensive publicity surrounding both the Hall I and Hall II murder trials, trial
counsel moved for a change of venue. The district court denied the motion, and attempted to
seat a jury from Ada County. This attempt failed, however, when it became abundantly clear
that the jury pool was tainted by the extensive publicity and the potential jurors' knowledge of
the case and of Mr. Hall's previous murder conviction and death sentence.
Trial counsel renewed their motion for change of venue in open court, providing several
documents to support the renewed motion. (R., pp.831-839.) Trial counsel argued that the trial
should be moved to a northern Idaho county where a potential jury pool would not be tainted.s
The court instead decided to select a jury from Gooding County, only approximately one
5 This and other assertions of fact are based on current counsels' limited conversations with trial counsel. Upon
receipt of the Reporter's Transcript and upon further discussions with and/or depositions of trial counsel, and upon
full investigation, Petitioner will amend or delete the claim as indicated.
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hundred (l00) miles from Boise. The court determined that the selected jurors and alternates
would then be bused to the Ada County Courthouse in Boise daily for the trial, the very same
area in which the media coverage prevented the selection of an unbiased jury.
Subsequently, trial counsel filed a motion to reconsider selecting the jury from Gooding
County, in part based on the fact that media local to Gooding, including Boise media received in
Gooding County, had tainted that jury pool as well.6
Trial counsel should have thoroughly litigated the change of venue issue. It is the
defendant's burden to show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news coverage prevented a
fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003). Thus, it was up to trial counsel to
establish that in the totality of the circumstances, juror exposure to pretrial publicity would result
in a trial that was fundamentally unfair to the Defendant. Id Trial counsel should have presented
the Court information in support of a motion for change of venue including, but not limited to,
the nature and content of pretrial publicity, affidavits indicating the level of community
prejudice, and testimony by prospective jurors. Id Trial counsel also should have provided a
thorough constitutional basis for their motions.7
Mr. Hall asserts that he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury. For
example, despite the fact the venue was originally changed from Ada to Gooding County, the
foreman of Mr. Hall's jury was aware of Mr. Hall's previous death sentence. After a review of
the transcripts and record, Petitioner anticipates expanding this claim to include other evidence
6 It appears from the record and from discussions with trial counsel that trial counsel was arguing to move the trial to
Lewiston, an area which had been subjected to far less media coverage.
7 It appears that trial counsel did incorporate previous oral argument and authority in support of the motion. (See,
R., p.916 ("The defense further requests the Court take notice of prior filings and oral argument in support of their
motion for change of venue.").) Upon receipt and review of the transcripts, Mr. Hall will amend or delete this claim
as indicated.
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of the ineffectiveness of counsel or judicial error in failing to secure an adequate change of
venue.
B. ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON
JURY FOREMAN'S KNOWLEDGE THAT MR. HALL HAD
PREVIOUSLY BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH
The jury foreman and possibly other jurors knew Mr. Hall was under sentence of death
during the guilt-phase of the deliberations. See Claim A, above. It appears that trial counsel
repeatedly moved for a remedy, and specifically moved for a mistrial and/or new trial after the
first degree murder verdict was returned. Trial counsel sought, in the alternative, impanelment
of a new jury for the sentencing phase. The Court erroneously denied the motion. Mr. Hall
asserts that, but for that decision, he would not have been sentenced to death. Petitioner is
awaiting the trial transcripts and is investigating this claim. Upon full investigation, Petitioner
shall expound upon this claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
C. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
INFORMING THE JURY AT SENTENCING THAT MR. HALL WAS
ALREADY UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts and is investigating this claim. Upon full
investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. It
appears that trial counsel chose to present Mr. Hall's status as death row inmate in an attempt to
seek mercy from the jury. As a preliminary claim, Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsels' decision
was objectively unreasonable, and but for the jury's knowledge of his prior death sentence, there
is a reasonable probability that Mr. Hall would have received a life sentence.
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D. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AND/OR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN FAILING TO
UNCOVER OR DISCLOSE FACTS REGARDING THE
PROSECUTOR'S CONNECTION TO THE GOODING COUNTY AREA
AND THE PROSECUTOR'S MARRIAGE TO A LEAD INVESTIGATOR
IN THE HALL I CASE
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts and is investigating this claim. Upon full
investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
Preliminary investigation shows that one of the prosecutors was raised in the Gooding
area or and/or has extensive family connections to the area. It is likely, then, that at least some
jurors were familiar with the prosecutor or the prosecutor's family. Petitioner asserts that the
prosecutor's connections to the rural area from which the jury was selected caused the jury to
give greater weight to the State's case, witnesses and evidence; impermissibly lowered the
State's burden of proof; and violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed to Mr. Hall. This
rendered all aspects of Mr. Hall's trial fundamentally unfair, including the jury selection, and the
guilt and sentencing phases of trial.8
Preliminary investigation also shows that the same prosecutor is married to a Garden City
detective who was extensively involved in the investigation of the disappearance and homicide
of Lynn Henneman. Because the Henneman homicide played such a prominent role in this case,
that connection also rendered all aspects of Mr. Hall's trial fundamentally unfair.
8 It is Mr. Hall's belief that the prosecutor disclosed the relationship, but in an untimely manner. Further, he
believes the prosecutor did not examine the spouse-witness, but nonetheless asserts that it is improper.
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E. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF MR. HALL'S MARCH 2003
INTERROGATIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Trial counsel filed a Motion to Suppress in March 15,2004. (R., pp.l00-l04.) However,
trial failed to adequately argue that the interrogations in or around March of 2003, in additional
to violating due process, also violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In addition, trial counsel failed to support their motion with expert testimony establishing
that the statements made to law enforcement during the interrogations were the result of
coercion, rendering the statements involuntary. Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully
investigate and develop this claim. Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation,
Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
In addition to failing to suppress the statements, trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in allowing the jury to use and review inaccurate transcripts of the
interrogations.9 Mr. Hall is attempting to obtain the transcripts in order to thoroughly compare
them to the interrogation tapes, but preliminary asserts there were gross and highly prejudicial
discrepancies.
F. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE GUILT-PHASE ISSUES
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, Mr. Hall asserts that trial
9 It is unclear whether the jury was allowed to take the transcripts into deliberations, and unclear how the jury was
instructed regarding the transcripts. Petitioner will expand or withdraw this claim after receipt and review of the
interrogation transcripts used at trial, the trial transcripts, and full investigation.
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counsel were ineffective in failing to adequately investigate evidence of a co-perpetrator and/or
alternate perpetrator, and failing to adequately investigate the State's guilt-phase witnesses.
1. Failure To Challenge The State's Presentation Of DNA Evidence
Introduced Against Mr. Hall
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, Mr. Hall asserts that trial
counsel were ineffective in failing to adequately investigate evidence of a co-perpetrator and/or
alternate perpetrator.
2. Failure To Adequately Investigate Co-Perpetrators And/Or Alternate
Perpetrators
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
3. Failure To Adequately Investigate And/Or Examine The State's
Guilt-Phase Witnesses
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
G. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE
GUILT-PHASE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, Mr. Hall asserts that the State
failed to disclose evidence of a co-perpetrator and/or alternate perpetrator.
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H. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF A CO-PERPETRATOR IN THE HALL I CASE
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully develop this claim. Upon receipt of the
transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim. Petitioner has
provided evidence that there was a co-perpetrator involved in the killing of Ms. Henneman.
However, Mr. Hall still requires a thorough review ofthe transcripts and of trial counsel's files in
order to present that claim in this matter. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts that
trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the co-perpetrator evidence in Hall I, and failed to
present any evidence of a co-perpetrator in the Hall I case to the Hall II jury. Specifically, in the
Hall I post-conviction, Mr. Hall has raised credible claims that there was a co-perpetrator
involved in the rape and/or homicide of Ms. Henneman. Moreover, investigation has established
there was more than one sperm donor in the Henneman case. Mr. Hall anticipates submitting
affidavits and other evidence from the Hall I post-conviction investigation to support this claim.
Mr. Hall asserts that there is a reasonable probability that had that evidence been presented to the
Hall II jury, the jury would not have imposed the death sentence, as Mr. Hall's culpability in
Hall I would have been significantly diminished. Mr. Hall intends to provide the documentation
from the Hall I post-conviction as well as additional investigation to support this claim.
I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE
EVIDENCE OF A CO-PERPETRATOR IN THE HALL I CASE
See Claim H, above. The State was well aware of the possibility of a co-perpetrator in
the Hall I case, yet failed to provide supporting information to trial counselor present the
exculpatory evidence to the jury.
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J. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN EXAMINING DEFENSE
WITNESSES
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, Mr. Hall asserts that the
cross-examination of Dr. Beaver constituted misconduct insofar as the State implied facts not in
evidence, namely, that Ms. Henneman had been strangled with her own clothing.
K. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that trial counsel failed to: (l) elicit additional testimony from the witnesses presented; (2) failed
to elicit testimony regarding sexual abuse and related trauma; and (3) failed to adequately
prepare or examine witnesses. The information trial counsel failed to elicit was necessary to
combat the State's case in aggravation, as well as provide the jury with powerful mitigating
evidence which would have provided a more complete and compelling picture of Erick Hall.
1. Failing To Elicit Additional Testimony From The Witnesses Presented
While Mr. Hall requires transcripts and investigation to fully develop this claim, he
asserts that, at a minimum, trial counsel had mitigating information that could have been readily
elicited from witnesses presented at sentencing. For example, Shannon Pambrun, provided an
affidavit in the Hall I post-conviction, which detailed sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect
beyond that presented in his testimony in this case.
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2. Failing To Elicit Testimony Regarding Sexual Abuse And Related
Trauma
Trial counsel failed to present any testimony through fact witnesses describing or
confirming sexual abuse suffered by Erick Hall during his childhood and adolescence, even
though that information was readily available, as illustrated by the affidavits obtained in the
Hall I post-conviction, including the affidavits of Shannon Pambrun, Jeff Langston, and Harry
and Sophronia Selby. These affidavits will be submitted in support of this claim.
3. Failing To Adequately Prepare Or Examine Witnesses
Trial counsel failed to adequately prepare and/or examine their witnesses at the
sentencing trial. While Mr. Hall requires transcripts and investigation to fully develop this
claim, he asserts that, at a minimum, trial counsel: (l) failed to adequately examine expert
witnesses and provide sufficient factual testimony for their expert testimony; (2) failed to ensure
witness Cookie Quirk had the necessary records from which to refresh her recollection; (3) failed
to adequately prepare and examine fact witnesses, in order to elicit mitigating testimony.
4. Failing To Adequately Investigate Mitigation
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim, and
will require a thorough examination of trial counsel files to determine which, if any, avenues of
investigation were not pursued. Additionally, Petitioner will require the full cooperation of trial
counsel. Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound
upon this claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
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L. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY REBUT THE STATE'S CASE IN
AGGRAVATION
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
M. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE
SENTENCING-PHASE EXCULPATORY OR MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
N. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REGARDING TESTIMONY OF
PRIOR ACQUAINTANCES AND GIRLFRIENDS
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
O. THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED MISCONDUCT IN SENTENCING
PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF
MITIGATION
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 16
000024
         
        
 
             
              
       
       
     
             
              
       
      
    
             
              
       
       
       
 
             
              
       
     
1. Improper Limiting Definition Of Mitigation And Mischaracterization
Of The Law By Implying There Was A Nexus Requirement Between
Mitigation And The Crime
Several times during closing argument, the State argued that Petitioner's mitigation
evidence was not mitigating evidence because it did not excuse his conduct or reduce his
accountability. This argument impeded the jury's consideration of valid mitigating evidence by
mischaracterizing the law. Specifically, the State argued that relevant mitigation is limited either
to circumstances that remove the defendant's ability to choose not to engage in criminal conduct
or to circumstances that are causally connected to the defendant's criminal conduct and thus
excuse his accountability. These arguments impede a jury from giving meaningful consideration
to mitigation by equating mitigation with first-phase defenses that would justify the crime (i.e.,
self-defense and defense of others), lower the degree of the crime (i.e., heat of passion), or
completely negate the defendant's mens rea or another element of the crime. In addition, they
improperly stated the law insofar as they argued a nexus requirement between the mitigation and
the crime.
However, by definition, mitigation is not so narrowly confined; indeed, mitigation cannot
constitute an excuse or justification for criminal conduct, if so, then the defendant would not be
guilty of the crime. As such, the prosecution's argument precluded the jury from considering
mitigation presented at odds with the definition of mitigation. The Idaho Supreme Court has
stated,
We generally note that the concept of mitigation is broad. Mitigating
circumstances have been defined as: "Such as do not constitute a justification or
excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be
considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability." Black's
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 903.
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State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415, 631 P.2d 187, 197 (1981). Indeed, mitigation is anything
that could justify a sentence less than death, State v. Creech, 105 Idaho at 369, 670 P.2d at 470
(1983) or any circumstances that "may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 415,631 P.2d at 197. Thus, mitigation not only refers
to circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime but also circumstances of the
defendant himself including "his background, his age, upbringing and environment or any other
matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of culpability." Id.
An individual juror must be free to consider a mitigating factor, regardless of
whether other members of the jury agree as to its existence. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) ("each juror [must] be permitted to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence"). It is not enough "simply to allow the
defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer," rather there must not be any
impediment, through evidentiary rules, jury instructions, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987), or prosecutorial argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326 (1989). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected any sort of "nexus" requirement for evidence to be
relevant mitigation. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (rejecting the nexus
requirement and discussing the "low threshold for relevance" for mitigating evidence);
Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004) (holding that a "nexus" requirement for purposes of
establishing relevant mitigation is "a test we never countenanced and now have unequivocally
rejected").
In this case, the prosecutor's closing argument created an impediment to the jury's
consideration of mitigating circumstances by limiting the jury's consideration of mitigation to
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evidence that would excuse criminal conduct by reducing his accountability and thus impeding
consideration of evidence that would have called for a lesser sentence. 10
2. The Prosecution Improperly Inflamed The Passions And Prejudices
Of The Jury With Photographs Of The Victims
The repeated and inflammatory nature of the post-mortem photographs of both homicide
victims impermissibly inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury. In addition, some of the
photographs involved the so-called "reenactment" constructed at the coroner's office of the
Henneman homicide, and do not accurately depict anything more than speculation as to the
manner of Ms. Henneman's death. The prosecution exacerbated stating Ms. Henneman was
strangled with her own clothing when, in fact, that was only one theory unsupported by fact - but
presented as fact through the reenactment photographs. Also, the pictures were especially
prejudicial because they showed the victim after her body was submerged for approximately two
weeks in the Boise River, and did not reflect the condition of the body prior to submersion.
The prosecutor also repeatedly showed post-mortem pictures of the victim in this case to
the jury during closing arguments, which were unduly prejudicial and calculated to inflame the
passions of the jury.
3. Overwhelming Quantity Of Argument Regarding The Henneman
Murder And Presentation Of "Facts" Not Established At Trial
Regarding Her Murder
The State spent an extraordinary amount of time during the sentencing trial presenting
evidence of the alleged circumstances surrounding the Henneman homicide. This was despite
the fact that the aggravating circumstance regarding the Henneman homicide merely required, on
its face, that the State prove Mr. Hall had previously been convicted of another murder. The
10 Mr. Hall asserts that these improper arguments not only affected the jury and its verdict, but they affected the
Court as well. Specifically, in its post-verdict findings, the Court noted that Petitioner's mitigation evidence did not
excuse his crimes and that the Petitioner was prone to use the "abuse excuse" and that he used the "abuse excuse" to
try and justify rape and murder.
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I '
aggravating circumstance, did not, on its face, require presentation of evidence regarding the
circumstances of the homicide. The State's closing arguments reflected the disproportionate
amount of time devoted to the Henneman homicide, and was calculated to improperly pressure
the jury into finding the statutory aggravating circumstance based upon inflammatory evidence,
not the previous conviction. In fact, because Mr. Hall stipulated to the previous conviction, no
evidence surrounding that homicide was necessary.
In addition, the State's closing argument contained factually incorrect or factually
unsupported statements regarding the circumstances of the Henneman murder, as discussed in
Claim J, above. Again, the argument was designed to and did improperly inflame the jury and
pressure them into finding a statutory aggravating circumstance.
P. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Not only must trial counsel investigate and present mitigation, see e.g., Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), but counsel must also
explain the meaning and purpose of mitigating evidence. Pizzuto v. Arave, 385 P.3d 1247, 1252
(2004) (citing Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To perform effectively
in the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel must conduct sufficient investigation and engage
in sufficient preparation to be able to present and explain the significance of all the available
[mitigating] evidence."); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 399.
During the penalty phase, defense counsel offered the testimony of several mitigation
witnesses including family members who testified as to the childhood and character of Petitioner.
Dr. Craig Beaver and Dr. Pablo Stewart I I testified regarding mitigation, including facts of
II Dr. Stewart's testimony was presented by way of a video deposition.
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Petitioner's upbringing such as incest, drug abuse, physical and verbal abuse, and neglect. Trial
counsel however failed to explain the purpose of mitigation and their testimony to the jury, and
instead allowed the prosecution to mislead the jury regarding the definition and purpose of
mitigation by failing to object to the prosecution's closing argument mischaracterizing the
definition of mitigation. See supra, Claim IV. A.
In contrast to the State's closing arguments, trial counsel presented no exhibits and did
not use visual aids or presentations of any sort. Trial counsel, at a minimum, could have shown
pictures of Erick Hall as a child, institutional records, and demonstrative aids explaining
mitigation and weighing to the jury. Overall, trial counsel failed to paint a picture of Mr. Hall as
an abused, abandoned, neglected, and impaired individual whose "choices" were severely limited
by the circumstances ofhis life.
Trial counsel instead minimized the jury's responsibilities by emphasizing that Mr. Hall
had already been sentenced to death for the murder of Lynn Henneman, stating that a second
death sentence would be of no import because the State could only execute him once. Trial
counsel's closing argument also increased the likelihood, not only that Mr. Hall would be
sentenced to death again, but also that he would be sentenced to death on the basis of the
Henneman murder conviction when trial counsel argued that Ms. Hanlon's death provided
"justice" vis a vis evidence linking Mr. Hall to the Henneman homicide.
Petitioner asserts that but for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have considered the mitigation, appropriately weighed it against
the aggravating circumstances, and imposed a life sentence. Petitioner is awaiting the trial
transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim. Upon receipt of the transcripts and after
full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
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Q. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO PRESENT LIVE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND/OR
DENIAL OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO ALLOW A CONTINUANCE
TO PRESENT LIVE EXPERT TESTIMONY
Trial counsel failed to adequately argue the Petitioner had a right to present live
testimony from his experts, thus impacting Mr. Hall's ability to present a meaningful defense.
Due to their failure, the testimony of a very important mitigation witness, Dr. Pablo Stewart, was
presented to the jury in the form of a video deposition. Trial counsel conducted the video
deposition by telephone, without exhibits, and without Mr. Hall's presence. Additionally,
portions of the video failed to work due to technical difficulties. As a result, portions of the
testimony were then read into the record. 12 Moreover, the audio quality of the tape was
extremely poor.
It is well established that the live presentation of witnesses is far more compelling than
videotaped testimony. See United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 951 (3 rd Cir. 2007) (explaining
the preference for live testimony underlying both constitutional principles and rules of evidence).
The presentation of the videotaped deposition constituted deficient performance, especially in
conjunction with the problems playing the videotape to the jury. Mr. Hall asserts that, had
Dr. Stewart presented live in-court testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the sentencing trial would have been different. In particular, Mr. Hall asserts that several
jurors were sleeping and/or inattentive during critical portions of Dr. Stewart's testimony. The
difficulties with the recording also afforded the State three (3) opportunities to play their cross-
examination to the jurors, thus reinforcing the State's recurring theme that Mr. Hall knew right
from wrong and was able to choose not to kill.
12 Trial counsel knew in advance that Dr. Stewart would be unavailable to testify for one week toward the end of
October, but believed, based on the State's witness list, he would be able to attend to testify in court at sentencing.
From a review of the record and brief conversations with the trial counsel team, it appears that the State rested its
sentencing case far earlier than trial counsel expected.
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In addition, and in the alternative, the Court had an independent duty to ensure Mr. Hall's
trial counsel were not prevented from performing duties essential to subjecting the State's case to
meaningful adversarial testing. In certain circumstances, it is "so unlikely that any lawyer could
provide effective assistance" there is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 660,661 (1984). Mr. Hall asserts that the Court's failure to ensure trial counsel
was able to present the live testimony of experts was tantamount to the complete denial of
counsel, and no showing of prejudice is necessary.
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated.
R. MR. HALL WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT ALL
CRITICAL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Hall had the right to be present at all critical proceedings. See State v. Carver, 94
Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676 (1972) ("The right to be personally present at one's trial. .. is embodied
in Amendments Six and Fourteen of the Unites States Constitution, Idaho Const., art. 1, §§ 7 and
13, and I.e. § 19-1903 ... ") citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Mr. Hall asserts that he was not
present during numerous in-chambers conferences, and other critical proceedings. Also,
Mr. Hall was not present for the videotaped deposition of Dr. Pablo Stewart, even though trial
counsel, the Court, and the State contemplated the deposition would be used in lieu of live
testimony - clearly a critical stage of the proceedings. 13
13 Petitioner purportedly waived his right to be present for the video deposition. (R., pp.l1l8-1119.) Counsel
nonetheless must investigate to determine whether the waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
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S. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
HAVING PETITIONER WEAR PRISON CLOTHING AND SHACKLES
DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE TRAIL
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to the
jury absent a trial court determination that restraints are justified by a state interest specific to the
particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, _, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 2009 (2005)
(citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)). This basic rule embodies notions of
fundamental fairness. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2011; see also, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503,
505 (1976) (making a defendant appear in prison garb poses such a threat to the "fairness of the
factfinding process" that it must be justified by an "essential state policy"). Visible shackling
undermines the presumption of innocence, the fairness of the factfinding process, the right to
counsel and right to secure a meaningful defense, and the maintenance of a dignified juridical
process that includes respectful treatment of the defendant. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2013 (citing
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)) (presumption of innocence "lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law"); Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (restraint
suggests that the justice system itself sees "a need to separate a defendant from the community at
large"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-341 (1963) (holding the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to counsel in order to secure a meaningful defense); Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (shackling affronts the "dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings").
The prohibition against shackling applies with equal force during the penalty phase of a capital
trial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010-2014. Given the severity and finality of a death sentence, jury
accuracy in making the decision between life and death is no less critical than the decision
between guilt and innocence. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014.
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Absent adequate justification and findings regarding the specific circumstances of the
case, visible shackling is inherently prejudicial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014-2016 (citing Holbrook,
475 U.S. at 568.) The effects cannot be shown from a trial transcript. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2015.
Thus, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation.
Id. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id., (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24
(1967)).
Mr. Hall was shackled and clothed in bright orange prison garb during the sentencing
phase of his trial. In this case, there are indications that trial counsel made a conscious choice to
present Mr. Hall to the jury in prison garb and shackles. However, their decision was objectively
unreasonable. Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 479,481 (2000) ("[t]he relevant question is not whether
counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable") (internal citations omitted);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2000) ("[w]e focus on whether the investigation supporting
counsel's decision...was itself reasonable") (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Allowing Mr. Hall to be presented to the jury wearing shackles and prison clothing was a signal
to the jurors that he was dangerous, even in the courtroom. It also dehumanized him to the jury,
and made it easier to impose the death penalty, i.e., it lessened the jury's burden in determining
sentence.
T. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
INADEQUATELY ARGUING TO LITIGATE FACTUAL AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR
BAD ACTS
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
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that trial counsel inadequately argued that evidence of prior bad acts should have been excluded,
including, but not limited to: (1) an incident in the holding area involving a broken handcuff;
(2) testimony from prior girlfriends regarding threats and/or acts of violence; (3) and Mr. Hall's
criminal history. The introduction of such acts violated Mr. Hall's right to a fair trial, the right to
present a defense, the right to have all elements of a crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the presumption of innocence and violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, corresponding provisions of the Idaho Constitution, and the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, specifically, IRE 401,402,403 and 404.
U. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO FULLY INSULATE SENTENCING MOTIONS FROM
"MOTION TO DECLARE IDAHO'S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME
UNCONSTITUTIONAL" FROM FUTURE ATTACKS BY THE
GOVERNMENT THAT THE CLAIM WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
PRESERVED
Trial counsel must be diligent in protecting a defendant's constitutional claims from
future attacks by the government that the claims were not properly preserved appellate and
federal habeas corpus proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 1O.8.A.3.c. As stated in
part in the Commentary,
One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case at trial
is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage of appellate
and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may result in the client
being executed even though reversible error occurred at trial. For this reason, trial
counsel in a death penalty case must be especially aware not only of strategies for
winning at trial, but also of the heightened need to fully preserve all potential
issues for later review.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted).
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to fully protect their
challenges to the constitutionality of the new death penalty statute claims from procedural
default attacks from the government. While trial counsel did cite numerous United States
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Supreme cases, because of the near certainty that the government will assert some sort of
procedural bar on nearly every claim in state appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings,
trial counsel should have cited specific constitutional provisions violated if for no other reason
than to preserve the claim against future legal challenges.
For instance, trial counsel complained that there are no definitions or explanations of
weighing, sufficiently compelling, unjust, mitigating circumstances, and that the statute fails to
explain the weighing process or define aggravating circumstances. (R., pp. 204-205.) It is a fair
reading of the motion that trial counsel challenged these statutory provisions based on the case
law set forth elsewhere in the motion. To absolutely ensure subsequent consideration of the
claims on their merits, trial counsel should have rested their motion on the following
constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.14
14 Mr. Hall does not concede that the claims in this particular motion are not properly preserved for future review,
but makes this claim on the basis that counsel had a duty to fully insulate their claims against future procedural
attack. In light of the wealth of case law in which condemned inmates have lost valid claims under severe default
rules, trial counsel took a short-sighted and even flippant approach trial counsel took to their motion practice, at
times captioning motions, "Yet Another Motion To..." and often not citing to a single constitutional provision in
support. (R., pp. 142-44.)
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V. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY
NONSTATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Evidence of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances was introduced against Mr. Hall
including his prior convictions, as well as evidence of other alleged bad conduct with former
girlfriends and acquaintances. With the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel should have
challenged the admissibility of non-statutory aggravating circumstances on the following
grounds:
• That such evidence was not pled by way of Indictment or Information in violation of
Mr. Hall's state statutory and constitutional rights;
• That Mr. Hall was not given adequate notice as entitled by the state and federal due
process clauses;
• That I.C. 19-2515, in its latest post-Ring incarnation, does not provide for
consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; and
• That due to the lack of guidance available by Idaho law in the context of jury
sentencing, jury consideration of non-statutory aggravators violates the Eighth
Amendment.
If deemed admissible, then trial counsel should have litigated the following:
• That state and federal due process requires that the jury should be instructed that the
prosecution bore the burden of proving the existence of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and
• That the jury should be instructed that they cannot consider nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances when making their determination of whether a statutory aggravating
circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt or when weighing the statutory
aggravators against the mitigation.
In conclusion, trial counsel should have objected to nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances based on Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland.
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w. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AT GUILT AND SENTENCING PHASES
Petitioner is not in possession of the jury instructions or the transcripts, but reserves the
right to raise any and all issues related to defective jury instructions, including violations of
federal and state constitutional provisions and related ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
x. THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL
GUIDANCE TO THE JURY REGARDING JURORS' QUESTION
ABOUT AN ELEMENT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER VIOLATED MR.
HALL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PREVENTED THE JURY
FROM FINDING A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OR A NOT GUILTY
VERDICT
During guilt-phase deliberations, the jury sent at least one note to the Court seeking
definitions and/or clarifications of the relationship between the predicate felony of rape and the
killing. Based on the court minutes, it seems that the jury sought definition of the terms "stream
of events" and "perpetration," clearly in regard to the first degree felony murder charge. It
appears the Court provided a limited response; however, it is unclear as to exactly what the
response stated. Petitioner requires the transcripts, further investigation and the note(s) sent to
the Court and the response(s) to the jury, but preliminary asserts that the response to the jury was
inadequate and likely caused them to return a first degree murder conviction rather than a
conviction for a lesser included offense or a not guilty verdict. Mr. Hall specifically reserves the
right to raise any and all issues related to the questions posed by the jury and the responses or
lack thereof from the Court, including violations of federal and state constitutional provisions
and related ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Y. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO HAVE ACCESS TO ADEQUATE RESEARCH
RESOURCES
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
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claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that conflict counsel had limited access to research providers, specifically that trial counsel only
had access to "Case Maker" as opposed to more comprehensive legal research services.
Z. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY CHALLENGE THE INTRODUCTION OF
INFLAMMATORY CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that post-mortem photographs of the victim should not have been introduced at trial or
sentencing and were highly prejudicial.
AA. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that victim impact testimony was improperly admitted - including testimony from the family
members of Lynn Henneman. The improper admission of victim impact testimony violates the
Eighth Amendment and may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when
evidence portrays more than a brief glimpse of the victim. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987) (holding Eighth Amended prohibits introduction of victim impact evidence); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (modifying Booth in holding that Eighth Amendment does not
erect a per se bar against victim impact evidence, but leaving prohibition of characterizations and
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence intact, and noting that
introduction ofvictim impact evidence could violate due process under some circumstances).
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Moreover, it is reasonably likely that the jury, considered victim impact as non-statutory
aggravating circumstances. As such, without a proper limiting construction, the victim impact is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated Mr. Hall's rights to
due process and notice as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) ("a capital sentencing scheme must'genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder. "')
BB. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE SCOPE OF EVIDENCE THE STATE
WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT REGARDING THE
HENNEMAN HOMICIDE
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that his attorneys inadequately moved to limit the scope of the evidence presented during the
sentencing phase of his trial. Specifically, trial counsel should have motioned to limit the
amount of evidence presented regarding Lynn Henneman's murder and photographs related to
both murders. The evidence presented related to these matters was highly prejudicial.
Among other statutory aggravating circumstances, the State sought to obtain a death
sentence based on the fact that Mr. Hall had previously been convicted of murder. is Trial
counsel stipulated to the prior conviction. However, rather than just introduce the fact of that
conviction, the State presented an overwhelming amount of evidence related to the previous
homicide itself. The State presented numerous fact witnesses involved in the investigation of the
15 The aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally sought, however. The aggravator was charged by
Indictment, but prior to Mr. Hall's conviction for the Henneman murder.
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Henneman homicide, the interrogations of Mr. Hall, family members of the victim, information
about the discovery of the body, the autopsy, and numerous facts alleged but not proven about
the circumstances of Ms. Henneman's death. Furthermore, as discussed in Claim 0(3), above,
during sentencing phase closing statements the State, without objection from trial counsel,
repeatedly argued untried facts regarding Ms. Henneman's murder. Specifically, the State
argued Ms. Henneman ran up and down the Greenbelt while Mr. Hall chased her. However, this
fact was never proven during the trial relating to her murder or during the guilt-phase of the
criminal proceedings underlying this case.
CC. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S USE OF POST-MORTEM
PHOTOGRAPHS OF BOTH MS. HANLON AND MS. HENNEMAN
WHICH WERE HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY AND PREJUDICIAL
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that trial counsel failed to adequately object to the State repeatedly showing the jury photographs
of the decomposing bodies ofLynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon. See Claim 0(2), above.
DD. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
CONVICTED OF ANOTHER MURDER
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim. Upon
receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or
withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts that I.C. §
19-2515(9)(a), on its face, and as applied, is unconstitutional. Moreover, Mr. Hall asserts that
the indictment charging him with that statutory aggravating circumstance was constitutionally
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defective insofar as he had not been convicted with that murder at the time the Indictment was
issued.
EE. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY STATUTE FOR ITS FAILURE TO ASSIGN A
BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE JURY'S WEIGHING FINDINGS
A defendant cannot be sentenced to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it is also
found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State v.
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial court may
sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court finds that all the mitigating circumstances
do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found and make imposition
of death unjust.") Unless this additional finding is made, the maximum punishment is life
without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, based on the rule of law set forth in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), this finding represents a finding that must be presented to a jury
and found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court enunciated the rule of law:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees
of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id at 600 (citations omitted). Accordingly, trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the Idaho death penalty scheme for removing from
the State the burden of proving this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, by failing to assign the burden upon the State, the new death penalty statute
impermissibly shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant to disprove an element, or
functional equivalent of an element, or even just an essential fact. This violates the defendant's
rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under the
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Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (addressing due process); but see State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,
417, 631 P.2d 187, 199 (1981) (holding pre-Ring, that the scheme does not violate due process
because the weighing process is not part of an element of the offense).
FF. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY STATUTE FOR ITS FAILURE TO DEFINE
"SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING" IN A MANNER REQUIRING THAT
THE INDIVIDUAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH
THE MITIGATION
Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced to
death unless it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g.,
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) (holding that a defendant
can be sentenced to death, only if it is found "that all the mitigating circumstances do not
outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found and make imposition of
death unjust.") Accordingly, if the mitigation outweighs the gravity of each of the aggravators,
by any degree, then the defendant cannot be sentenced to death. Under Idaho law, even where
the mitigation is only of equal weight to the gravity of the aggravation, the maximum
punishment is fixed life.
Trial counsel should have challenged the new Idaho death penalty statute because it does
not provide that the individual aggravators must outweigh the mitigation. The death penalty
statute provides in relevant part that the jury shall return a special verdict stating:
If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the
aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty
would be unjust.
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I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a)(ii). The statute does not define "sufficiently compelling" as requiring the
aggravation to "outweigh" the mitigation. The instructions likewise provide no definition for
"sufficiently compelling" and do not require that the jury find that individual aggravators each
"outweigh" the mitigation.
There is simply no way of knowing whether the jury imposed a death sentence even if
they believed the mitigation was of equal weight to the aggravation. Indeed, there is a
reasonable probability that the jury believed that the mitigation outweighed the aggravation, but
not in such a manner or degree as to make imposition of the death penalty unjust. It may very
well be that the jury believed that the mitigation must substantially outweigh the aggravation for
the imposition of the death penalty to be unjust under the facts of this case. This violated
Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
GG. THE FACT THAT MR. HALL'S DEATH SENTENCE IS PREDICATED
ON THE SOLE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTOR THAT HE
WAS PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF MURDER VIOLATES THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE, DUE PROCESS, AND THE FIFTH,
SIXTH, AND EIGHTH AMENDMENTS, AND COROLLARY
PROVISIONS OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy has been held to consist of three separate guarantees: (1) it
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple
punishment for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
The death sentence in this case was predicated on the sole statutory aggravating factor
that Mr. Hall had previously been convicted of murder. At a minimum, this violates double
jeopardy principles insofar as it allows the State to punish Mr. Hall twice for the death of Lynn
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Henneman. This is constitutionally unacceptable, and is the direct result of the State essentially
retrying the Hall I case before the Hall II jury. This is supported by the fact that the State spent
an inordinate amount of time and presented an inordinate amount of testimony involving the
homicide ofLynn Henneman, the convictionfor which trial counsel had already stipulated.
That Mr. Hall was being twice punished for the death ofLynn Henneman is also strongly
supported by the jury's failure to sentence him to death based on any other statutory aggravating
factors argued by the State, including those factors specifically related to the death of Cheryl
Hanlon.
In addition, the I.e. § 19-2515 (9)(a) aggravator is subsumed by the I.C. § 19-2515 (9)(i)
aggravator. Thus, Mr. Hall should have been charged only with one of those aggravating
circumstances, not both.
HH. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO MOVE TO SET ASIDE MR. HALL'S DEATH SENTENCE
BASED ON THE FACT THAT IT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Petitioner is awaiting the trial transcripts to fully investigate and develop this claim.
Upon receipt of the transcripts and after full investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this
claim, or withdraw the claim as indicated. As a preliminary claim, however, Mr. Hall asserts
that trial counsel's failure to move to set aside his sentence, under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and
on federal constitutional grounds, constituted deficient performance, but for which there is a
reasonable probability that his sentence would have been vacated or reduced. See Claim GG,
above.
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II. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
STIPULATING THE HALL I CASE BE TRIED PRIOR TO THE HALL
II CASE
Trial counsel agreed with the State that the Hall I case should proceed to trial prior to the
Hall II case, (R., pp.77-79), despite the fact that the Hall II case was far less compelling with
respect to both the guilt and sentencing phases. In many ways, the facts presented in Hall II were
far less emotionally provocative. The facts of Hall II, unlike Hall I, did not involve an
abduction, did not involve a stranger, and did not necessarily involve an initially nonconsensual
encounter.
Had Hall II gone to trial first, there is a reasonable probability that the conviction alone
would not have been a significant factor in sentencing Mr. Hall in Hall 1. On the other hand, as
played out in this case, the conviction in Hall I in fact played a vital role in the Hall II
sentencing, as it was the only statutory aggravating factor for which the jury imposed the death
sentence.
JJ. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO RAISE INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise international law violations on behalf of
Mr. Hall, which prejudiced Mr. Hall under Strickland. The convictions and sentences entered
against Mr. Hall were obtained in violation of international law. Mr. Hall's death sentence was
obtained in violation of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
prohibits death sentences where: (a) the accused will endure a prolonged incarceration on death
row which violates Article 7, (b) the accused does not have access to a meaningful clemency
process, which violates Article 6, (c) the accused is arbitrarily deprived of his life, which violates
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Article 6, and (d) the accused is denied his rights to due process, which violates Article 14.
Mr. Hall's death sentence was also obtained in violation of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, Article XXVI (guaranteeing an "impartial" hearing to the accused),
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (providing protection for the less culpable co-defendant who refuses to cooperate as
Damocles' Sword of the death penalty is held over his head).
The ICCPR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment were signed
and ratified by the United States. Idaho may not impose or execute Mr. Hall's death sentence
without violating the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which states:
All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const., Article VI, § 2.
Moreover, Mr. Hall's death sentence does and will violate: (a) the American Convention
of Human Rights; (b) the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; (c) and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relation, which have not yet been signed by the United States, but
which inform Customary International Law. The United States is obligated to pay heed to
Customary International Law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 670 (1900) ("[I]nternational
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determinations.") Mr. Hall's death sentence further violates the principle ofjus cogens. A
jus cogens norm is an elementary right of humanity, so basic as to be recognized by the
international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention
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on the Law of Treaties, Article 53; Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law, § 102. The
execution of the neurologically damaged, mentally ill and/or mentally retarded violates this
principle.
KK. LETHAL INJECTION
Idaho prescribes execution by lethal injection. 16 I.C. § 19-2716 (" ...punishment of death
shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultra-short-
acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent ....") Executing Mr. Hall by
lethal injection is unconstitutional, however. See, e.g., Harbison v. Little, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2007
WL 2821230 (M.D.Tenn. 2007) (holding Tennessee's new lethal injection procedures are cruel
and unusual, because they present "a substantial risk of unnecessary pain" violate death row
inmate Edward Jerome Harbison's constitutional protections under the Eighth Amendment, and
noting that the protocols do not adequately ensure that inmates are properly anesthetized during
lethal injections, a problem that could "result in a terrifying, excruciating death"); Baze v. Rees,
_ S.Ct. _, 2007 WL 2075334 (mem.) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to review question
of whether Kentucky's lethal injection execution method violates the Eighth Amendment).
LL. DEPRIVATION OF COUNSEL DUE TO CONFLICT OF INTEREST
On February 27, 2007, trial counsel filed a "Motion for Leave to Withdraw and for Ex-
Parte Hearing on the Motion." (R., pp.554-560). The motion for leave was based upon "a
complete breakdown in communication between Mr. Hall and [both trial counsel]." Trial
counsel asserted that it would be fundamentally unfair under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and also under the Idaho Constitution, art. 1, sections 6 and 13 to
proceed. Trial counsel also relied upon I.R.P.R. 1.16.
16 Post-conviction counsel is unaware of any IDOC policy regarding the exact protocol for execution by lethal
injection. However, it is becoming readily apparent that lethal injection is not the painless, "humane" manner of
execution it was once portrayed, and can cause excruciating pain, albeit sometimes masked by a paralytic agent.
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Articles I, Section 13 ofthe
Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. For "good cause" a trial court may, in its
discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant. I.C. § 19-856; State v.
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d. 1000, 10001 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713,
946 P. 1351, 1353 (Ct.App. 1997). The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel
after having been made aware of the problems involved. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d at
1002. Where the breakdown is complete, a defendant is essentially denied counsel altogether,
and prejudice should be presumed.
Mr. Hall asserts that under these circumstances, prejudice should be presumed. See
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662, n.31 (1984). In the alternative, Mr. Hall asserts that
the conflict of interest adversely affected trial counsels' representation. See e.g., Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002). The complete breakdown in communications and the Court's
failure to allow counsel to withdraw from the case resulted violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Articles I, §§ 5, 6, and 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.
v. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this Honorable
Court:
1. To order the State to preserve any and all evidence in its possession or in the
possession of its agents, including, but not limited to the Power Point exhibit used
during closing argument at the guilt and sentencing phases;
2. To allow civil discovery pursuant to the I.R.C.P. and LC.R. 57(b);
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3. For leave to amend the Petition as more information becomes available during the
course of these proceedings;
4. For an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition;
5. For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against Petitioner;
6. For such other, further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable.
DATED this li.-~ay of February, 2008.
~~.j~
PAULA M. SWE SEN
Lead counsel for Mr. Hall
UL}d.~ t 'iklhf)~
NICOLE OWENS
Co-counsel for Mr. Hall
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County ofAda )
Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the contents thereof, and that the
facts contained therein are true and correct as I verily believe based upon his review of the
record, conversations with Petitioner.




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \~ day ofFebruary, 2008.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this ~day of February, 2008 served a true and
correct copy of the forgoing PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF as indicated
below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
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FILED
Tuesday. February 19. 2008 at 07:47 AM
J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff(s)
VS
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT
Defendant(5)
)
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2008-03085
)





I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in
this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
Paula M. Swenson
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Civil Division
Interdepartmental Mail
Dated:Tuesday, February 19, 2008
J. DAVID NAVARRO
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF





















COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County
of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's Answer and Response to the Petitioner, Erick
Virgil Hall's Petition for Post Conviction Relief, as follows. For ease of the Court, the
Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "State") will track its responses to the allegations as
labeled and numbered by Erick Virgil Hall (hereinafter "Petitioner"). The State will also refer to
the Hall/Henneman case (H0300518/SPOT0500155) as Hall I and to this case, Hall/Hanlon, as
Hall II.
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The State DENIES all allegations made by the Petitioner in his Petitioner unless
specifically admitted to herein. The State denies that the Petitioner is illegally restrained of his
liberty and denies that the Petitioner's convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of
the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Idaho, or in violation of any statute, rule or
international treaty. The State denies that the Petitioner is entitled to any relief.
I.
RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN SECTION I.,
PARAGRAPHS #1. THROUGH #10., BACKGROUND
1. Answering paragraph #1, the State admits that the Petitioner was charged with First
Degree Murder and Rape of Cheryl Ann Hanlon.
2. Answering paragraph #2, the State admits that the Petitioner was first represented by
the Ada County Public Defender's Office, Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr.
3. Answering paragraph #3, the State admits that the Petitioner was thereafter
represented by conflict counsel, Robert Chastain and Deborah Krista!. Answering
paragraph #3 footnote #1, the State admits Petitioner was convicted of the murder of
Lynn Henneman in Ada County Case #H0300518 and that there was a post-
conviction case filed in the Henneman matter, which contained allegations of
ineffective assistance of the same counsel assigned to represent the Petitioner in Hall
II.
4. Answering paragraph #4, the State admits that a not guilty plea was entered and that
thereafter a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the crimes of First Degree Murder and
Rape.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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5. Answering paragraph #5, the State admits that following the jury's guilty verdicts,
this Court entered a Judgment and sentence in this matter in the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, County of Ada, Boise, Idaho.
6. Answering paragraph #6, the State admits that the Petitioner stands convicted of the
crimes of Count I, First Degree Murder and Count II, Rape in Ada County Case #
H0300624.
7. Answering paragraph #7, the State admits that on January 3, 2008, the Honorable
Thomas F. Neville pronounced sentence on the Petitioner and that this Court imposed
a Death Sentence for Count I, First Degree Murder following the jury's imposition of
the death penalty on Count I on or about October 25, 2007. The State further admits
that the Court imposed a fixed life sentence on Count II that is consecutive to his
other sentences.
8. Answering paragraph #8, asserting that this is Petitioner's first attempt in any court to
obtain relief from the convictions and sentences challenged, the State believes this
allegation to be true, but specifically reserves the right to raise a successive petition,
res judicata, or procedural default bar or defense should facts come to light indicating
that the allegation is in any part false.
9. Answering paragraph #9, the State admits that the Petitioner was previously convicted
of First Degree Murder, Kidnapping and Rape of Lynn Henneman, Ada County Case
# H0300518; that the Petitioner was sentenced to death for the First Degree Murder
and that he is currently involved in post-conviction proceedings in that case, Case #
SPOT0500155. The State further admits that the Petitioner is represented by the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office (hereinafter, "SAPD") in those post-conviction
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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proceedings, Case # SPOT0500155, and in the appeal in that case. Answering
paragraph #9 footnote #2, the State asserts that footnote #2 is not a fact capable of
admitting or denying.
10. Answering paragraph #10, the State admits that the Petitioner is in the custody of the
Idaho State Department of Corrections, detained at the Idaho Maximum Security
Institution near Boise, Idaho.
II.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY
ALLEGATION CONTAINED IN SECTION II.
Answering Section IT, the State denies that the Petitioner is illegally restrained of his
liberty and denies that the Petitioner's convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of
the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Idaho. The State further denies that the
Petitioner's convictions or sentences were obtained in violation of any statute, court rule,
international treaty or any other law. The State denies each and every allegation contained in
Section IT.
III.
RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND
STATEMENT CONTAINED IN SECTION III.
Answering Section III. in its entirety, including footnotes #3 & #4, to the extent that there
are factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied contained within Petitioner's Section
III, the State denies those factual allegations because the State has insufficient knowledge to
admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained in
Section ITI. Answering the remainder of Section ITI. in its entirety, including footnotes #3 and #4,
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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to the extent this Section contains conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State
denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
IV.
RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S GROUNDS FOR RELIEF ALLEGATIONS
CONTAINED IN SECTION IV.
1. Answering the first two unnumbered, introductory paragraphs in Section IV, the State
denies each and every claim contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV. A. #1. through #3. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND/OR FAILURE OF COURT TO ENSURE
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE JURY SELECTION AND UNBIASED JURY
1. - 2. Answering the introductory unnumbered paragraph and the subsequent paragraphs
contained in Section IV.A.#1. and IV.A.#2, there are no factual allegations contained therein, but
merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing and, therefore, the State denies each and
every allegation contained therein.
3. Answering Section IV.A.#3, the State denies that the district court erred in denying
defense trial counsel's renewed motion for change of venue and further denies that defense trial
counsel was ineffective in arguing for change of venue. Answering the first unnumbered
paragraph contained in Section IV.A.#3, the State admits that defense trial counsel moved for a
change of venue and that the trial court initially denied the motion. Answering the remainder of
the first unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.A.#3, the State admits that the trial court
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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thereafter granted a change of venue, but without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny the remainder of the first unnumbered paragraph contained in
Section IV.A.#3., and therefore denies the remainder of the factual allegations contained therein.
Answering the second unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.A.#3, the State
admits defense trial counsel filed a renewed motion for change of venue. Answering the
remainder of the second unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.A.#3, without a
transcript to review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the
second paragraph, and therefore the State denies each and every allegation in the remainder of the
second unnumbered paragraph. Answering footnote #5 contained in the second unnumbered
paragraph of Section IV.A.#3, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny footnote #5
and therefore denies the same.
Answering the third unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.A.#3, including
footnote #6, the State admits that defense trial counsel filed a motion to reconsider selecting a
jury from Gooding, County, but without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny the remainder of the third unnumbered paragraph, and therefore the
State denies each and every allegation in the remainder of the third unnumbered paragraph.
Answering the fourth and fifth unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.A.#3,
there are no factual allegations contained therein, but merely conclusory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing and, therefore, the State denies each and every allegation contained therein.
Answering footnote #7 contained in Section IV.A.#3 in the fourth unnumbered paragraph, the
State believes that it is true, but will need a transcript to review in order to accurately respond.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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RESPONSES TO SECTION IV. B. ASSERTING ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON JURY FOREMAN'S KNOWLEDGE THAT PETITIONER
HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH
1. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in Section N.B., the State denies that the trial
court erroneously denied a motion for mistrial and/or new trial related to the jury foreman.
Answering the first unnumbered paragraph in Section N.B., to the extent it contains factual
allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny,
and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained therein. To the extent
the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph in Section N.B. contains conclusory legal
statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be
raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and
argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV. C. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY INFORMING THE JURY AT SENTENCING THAT PETITIONER WAS
ALREADY UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH
1. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.C., the State denies that defense
trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Answering the first unnumbered paragraph contained
in Section IV.C., to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the
State has insufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every
factual allegation contained therein. Answering the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph in
Section IV.C., it contains conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for
a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State
denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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RESPONSES TO SECTION IV. D. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND/OR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN FAILING TO UNCOVER
OR DISCLOSE FACTS REGARDING THE PROSECUTOR'S CONNECTION TO THE
GOODING COUNTY AREA AND THE PROSECUTOR'S MARRIAGE TO A LEAD
INVESTIGATOR IN HALL I
Answering Section IV.D., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel and denies
prosecutorial misconduct.
1. Answering the first unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.D., there are no factual
allegations contained therein, but merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing and,
therefore, the State denies each and every allegation contained therein.
2. Answering the second, unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.D., the State denies that
the prosecutor referred to therein was raised in the Gooding County area and/or has extensive
family connections to the area. The trial court, the jurors and the parties all disclosed any
connections to each other and those issues were explored during jury selection. Answering the
remainder of the second, unnumbered paragraph in Section N.D., there are no factual allegations
contained therein, but merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate
for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing and, therefore, the State
denies each and every allegation contained therein.
3. Answering the third, unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.D., the State admits the
prosecutor referred to is married to the Garden City detective referred to therein. Answering the
remainder of the third, unnumbered paragraph in Section N.D., there are no factual allegations
contained therein, but merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing and, therefore, the State
denies each and every allegation contained therein. Answering Petitioner's footnote #8, it should
be noted that it is unclear to which paragraph, Petitioner's footnote #8 refers. It is connected to
the second, unnumbered paragraph, but seems to refer to the third, unnumbered paragraph.
Answering Petitioner's footnote #8, the State admits that this relationship was known to the trial
court and defense trial counsel and admits that neither the prosecutor referred to or the Hall II's
co-counsel examined the Garden City detective referred to therein. The State denies that it was
Improper.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV. E. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS PETITIONER'S MARCH 2003 STATEMENTS
TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Answering Section IV.E., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the
motion to suppress.
1. Answering the first unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.E., the State admits that
defense trial counsel filed a motion to suppress. Answering the remainder of the first
unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.E., it contains conclusory legal statements and arguments,
which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing,
and therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained
therein.
2. Answering the second unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.E., to the extent it
contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information
to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained
therein. To the extent the remainder of the second unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.E.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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contains conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-
conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every
conc1usory legal statement and argument contained therein.
3. Answering the third unnumbered paragraph in Section N.E. and accompanymg
footnote #9, to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State
has insufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every
factual allegation contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the third unnumbered
paragraph in Section N.E. contains conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State
denies each and every conc1usory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV. F.#l through #3 ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE
GUILT-PHASE ISSUES
Answering Section N.F., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the
investigation of guilt-phase issues.
Answering the introductory unnumbered paragraph in Section N.F., there are no factual
allegations contained therein, but merely conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing and,
therefore, the State denies each and every allegation contained therein.
1. - 3. Answering paragraphs contained in Section N.F. #1 through #3, there are no
factual allegations contained therein, but merely conc1usory legal statements and arguments,
which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing
and, therefore, the State denies each and every allegation contained therein.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.G. ASSERTING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
FAILING TO DISCLOSE GUILT-PHASE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
1. Answering Section IV.G., the State denies prosecutorial misconduct in failing to
disclose guilt-phase exculpatory evidence. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in Section
IV.G., it contains conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-
conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies
each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.H. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF CO-PERPETRATOR IN HALL I
1. Answering Section IV.H., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
investigation and presentation of co-perpetrator evidence in Hall 1. Answering the unnumbered
paragraph in Section IV.H, to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to
review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies
each and every factual allegation contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the
unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.H. contains conclusory legal statements and arguments,
which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing,
the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.I. ASSERTING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
FAILING TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE OF CO-PERPETRATOR IN HALL I
1. Answering Section IV.1., the State denies prosecutorial misconduct in failing to
disclose evidence of a co-perpetrator in Hall 1. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in Section
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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N.I, to the extent it contains factual allegations, the State denies each and every factual
allegation contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph in
Section N.!. contains conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a
post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and
every conc1usory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.J. ASSERTING PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT IN EXAMINING DEFENSE WITNESSES
1. Answering Section N.J., the State denies prosecutorial misconduct in examining defense
witnesses. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in Section N.J, to the extent it contains factual
allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny,
and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained therein. To the extent
the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph in Section N.J. contains conc1usory legal statements
and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.K.#1-#4 ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT
MITIGATION EVIDENCE
Answering Section N.K., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence. Answering the introductory unnumbered
paragraph in Section N.K, to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to
review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies
each and every factual allegation contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the
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introductory unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.K. contains conc1usory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
1.- 4. Answering paragraphs contained in Section IV.K.#l through #4, to the extent those
paragraphs contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation
contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the paragraphs in Section IV.K.#l through #4
contain conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory
legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.L. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY REBUT THE STATE'S CASE IN
AGGRAVATION
Answering Section IV.L., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
evidence in rebuttal to the State's aggravation evidence. Answering the unnumbered paragraph
in Section IV.L, there are no factual allegations contained therein but merely legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and every conc1usory legal statement
and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.M. ASSERTING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
FAILING TO DISCLOSE SENTENCING PHASE EXCULPATORY OR MITIGATING
EVIDENCE
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
(HALL II), Page 13
000065
           
             
             
  
             
             
               
               
            
               
      
        
          
 
           
            
               
             
             
    
        
        
 
          
    
Answering Section N.M., the State denies prosecutorial misconduct regarding sentencing
phase exculpatory or mitigation evidence. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in Section
N.M, there are no factual allegations contained therein but merely legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement
and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.N. ASSERTING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
REGARDING TESTIMONY OF PRIOR ACQUAINTANCES AND GIRLFRIENDS
Answering Section N.N., the State denies prosecutorial misconduct regarding the
testimony of prior acquaintances and girlfriends. Answering the unnumbered paragraph in
Section N.N, there are no factual allegations contained therein but merely legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement
and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.O #1-3. ASSERTING PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT IN SENTENCING PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENTS REGARDING
DEFINITION OF MITIGATION
Answering Section N.O., the State denies prosecutorial misconduct regarding sentencing
phase closing arguments. Answering the introductory unnumbered paragraph in Section N.D,
there are no factual allegations contained therein but merely legal statements and arguments,
which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing,
and therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained
therein.
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1. Answering the first unnumbered paragraph contained in IV.O.#I, to the extent that it
contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information
to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained
therein. To the extent the first unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.O.#1 contains
conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory
legal statement and argument contained therein. Answering the second, third and fourth
unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.O.#1 and including footnote #10, those
paragraphs and footnote #10 contain conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and
therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained
therein.
2.- 3. Answering paragraphs contained in Section IV.O.#2 through #3, to the extent those
paragraphs contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation
contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the paragraphs contained in Section IV.O.#2
through #3, contain conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a
post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and
every conc1usory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.P. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
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1. Answering Section IV.P., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
an explanation of mitigation evidence during closing arguments. Answering the first
unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.P, there are no factual allegations contained
therein but merely legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and
every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
2. Answering the second unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.P. including
footnote #11, the State admits that defense trial counsel offered testimony of several mitigation
witnesses and that Dr. Pablo Stewart's testimony was presented by way of video deposition. The
remainder of the second unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.P. contains factual allegations and
without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny the
remainder of this paragraph, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation
contained therein.
3. Answering the third, fourth and fifth unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section
IV.P., to the extent those paragraphs contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review,
the State has insufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and
every factual allegation contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the third, fourth and
fifth unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.P. contain conclusory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
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RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.Q. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO PRESENT LIVE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND/OR A
CONTINUANCE
Answering Section IV.Q., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding live
expert testimony and denies that the Court erred. Answering the first, second, third and fourth
unnumbered paragraphs, including footnote #12, contained in Section IV.Q., to the extent those
paragraphs contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation
contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the first, second, third and fourth unnumbered
paragraphs, including footnote #12, contained in Section IV.Q. contain conclusory legal
statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be
raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and
argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.R. ASSERTING PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT ALL CRITICAL STAGES
Answering footnote #13 contained in the unnumbered paragraph in Section IV.R., the
State admits that the Petitioner waived his right to be present during the video deposition of Dr.
Pablo Stewart. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.R., to the extent it
contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information
to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph, and therefore the State denies each and every
factual allegation contained therein. To the extent the unnumbered paragraph contained in
Section IV.R. contains conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a
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post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and
every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.S. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY HAVING PETITIONER WEAR PRISON CLOTHING AND SHACKLES
DURING SENTENCING
1. Answering Section IV.S., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
the Petitioner wearing prison clothing and shackles during sentencing. Answering the first and
second unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.S., there are no factual allegations
contained therein but merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate
for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State
denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
2. Answering the third unnumbered paragraph Section IV.S., the State admits the
Petitioner was wearing prison clothing and restraints during the sentencing phase of trial.
Answering the remainder of the third unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.S., to the
extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph, and therefore the State denies each
and every factual allegation contained therein. To the extent the remainder of the third
unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.S. contains conclusory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
(HALL II), Page 18
000070
              
        
        
         
  
            
             
            
            
               
           
            
             
              
              
                
              
           
             
             
  
          
    
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.T. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR INADEQUATELY ARGUING CHALLENGES TO INTRODUCTION
OF PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
1. Answering Section IV.T., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
the challenges to prior bad acts evidence. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in
Section IV.T., it is unclear whether the Petitioner alleges that the prior bad acts evidence as listed
in Section IV.T. was presented during the guilt phase or the sentencing phase of the jury trial.
The State denies that the prior bad act evidence as listed in Section IV.T. was presented during
the guilt phase of the trial. The State admits that there was propensity evidence presented during
the sentencing phase of the trial and denies any error in the admission of this evidence. To the
extent the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.T. contains merely
conc1usory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory
legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.U. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO INSULATE SENTENCING MOTIONS FROM MOTION
TO DECLARE IDAHO'S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME FROM FUTURE
ATTACKS THAT CLAIM WAS NOT PRESERVED
1. Answering Section IV.V., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
the failure to insulate sentencing motions from defense trial counsel's motion to declare Idaho's
capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional. Answering the first unnumbered paragraph
contained in Section IV.D., it contains merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which
are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and
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therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained
therein.
2. Answering the second and third unnumbered paragraphs, including footnote #14,
contained in Section IV.V., those paragraphs contain merely conclusory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement
and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.V. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE INTRODUCTION OF ANY
NONSTATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Answering Section IV.V., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
the failure to challenge the introduction of any nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.
Answering the first and second unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.V., to the extent
they contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation
contained therein. Answering the remainder of the first and second unnumbered paragraphs
contained in Section IV.V., to the extent they contain merely conc1usory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.W. ASSERTING CLAIMS REGARDING JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AT GUILT AND SENTENCING PHASES
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1. Answering Section N.W., the State denies any error regarding jury instructions at the
guilt phase or the sentencing phase of the jury trial. Answering the unnumbered paragraph
contained in Section N.W., there are no factual allegations contained therein but it contains
conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and
every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.X. ASSERTING VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY FAILURE OF THE COURT TO PROVIDE
MEANINGFUL GUIDANCE TO THE JURY REGARDING QUESTION ABOUT
ELEMENT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER
1. Answering Section N.X., the State denies any error regarding the Court's response to
questions from the jury. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section N.X., to the
extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation
contained therein. Answering the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section
N.X., to the extent it contains merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State
denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.Y. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO HAVE ACCESS TO ADEQUATE RESEARCH
RESOURCES
1. Answering Section N.Y., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
access to adequate research resources. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in
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Section IV.Y., the State is without sufficient information to admit or deny this claim and
therefore denies each and every allegation contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.Z. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY CHALLENGE INTRODUCTION OF
CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS
1. Answering Section IV.Z., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
the crime scene photographs. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.Z.,
to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has
insufficient information to admit or deny the of these paragraphs, and therefore the State denies
each and every factual allegation contained therein. Answering the remainder of the unnumbered
paragraph contained in Section IV.Z., to the extent it contains merely conclusory legal statements
and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.AA. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER VICTIM IMPACT
TESTIMONY
1. Answering Section IV.AA., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel
regarding victim impact statements. Answering the first and second unnumbered paragraphs
contained in Section IV.AA., to the extent they contain factual allegations, without a transcript to
review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny the of these paragraphs, and
therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained therein. Answering the
remainder of the first and second unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.AA., to the
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extent they contain merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate
for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each
and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.BB. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE SCOPE OF HENNEMAN EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT SENTENCING
1. Answering Section IV.BB., the State denies ineffective assistance ofcounsel regarding
the scope of the Henneman evidence. Answering the first and second unnumbered paragraphs,
including footnote #15, contained in Section IV.BB., to the extent they contain factual
allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny
the of these paragraphs, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained
therein. Answering the remainder of the first and second unnumbered paragraphs, including
footnote #15, contained in Section IV.BB., to the extent they contain merely conclusory legal
statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be
raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and
argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.CC. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO CHALLENGE USE OF HANLON AND HENNEMAN
POST-MORTEM PHOTOGRAPHS
1. Answering Section IV.CC., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
Hanlon and Henneman photographs. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section
IV.Ce., to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has
insufficient information to admit or deny the of these paragraphs, and therefore the State denies
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each and every factual allegation contained therein. Answering the remainder of the unnumbered
paragraph contained in Section IV.CC., to the extent it contains merely conc1usory legal
statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be
raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory legal statement and
argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.DD. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO CHALLENGE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT PETITIONER HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONVICTED OF
ANOTHER MURDER
1. Answering Section IV.DD., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel
regarding a challenge to the statutory aggravating circumstance that Petitioner had been
previously convicted of another murder. Answering the unnumbered paragraph contained in
Section IV.DD., to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the
State has insufficient information to admit or deny, and therefore the State denies each and every
factual allegation contained therein. Answering the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph
contained in Section IV.DD., to the extent it contains merely conclusory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conc1usory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.EE. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY STATUTE FOR ITS FAILURE TO ASSIGN BURDEN OF PROOF
TO JURY'S WEIGHING FINDINGS
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1. Answering Section IV.EE., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
a challenge to the Idaho death penalty statute for its failure to assign a burden of proof to the
jury's weighing findings. Answering the first and second unnumbered paragraphs contained in
Section IV.EE., to the extent they contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the
State has insufficient information to admit or deny the of these paragraphs, and therefore the
State denies each and every factual allegation contained therein. Answering the remainder of the
first and second unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.EE., to the extent they contain
merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory
legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.FF. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY STATUTE FOR ITS FAILURE TO DEFINE "SUFFICIENTLY
COMPELLING"
1. Answering Section IV.FF., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
a challenge to the Idaho death penalty statute for its failure to define "sufficiently compelling."
Answering the first, second and third unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.FF., to the
extent they contain factual allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny the of these paragraphs, and therefore the State denies each and
every factual allegation contained therein. Answering the remainder of the first, second and third
unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.FF., to the extent they contain merely
conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
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petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory
legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.GG. ASSERTING DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES
DOUBLE JEOPARDY, DUE PROCESS, AND THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND EIGHTH
AMENDMENTS AND COROLLARY IDAHO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1. Answering Section IV.GG., the State denies that the death sentence in this case
violates the United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause, the due process clause or the
Fifth, Sixth or Eighth Amendments and the State further denies that the death sentence violates
any corollary Idaho Constitutional provisions. Answering the first, second, third and fourth
unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.GG., to the extent they contain factual
allegations, without a transcript to review, the State has insufficient information to admit or deny
the of these paragraphs, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained
therein. Answering the remainder of the first, second, third and fourth unnumbered paragraphs
contained in Section IV.GG., to the extent they contain merely conclusory legal statements and
arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing, the State denies each and every conclusory legal statement and argument
contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.HH. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO MOVE TO SET ASIDE PETITIONER'S DEATH
SENTENCE BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
1. Answering Section IV.HH., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to move to set aside the death sentence in this case. Answering the unnumbered
paragraph contained in Section IV.HH., to the extent it contains factual allegations, without a
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transcript to reVIew, the State has insufficient infonnation to admit or deny the of these
paragraphs, and therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained therein.
Answering the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph contained in Section IV.HH., to the
extent it contains merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for
a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each and
every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.II. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR AGREEING TO TRIAL HALL I PRIOR TO HALL II
1. Answering Section IV.!I., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
Hall I being tried before Hall II. Answering the first and second unnumbered paragraphs
contained in Section IV.11., to the extent they contain factual allegations, without a transcript to
review, the State has insufficient infonnation to admit or deny the of these paragraphs, and
therefore the State denies each and every factual allegation contained therein. Answering the
remainder of the first and second unnumbered paragraphs contained in Section IV.II., to the
extent they contain merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate
for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, the State denies each
and every conclusory legal statement and argument contained therein.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.JJ. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO RAISE INTERNATIONAL LAW CLAIMS
1. Answering Section IV.n., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel regarding
failure to raise international law claims. Answering the first, second and third unnumbered
paragraphs contained in Section IV.J]" there are no factual allegations contained therein, but
merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction
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petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing, and therefore, the State denies each and
every allegation contained therein. The State does not believe or concede that this International
Law claim is a cognizable basis for relief in this action.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.KK. ASSERTING UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LETHAL INJECTION
1. Answering the unnumbered paragraph, including footnote #15, contained in Section
IV.KK., the State has insufficient information to admit or deny the factual allegations contained
therein, and therefore denies the same. Answering the remainder of the unnumbered paragraph,
including footnote #15, it contains merely conclusory legal statements and arguments, which are
inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in subsequent briefing and,
therefore, the State denies each and every allegation contained therein. Further, it does not
appear that the United States Supreme Court has decided Baze v. Rees yet.
RESPONSES TO SECTION IV.LL. ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BASED ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST
1. Answering Section IV.LL., the State denies ineffective assistance of counsel based on
conflict of interest. Answering the first, second and third unnumbered paragraphs contained in
Section IV.LL., the State admits that defense trial counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw
and that there were discussions on the record with the Court, and outside the presence of the
State, regarding this issue; however, without transcripts to review, the State has insufficient
information to admit or deny the remainder of the factual allegations contained therein, and
therefore denies the same. Answering the remainder of the first, second and third unnumbered
paragraphs contained in Section IV.LL, they contain merely conclusory legal statements and
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arguments, which are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition, but might be raised in
subsequent briefing and, therefore, the State denies each and every allegation contained therein.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. Idaho
Code § 19-4901(a); I.R.c.P. 12(b)(6).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims are
procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b).
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a
genuine issue ofmaterial fact. Idaho Code §§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition fails to allege sufficient facts that would warrant a conclusion that
trial counsel was deficient and/or that any deficiency prejudiced the Petitioner.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition alleges in Section III. that it is impossible for him to file a Petition
which fully complies with the applicable law. The Petitioner alleges that he needs more time and
that he will need to file an Amended Petition at some future date. The State does not concede
that the Petitioner has made a proper showing by this assertion to allow a future amendment.
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
(HALL II), Page 29
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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition requests an order for preservation of evidence. The State does not
concede that the Petitioner has made a proper showing or provided a legal basis for request.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition requests permission for civil discovery. The State does not concede
that the Petitioner has made a proper showing for this request.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition requests permission for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The
State does not concede that the Petitioner has made a proper showing for this request.
WHEREFORE, Respondent (State) prays for relief as follows:
a) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;
b) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; and,
c) for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / /7l- day ofMarch 2008.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
By:df::'~~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
(HALL II), Page 30
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho
83703, through the United States Mail, thisl day of March 2008.
JM-;
Legal Assistant
STATE'S ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
(HALL II), Page 31
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CVPC0803085




















COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for its Order directing the Ada
County Public Defender's Office Conflict Counsel Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal, as
well as Ami! Myshin, Ada County Public Defender and D.C. Carr, formerly of the Ada
STATE'S MOTION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND MOTION
FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING STATE TO DISCUSS CASE WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL (HALL II), Page 1
000084
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County Public Defender's Office, to produce a second copy of the same documents it
provides to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office in the above-entitled action
during the course of discovery.
The State also requests an Order permitting the State to discuss this case with both
initial counsel (Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr) and conflict defense trial counsel (Rob
Chastain and Deborah Kristal).
This Motion is based upon the fact that the Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-
Conviction relief in this matter on February 14,2008. As this Court is aware, Mr. Myshin
and Mr. Carr represented the Petitioner until there was a conflict created by the filing of a
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the HaIVHenneman matter. Thereafter, Mr.
Chastain and Ms. Kristal began representation of the Petitioner in the above-entitled
matter. The State has filed an accompanying Motion for Attorney-Client Privilege
Waiver in the above-entitled case.
The Petitioner's Petition includes a wide range of claims, alleging errors by the
Court, the prosecutors and the defense trial counsel in this case at all stages of the trial
and sentencing proceedings. The State hereby incorporates by reference the claims
contained in Petitioner's Petition filed on February 14,2008, as a basis for this request for
production of documents and permission to discuss this case with initial counsel and
defense trial counsel. The State is entitled to rebut the claims set forth in the Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. In order to rebut those claims, the State needs access not only to
STATE'S MOTION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND MOTION
FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING STATE TO DISCUSS CASE WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL (HALL II), Page 2
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the documents and materials related to that representation, but also needs permission to
discuss the representation of Petitioner with both initial counsel and conflict defense trial
counsel.
The State is hereby requesting copies of all attorney notes, emails, written
correspondence with the Petitioner and/or other witnesses, investigator notes, consultant
notes, any reports, documents, and any and all other materials generated in this case as
they relate to the representation of the Petitioner in the Hall/Hanlon murder trial, both
regarding the guilt phase and the sentencing phase, and is requested of both initial counsel
(Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr) as well as defense trial counsel (Rob Chastain and Deborah
Kristal). This request includes a request for production of all attorney notes, emails,
written correspondence with the Petitioner and/or other witnesses, witness notes (expert
or lay witness notes, including potential witnesses or potential expert witnesses notes),
documents, reports, emails and any and all other materials generated by: employees,
investigators, consultants, trial witnesses or potential trial witnesses; expert witnesses
consulted with and/or potential expert witnesses consulted with and/or any other agent of
Amil Myshin, D.C Carr, Conflict Counsel, Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal as it relates
to the representation of the Petitioner in the Hall/Hanlon murder trial, both regarding the
guilt phase and the sentencing phase.
This request includes attorney notes, emails, reports, documents, and any and all
other materials generated by any mental health experts, including notes, who saw, spoke
STATE'S MOTION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND MOTION
FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING STATE TO DISCUSS CASE WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL (HALL II), Page 3
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to, tested or evaluated the Petitioner for the purpose of assisting the both initial counsel
and conflict defense trial counsel, together with all testing instruments and test results
administered by mental health professionals to Erick Hall so that the State can prepare to
rebut the post-conviction claims of the Petitioner.
This request includes attorney notes, emails, reports, documents, and any and all
other materials generated by any other expert, any other witness and/or consultant who
examined, tested and/or evaluated the evidence in this case for the purpose of assisting
the both initial counsel and conflict defense trial counsel in the preparation for the guilt
phase and sentencing phase of the trial. Again, this request is made so that the State can
prepare to rebut the post-conviction claims of the Petitioner.
The documents and the permission to speak to initial and conflict defense trial
counsel are necessary to evaluate and prepare to rebut any claims of the Petitioner that
initial counsel and/or conflict defense trial counsel were ineffective in trial preparation,
during the trial, during the preparation for the sentencing proceedings and/or during the
sentencing proceedings.




STATE'S MOTION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND MOTION
FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING STATE TO DISCUSS CASE WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL (HALL II), Page 4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this~ day of March 2008.
STATE'S MOTION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND MOTION
FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING STATE TO DISCUSS CASE WITH TRIAL
COUNSEL (HALL II), Page 5
000088
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,



















COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court to declare that the attorney-client
privilege that existed between the Ada County Public Defender's Office Conflict
Counsel, Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal, their employees, investigators, consultants,
and/or any other agents of Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal and the Petitioner, Erick V.
STATE'S MOTION FOR ORDER WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 1
000089
   
    
   
   
     
      
   
  
  
   
  A . o,~~ 
   ii Ef  
D I.  
          
           
   
 
 











- - - - - - - - - - - - --) 
   
   
   
  
 
            
               
           
          
               
       
    
Hall as it relates to their representation of the Petitioner in the Hall/Hanlon murder case is
waived as required by Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(d)(3).
The State further moves this Court to declare that the attorney-client privilege that
existed between Amil Myshin, Ada County Public Defender's Office, and D.C. Carr,
formerly with the Ada County Public Defender's Office, their employees, investigators,
consultants and/or any other agents of Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr and the Petitioner,
Erick V. Hall as it relates to their representation of the Petitioner in the Hall/Hanlon
murder case is waived as required by Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(d)(3).
This Motion is based upon the fact that the Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-
Conviction relief in this matter on February 14, 2008. As this Court is aware, Mr.
Myshin and Mr. Carr represented the Petitioner until there was a conflict created by the
filing of a Petition for Post-Conviction in the Hall/Henneman matter. Thereafter, Mr.
Chastain and Ms. Kristal began representation of the Petitioner in the above-entitled
matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this If 7!:::. day of March 2008.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor
STATE'S MOTION FOR ORDER WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 2
000090
                
         
             
            
           
              
               
            
              
               
               
            
            
 
          
   
   
By: an M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
       
    
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this _l_f_ day of March 2008.
Legal Assistant
STATE'S MOTION FOR ORDER WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 3
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

















COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and moves the Court for a scheduling order outlining deadlines for the Post-
Conviction proceedings in the above-entitled matter.




B : JaIl M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
MOTION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER (HALL), Page 1
000092
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho
83703 through the United States Mail, this1L day ofMarch 2008.
MOTION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER (HALL), Page 2
000093
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FILED
Wednesday. May 07, 2008 at 09:23 AM
J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT
BY:_--.:::::::;t1K.t=~~~::::::::..::-_-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff(s)
VS













NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Scheduling Conference: Monday, June 09, 2008 At: 04:00 PM
Judge: Thomas F. Neville
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Wednesday, May 07,2008.




DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE 10 83703
Dated: Wednesday, May 07,2008
I NOTICE OF HEARING-Multiple
J. DAVID NAVARRO
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Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Defendant: IDAHO, STATE OF
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:





16:17:43 - New case
IDAHO, STATE OF
16:18:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court view of file and pleadings, re: State wanting scheduli
ng conference
16:19:21 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated not quite sure of when balance of transcr
ipts are coming






   
    










   
  
   
   
 
 
    
    
  
  




   
   
     
  
          
  
     
           
   




16:21:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court was approached by Ms. Gorcyca requesting an extens
ion to get her
16:21:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
transcripts done due to issues. The Court had signed that r
equest but not
16:22:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
sure when Mr. Kenyon would have signed it.
16:26:07 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated would make since to know when transcript
s are to be
16:26:24 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
submitted.
16:26:31 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated she would also have some further motions
re: Juror
16:26:47 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
questionnaires as well
16:28:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court is inquiring of Brad Thies re: transcripts are don
e
16:32:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has confirmed with Brad what transcripts have bee
n received
16:34:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will set out to July 14, 2008 @ 3:00 p.m. for furt
her review of
16:36:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
where we are at on transcripts
16:37:05 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson advised Court that trying to get original trial
counsel's notes,
16:37:45 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
but wanted to inquire of Court whether can have those since
they deal with
16:37:57 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
jury information
16:38:02 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
No objection to that
16:38:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court does not have a problem with that.
16:38:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.




--- --- ~~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ----
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAe STRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff,
Vs.










NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Status Hearing
Judge:
Monday, July 14, 2008
03:00 PM
Thomas F. Neville
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice











Clerk of the District Court
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Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, NICOLE
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:





15:10:33 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
15:10:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court is advised that Ms. Swenson has left the SAPD's of
fice
15:11:46 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, NICOLE
Ms. Owens stated she has left.
15:12:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court has heard from Ms. Gorcyca re: approx. when she would
be done with
15:12:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.





   
    
   
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
   
   
 
    
    
  
  




   
    
     
  
            
 
     
      
     
           
   
     





15:12:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
remaining since requesting the extension. Extension deadlin
e was September
15:12:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
4th and she completed another 4200 pages with approx. 3000 p
ages remaining.
15:13:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
She is hoping to have completion prior to Sept. 4th. Court
would like to set
15:13:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
another status conference approx. 1 month out. Court will s
et over to August
15:15:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
8, 2008 @ 11:00 a.m.
15:15:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court understands from Ms. Swenson that Mr. Ackley would ass
ume lead chair as
15:16:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.







     
       
   
     
           
  
     
           
    
     
          
    
     
     
     
          
    
     




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No: CVPC2008-3085
NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE







STATE 0t IDAHO, DEFENDANT )
De~ ndant. )




Friday, August 08, 2008
11:00 AM
Thomas F. Neville
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice
were served as follows on the 15th July, 2008.
JAN BENNETTSIDOUGLAS VARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
VIA EMAIL
MARK ACKLEYINICOLE OWENS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
INTER DEPT MAIL
Dated: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 J. DAVID NAVARRO




Court Reference CV-PC-2008-03085 000100
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
f'c ~ t. i 1\, \:·----v.I:lt~~5~. --:1I'r:".-'16--\J \ \\~ k·~~c;.·· ~~R.M. "r'
JA,rJ2 7 2009
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT





NOTICE OF HEARING FOR














COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through"his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender, and provides notice that a hearing will be held for the purpose of
discussing scheduling matters in the above-captioned case. In coordination with the Court's
clerk, and by agreement of the parties, the hearing will be held on the 3rd day of February, 2009,
at 10:30 a.m., before the Honorable Thomas F. Neville at 200 W. Front St., Boise, Idaho
Petitioner moves the Court to enter the proposed scheduling order that has been filed
contemporaneously with this Notice. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) (providing that written motions may be
incorporated in the notice of hearing on the motion). The proposed order is based on the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, which provide in relevant part:
Except in cases exempted by order of the court as inappropriate, the judge or
magistrate shall, after consulting with the attorneys for the parties . . . enter a
scheduling order that limits the time (1) ... to amend the pleadings; (2) to file and
/ NOTICE OF HEARING FOR ENTRY OF SCHEDULING ORDER Page 1000101
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hear motions; and (3) to complete discovery. The scheduling order also may
include ... (7) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
LR.C.P. 16 (b).
The request for a scheduling order is uncontested. The terms contained within the
proposed order reflect the product of multiple discussions between the parties and are based in
large part upon the scheduling orders in three pending capital post-conviction proceedings,
including Erick Hall v. State, Ada County case no. SPOT0500155 (herein "Hall I"); Azad
Abdullah v. State, Ada County case no. SPOT0500308; and Timothy Dunlap v. State, Caribou
County case no. CV2006-111.
It has been the parties' intent to propose a scheduling order designed to conclude these
post-conviction proceedings in a just and efficient fashion while providing the parties flexibility
to accommodate unforeseeable events. See LR.C.P. 16(b) ("A scheduling order shall not be
modified except by leave of the judge or a magistrate upon a showing of good cause.") The
parties have agreed to inform the Court of future events that may arise which could lead to
requests for further modifications. 1
DATED this 27th day ofJanuary, 2009.
NIC6LE\)WENS
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall
1 For example, Petitioner's counsel intends to reference various matters including, but not limited
to, a pending interlocutory appeal in Hall 1. It is not Petitioner's intent to litigate such matters at
this point, but rather to bring them to the Court's attention as matters that could become relevant
to scheduling. This and other such matters have been discussed between the parties.
NOTICE OF HEARING FOR ENTRY OF SCHEDULING ORDER Page 2000102
            
             
   
             
               
            
              
              
    
               
             
             
                 
                 
     
       
Vciw  
     
              
                  
                 
             
          
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of January, 2009, served a true and correct




ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA



















THIS COURT HAVING considered the party's respective positions during a
hearing held on February 3, 2009, and this Court being otherwise fully informed, hereby
incorporates its findings from said hearing and enters the below scheduling order for the
above-captioned post-conviction proceedings.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Petitioner shall file his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(hereinafter "Amended Petition") no later than April 2, 2009;
(2) Respondent shall file an Answer to the Amended Petition within one
hundred twenty (120) days thereafter, said Answer being due no later than
I
August 1, 2009;
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 1
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(3) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their motions for discovery within
fourteen (14) days thereafter, said motions being due no later than August
15,2009;
(4) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their responses to motions for
discovery within twenty-one (21) days thereafter, said responses being due
no later than September 5, 2009;
(5) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their replies to the responses to
motions for discovery within fourteen (14) days thereafter, said replies
being due no later than September 19, 2009;
(6) The parties shall be prepared for a hearing on the motions for discovery
within seven (7) days thereafter, said hearing being held on or about
September 26,2009, depending on the Court's docket;
(7) The parties shall complete discovery within ninety (90) days after the
entry of the Court's Order regarding discovery;
(8) Petitioner shall file his Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(hereinafter "Final Amended Petition") within sixty (60) days of the
completion of discovery or the receipt of all transcripts from any Court-
ordered depositions, whichever occurs later;
(9) Respondent shall file an Answer to the Final Amended Petition within one
hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the final Amended Petition;
(10) Petitioner and Respondent shall file all dispositive motions within sixty
(60) days after the filing ofRespondent's Answer;
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 2
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(11) Petitioner and Respondent shall file all responses to dispositive motions
within sixty (60) days after the filing ofthe dispositive motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3'~ay of February, 2009.
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 3
000106
           
           
         
THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
District Judge 
      
· " \ ...
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this ~ day of February, 2009, served a true
and correct copy of the attached NOTI«-OF HEARING FOR ENTRY OF
SCHEDULING ORDER by the method indicated below:
JAN M. BENNETTS
DOUGLAS R. VARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE




STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN




10:51:35 - New case






, STATE OF IDAHO
10:53:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Time set for scheduling conference. Court inquired if couns
el have all
10:53:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
transcripts requested.
10:54:02 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley stated have all transcripts approx. October 2nd.
Amended Pet. to
10:54:25 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
be filed approx. April 2nd. States there was one transcript
under seal not
10:55:32 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
transcribed that was Motion to Withdraw hearing not sure whe
ther it was
000108
    
  
   
    
   
  









   
 
   
   
  
    
  
    
    
    
  
 
   






    
     
     
   
     
  
     
    
         
   
     
          
   
     
          
   
Court will be
Do not know wha
6.-
Se~sion: Neville020309
10:56:16 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
relevent. Do not think that affects any timelines.
10:56:37 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated have a transcript, not sure re: costs of
the transcript
10:57:14 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
dispute.
10:59:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court is also in poss. of copy that also has a dispute r
e: the costs.
11:01:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquired if any objection to proposed order re: schedu
ling order
11:01:35 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated there is not, with understanding there m
ay need to be
11:01:49 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
some flexability with dates. Will work hard to meet the d
eadlines.
11:02:47 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Mr. Ackley responded re: post conviction resources, time is
not an issue,
11:03:27 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
Budget has been impacted as a State agency.
t money will be
11:04:02 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
in the budget in 2010, informed by Molley Huskey, the State
Appellate public
11:04:34 - Pers. Attorney: Ackley, Mark
defender informs there is no money for the capital litigatio
n unit in 2010.
11:04:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court entered proposed scheduling order.
available anytime
11:06:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff,
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NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE






ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice













          
           
    
 
 









   
    
            
  
 
   
  
   
         
                 
                  
         
   
  
   
  
     
   
   
   
     




State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, LS.B. #7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CN (t,O'(j ~ 30~~













Petitioner, Erick V. Hall, by and through Deputy State Public Defender Mark J.
Ackley, and Respondent, the State of Idaho, by and through Deputy Ada County
Prosecutor Jan Bennetts, agree and stipulate to the following:
The Petitioner through counsel, Mark Ackley, contacted the counsel for the State
of Idaho, Jan Bennetts, and informed Ms. Bennetts that an additional three work days
may be necessary to complete the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
("Amended Petition") due to an illness of one of the members of Mr. Ackley's staff.
Specifically, Mr. Ackley informed Ms. Bennetts that the administrative assistant in Mr.
Ackley's capital litigation unit who is responsible for proofreading, formatting, copying,
binding, and otherwise finalizing the Amended Petition, as well as other administrative
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.. .
and secretarial tasks, was out of the office for the entirety of last week (March 23-27);
was sent home by Mr. Ackley on March 31, 2009; and has a scheduled doctor's
appointment on April 1, 2009, all due to a protracted illness.
Pursuant to the Court's scheduling order, the Amended Petition is currently due
on April 2, 2009. The parties stipulate that the scheduling order may be revised to permit
a timely filing of the Amended Petition on April 7, 2009. The parties further stipulate
that the State's Answer will remain due 120 days after the filing of the Amended Petition,
consistent with the scheduling order. To remain on schedule, the parties agree that the
remaining deadlines will not be affected by this stipulation. Thus, the deadline following
the State's Answer, i.e., for the filing of motions for discovery, will remain due no later
than August 15,2009.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2009.
MARKJ. KLE
Deputy, State Appe late Public Defender
JA£f~
Deputy, Ada County Prosecutor




                
               
           
            
                
               
                
              
             
                
   
       
      




I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this _ day of April, 2009, served a true
and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION TO CORRECT TRANSCRIPTS as
indicated below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE















STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) Case No. CVPC08-03085
)
Petitioner, )
) ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF
v. ) TIME TO FILE AMENDED
) PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
STATE OF IDAHO, ) RELIEF PURSUANT TO A
) STIPULATION BY THE PARTIES
Respondent. )
) (CAPITAL CASE)
THIS COURT HAVING considered the parties' Stipulation for Extension of
Time to File Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief filed on April 1, 2009, and
otherwise being sufficiently informed, hereby orders that the parties' stipulation is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief must be filed no later than April 7, 2009. The date for the State to
file its Answer will be adjusted accordingly, but otherwise remain 120 days following the
filing of the Amended Petition. The deadline for filing motions for discovery will remain
no later than August '15, 2009. The purpose of this Order is to permit the requested
000114
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extension due to extenuating circumstances noted in the stipulation while preserving the
remaining deadlines as reflected in the Court's scheduling order filed February 23,2009.




            
            
         





I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this __ day of Pebtblil)', 2009, served a true
and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF HEARING FOR ENTRY OF
SCHEDULING ORDER by the method indicated below:
JAN M. BENNETTS
DOUGLAS R. VARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE





~ Hand Delivery \j~-a. (b'Y)
MARK J. ACKLEY
NICOLE OWENS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER





-:1:::== Hand Delivery Vl (A
000116
   
I ~              rui      
            
       
   
   
    
     
   
   
  
    
    








~   
MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. #4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
MARK J. ACKLEY, ISB #6330
NICOLE OWENS, ISB #7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders




NO,-__'""I!III"I.,,_----1G8 3AM., P.U.l hL
~~, • [" ; 1\ I f\AfR -1 2009
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. J.~NAV.,t\RRO, OIJtrk
tt V~d~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT




















Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), petitions this Honorable Court for post-conviction
relief from the conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth Judicial
District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300624, on January 3, 2008. This
Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to I.C. §19-2719; §§19-4901 et seq.;
I.C.R., Rule 57; and Article I, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.
Mr. Hall relies on Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8, 13, 17 and 18 of the Constitution of the State
of Idaho, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution as well as International Human Rights Law in support of this
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein "Amended Petition"). '
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1
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I. BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(1) through (a)(6))
1. Mr. Hall was charged with first degree murder and rape of Cheryl Ann Hanlon on
May 20, 2003. (R., pp.l4-15.)
2. Mr. Hall was represented by the Ada County Public Defender's office; Ami!
Myshin and D.C. Carr, until January 20, 2005. (R., ppA04-408.)
3. Mr. Hall was thereafter represented by conflict counsel, Robert Chastain and
Deborah Krista!.l
4. Mr. Hall pled NOT GUILTY and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the crimes
charged.
5. Judgment and sentence were pronounced by Honorable Thomas F. Neville,
District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in Ada County,
Boise, Idaho.
6. Mr. Hall stands convicted in Ada County Case No. H0300624 of the crimes of:
Count I: Murder in the First Degree (felony murder only);
Count II: Rape.
7. The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 3rd day of January, 2008:
Count I: Death;
Count II: Life in Prison without possibility of parole.
8. Other than post-trial motions and any prematurely filed NOTICE OF APPEAL,
which cannot be litigated under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are
1 Conflict counsel was assigned following Mr. Hall's conviction for the murder of Lynn
Henneman, Ada County Case No. H0300518 (herein "Henneman case"), and the filing of
a post-conviction petition in Case No. SPOT0500155 which contained allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel involving the same attorneys. (See R., ppA04-408.)
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 2
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concluded, this is Mr. Hall's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from the
convictions and sentences herein challenged.
9. Mr. Hall is in the custody of the State of Idaho Department of Correction,
detained at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution near Boise, Idaho.
II. ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY
Mr. Hall is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State of
Idaho, under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. This restraint is pursuant, in
part, to the following conviction and sentence imposed on January 3, 2008 by this Court
presiding in the Fourth Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No.
H0300624: Murder in the First Degree (felony murder) and Rape. This restraint is illegal
in that the convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the constitutions of the
United States and of the State of Idaho and in violation of court rules, statutes and other
law as set forth below.
III. LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND
This Amended Petition contains all currently known claims for post-conviction
relief, and is timely filed pursuant to this Court's scheduling order entered February 2,
2009. Pursuant to such scheduling order, Mr. Hall will file a final petition upon
completion of his current counsels' independent investigation.2 Such investigation is not
yet completed due to various circumstances, including but not limited to the following:
2 Competent post-conviction representation requires a reinvestigation of the underlying
criminal case for all potentially meritorious guilt and sentencing-phase claims inside and
outside the record. See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Trial Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (herein "ABA Guidelines"),
Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties Of Post-Conviction Counsel")(Exhibit 1.).
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 3
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1. Mr. Hall's trial counsel have failed to fully cooperate. Specifically, lead trial
counsel (Rob Chastain) has indicated that he will not discuss his
representation without the presence of one the State's representatives, either
Jan Bennetts or Doug Varie, while his co-counsel (Deb Kristal) believes that
the State's counsel represents her in this post-conviction action. In addition,
Mr. Hall believes that, despite his requests, he still has not received all of his
trial counsels' files, including all of their emails, handwritten notes, and
investigator/mitigation specialist files.
2. The Court has denied Mr. Hall access to the completed jury questionnaires.
These questionnaires were relied upon by all parties, including the Court,
during jury selection. Mr. Hall has now identified and raised claims in this
Amended Petition to which those questionnaires are present. Accordingly,
Mr. Hall intends to file another motion with the Court to justify access to the
questionnaires for purposes of these post-conviction proceedings.
3. The Court has prohibited Mr. Hall from contacting the jurors. Mr. Hall
intends to file another motion with this Court to show that access to jurors is
necessary for meaningful post-conviction proceedings.
Despite these limitations on his investigation, Mr. Hall raises the following
grounds for relief:
IV. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
The convictions and sentences entered against Mr. Hall were obtained in violation
of laws of the United States and of Idaho, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8 13, 17, and
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 4000120
             
           
          
            
           
               
           
   
             
           
             
         
               
       
             
               
     
           
   
    
            
                
                
      
18, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, provisions of the Idaho Code and the Idaho
Criminal Rules as well as international law.
Mr. Hall alleges that all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel herein satisfy
both prongs of the Strickland analysis, specifically, that the claims show (1) a deficiency
in trial counsels' performance, and (2) that such deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In addition, Mr. Hall
alleges that he has demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct and the necessary level of
prejudice for this Court to grant him relief. Finally, Mr. Hall alleges that even if the
claims do not meet the governing level of prejudice on their own, that when cumulatively
considered, the accumulation of error creates prejudice entitling Mr. Hall to relief Mak v.
Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1992).
A. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
On February 27, 2007, trial counsel filed a "Motion for Leave to Withdraw and
for Ex-Parte Hearing on the Motion." (R. Vol. III, pp.554-560.) In their affidavit, trial
counsel stated that "[t]here has been a complete breakdown in communication between
Mr. Hall and the undersigned attorneys" and that "[p]rofessional and ethical
considerations require termination of our representation." (R. Vol. III, p.558l The Court
denied trial counsels' motion. Mr. Hall claims that his relationship with trial counsel
worsened and adversely affected many aspects of their representation, including but not
3 The Court held two ex parte hearings with the defense based on concerns about the
attorney-client privilege, at least one of which directly impacts this claim; those hearings
are sealed and all privileges remain intact until this Court finds a waiver.
-
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limited to, their investigation, choice of defense, and advice to Mr. Hall regarding the
defense as well as his right to testify.
Mr. Hall cannot adequately state this claim at this time because trial counsel has
refused to speak confidentially regarding the full nature and scope of the breakdown in
the attorney-client relationship to determine whether this claim should be withdrawn or
amended. At this time, Mr. Hall raises this claim as a complete denial of counsel, see
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), as a conflict of interest, and alternatively,
as a denial of the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland.4
B. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE IN
ENSURING THAT ALL THEIR CLAIMS WERE FULLY INSULATED
FROM ANY FUTURE CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE
CLAIMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED
Trial counsel must be diligent in protecting a defendant's constitutional claims
from future attacks by the government that the claims were not properly preserved for
appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline
10.8.A.3.c. As stated in part in the Commentary:
One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case
at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage
of appellate and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may
result in the client being executed even though reversible error occurred at
trial. For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be
especially aware not only of strategies for winning at trial, but also of the
heightened need to fully preserve all potential issues for later review.
Commentary, ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted). Trial
counsel has a duty to make sure that all claims are properly preserved; failure to do so is
4 To the extent the Court orders trial counsel to cooperate with Mr. Hall's reasonable
requests and/or orders the taking of depositions, undersigned counsel will take measures
to ensure the State is on notice of the factual basis for this claim prior to depositions, and
at a minimum, at the time of filing Mr. Hall's final petition pursuant to the Court's
scheduling order.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 6
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ineffective assistance of counsel. Davis v. Secretary for Dept. ofCorrections, 341 F.3d
1310 (lIth Cir. 2003) (stating that trial counsel was ineffective in murder case in failing
to adequately preserve a Batson claim for appellate review).
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Allow Defense To Provide Copy Of
Grand Jury Transcript To Defendant" From Future Attacks By The
Government That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently Preserved
Trial counsel moved to be allowed to provide grand jury transcripts to Mr. Hall.
(R., pp. 45-46.) The motion was partially denied. The Court specifically limited copies
of grand jury transcripts to counsel and counsel's staff and experts. Moreover, the Court
ordered that trial counsel was not permitted to provide copies to the defendant. (R., pp.
55-57.) The Court did allow trial counsel to review the transcripts with the client, but this
was never adequate to allow Mr. Hall to read the transcript in its entirety or adequately
review the transcripts for inaccuracies or discrepancies.
While trial counsel did state that the "Defendant has State and Federal
Constitutional Rights to confront the witnesses against him and to a fair trial," (R., p. 45),
they did not state the specific constitutional provisions upon which they were relying.
Counsel should have rested their motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
which in addition to the rights noted by counsel, including the defendant's right to due
process, the right to counsel, the right to assist counsel in his defense, and the right to
present a defense. Because this is a capital case, counsel should always raise their client's
Eighth Amendment rights.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 7000123
             
               
         
           
           
          
        
              
             
              
               
                
                
       
            
                
             
            
           
               
                 
               
   
      
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Declare Idaho's Capital Sentencing
Scheme Unconstitutional" From Future Attacks By The Government That
The Claim Was Not Sufficiently Preserved
Trial counsel moved to declare Idaho's capital sentencing scheme
unconstitutional. (R., pp.92-99.) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to fully protect their challenges to the constitutionality of the new death penalty
statute claims from procedural default attacks from the government. While trial counsel
did cite numerous United States Supreme cases, because of the near certainty that the
government will assert some sort of procedural bar on nearly every claim in state
appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings, trial counsel should have specified the
constitutional provisions violated if for no other reason than to foolproof the claim
against any challenges.
For instance, trial counsel complained that there are no definitions or explanations
of weighing, sufficiently compelling, unjust, mitigating circumstances, and that the
statute fails to explain the weighing process or define aggravating circumstances. (R., pp.
204-205.) It is a fair reading of the motion that trial counsel challenged these statutory
provisions based on the case law set forth elsewhere in the motion. To absolutely ensure
subsequent consideration of the claims on their merits, trial counsel should have rested
their motion on the following constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.s
5 Mr. Hall does not concede that the claims in this particular motion are not properly
preserved for future review, but makes this claim on the basis that counsel had a duty to
fool-proof their claims against any conceivable procedural attack. In light of the wealth of
case law in which condemned inmates have lost valid claims under severe default rules,
Mr. Hall is struck by the short-sighted approach trial counsel took to their motion
practice, often not citing to a single constitutional provision in support.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 8
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3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Motion To
Reconsider Selecting Jury In Gooding County
It appears trial counsel federalized their Motion To Reconsider Selecting Jury In
Gooding County by asking the Court to take notice of prior filings in support of their
motion for change of venue. (R., pp. 914-916.) To the extent the Court deems this
motion not federalized, trial counsel was ineffective. Counsel should have expressly
rested their motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion To
Strike/Dismiss Aggravating Circumstances"
On March 15, 2004, trial counsel filed a Motion To Strike/Dismiss Aggravating
Circumstances. (R., pp. 88-90.) Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal
constitutional section or amendment as authority for their motion. (R., pp. 88-90.) Trial
counsel argued that the prosecutor failed to provide adequate legal definitions for the
Grand Jury to perform its constitutional function. Without jury instructions with proper
limiting construction regarding the aggravating circumstances, the grand jury could not
intelligently decide whether a crime (here the aggravators) had been committed. People
v. Calbud, 402 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Superior Court, 580 P.2d 747 (Ariz.
App. 1978). The failure to provide the limiting instructions violated Mr. Hall's state
constitutional rights, Article I, Section 8, as well as his federal constitutional rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Due Process Clause) to the United States
Constitution.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 9
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5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Oral Motion To
Strike Juror No. 138
Trial counsel did not cite any constitutional provision in support of their oral
motion to strike prospective Juror No. 138. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3348, L.20 - p.3350, L.3.)
Counsel should have rested their motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Objection To The
State's Introduction Of Photographs
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional provision as
authority for their objection to the State's introduction of photographs 63 and 66. (Tr.
Vol. 9, pA154, L.l1 - pA157, L.l.) Similarly, trial counsel did not cite to state or federal
constitutional provisions when objecting to the introduction of photographs 21, 25, 27,
28,29, and 30. (Tr. Vol. 9, pA459, L.22 - pA460, L.17.) Trial counsel did not cite to
state or federal constitutional provisions when objecting to photograph 80. (Tr. Vol. 9,
pA507, L.2 - pA508, L.2l.) Counsel should have rested their motion on the following
Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Objection To The
Courts Instruction To The Jury During Deliberations
During jury deliberations the jury asked the Court to provide them with
clarification on whether a murder was committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate a rape. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5759, Ls.3-14.) The Court responded by instructing the
jury that:
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 10
000126
           
           
    
             
              
            
           
           
           
    
             
              
  .4  1              
            
        .4         
             
.4   .4            
           
   
           
           
       
            
             
              
  
       
Idaho case law provides that deaths which occur as part of the stream of
events during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate rape are first degree
murder. Beyond that, the Court will simply refer you back to the language
which you quoted in your question to the Court.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.5770, Ls.l - 8.) Trial counsel objected to the Court giving this, or any,
instruction to the jury. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5771, L.18 - p.5772, L.14.)
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional provision as
authority for their objection to the Court providing the jury with a definition of stream of
events. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5771, L.18 - p.5772, L.14.) Counsel should have rested their
motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Objection To The
States Introduction OfVictim Impact Testimony
Trial counsel objected to the admission of victim impact statements through
various witnesses throughout both phases of the trial. During Jeff Carlson's testimony
trial counsel objected because "much of his testimony is getting more in the point of
victim impact statements, as opposed to relevant evidence to determine whether or not
Mr. Hall is guilty of first degree murder." (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4191, Ls.3-10.) Similarly,
during the testimony of Walter Us, trial counsel objected on the basis that his testimony
was improper victim impact as were the pictures of Ms. Henneman. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5960,
L.5 - p.5965, L.5.) During the testimony of Laura Pettet, trial counsel objected again on
the basis that her testimony was improper victim impact. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6151, L.19 -
p.6152, L.14.) Trial counsel, in each of these instances, failed to cite to one state or
federal constitutional provision as authority for their objection. Counsel should have
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 11
000127
              
            
             
         
                
           
             
                
             
            
      
           
           
      
           
            
               
             
              
               
               
              
              
                
           
      
rested their motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
9. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Objection To The
State's Introduction Of The Belt
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional provision as
authority for their objection to the State's introduction of a belt for illustrative purposes.
(Tr.Vol. 10, p.5547, Ls.21-25.) Counsel should have rested their motion on the
following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
C. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ENSURE THAT ALL PROCEEDINGS WERE RECORDED
AND THAT MR. HALL WAS PRESENT FOR ALL PROCEEDINGS
Numerous unrecorded bench conferences and in-chambers proceedings were held
without Mr. Hall's presence. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in
failing to protect Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to be present and his due process
right to meaningful appellate and post-conviction review. The ABA Guidelines provide
in part:
[C]ounsel at every stage must ensure that there is a complete record
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions,
statements of grounds, questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral
and written arguments of both sides, discussions among counsel and the
court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the
parties. If a court refuses to allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel
should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the substance of the
court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of
what transpired in the unrecorded proceeding.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8; see also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357,
358 (1993).
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Moreover, Idaho law provides that that all oral proceedings, including telephone
conferences, shall be recorded. See I.C. § 1-1103; I.C.R. 43.1. Idaho law places no
obligation on a party to request recording. Only where the record clearly demonstrates
counsel's waiver of recording and the consent of the trial judge is the requirement waived.
State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 231, 542 P.2d 63, 65 (1975). The recording requirement
extends to all communications intended for the court, i.e., conversations between the
judge and the parties, and thus would include bench and chambers conferences. See
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 761, 819 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Ct. App. 1991)(holding that
"proceedings" do not include conversations solely between the defendant and his
attorney); Fountain v. State, 269 Ark. 454, 601 S.W. 2d 862 (Ark. 1980) (holding "all
bench conferences and in-chambers conferences should be 'on the record' unless they
involve matters unrelated to the current trial.") Court minutes or summaries are an
insufficient substitute for a recording. Wright, 97 Idaho at 231, 542 P.2d at 65.
In State v. Matt, 199 P.3d 244 (Mont. 2008), the Montana Supreme Court held
that an in-chambers conference was a critical stage of the proceedings that invoked that
defendant's right to be present. Id. at 248-50. They reasoned that a defendant has a right
to be present at an in-chambers conference to preserve their rights, observe whether their
attorney is advocating zealously and professionally, observe the demeanor of the judge
and prosecutor, and listen to the arguments. Id. It is because these observations can
inform a defendant regarding making important decisions related to the case and
"[u]ltimately, it was [the defendant] who bore the consequences of the District Court's
rulings on the matters raised by defense counsel-matters which ... had the potential to
prejudice [the defendant's] defense substantially." Id.
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Proceedings Mr. Hall is aware took place off the record include: (Tr. Vol. 1, p.56,
Ls.7-8; p.57, Ls.9-1O; p.58, Ls.l8-19; p.115, Ls.6-7; Tr. Vol. 2, p.206, Ls.7-8; p.242,
Ls.9-10; p.245, Ls.20-21; p.657, Ls.7-8; p.662, LsA-5; p.736, Ls.13-14; p.828, Ls.7-8;
p.1154, Ls.3-4; Tr. Vol. 3, p.1241, Ls.15-16; p.1349, Ls.3-4; p.1391, LsA-5; p.1395,
Ls.1-2; p.1440, Ls.8-9; p.1452, Ls.l5-16; p.l458, Ls.8-9; p.1492, Ls.23-24; p.1640, Ls.3-
4; p.l666, Ls.l2-13; p.2014, Ls.22-23; p.2090, Ls.19-20; p.2182, Ls.13-14; Tr. Vol. 4,
p.2394, Ls.22-23; Tr. Vol. 6, p.2623, Ls.9-10; Tr. Vol. 7, p.2784, Ls.3-5; p.2868, Ls.7-8;
p.2951, Ls.18-19; p.2965, Ls.12-13; p.3263, Ls.ll-12; p.3374, Ls.16-17; Tr. Vol. 8,
p.3550, Ls.9-10; p.3609, Ls.22-23; p.3686, Ls.15-16; p.3744, Ls.7-8; p.3842, Ls.l-2.;
p.3857, Ls.14-15; p.3907, Ls.21-22; p.3926, Ls.12-13; p.3990, Ls.22-23; pA022, Ls.8-9;
Tr. Vol. 9, pA314, Ls. 8-19; pA321, L. 25 - pA322, L. 1; pA472, Ls.2-3; pA531, Ls.10-
11 (where the Court questioned a juror regarding out of Court conversation regarding the
case); pA910, Ls.23-24; Tr. Vol. 10, p.5126, Ls.10-11; p.5701, Ls.2-3; p.5758, Ls.l4-15;
and Tr. Vol. 11, p.6535, Ls.1O-11.).
Proceedings that Mr. Hall is aware took place off the record and outside his
presence include:
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the State informed the Court it was withdrawing the
motion for expert access to the defendant and there was a discussion
regarding the jury questionnaire. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.l15, L.20 - p.117, L.23.)
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which change of venue was discussed. (Tr. Vol. 6, p.2551,
L.10 - 12.)
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• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the logistics of changing venue were discussed. (Tr.
Vol. 6, p. 2561, L.14 - p. 2563, L.9.)
• Two unrecorded in-chambers conferences with the Court, trial counsel,
and the State were discussed in which the parties again talked about the
logistics of changing venue. (Tr. 5/14/07, p.158, L.8 - p.l60, L.19.)
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed bringing juror number 105 in for
further questioning. (Tr. Vol. 8, p.3550, L.6 - p. 3552, L.22.)
• A discussion with the Court, trial counsel, and the State in which the
parties discussed the anticipated timeline of the trial (Tr. Vol. 1, p,41,
Ls.12 - 25.)
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed jury instructions. (Tr. Vol. 9,
p,4748, L.24 - p.4749, L.17.)
• An unrecorded conference with the Court, trial counsel, and the State in
which the parties discussed order of testimony. (Tr. Vol. 9, p,4663, Ls.9-
15.)
• An unrecorded sidebar before the proceedings with the Court, trial
counsel, and the State in which trial counsel indicated they wanted Mr.
Hall to appear at the sentencing phase in his prison clothing. (Tr. Vol. 10,
p.5753, L. 4 - p.5754, L.118.)
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Proceedings that Mr. Hall is aware took place on the record but outside his
presence include:
• A hearing with the Court and the State present in the courtroom and trial
counsel appearing telephonically in which a discussion as to how to
respond to a question from the jury takes place. (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5755,
Ls.21-25.)
Erick Hall had the right, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, to be present at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings where his
presence would contribute to the proceeding's fairness. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730 (1987).
D. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO IMPANELING A
JURY FROM GOODING COUNTY IN LIEU OF CHANGING VENUE
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to
impaneling a jury from Gooding County, the county to which venue would otherwise
have been transferred.6 Trial counsel should have insisted that the Court first make the
requisite findings pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-1816. The statute provides:
As an alternative to entering the order of removal provided in the
preceding sections of this chapter, the court may instead enter an order
directing that jurors be impaneled from the county to which venue would
otherwise have been transferred, if it finds:
6 Due to the number of unrecorded off-the-record meetings, it is unclear whether the
Court initiated the idea of bussing out-of-county jurors to Ada County or whether it acted
on the State's request. (Tr. 4/19/07, p.2558, L.16 - p.2559, L.2 ("... You can pick a jury
in another location and move them here ... You can go somewhere else and hope that
you get lucky and can pick a jury. I still think that's less likely in Southern Idaho than it
is in any place north of the Salmon."); Tr. 4/20/07, p.2561, L.14 - p.2563, L.14 ("... The
State also ruminated with me about a potential of trying to find -- to pick jurors
somewhere in Southern Idaho and transporting them back and forth; so I'm open to any
and all options.").)
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1. That a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled in the county
where the criminal complaint, information or indictment is filed;
2. That it would be more economical to transport the jury than to
transfer the pending action; and
3. That justice will be served thereby.
I.e. § 19-1816(a). While not referencing the statute, the Court found that a jury could not
be impaneled in Ada County due to pervasive pretrial publicity, most notably, a
newspaper headline published during the initial voir dire. However, the Court neither
found it to be more economical to transport the jury from Ada County to Gooding County
nor that justice would be served thereby.
In terms of economics, there were no findings regarding the cost of transportation,
including the cost of fuel and bus rental. Further, while it is not clear whether indirect
costs are considered by the statute, there were certainly significant costs to the jurors
themselves in the form of lost wages.
There likewise were no findings in terms of justice served. In fact, the Court
noted its own skepticism that a jury chosen from Gooding County could escape the taint
of the pretrial publicity form the case. Moreover, trial counsel argued that there was an
unacceptable risk that the jurors would punish Mr. Hall for exercising his constitutional
right to a jury trial. This risk was easily anticipated and confirmed by at least some
prospective jurors during voir dire. Finally, there is little doubt that the travel and the
intense daily schedule affected jurors. One juror indicated that she suffered from severe
motion sickness, and several fell ill during the trial. Mr. Hall anticipates evidence that at
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least two jurors fell asleep during sentencing testimony.7 Indeed, during the period of
time that trial counsel had to make the trip for purposes of jury selection, they attributed
varying degrees of fatigue to the rigors of the travel.
Mr. Hall agrees with his trial counsel that the venue should have been moved to a
northern Idaho county, one which had not been as exposed to pretrial publicity.
However, alternatively Mr. Hall asserts that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to
object to the lack of findings. As noted above, such findings could not have been found
under the circumstances of this case. This error is not subject to harmless error analysis,
therefore Mr. Hall's judgment of conviction and sentence should be vacated. In addition,
Mr. Hall otherwise asserts that he has established both prongs of Strickland.
E. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DURING JURY SELECTION
Standard of Performance: A criminal defendant has the right to effective
assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him, including the
impaneling of the jury. Cf Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (holding
that voir dire is a critical stage). Indeed, it is widely understood that the quality of
advocacy during jury selection can determine the ultimate outcome of the case. (See ABA
Guidelines, n.259, citing John H. Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through
Expanded Voir dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1209 & n.1 (2001) ("The conventional
wisdom is that most trials are won or lost injury selection.").) Accordingly, the standard
of performance for trial counsel in death penalty cases provides that:
7 Mr. Hall must talk to the jurors to determine whether the jurors slept due to the format
in which the testimony was presented, due to the fatigue associated with the constant
travel, or some combination of both.
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Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and
challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding
"death qualification" concerning any potential juror's beliefs about the
death penalty. Counsel should be familiar with techniques: (1) for
exposing those prospective jurors who would automatically impose the
death penalty following a murder conviction or finding that the defendant
is death-eligible, regardless of the individual circumstances of the case; (2)
for uncovering those prospective jurors who are unable to give meaningful
consideration to mitigating evidence; and (3) for rehabilitating potential
jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make
them possibly excludable.
ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.10.2.B.
Deficient Performance: Mr. Hall asserts that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in the following manner: 1) failing to draft a jury questionnaire sufficient to
elicit all relevant views on the death penalty; 2) stipulating to the excusal of prospective
jurors based solely on their completed questionnaires; 3) failing to object to
discrimination in the jury selection process; 4) failing to conduct any voir dire (select
jurors); 5); failing to request a dual jury; 6) failing to object to improper rehabilitation of
all prospective jurors; 7) failing to conduct an adequate voir dire (all jurors); 8) failing to
conduct an adequate voir dire and failing to move to strike for cause or by use of
peremptory challenge (seated jurors); 9) failing to move to strike for cause (select jurors
struck with peremptories); 10) failing to adequately move for cause (select non-seated
jurors); 11) failing to strike with peremptories (select jurors); 12) failing to adequately
investigate tainted panel; 13) failing to object to deviation from procedures; and 14)
failing to ensure adequate procedural safeguards.
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1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Draft A Jury
Questionnaire Sufficient To Elicit All Relevant Views On The Death
Penalty
The jurors were each provided a lengthy questionnaire including questions about
their knowledge of the law and facts of the case and their views about the death penalty.
Many prospective jurors felt that the questionnaire was confusing, overwhelming, or
otherwise annoying. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.841; Tr. Vol. 3, pp.l978, 2037, 2045; Tr. Vol. 4,
p.2244; Tr. Vol. 7, pp.3147, 3173; Tr. Vol. 8, p.3780.) As a result, some jurors did not
take the questionnaires seriously and others either left questions unanswered or answered
them incorrectly. For some prospective jurors, the questionnaire itself triggered latent
about the case or other crimes associated with Mr. Hall. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp.1061-63, 1066.)
While Mr. Hall relies on the aforementioned problems in support of this claim,
the crux of this claim lies in the fact that the jury questionnaire failed to list any of the
aggravating circumstances (statutory and non-statutory) relied upon by the State in
seeking the death penalty against Mr. Hall. Indeed, trial counsel initially proposed listing
all statutory aggravating circumstances in the questionnaire. (R., Certificate of Exhibits,
Exhibit 1, pp.1l-12 (stating in part, "Are there any of the statutory aggravating factors
listed above that you believe should automatically result in the death penalty?").) The
State objected. (R., Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit 2, p.3 (stating in part that, "not all the
statutory aggravating circumstances have been pled and charged in this case.").) IN
response, trial counsel agreed that "only the statutory aggravating circumstances which
have been pleaded and charged should be included in the Questionnaire." (See R. Vol. V,
pp.956-57.) It is unclear why trial counsel removed the list in its entirety.
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In addition, the jury questionnaire contains a leading pre-designed answer to a
question aimed at protecting an otherwise automatic death penalty juror from
disqualification. The question provided, "With regard to the death penalty, which of the
following statements would best describe your feelings: ..." (Exhibit 2, Gooding County
Jury Questionnaire) The specific answer at issue here provided:
Although I believe that the death penalty is appropriate in all first degree
murder cases, as long as the law provides that the death penalty is not
automatically imposed, I could assess a penalty other than the death
penalty under the proper set ofcircumstances.
(Exhibit 2, Gooding County Jury Questionnaire, p.17.) Any juror who adopts this view
as his or her own is saying that they believe the death penalty is appropriate in all first
degree murder cases, but would be willing to follow the law that says it is not automatic.
While the district court and the parties treated this answer as a qualifying answer, in fact
it is disqualifying. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1992) ("It may be that a
juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that
maintaining ... dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from
doing SO.,,). 8
Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
include questions adequately designed to expose prospective jurors who would
automatically impose the death penalty, including those who would impose it
automatically based on the aggravators alleged by the State. This was especially
important given the lack of voir dire on the aggravators, most notably the prior murder
8 This pre-designed answer was not listed in either the questionnaire proposed by the
defense or the State. (See R., Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibits 1-2.) At a hearing on the
questionnaire, the parties indicated that they had discussed their disagreements, and had
agreed to the proposed revision. (Tr. 8/17/07, p.46, L.11 - p.48, L.3.)
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conviction aggravator. Mr. Hall asserts that due to trial counsels' deficient performance
there is at a minimum a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the jurors that
deliberated in his case was disqualified to deliberate based on the opinion that a
defendant previously convicted of murder should be automatically sentenced to death.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Stipulating To The
Excusal Of Prospective Jurors Based Solely On Their Completed
Questionnaires
Trial counsel should not have relied on the flawed jury questionnaires as
sufficient on their own to disqualify jurors without voir dire. Nevertheless, trial counsel
entered stipulations to exclude numerous jurors based solely on their written answers.
Trial counsel initially placed the reasons for the stipulations on the record. (Tr. Vol. I
pp.49-58.) However, the vast majority of the subsequent stipulations were placed on the
record without reference to the reasons for the stipulation. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp.124-130, 153;
Tr. Vol. 2, pp.847-851; Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1832-1833; Tr. Vol. 8, pp.3748-3749, 3964.)
The rationale of United States Supreme Court precedent, in conjunction with
opinions issued by lower courts demonstrates that reliance on jury questionnaires without
follow-up voir dire is inadequate to protect a capital defendant's rights to a fair and
impartial jury. For instance, in Us. v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237 (lOth Cir. 2000), the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Supreme Court precedent as "support for [the]
assertion that voir dire is required prior to excusing a juror for cause based on his views
on capital punishment." Id., at 1269 (citations omitted); see also State v. Anderson, 4 P.3d
369, 372-379 (Ariz. 2000) (holding that it was error to excuse three jurors based solely
upon each of their responses to a juror questionnaire). The California Supreme Court has
adopted an exception to the rule, stating in part:
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[R]eliance on written responses alone to excuse prospective jurors for
cause is permissible if, from those responses, it is clear (and 'leave[s] no
doubt') that a prospective juror's views about the death penalty would
satisfy the Witt standard and that the juror is not willing or able to set aside
his or her personal views and follow the law.
People v. Wilson, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211,232 (Cal. 2008).
Without access to the completed jury questionnaires and without meaningful
access to trial counsel, Mr. Hall cannot state this claim in its entirety at this time.
However, at least one matter is clear from the jurors who were questioned; numerous
prospective jurors changed their answers during voir dire, indicating that they had been
confused, fatigued, or even disinterested when initially filling out their questionnaires.
(See e.g., Tr. Vol. II, p.361, 440, 512-13, 566) The inaccuracies in the questionnaires of
the prospective jurors who were questioned demonstrates additional problems with
relying on the questionnaires without at least some minimal voir dire.
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To
Improper Rehabilitation Of Prospective Jurors
Prior to individual voir dire, "mini-panels" (groups of five to six jurors) were
brought into the courtroom for the Court's introductory comments. The Court's
comments included, in relevant part, the following:
Selection of a jury is an extremely important part of the trial. Both sides
are entitled to a fair and impartial jury to hear the evidence in this
case. Such a jury can only be chosen if each of you is frank and honest in
your responses. Please listen carefully to these questions and those which
follow later from the attorneys.
* * *
The jury must consider all the evidence, then, both the State and the
defendant will have an opportunity to present argument for or against the
death penalty. . . . Many people have strong feelings about the death
penalty, both for it and against it. The fact that you may have such
feelings does not disqualify you to serve as a juror, as long as you are able
to put those feelings aside and apply the law as I instruct you. In other
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words, you must be willing to be bound by your oath as a juror to
obey the laws of this state in making your decision.
(Tr. Vol. 2, pA07, Ls.14-20; pA09, L.17 - pAlO, L.7) (emphasis added.) The Court's
comments subtly equated a juror's ability to be fair and impartial with the juror's ability
to set aside their preconceived views about the death penalty. While this may be
technically accurate, it sends a signal to the jurors that if they cannot set aside such views
then they are not fair and impartial.
Following each mini-panel, the Court conducted a preliminary individual voir
dire which consisted primarily of the following compound question:
I think I just have one question. It's a compound question, so you have to
hang with me all the way to the end of it. Let's assume, for purposes of
this question, sir, that you are selected to serve on this jury and that the
jury you are a part of at the appropriate time in this trial does return a
verdict of guilty to the charge of first degree murder. Will you then --
will you then, as part of the jury, weigh the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented to you in the evidence, listen to the arguments of
the attorneys, follow the Court's instruction to you on the law and
fairly consider both voting to impose the death penalty or voting for
life in prison?
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.560, Ls.9-23 (emphasis added); see also e.g., Tr. Vol. 2, p.671, L.24 -
p.673, LA; p.739, L.13 - p.741, L.12.)9 Although presumably unintended, the Court's
preliminary voir dire placed subtle pressure on the jurors to respond affirmatively to
questions whether they could follow the law and decide the case solely on evidence
elicited during the trial. Indeed, many of the prospective jurors appeared susceptible to
such suggestions; readily admitting that they felt intimidated by the process. (See e.g., Tr.
9 The compound question was complicated, and often had to be repeated. Further, the
question was not designed to elucidate the juror's true feelings about the death penalty; in
fact, the Court indicated that it was only interested in "yes" or "no" answers. (See e.g., Tr.
Vol. 2, pp.764, 890, 927,1049, 1060, 1108; Tr. Vol. 3, pp.l222, 1398, 1443, 1782, 1880,
1995, 2138; Tr. Vol. 4, pp.2348, 2397; Tr. Vol. 6, p.2612; Tr. Vol. 7, pp.2940, 2956,
3122-23; Tr. Vol. 8, pp. 3898,3912.)
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Vol. 2, p.1498, L.10 ("[Alternate Juror No.7!]: I am nervous."); Tr. Vol. 3, p.23l2,
Ls.8-9 ("Q. Good morning. How are you? A. Terrified."); p.240l, Ls.l-2 ("Q. Take a
deep breath. A. I'm still nervous."); Tr. Vol. 7, p.2709, Ls.2l-24 ("Q. Are you nervous? .
. . A. Yeah. A little bit, you know, considering."); p.2797, LsA-5 ("Q. How are you doing
this morning? A. Fine. A little nervous."); p.3023, L.2l ("It feels like I'm on trial.").);
p.3l26 ("Q. I'm wondering if you feel you are in the hot seat there. A [Juror No. 130]. I
kind of do."); Tr. Vol. 8, p.3555, Ls.5-6 ("Q. How are you today? Are you nervous? A.
Yes.").)
Following the Court's initial questioning, the State conducted its voir dire. The
ability of the State to question the jurors prior to the defense gave it a distinct tactical
advantage that lasted throughout jury selection. With the knowledge derived from the
completed questionnaires, the State methodically crafted their questions to counter any
disqualifying answers for jurors in favor of the death penalty. For example, the State
often asked "can you follow the law" and "can you be fair"-type questions designed to
preemptively "rehabilitate" jurors or otherwise prepare them for questions about
statements in their questionnaires indicating disqualifying bias or prejudice. A portion of
the voir dire for alternate Juror No. 65 illustrates the point:
Q And then in (d), you indicated -- would you consider his mental
health, and you indicated "No." Is that correct? Do you recall
that?
A I don't recall it offhand; no.
Q Understanding now that the law requires you to consider
whatever is presented to you, is that something that you would
be able to do?
A I guess I would have to; yes.
Q And then also in (e), you indicated in answer to "Would you
consider Erick Virgil Hall's leaming disabilities?", you indicated
"No." Again, is that something that you would be able to
consider?
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 25
000141
      1         
          .1     
                
                 
               
                   
                 
 
            
                 
            
           
              
                
          
            
           
            
           
 
       
          
           
    
        
             
    rn     
           
 
      
A I suspect I would have to; yes.
(Tr. Vol. 3, p.1409, L.25 - p.1410, L.B (emphasis added); see also e.g., Tr. Vol. 2,
p.572, L.20 - p.576, L.IO (seated Juror No. 16) ("Q. Any problem following the Court's
instructions and the law as the Judge would set forth to you? A. No. Q.... The Court
will tell you . . . The jurors have to listen to all the evidence before making a decision
about whether or not to impose the death penalty...."); p.865, L.5 - p.867, L.B (seated
Juror No. 28) ("Q.... In Idaho, the death penalty is not an automatic penalty. I think
that there was a question about that in the jury questionnaire...."), p.1509, L.23 -
p.1510, LA (seated alternate Juror No. 71) ("Q. And do you understand that under
Idaho law, that the death penalty is not automatic ... and you have to wait until you hear
more evidence before making that decision?"); Tr. Vol. 7, p.3147, L.20 - p.3151, L.I5
(seated Juror No. 130) ("Q.... I mean it sounds like you really would want to be fair
and impartial and listen to everything?").
Of course all jurors want to be viewed as willing to follow the law, or otherwise
fair and impartial. 10 The State used answers these types of questions to serve their
purposes. For instance, in defending against a defense motion to excuse for cause, the
State argued in part: "All of the questions that Mr. Chastain asked [the juror] related to
his beliefs ... the more important inquiry is "What would you do? Would you follow the
10 (See e.g., Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1410, LsA-7 ("Q. Understanding now that the law requires you
to consider whatever is presented to you, is that something that you would be able to do?
A. I guess I would have to; yes."); p.1802, L.B ("A. Got to follow the law. That's what
it's about."), p.2008, Ls.5-8 ("Q. Okay. As you sit here right now, do you believe that
you could give a fair and impartial reading of the case to both the State and to the
defendant." A. "Legally I have to."); Tr. Vol. 8, p.3730, Ls.3-5 ("JUROR: Well, you
know -- and I want to -- I want to be a good citizen and do my civic duty, you know, if
possible."); p.377I, Ls.16-18 ("Q.... How do you feel about sitting in judgment of
another person's actions? A. Well, ifit's my civic duty, here I am.").
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law?" (Tr. Vol. 8, p.3789, Ls.8-14.) The State's arguments resonated with the Court.
(Tr. Vol. 8, p.3793, Ls.10-13 ("THE COURT: A prospective juror's views are not the
only inquiry. I agree with Mr. Varie's arguments as to what he would do even while
holding those views.").) Trial counsel failed to anticipate and rebut the State's line of
questioning and argument based on Morgan and its progeny. In Morgan v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court recognized that general questions about whether a juror would follow the
law are not adequate in voir dire.
[J]urors could in all truth and candor respond affirmatively [to questions
of fairness], personally confident that such dogmatic views are fair and
impartial.. .. It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to
uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining ... dogmatic beliefs
about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so.
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1992). Based on this rationale, lower courts
have held that once a juror gives a clearly articulated disqualifying view on the death
penalty, then their subsequent proclamation that they can follow the judge's instructions
are inadequate to protect a capital defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial
JUry. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated:
Rehabilitation is "[the] commonly accepted terminology to describe the
questioning of a juror who has made a statement indicating bias or
prejudice. It is an inaccurate term, suggesting a goal of getting a juror to
change the biased attitude. The questioning should actually be for the
purpose of clarification or elaboration." Daniel 1. Sheehan, Jr. and Jill C.
Adler, supra, at 633, fn. 11. The better view, therefore, is that if a
prospective juror makes an inconclusive or vague statement during voir
dire reflecting or indicating the possibility of a disqualifying bias or
prejudice, further probing into the facts and background related to such
bias or prejudice is required.... Once a prospective juror has made a clear
statement during voir dire reflecting or indicating the presence of a
disqualifying prejudice or bias, the prospective juror is disqualified as a
matter of law and cannot be rehabilitated by subsequent questioning, later
retractions, or promises to be fair.
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O'Dell v. Miller, 565 S.E.2d 407, 411-12 (W. Va. 2002) (Emphasis added). For similar
reasons, Justice Bistline made the following observations:
Although the trial court is allowed considerable discretion in the manner
ofvoir dire examination of prospective jurors, it is questionable whether it
is good practice for a court to attempt to rehabilitate a juror who has stated
that he does in fact have a bias. Tremendous pressure is exerted upon a
prospective juror when a judge publicly inquires, "Will you follow the
law?" When the venireperson responds that he or she will follow the law,
it is often because of the psychological impact of publicly answering the
judge's question. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.s. at 728,81 S.Ct. at 1645. It is for
this reason that a juror must be excused for cause whenever it appears that
any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror can act with entire
impartiality.
State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 572-73, 808 P.2d 1313, 1317-18 (1991) (Bistline, J.,
dissenting).ll Therefore, answers to these types of questions should not control the
decision to excuse a juror for cause, when the juror has expressed otherwise disqualifying
views in his jury questionnaire or his voir dire. Accordingly, trial counsel should have
objected to the "follow-the-Iaw"-type instructions and questions used by both the Court
and the State, and further, counsel should have requested to rotate with the State for
questioning the jurors after the Court.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Conduct An
Adequate Voir Dire (All Jurors)
Trial counsel conducted an inadequate voir dire for all the jurors in multiple ways,
including but not limited to the following: 1) by failing to question the jurors about the
"previously convicted of murder" aggravator; and 2) by failing to question the jurors
what it means to them to "consider" mitigation.
11 While Justice Bistline's observations were made in dissent, it is important to recognize
that his observations were not rejected by the majority because the jurors subjected to
rehabilitation were struck by peremptory challenges.
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The "previously convicted of murder" aggravator: Trial counsel should have
argued that under Morgan, they were entitled to question the jurors about their views of
the death penalty in light of the specific aggravators sought to be proven by the State. See
People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342-43 (2002) (relying on Morgan v. Illinois, and reversing
death sentencing based on trial court error prohibiting defense counsel from inquiring
during voir dire whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for death penalty if
defendant had previously committed another murder.) Without knowledge of this
aggravating circumstance, prospective jurors could respond truthfully to general
questions of fairness and impartiality, as well as general questions about the death
penalty, while the specific concern was left uncovered.
The jurors' willingness to "consider" mitigation: Trial counsel failed to give
meaning to the term "consider" when jurors were asked whether they could "consider
mitigation" as required by law or instructed by the Court. For a juror to "consider"
mitigation, a juror must be willing to give it some weight. How much weight the juror
gives it is the juror's decision; however, some weight must be given as a matter of law.
Therefore, trial counsel should have inquired of all jurors, and especially those that were
resistant to mitigating circumstances, whether their definition of "consider" means "I will
listen to it but not give it any weight" as opposed to "I will listen to it and will give it
some weight, maybe a lot, maybe a little."
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A
Dual Jury To Ensure An Adequate Voir Dire On All The Aggravators
Relied Upon By The State In Seeking The Death Penalty For Mr. Hall
Trial counsel should have moved for the impanelment of two juries, one for the
guilt/innocence phase, and then a second jury, if necessary, for the sentencing phase.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 29
000145
          
               
                 
               
            
             
          
         
             
        
           
             
               
                
                 
              
            
                     
        
           
            
             
              
             
      
Trial counsel should have based their motion on at least two different grounds: 1) because
a death-qualified jury would be conviction prone in the guilt phase; and 2) because it was
impossible to life-qualify the jury without informing them of highly prejudicial prior bad
acts evidence which had been deemed inadmissible in the guilt phase. Specifically, it
was necessary to determine whether the jury could consider a sentence other than death
and take full responsibility for imposing a death sentence where the defendant had
previously been convicted of another murder and sentenced to death.
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Conduct An
Adequate Voir Dire And/Or Failing To Strike Seated Jurors
Trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate voir dire of the seated jurors,
including the alternates.
Juror No. 16: This juror recalled reading about the Hanlon case on line when it
happened. While the juror noted that he "keyed on it" because he shared the same last
name with Mr. Hall, the juror asserted that he did not recall any details. (Tr. Vol. 2,
p.565, L.8 - p.566, L.25.) The underlying criminal record establishes that the initial
reports on the Hanlon case were inextricably linked to the Henneman case. Therefore,
the chances are high that this juror was exposed to evidence about the Henneman case.
While the juror certainly had the opportunity to volunteer knowledge about the
Henneman case, based on the questions asked, he could have answered them truthfully
without referencing the Henneman case.
This juror also indicated that his niece's grandchildren were murdered by his
niece's son-in-law. The murderer in that case received a life sentence pursuant to a guilty
plea. This juror felt a life sentence in that case was appropriate punishment because the
prosecution had offered a life sentence in exchange for the plea. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.568,
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Ld.17-25; p.582, LA - p.583, L.6). However, trial counsel failed to inquire about the
juror's views on the death penalty where a murderer does not plead guilty or otherwise
accept responsibility.
This juror held disqualifying views about the death penalty based on answers in
his questionnaire wherein he indicated that he would not consider certain kinds of
mitigation evidence, including Mr. Hall's family history, mental health, behavior in jail,
and any physical and sexual abuse that Mr. Hall suffered as a child. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.586,
L.14 - p.588, L.3.) The juror did not consider this evidence to be mitigating because Mr.
Hall was presumably "capable of making a value judgment" as well as the "choice" to
kill or not to kill. For this juror, unless Mr. Hall was "totally mentally incompetent" or
unless he could not know that murder is wrong because of "total incompetence," such
evidence was not mitigating to him. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.587, Ls.2-25.)12 On voir dire, the juror
reaffirmed that those were still his beliefs. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.588, Ls.2-3.)
Based on these answers alone, the juror should have been disqualified under
Morgan, supra. Accordingly, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike
this juror for cause based on Morgan. Alternatively, counsel was ineffective for failing to
strike this juror with a peremptory challenge.
Juror No. 12: The State mischaracterized the nature of mitigation, asserting that
the Court would instruct the jurors to consider mitigating evidence but that the jurors
would "then determine what weight to give it, if any." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.681, L.25 - p.682,
12 This juror was surely influenced by the State's misconduct in closing argument which
impeded the juror's consideration of valid mitigation, focused on Mr. Hall's ability to
make choices, and argued that he did not deserve mercy because he did not show mercy.
See infra, Claim EE.
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L.3.)13 In addition, the State mischaracterized the law, informing the juror that the juror's
apparent belief that the death penalty should not be automatic for all murders was the
equivalent to "the law in the State of Idaho -- that the death penalty is only appropriate
for first degree murder cases, which is a small number of cases or a smaller number of
cases." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.681, Ls.12-17.) This argument suggests that as a first degree
murder case, Mr. Hall's case was already one of the few in which the death penalty is
appropriate. This argument is misleading; until an aggravating circumstance IS
determined to exist, the death penalty, even for first degree murder cases, IS
inappropriate. See I.C. § 19-2515. Trial counsel failed to correct or object to these
mischaracterizations, both of which tended to reduce the State's burden of proof, and the
former of which clearly was part of a theme that the State carried through its closing
argument in the sentencing phase. During trial counsels' voir dire, counsel failed to
listen and react to the juror's answers. For example, the juror had stated in his voir dire
that he felt the death penalty is appropriate in cases where a person kills for no reason.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.692, L.20 - p.693, L.14.) This suggests that the juror held the view that the
death penalty is appropriate for any kind of homicide which is committed without
justification. Trial counsel failed to adequately question the juror's views, and instead,
resorted leading questions and a scripted monologue designed to instruct on the law as
opposed to asking additional questions to reveal the juror's views on the death penalty.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.693, L.10 - p.697, L.17.) Indeed, trial counsel failed to ask any questions
to determine whether the juror could give full consideration and effect to Mr. Hall's
13 This voir dire paralleled the State's closing argument in which it argued that Mr. Hall's
evidence was not mitigating in part because it did not cause him to commit his crimes.
See infra, Claim EE.
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mitigation evidence. As a consequence, counsel and Mr. Hall could not make an
informed descision whether to strike this juror with a peremptory challenge.
Juror No. 23: The State again mischaracterized the nature of mitigation, asserting
that the Court would instruct the jurors to consider mitigating evidence but that the jurors
would "then determine whether it weighs heavily or weighs a little or not at all." (Tr.
Vol. 2, p.747, Ls.2_3.)14 Ultimately, trial counsel's voir dire was inadequate to reveal
this juror's true feelings about the death penalty. Trial counsel failed to ask the juror
about any mitigation. As a consequence, trial counsel could not intelligently determine
how to exercise their peremptory challenges.
Juror No. 28: This juror's responsibility for imposing the death penalty was
diminished by her flawed assumptions about the appellate process. In relevant part, the
juror stated:
I feel okay about [the death penalty]. I'm glad that we have a -- quite a
long appeal process so that when somebody isn't really guilty like you
have assumed, it's overturned. So I feel like we really don't ever put
anyone to death that is innocent. ... I hope that's right.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.863, Ls.14-20.) Trial counsel's follow-up was inadequate. Specifically,
trial counsel asked the juror whether she would be "more inclined" to give the death
penalty due to her understanding of the appellate process, to which the juror stated, no
because you cannot always count on the appellate process to fix errors. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.885,
L.9 - p.886, L.9.) However, the juror was not asked whether her understanding of the
process would impact her assessment of the evidence, or otherwise provide her some
degree of reassurance. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike this
14 See supra, Claim E.
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juror for cause based on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). Alternatively, trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to strike this juror with a peremptory challenge.
Juror No. 82: This juror stated that his stepdaughter had been raped and that he
believed justice had not been served in her case. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.1837, L.19 - p.1838, L.2.)
On his questionnaire this juror rated himself a 10 out of lOin favor ofthe death penalty.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.1863, L.21 - p.1864, L.l.) During voir dire, the juror stated his rating
might be lower, perhaps an 8 out of 10. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.1863, L.21 - p.1864, L.6.)
Regardless of his self-rating, whether 8 out of 10 or 10 out of 10, this juror's explanation
for that rating is indicative ofhis disqualifying views on the death penalty.
A Taking someone else's life is one that is inexcusable.
Q Okay.
A And even though I can see myself agreeing with mItIgating
circumstances where the person, I don't know, is mentally
challenged or, you know, other reasons that would allow that
person to not be given the death penalty, I just feel that someone of
sound mind and body planning to kill somebody else and goes
through with that, there's a need for that type of sentence, I believe.
Q Okay. I think that's pretty well reflected in some of your other
answers to the questions. Question 78, "The best argument in
favor of the death penalty is?" And your answer was
"Premeditated murder." Do you remember that?
A Uh-huh. Vh-huh.
Q Clearly -- I guess one more I would like to refer to is -- it says -- 89
is the question, for Court and counsel. "Do you believe in, quote,
'an eye for an eye'," unquote. And you circled "Yes." Do you
remember that?"
A Vh-huh.
Q And then your explanation was "I believe in the Bible."
A Uh-huh.
Q You are going to have to say "Yes" or "No" --
A Yes.
(Tr. Vol. 3, p.1864, L.20 - p.1865, L.23.)
In essence, the juror is stating two related disqualifying views. First, the juror
believes that all first degree murderers should be sentenced to death. This belief tends to
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negate or diminish the State's burden of proving aggravating circumstances, and is
inconsistent with Idaho law and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Second, although the
juror understands that mental retardation might preclude imposition of the death penalty,
short of that, the juror would not give meaningful consideration to mitigation in a case of
premeditated murder.
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike this juror for cause
based on Morgan. Alternatively, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike this
juror with a peremptory challenge.
Juror No. 9115: This juror's sister-in-law was recently murdered, and the case
was on-going at the time of Mr. Hall's trial. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.2042, L.18 - p.2045, L.2.) In
addition, this juror had heard something about the case but could not recall exactly at the
time of his voir dire. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.2030, L.8 - p.203I, L.8 ("I can't recall anything right
offhand. I'm sure I heard something... ,,).)16
During the State's voir dire, the juror indicated that some people had approached
her to discuss the case; the juror suggested that some people did not honor her request not
to talk about it, so she had to walk away. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.2030, Ls.19-23.) Trial counsel
failed to follow-up on this line of questioning.
15 This juror suffered from significant motion sickness, and special arrangements were
suggested for her bus trips. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.2046, L.3 - p.205I, L.8.) The record does not
indicate whether the juror was adversely affected by the arrangement. Due to the current
prohibition on jury contact, Mr. Hall cannot investigate this matter.
16 While these facts, i.e., relationships with other victims and knowledge of the case,
when taken in isolation are not necessarily disqualifying, it must at least be recognized
that multiple jurors who deliberated in Mr. Hall's case were related to victims of murder
or other serious crimes and had some knowledge of his case. Mr. Hall asserts that the
cumulative effect of these shared tragic experiences and shared knowledge rendered his
jury biased and his trial unfair.
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In terms of the death penalty, this juror believed that it should be imposed when a
victim of murder dies violently or where the murder is accompanied by rape. (Tr. Vol. 3,
p.2052, L.23 - p.2057, L.2l.) This juror was not questioned about mitigation. It appears
that this juror was generally in favor of the death penalty; however, without access to her
completed jury questionnaire, it is impossible to say how her views were reflected in
writing. It is clear however that the State methodically questioned this juror with a series
of "follow-the-Iaw"-type questions and instructions. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.2038, LsA-l5; p.2039,
Ls.l8-2l ("... What you are required to do under the law is fairly consider whatever is
presented to you.").) Nevertheless, Mr. Hall asserts that based on her views about the
death penalty, she was excludable under Morgan. Alternatively, trial counsel failed to
conduct an adequate voir dire to reveal the juror's views about the death penalty and to
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges.
Juror No. 97: This juror indicated that he did not consider a capital defendant's
family history or learning difficulties to be mitigating, and just "possibly" would consider
behavior in jail and mental health mitigating. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.2ll2, L.23 - p.2l13, L.3.) To
"rehabilitate" the juror, the State asked the following: "If the Judge instructed you to
listen to that to consider it and to use that information in your weighing in determining
whether the death penalty is appropriate, could you do that ... and you would be willing
to follow the law?" (Tr. Vol. 3, p.2l13, LsA-9.) Of course, for reasons stated above, the
juror answered affirmatively to both questions. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.2l13, Ls.8-l0.) But what
this really means is that the juror would be willing to put the evidence on the figurative
scale with other mitigation for purposes of weighing; however, the juror had already
clearly indicated that he would assign it no weight. A district court cannot instruct a juror
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 36
000152
                
                
   1           
                
              
               
         .4 1   
.1 1                 
              
            
                
    
              
             
          11   1    
              
                
                
       1  .4         
         1  -1    
                 
             
                
      
how much weight to give mitigating evidence. Accordingly, where a juror indicates that
he or she does not believe certain evidence is mitigating, it is inconsistent as a matter of
law to ask the juror whether he or she would give it weight if so instructed by the judge.
For these reasons, trial counsel should have moved to strike this juror for cause
under Morgan. Alternatively, trial counsel should have exercised a peremptory
challenge.
Juror No. 101: This juror, whose daughter is a prosecutor for the Boise City
Attorney's Office, rated herself 10 out of 10 in favor of the death penalty. (Tr. Vol. 4,
p.2252, Ls.16-22.) In some cases, including torture, this juror indicated that the death
penalty is the only just punishment. (Tr. Vol. 4, p.2252, L.24 - p.2253, L.13.) Trial
counsel obtained nothing, and apparently sought nothing, about the juror's death penalty
views during his voir dire. Nevertheless, trial counsel should have moved to strike this
juror for cause under Morgan.
Juror No. 112: This juror represents yet another juror who sat who had a close
family member murdered; in this case, his father-in-law was murdered years ago but the
case has not been solved and is still ongoing. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.2674, Ls.2-l6; p.2676, L.ll -
p.2677, L.24.) The juror indicated that despite the tragedy, he "thinks" he could be fair,
and that he has a high regard for law enforcement. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.2674, L.16; p.2677,
Ls.12-20.) In addition, this juror also had some recollection about the Hanlon case from
pretrial publicity, but unlike other jurors, at least expressed certainty about his
knowledge, which on its face does not appear disqualifying in and of itself. (Tr. Vol. 2,
p.2678, LsA-8 ("Just I vaguely remember when it happened and where the body was
found ... That's it. I never heard anything more about it. That was it.").)
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Trial counsel conducted a very limited voir dire, focusing on the juror's research
with the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration Service. Ultimately, trial
counsel passed this juror for cause without receiving any meaningful information about
his views on the death penalty.
Juror No. 130: This juror was aware of the Henneman case, but did not recall
who if anyone had been arrested for that case. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.3133, L.18 - p.3134, L.6.)
It appears that this juror indicated some disqualifying views, or at least very pro-
death penalty views on her questionnaire. For instance, the juror indicated that she
believed the crime of aggravated rape should be eligible for the death penalty. (Tr. Vol. 7,
p.3I73, Ls.5-I9 ("... A rapist takes so much away from the victim, it's a different mind-
set to me.").) The State subjected the juror to "follow-the-Iaw"-type questions in
conjunction with a series leading questions based on the juror's questionnaire designed to
insulate the juror from questions by the defense.
Q ... If the Court instructs you that you have to listen and consider
the evidence and then determine what weight to give it, could you
do that?
* * *
Q Okay. I got the general sense from your questionnaire that you
were wanting to hear the evidence and consider everything before
you would make a sentencing decision like that.
* * *
Q So are you the kind of person that would not want to be in the
position to automatically make that decision before you have heard
all of the evidence?
* * *
Q And in question 76 about the death penalty never being imposed
you said, "I don't believe in never." I mean it sounds like you
really would want to be fair and impartial and listen to everything.
(Tr. Vol. 7, p.3148, Ls.2-4; p.3I50, Ls.9-I2; p.3I50, Ls.22-24; p.3I51, Ls.12-I5.)
Trial counsel should have objected to this line of questioning. See supra, Claim E.
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Further, based on this juror's views about rape and the death penalty, trial counsel should
have moved to strike the juror for cause, and alternatively, should have struck this juror
with a peremptory challenge.
Juror No. 134: This juror recalled the Henneman case and at least loosely
associated that murder with Mr. Hall, although she could not say for certain.
Q . . . Well in this case, we gave you a little bit of a summary in the
jury questionnaire of what the facts are about, not a lot of
information that we are able to give you at this point, but enough to
see if you recall anything about the case. Any spark or memory of
this case at all from the news or any other source?
A I recall hearing something about -- and I don't even know if it was
this case -- about a young lady that was found on a path or she was
an airline flight attendant or something."
(Tr. Vol. 7, p.3193, L.12 - p.3194, L.l.)
This juror noted that a co-worker had a daughter who was murdered, and knows
the difficulty that her co-worker suffered. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3191, L.24 - p.3193, L.Il.)
Trial counsel conducted a very short voir dire without any follow-up questions on
the pretrial publicity or her co-worker's experience. Trial counsel asked only a few
questions about the death penalty; inadequate overall to permit counsel to make an
informed decision on peremptory challenges.
Juror No. 131: This juror's aunt was murdered by her uncle. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3220,
L.IO - p.3222, L.7.) On questioning by the district court, the juror indicated that she
could be fair and impartial. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3221, L.1O - p.3222, L.7.) This juror is an
acquaintance of Juror No. 82, the jury foreman. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3227, Ls.4-21.)
This juror may have been mitigation impaired as she indicated she would
"consider" evidence but not necessarily "deem" it to be mitigating. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3235,
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Ls.14-18.) The State, by recharacterizing her answer in her questionnaire and then by
asking a series of leading questions, sought to "rehabilitate" the juror without any
objection or follow-up by the defense. (Tr. Vol. 7, p.3236, Ls.2-20.) Indeed, trial
counsel's voir dire ofthis juror represents one of the worst examples of defense voir dire
through the entirety of jury selection, perhaps attributable at least in part to fatigue. In
any event, seemingly working from a scripted monologue, counsel received the
occasional one-word answer before passing the juror for cause. Trial counsel should
have moved to strike the juror for cause under Morgan. In addition, due to an inadequate
voir dire, trial counsel was unable to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges.
Alternate Juror No. 65: As noted above, this juror was subjected to improper
"rehabilitation" by the State. Specifically, it appears that the juror indicated in his
questionnaire that he would not consider a defendant's mental health or learning
disabilities as mitigation. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.1409, L.25 - p.1410, L.9.) Drawing upon these
answers, the State sought to "rehabilitate" the juror by asking whether he would be
unwilling or unable to follow the law.
Q Understanding now that the law requires you to consider whatever
is presented to you, is that something that you would be able to do?
A I guess I would have to; yes.
Q And then also in (e), you indicated in answer to "Would you
consider Erick Virgil Hall's learning disabilities?", you indicated
"No." Again, is that something that you would be able to
consider?
A I suspect I would have to; yes.
(Tr. Vol. 3, p.1409, L.25 - p.l410, L.13.)
Based on the juror's disqualifying views contained in his questionnaire, and his
revealing responses during the State's voir dire, i.e., "I guess I would have to" and "I
suspect I would have to" consider mitigation, trial counsel should have moved to strike
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this juror for cause under Morgan. Alternatively, trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to strike this juror with a peremptory challenge.
Alternate No. Juror 71: This juror was subjected to the same improper
rehabilitation of being informed about the law and then asked whether she would follow
the law. The juror's response to these questions is revealing, "Why are these things hard
to say?" (Tr. Vol. 3, p.1510, Ls.15.) That is the point of what should have been an
objection, namely, these questions are not eliciting useful information because a juror has
every incentive to say "yes, of course I will follow the law." That is easy. This is not to
say that all jurors who say they will follow the law and the judge's instructions are lying,
it is just to say that such questions are not valid "rehabilitation" because they do little if
anything to clarify the juror's views on the death penalty.
Trial counsel received no meaningful information from their voir dire. It is
difficult to prove prejudice from trial counsels' deficient performance without access to
the completed jury questionnaires and without the opportunity to depose counsel. At this
point, Mr. Hall, while reserving the right to amend his petition, asserts that trial counsels'
performance, at a minimum, prevented them from intelligently exercising their
peremptory challenges.
Alternate Juror No. 146: This juror indicated that the best argument in favor of
the death penalty is if the defendant had a long history of crime and the best argument
against the death penalty is if the defendant has no prior history of violence. (Tr. Vol. 8,
p.3538, L.14 - p.3359, L.24.) While this juror appears to be an unfavorable juror in light
of Mr. Hall's case, without access to her completed questionnaire, and without deposing
trial counsel, it is impossible to fully state any claim relating to this juror.
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Alternate Juror No. 156: Trial counsel obtained nothing from this voir dire. It
appears that trial counsel was so discouraged by prior court rulings, or so fatigued by the
jury selection process, that counsel simply gave up any effort.
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Conduct
Any Voir Dire
Prospective Juror No. 17: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to conduct any voir dire of prospective Juror No. 17. (See generally,
Tr. Vol. 2, pp.598-642.) This juror was excused over defense objection on the State's
motion to strike for cause. Trial counsel had a duty to clarify the juror's answers in his
questionnaire and his answers during the State's voir dire, especially given the juror's
statement that he was opposed to the death penalty but willing to follow the law. (Tr.
Vol. 2, p.602, Ls.l2-24.) Under the standard generally employed and argued by the
Court and the State respectively, this juror should not have been excluded based on his
views on the death penalty. Mr. Hall must review the juror's completed questionnaire
and must depose trial counsel to fully state this claim.
Prospective Juror No. 87: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to conduct any voir dire of prospective Juror No. 87. (See generally,
Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1879-1922, L.8.) This juror was excused over defense objection on the
State's motion to strike for cause. Trial counsel requested limited voir dire which was
denied on the grounds that the request to voir dire was untimely. (Tr. Vol. 3, p.l916, L.14
-p.1918, L.9.)
Mr. Hall must review the juror's completed questionnaire, must interview the
juror, and must depose trial counsel to fully state this claim for relief. Nevertheless, Mr.
Hall asserts that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in the following ways: 1) by
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failing to argue that under I.C.R. 24 the request was timely; 2) by failing to request a trial
on the State's challenge for cause during which they could examine the juror on the bases
relied upon by the State and the Court; 3) by failing to argue that under Idaho law,
including I.C.R. 24, as well as federal constitutional law that the defense had a right to
voir dire and that the voir dire conducted by the district court and the State was
inadequate; 4) by failing to argue that it constitutes a violation of Idaho and federal
constitutional law to permit the State voir dire while denying the defense an equal
opportunity to voir dire and possibly rehabilitate the juror; 5) by failing to argue that it
constitutes a violation of Idaho and federal constitutional law to excuse a juror on
grounds not argued by the State while denying the defense an opportunity to question the
juror on those grounds; 6) by failing to argue that it violates the juror's state and federal
constitutional rights, including due process and equal protection, by excusing the juror for
"intellectual and cognitive deficiencies" where, even if assuming the juror had difficulty
following the questioning, numerous other jurors passed for cause likewise had such
difficulty; and 7) assuming arguendo that the Court was correct in denying voir dire, by
failing to conduct a timely voir dire.
Prospective Juror No. 123: Trial counsel failed to conduct any voir dire of this
prospective juror. (See generally, Tr. Vol. 7, p.2968, L.8 - p.3007, L.9.) This juror was
excused over defense objection on the State's motion to strike for cause. Trial counsel
rendered deficient performance in failing to conduct a voir dire of this juror. Mr. Hall
must review the juror's completed questionnaire, must interview the juror, and must
depose trial counsel to fully state this claim for relief.
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8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Strike For
Cause Jurors Struck With Peremptory Strikes
Without access to the jury questionnaires, and without deposing trial counsel, it is
impossible for Mr. Hall to fully state this claim.
9. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Adequately
Move For Cause
Trial counsel failed to adequately argue all of their motions to strike for cause,
including the following prospective jurors: Juror 14 (Tr. Vol. 2, pp.477-517); Juror 58
(Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1245-l323); Juror 78 (Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1591-1649); Juror 84 (Tr. Vol. 3,
pp.1781-1829); Juror 95 (Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1930-1993); Juror 106 (Tr. Vol. 4, pp.2395-
2469); Juror 120 (Tr. Vol. 7, pp.2871-2929); Juror 138 (Tr. Vol. 7, pp.3291-3359);
Juror 147 (Tr. Vol. 8, pp.3430-3501); and Juror 165 (Tr. Vol. 8, pp.3765-3808).
Trial counsels' deficient performance included, but is not limited to, their failure
to raise all grounds for excusal, e.g., failing to argue that Juror 78 and Juror 95 should
have been excluded under Morgan, failing to argue that Juror 106's views about repeat
offenders are excludable under Morgan, failing to argue (with the exception of Juror 120)
that the district court must resolve close calls about juror partiality in favor of the
defendant, and failing to argue against judicial findings based on anything other than the
voir dire conducted by both parties. Mr. Hall must review the juror's completed
questionnaire and must depose trial counsel to fully state this claim.
10. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Strike Pro-
Death Penalty Jurors With Peremptory Challenges
Trial counsel indicated that due to the Court's rulings on their motions to excuse
for cause, they were denied their ability to use peremptory challenges on various other
jurors, including for instance, Juror No. 97. (Tr. Vol. 8, p.4032, L.l3 - p.4037, L.19; Tr.
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Vol. 9, p.4303, L.19 - p.4304, L.24.) Trial counsel should have moved for additional
peremptory challenges. In addition, trial counsel should have argued that the use of their
peremptory challenges on jurors that they had moved to strike for cause (and should have
been struck for cause) violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution as well as Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.17
11. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Adequately
Inquire Into The Basque Conversations
The record indicates that prior to voir dire, the jury panel convened at the Basque
Center located in the city of Gooding. There was discussion at multiple tables about
Mr. Hall and his case, including the fact that he had already been convicted of murdering
Lynn Henneman. (See e.g., Tr. Vol. 2761, L.7 - p.2765, L.15.) Although multiple jurors
were questioned about the conversations at length, it appears that some of the jurors had
already been struck by stipulation and were not recalled for an investigation. Trial
counsel should have asked for a greater investigation of this incident, including but not
limited to, recalling any jurors who had been excused without questions about the
17 The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 569-70, 808
P.2d 1313, 1314-15 (1991), seemingly precludes this argument in many respects.
However, even assuming arguendo that Ramos is on point, trial counsel should have
argued for a change in existing Idaho precedent and otherwise preserved the error for
federal review by relying on the arguments set forth in the Ramos dissent. See id, at 572-
75, 808 P.2d at 1317-20 (distinguishing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), and
relying instead on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), for the rule that the
impairment of the right to peremptory challenges is reversible error). In addition, Ramos
did not address a claimed violation of due process under the analysis of Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387 (1985). In that regard, trial counsel should have argued that the State of
Idaho, by providing peremptory challenges, "must comport with the demands of Due
Process" to ensure that a defendant can meaningfully exercise those challenges. Id., at
393. It cannot be contested that the State of Idaho, when providing peremptory
challenges, presumed that district courts would follow the law and grant motions to strike
for cause when appropriate.
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incident. There was an unacceptable risk of a tainted jury. To prove prejudice, Mr. Hall
needs to review the completed jury questionnaires and interview the jurors.
12. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To
Deviation From Procedure Mandating That Alternates Be Removed By
Lot
Idaho Criminal Rule 24 provides for the use of a struck jury. I.C.R. 24(e). A
struck jury system provides greater information to the respective parties when exercising
their peremptory challenges, because they are working from a known pool of jurors
previously questioned and passed for cause. However, the rule retains an element of
chance. Specifically, alternates are identified by lot "[a]t the conclusion of closing
arguments." I.C.R. 24(d)(1).
The procedure adopted by the Court, while following the struck jury method
generally, deviated from the rule by removing the element of chance in the determination
of alternates. Without objection from trial counsel, the Court gave notice to the parties
that it would pre-identify, but not inform, the alternate jurors by designating jurors in
positions one through twelve as the initial panel and those in positions thirteen through
sixteen as the alternates. In addition, as peremptory challenges were exercised on jurors
in positions one through twelve, those positions would not be filled by jurors in positions
thirteen through sixteen would be jumped by jurors later in line. As a consequence,
jurors in positions thirteen through sixteen had no chance of being part of the initial panel
unless one of the first twelve jurors was removed during the trial.
In State v. Latham, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "The purpose of the
random selection of jurors is to ensure a fair trial by an impartial jury." State v. Latham,
98 Idaho 558, 569 P.2d 362 (1977). While Latham predated the adoption of Rule 24 (e),
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the Idaho Supreme Court noted that a certain degree of chance is a necessary element of
jury selection. The procedure adopted in Mr. Hall's case eliminated the element of
chance in the selection of alternates. While this procedure arguably gave the parties more
notice of who would sit on the jury, it created the possibility for the parties to manipulate
who would likely deliberate and created an incentive for the parties to ignore jurors who
were in positions thirteen through sixteen, and especially those in positions fifteen and
sixteen. Although addressing a different sort of variance, the Idaho Supreme Court's
rationale extends to this case.
This procedure is not the one prescribed by Idaho law. . . . Peremptory
challenges are to be used to strike a particular juror, but not to choose his
replacement. "The right is one of rejection, i.e. defendant is entitled to a
fair trial by an impartial jury, but he is not entitled to have a particular
juror selected." (emphasis added) 3 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, s 441
(12th ed. 1975).... This Court has held that the element of chance is
inherent in the selection of a jury.... "Such a course is not a mistake in
procedure, it is substitution of procedure...." Any replacement jurors for
jurors peremptorily challenged should have been selected from the entire
pool at random. To adopt another procedure is error and here it requires
reversal of the conviction.
Latham, 98 Idaho at 560, 569 P.2d at 364. Likewise, the determination of alternates
should have been selected by chance, drawn by lot as required by law. Trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to a deviation in procedure that the
Supreme Court has adopted to ensure a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.
13. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To
Systematic Discrimination Of Jurors Based On Their Economic Status
A court may appropriately excuse a prospective juror from jury service where that
service would constitute "an undue financial hardship." Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946). In Thiel, the Supreme Court has held that "[jury service] is a
duty that cannot be shirked on a plea of inconvenience or decreased earning power. Only
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when the financial embarrassment is such as to impose a real burden and hardship does a
valid excuse of this nature appear." Id. However, before excusing a juror on such
grounds, a court must make an inquiry into the situation and make a decision based on
sufficient evidence, and not mere speculation. The systematic exclusion of jurors which
is effectively based on their socio-economic status, no matter how well-intentioned,
violates the Constitution. As the Supreme Court stated,
[The] exclusion of all those who earn a daily wage cannot be justified by
federal or state law.... Wage earners, including those who are paid by the
day, constitute a very substantial portion of the community, a portion that
cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in whole or in part
without doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury system. Were
we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would [encourage] whatever
desires those responsible for the selection of jury panels may have to
discriminate against persons of low economic and social status.... It is
clear that a federal judge would be justified in excusing a daily wage
earner for whom jury service would entail an undue financial hardship.
But that fact cannot support the complete exclusion of all daily wage
earners regardless of whether there is actual hardship involved. . . . It is
likewise immaterial that the jury which actually decided the factual issue
in the case was found to contain at least five members of the laboring
class. The evil lies in the admitted wholesale exclusion of a large class of
wage earners in disregard of the high standards of jury selection. To
reassert those standards, to guard against the subtle undermining of the
jury system, requires a new trial by a jury drawn from a panel properly
and fairly chosen.
Thiel, 328 U.S. at 222-25.
At least twenty-one prospective jurors were excluded to some degree, if not
exclusively, based on financial hardship. (See generally, Tr. Vol. 2, pp.262, 387, 552,
706, 714, 734; Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1220, 1243, 1377, 1395, 1454, 1495; Tr. Vol. 4, p.2342; Tr.
Vol. 7, pp.2952, 2965, 3263, 3272; Tr. Vol. 8, pp.3686, 3926, 3696, 3907.)18 Many of
18 Without accessing the completed jury questionnaires, it is impossible to determine how
many additional jurors were struck by stipulation based solely on the questionnaires. See
supra, Claim E, incorporated by reference.
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such jurors that were struck were closer demographically to Mr. Hall (younger
individuals with less education of lower economic and social status), than those passed
for cause. As a consequence, it appears that the jury that deliberated was
disproportionately composed of persons who were either salaried or retired persons. It is
generally understood with some empirical support that older persons tend to support the
death penalty more than younger people. Accordingly, the removal of these prospective
jurors not only undermined Mr. Hall's constitutional right to a jury representing a fair
cross-section of the community, but also appeared to increase the chances that the jury
chosen would impose the death penalty.
Mr. Hall concedes that given the fact that venue was not moved from Ada County
to Gooding County, the district court was correct in honoring most, if not all, of the
stipulations by the parties which excused jurors based on financial hardship. However,
Mr. Hall contends that many, if not all, of these jurors would not have been excused for
financial hardship had venue been changed to Gooding County, allowing the jurors an
additional four to five hours a day to attempt to attend their employment obligations. 19
14. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Ensure
Adequate Procedural Safeguards
Trial counsel failed to ensure that adequate procedural safeguards were observed.
Specifically, trial counsel performed deficiently in the following ways: 1) by failing to
ensure that all proceedings were recorded; 2) by failing to ensure that the jury was timely
19 The prospective jurors were not asked whether, if the trial were held in Gooding
County rather than in Ada County, they would suffer the same hardship, whether
financial or otherwise.
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impaneled; and 3) by failing to ensure that the daily schedule, including the schedule for
deliberations, did not create an undue hardship on the jury.
The recording requirement: There were numerous off-the-record discussions
during jury selection; many of which pertained to the basis for stipulated excusals; others
involved actual argument by counsel, the exercise of peremptory challenges, and even
trial counsels' timely objection to the jury. (See generally, Tr. Vol. 2, pp.657, 662, 736,
828; Tr. Vol. 3, pp.1l54, 1640, 1666, 1777, 2014, 2090, 2182; Tr. Vol. 4, p.2394; Tr.
Vol. 6, p.2623; Tr. Vol. 7, pp.2868, 2951, 2965, 3263, 3374; Tr. Vol. 8, pp.3550, 3609,
3674, 3686, 3695, 3704, 3744, 3842, 3857, 3892, 3907, 3926, 3990,4018-4019, 4022.)
The requirement that all proceedings be recorded serves multiple functions, not the least
of which is to provide an adequate record for appeal. In capital cases, the recording
requirement also serves the purpose of ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner. See infra Claim C, incorporated herein by reference.
Delay in impaneling the jury: The Court and the parties concluded that the
requisite number ofjurors had been passed for cause on September 22,2007. Rather than
immediately exercise peremptory challenges and impanel the jury, the jurors were
instructed to respond ten days later on October 2, 2007 for peremptory challenges. This
constituted a deviation from procedures, where such procedures are necessary to protect
Mr. Hall's right to a fair and impartial jury. See I.C.R.24. Trial counsel should have
objected to this procedure as another example of forced deviation from due process
arising from the refusal to change venue.
Scheduling: There is currently an inadequate record to determine whether the
jury was instructed that they need not deliberate passed 5:00 p.m. every night and that
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they did not have to deliberate on Saturday. See LC.A.R., Rule 65. While the Court
indicated that the jury was informed of their choice at least on the first day of guilt-phase
deliberations, that instruction took place off-the-record and was otherwise insufficient to
ensure that the rule was satisfied. (See Tr. Vol. 10, p.5695, L.25 - p.5695, L.25; p.5699,
Ls.8-25; Tr. Vol. 11, p.5840, Ls.l4-22.) Trial counsel should have objected to the guilt-
phase verdicts based on the inadequate record.
In addition, trial counsel should have objected to the daily schedules which only
accounted for a fifteen-minute "lunch" recess when normally jurors would be allotted a
full lunch break. This was again another deviation from normal practice and procedures
to accommodate the logistics of bussing in the jurors from Gooding County. Mr. Hall
asserts that he was prejudiced due to lagging attention of a fatigued and undernourished
jury. Mr. Hall must interview the jurors, and depose trial counsel to make an informed
decision whether to revise or withdraw this claim.
F. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT
MR. HALL'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
JURY IN LIGHT OF THE EXPOSURE TO EXTRANEOUS
PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION BY JUROR NO. 130 AND JUROR NO. 82
After trial began, Juror No. 82 and Juror No. 130 were both independently
exposed to extraneous prejudicial information. The Court independently questioned both
jurors about the separate incidents. The Court's questioning was not designed to reveal
bias or prejudice, but rather to "rehabilitate" the jurors to ensure the avoidance of a
mistrial. Ultimately, the Court ruled that both jurors were fit to serve and denied trial
counsels' motion to excuse the jurors.
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The purpose of this claim is not to litigate this direct appeal issue. Instead,
Mr. Hall claims that his trial counsel should have done more to protect his rights to a fair
and impartial jury. First, trial counsel should have objected to the Court's manner and
scope of questioning. See supra, Claim F. Second, trial counsel should have requested
the opportunity to question the jurors themselves. Third, trial counsel should also have
asserted a violation of the Eighth Amendment and should have clearly articulated that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires heightened procedural
safeguards in capital cases. Fourth, trial counsel should have argued that the Idaho
Constitution provides even greater protection than the federal constitution. Mr. Hall
asserts that these failures constituted ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a reversal
of his convictions and death sentence.
G. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF MR. HALL'S MARCH 2003
INTERROGATIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Trial counsel filed a Motion to Suppress on March 15, 2004. (R., pp.l00-l04.)
However, trial counsel failed to adequately argue that the interrogations in or around
March of 2003, in addition to violating due process, it also violated the right to remain
silent and right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Further, trial counsel failed to support their motion with expert testimony
establishing that the statements made to law enforcement during the interrogations were
the result of coercion, rendering the statements involuntary.
In addition to failing to suppress the statements, trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in allowing the jury to use and review inaccurate transcripts of the
interrogations. Trial counsel admitted, during guilt phase opening statements, that the
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transcripts were not accurate. (Tr. Vol. 9, pA128, Ls. 4-25.) In addition to being
inaccurate, the transcripts were heavily redacted. Part of the redacted information
included Mr. Hall's description of the abuse he suffered as a child. See infra, Claim G.
Trial counsel should have argued to have the detailed accounts of abuse, offered by Mr.
Hall at the end of the interrogation, included in the transcript reviewed by the jury.
Failure to do so was ineffective. Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as trial counsel has
refused to cooperate with post-conviction counsel.
H. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILURE TO CHOOSE AND PRESENT A CLEAR AND PERSUASIVE
THEORY OF THE CASE THROUGH ALL PHASES OF THE TRIAL,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, OPENING STATEMENT
Trial counsel must choose a theory of the case which is both persuasive and
supported by evidence. In this case, trial counsel presented no theory of the case and
gave only vague and cryptic statements during guilt phase opening statement, which
offered no guidance to the jury.
Effective counsel must formulate a theory of the case, and when possible, should
seek a theory that will be effective in connection with both guilt and penalty phases. ABA
Guidelines, Guideline 10.10.1. Counsel must continually reassess their theory of the case
through pretrial investigation and preparation to "avoid becoming a prisoner of his or her
theory." NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (herein "NLADA Guidelines"),
Guideline 4.3 (1995) ("Theory of the Case"); Commentary, NLADA Guidelines, fn.2
(quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Trial Manual 5 for the Defense of Criminal Cases
(1988), Section 107). Counsel should advance their theory "during all phases of the trial,
including jury selection, witness preparation, pretrial motions, opening statement,
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presentation of evidence, and closing argument." Commentary to ABA Guidelines,
Guideline 10.10.1. The failure oftrial counsel to present a theory of their case constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[D]enying an accused the right to make final arguments on his theory of the defense
denies him the right to assistance of counsel." (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
858 (1975)).)
In fact, "the opening statement holds a uniquely important place in the trial
because it is the lens through which the jury views and evaluates the entire trial." State v.
Gutierrez, 162 P.3d 156, 163 (N.M. 2007). "The purpose of an opening statement is to
give the broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it." Bailey v. United
States, 831 A.2d 973, 981 (D.C. 2003). Opening statements allow the jury to "appreciate
the significance of the evidence as it is presented." State v. Thompson, 68 S.W.3d 393,
394 (Mo. 2002) (en bane). See also Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 928-929 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding trial counsel ineffective in capital case based on multiple penalty-
phase deficiencies, and noting counsel waived penalty phase opening statement, which
was "his first opportunity to explain the significance of the mitigating evidence to the
jury"). Opening statement presents defense counsel with the first formal opportunity to
influence the jury's perception of the evidence. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
612 (1976) (Burger, C.l., concurring) (noting that the purpose of opening statement "is to
state what evidence will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what
is to follow and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole ....").
In this case, trial counsel's opening statement lasted for two minutes and forty-
five seconds. (R., p.1 051.) During this time trial counsel did not present a theory of the
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case or give the jury a lens through which to view the evidence. Instead, trial counsel
started out by thanking the jury for their service and asked them to keep and open mind
and follow their oath. Trial counsel also noted that much of the evidence would be
unpleasant, sad, and "something that nobody wants to hear" but that they would need to
keep an open mind. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4128, Ls.1-6.)
After this perfunctory introduction, trial counsel then turned to the heart of their
opening statement, asking the jury to pay careful attention to the taped interview of
Mr. Hall. Trial counsel emphasized three times that they would, at some point never
specified, be asking the jury to pay careful attention to the audio and video of the
interrogation. Trial counsel described how this would not be an easy task because the
audio of the interview was poor and it was not always clear what the people on the tape
were saying. Despite this admission, trial counsel never explained to the jury what it was
they should be listening for. Instead, trial counsel said that there would "be parts of that
interview that we are going to at some point try to emphasize and ask you to look at and
take into context." (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4129, Ls.5-8.) During opening statements trial counsel
never explained the significance of Mr. Hall's interrogation tape and its relationship to
the jury's ultimate decision even though this was the only opportunity to do so before the
jury listened to the tape.
In concluding the opening statement, trial counsel told the jury to keep an open
mind because at the end of the trial he would "suggest" that the evidence did not
demonstrate Mr. Hall was guilty of first degree murder. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4129, Ls.9-14.)
He never told the jury why the evidence would not demonstrate Mr. Hall was guilty of
first degree murder. Likewise, counsel never definitively stated that the evidence would
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show Mr. Hall was in fact, not guilty of first degree murder. Instead trial counsel only
stated that he would make that suggestion. Trial counsel then, once again, desperately
begged the jury to keep an open mind. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4129, Ls.15-18.)
Viewing the opening statement in its entirety, there is no question that it was
objectively unreasonable and ineffective. Trial counsel's lack of theory, direction, and
specificity left the jury with only the State's explanation of how to view the evidence.
Even the most open minded jury needs a roadmap in order to understand the complexities
of a capital murder trial. But for trial counsel's failure, there is a reasonable probability
that Mr. Hall would have been convicted of first degree murder and rape.
I. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
HAVING MR. HALL WEAR SHACKLES DURING THE GUILT PHASE
OF THE TRIAL
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to
the jury absent a trial court determination that restraints are justified by a state interest
specific to the particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, _, 125 S.Ct.
2007, 2009 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)). This basic rule
embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2011; see also, Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503,505 (1976) (making a defendant appear in prison garb poses
such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it must be justified by an
"essential state policy"). Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence, the
fairness of the factfinding process, the right to counsel and right to secure a meaningful
defense, and the maintenance of a dignified judical process that includes respectful
treatment of the defendant. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2013 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453 (1895)) (presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of the
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administration of our criminal law"); Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (restraint suggests that
the justice system itself sees "a need to separate a defendant from the community at
large"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-341 (1963) (holding the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in order to secure a meaningful defense);
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (shackling affronts the "dignity and decorum
of judicial proceedings"). The prohibition against shackling applies with equal force
during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010-2014. Given the
severity and finality of a death sentence, jury accuracy in making the decision between
life and death is no less critical than the decision between guilt and innocence. Deck, 125
S.Ct. at 2014.
Absent adequate justification and findings regarding the specific circumstances of
the case, visible shackling is inherently prejudicial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014-2016 (citing
Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568.) The effects cannot be shown from a trial transcript. Deck,
125 S.Ct. at 2015. Thus, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make
out a due process violation. Id. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id.,
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967)).
Mr. Hall was shackled and bolted to the floor during the guilt phase of his trial.
His restraining devices were visible to the jury when he was not wearing a jacket to cover
them. (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5130.) The jury was therefore aware court authorities considered
him a danger to the community, inevitably affecting their perception of Mr. Hall. Deck,
125 S.Ct. at 2014 (reasoning that shackling almost inevitably implies to a jury, as a
matter of common sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to the
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community, and shackling almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of the
character of the defendant). The district court's refusal to allow post-conviction counsel
to interview jurors precludes Mr. Hall from otherwise fully developing this claim.
Absent written findings to the contrary, and because the shackles made Mr. Hall's
custody status and physical restraint apparent to the jurors, the use of the restraining
device, absent a determination that they were "justified by a state interest specific to
[that] particular trial," violated "a basic element of the 'due process oflaw' protected by"
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the presumption of innocence.
Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2012. Moreover, the shackling device impermissibly affected the
jury's determination of aggravating factors and the weighing of those factors, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, as well as Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to present a
meaningful defense.
J. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY IMPLYING TO
THE JURY THAT MR. HALL WAS DANGEROUS
In the quest to obtain the death penalty for Mr. Hall, the State engaged in
misconduct by repeatedly indicating Mr. Hall was dangerous and someone to be feared
by informing witnesses not to give out their full addresses and by telling the jury their
sequestration location would be undisclosed. (See Tr. Vol. 9, p.4BO, L.24; p.4170, L.23;
p.4227, L.15; p.4420, Ls.6-7; and Tr. Vol. 10, p.5310, Ls.16-17.) This sent the message
to the jury that they were personally vulnerable and needed to be protected from Mr.
Hall. This repeated implication that Mr. Hall could not be trusted with personal
information informed the jury that court authorities considered him a danger to the
community, inevitably affecting their perception of Mr. Hall. While trial counsel failed
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to object to these repeated instances of misconduct, such error is fundamental and
requires vacation ofMr. Hall's sentence.
K. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE
PROSECUTORS MISCONDUCT OF IMPLYING TO THE JURY THAT
MR. HALL WAS DANGEROUS
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct by the State when they
implied that Mr. Hall was dangerous. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference the facts and
legal arguments from See supra, Claim 1. Trial counsels' failure to object, and
alternatively their failure to request a mistrial, admonishment and curative instruction,
constitutes deficient performance. Mr. Hall asserts that but for counsels' deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of
murder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
L. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO GIVING A SPECIAL
JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING AMANDA STROUD
The jury was given the following instruction about Amanda Stroud prior to the
testimony ofher mother, Kathy Stroud:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a woman named Amanda Stroud has
been referred to during this trial. She is since deceased. The
circumstances surrounding her death have no relevance to this trial or to
this defendant.
(Tr. Vol. 9, p.4546, Ls.3-7.) Kathy Stroud testified that her daughter was Mr. Hall's
girlfriend during the timeframe that Ms. Hanlon was killed. Kathy Stroud also testified
that she took from Amanda a backpack which allegedly held evidence tending to link
Mr. Hall to Ms. Hanlon's death. At the conclusion of Ms. Stroud's direct testimony, at
trial counsels' request, the court recessed to permit trial counsel to consult. (Tr. Vol. 9,
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p.4748, Ls.10-23.) During the recess, the parties and the district court, presumably in the
absence of Mr. Hall, had an off-record in-chambers discussion about the Amanda Stroud
instruction, during which time trial counsel requested that the instruction be given a
second time, at the conclusion of Ms. Stroud's testimony. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4748, L.24 -
p.4749, L.17.) Trial counsels' rationale for this request, if ever given, is not reflected on
the record. Thereafter, Ms. Stroud was excused, and the district court read the instruction
to the jury for a second time. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4751, Ls.9-16.)
While the instruction informed the jury that Amanda Stroud's death had nothing
to do with Mr. Hall, in light of their relationship, the jury was likely to speculate why she
was absent, and more specifically, how and why she died. See Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114
Idaho 503, 511-12, 757 P.2d 1222, 1230-31 (Ct. App. 1998) (Burnett, J., specially
concurring) (noting how instructions might be misinterpreted by a jury). Mr. Hall asserts
that the instruction unnecessarily created speculation in the jury's mind regarding a
connection between Amanda Stroud's death and Mr. Hall. If an instruction was
necessary, then trial counsel should have requested an instruction that stated something
similar to the following:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a woman named Amanda Stroud has
been referred to during this trial. Ms. Stroud is unavailable to be called as
a witness by either party. The fact that she is unavailable has no relevance
to this trial or to this defendant and should not be held against either party.
You must not speculate about her unavailability.
Mr. Hall needs to depose trial counsel about this instruction, including their
rationale for requesting it to be read to the jury a second time. With further investigation,
including but not limited to such deposition, Mr. Hall will make an informed decision
whether to revise or even withdraw this claim.
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M. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE GUILT-PHASE ISSUES
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate
guilt phase issues. Specifically, trial counsel failed to challenge the pathology, failed to
investigate Ms. Hanlon's mental health, mental state, and level of intoxication, failed to
challenge the State's presentation of DNA evidence, and failed to adequately investigate
or examine the State's guilt-phase witnesses.
1. Failure To Challenge The PathologlO
To prepare for the State's evidence, expert assistance is often necessary. See ABA
Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1 ("Analyzing and interpreting such evidence is
impossible without consulting experts-whether pathologists, serologists, microanalysts,
DNA analysts, ballistics specialists, translators, or others.") Trial counsel was ineffective
in failing to present expert testimony challenging the testimony of Dr. Glen Groben, the
county medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Ms. Hanlon. In fact, trial
counsel never consulted with an independent pathologist. Consequently, counsel
permitted the virtually uncontested testimony of Dr. Groben on crucial issues at the guilt
phase, i.e. cause of death, and the sentencing phase, i.e., manner of death. Trial counsel's
performance is clearly deficient. As the Supreme Court has stated, trial counsel "has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691
(1984). With respect to experts, trial counsel must act reasonably in deciding whether or
not to seek or retain a particular expert. See e.g., Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317,327-334
(Ist Cir. 2005) (analyzing why trial counsel's failure to thoroughly investigate a "not
20 This claim applies to both the guilt/innocence and penalty phases ofMr. Hall's trial.
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arson" defense in an arson case, and consult with an arson expert, was not an informed,
tactical decision, but was deficient performance).
Trial counsel allowed Dr. Groben to present testimony that was not premised on
reasonable degree of medical certainty regarding his opinion that there was a struggle and
regarding the pattern injury found on Ms. Hanlon. (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5206 - p.5211.)
Further, because trial counsel did not consult with a pathologist they had no evidence to
present regarding Ms. Hanlon's level of intoxication in order to challenge Dr. Groben's
assertion that people at .50 BAC "function perfectly." (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5206 - p.5211.)
Similarly, trial counsel was not able to present evidence to rebut Dr. Groben's testimony
regarding the amount of resistance needed for rape. (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5206 - p.5211.)
Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim due in part to trial counsels' failure to
adequately cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case.
2. Failure To Investigate Hanlon's Mental Health, Mental State, And Level
Of Intoxication
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present testimony of Ms. Hanlon's
mental health, mental state, and level of intoxication. The State elicited testimony from
Jeff Carlson that Ms. Hanlon was in a committed monogamous relationship and that their
relationship was akin to a perfectly normal happy marital relationship. Trial counsel
should have used available evidence, from police interviews and lead sheets, to contradict
these assertions.
Jeff Carlson testified Ms. Hanlon would not have "stepped out of [their]
monogamous relationship", and engaged in "consensual sex with a stranger," and would
never have had "sex out on the dirt in the middle of the night somewhere secluded." (Tr.
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Vol. 9, p.4165, L.B - p.4166, L.3.) Trial counsel should have used readily available
information to contradict this testimony.
Specifically, Detective Mark Ayotte interviewed Jeff Carlson and Bill Williams
and in his report he noted that:
Jeff indicated that he does not normally stay out late, but Cheryl has been
staying out after she gets off work, going to bars that he has not visited
before.
Jeff says that as he drove home Cheryl expressed how displeased she was
with him. How she had not wanted to leave, and how he never wanted to
meet new people or be out with her.
He says that when he arrived home he let her out of the vehicle. He says
he knew ifhe went into the house he was in for a night of being told offby
her.
At this time Both [sic] Jeff and Bill explained that they feared Cheryl
had been having some type of mental problem. That for some time she
has seemed depressed, or delusional.
She has talked nonsense. Complaining about people following her, getting
into the house. But both say they never saw any evidence of anyone
following her or being in the house. Jeff indicated he had talked with her
about seeing a doctor but she has refused.
Lately she had begun talking about how the people who had stolen a
lottery ticket from her years ago in California were after her now. Jeff
says she has no idea what she was talking about, he knew nothing about
any lottery ticket.
Jeff indicated that both he and Cheryl had been involved with drugs when
they were younger living in California. He was fearful her condition had
something to do with the drug usage. But she refused to admit any
problem or to seek help of any type.
Jeff continued to explain when he had last seen Cheryl. He says that he
had not wanted to listen to a night of her being angry with him for wanting
to come home. So he let her out of the PIU and drove away. He says he
drove to Terry's to see ifhe could find a friend to stay with. He had been
unable to find anyone so he gave up and drove home.
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I again talked with Bill apart from Jeff. He confirmed that Cheryl had
been refused service at Terry's in part because she had bothered others in
the bar with her odd stories about people being after her.
Bill says that she had begun to run around with different people after not
being allowed to drink at Terry's. He knew that she has gone to other bars
without Jeff.
(Exhibit 3, Report of Detective Mark Ayotte - Interview with Jeff Carlson & Bill
Williams.)
Detective Ayotte also interviewed Joyce Hanlon, Cheryl Hanlon's mother. This
report should have been used to demonstrate the problems in Ms. Hanlon and
Mr. Carlson's relationship as well as the mental problems Ms. Hanlon had been
experiencing. Specifically, Detective Ayotte's report states:
Joyce indicated to me that she knows the victim and Jeff have been
having some problems, but she believes they are all verbal and knows of
no physical conflicts between the two of them.
Joyce also indicated that she is aware Cheryl has been talking of some odd
happenings. People following her or after her. Joyce indicated she
believed Cheryl had some mental health issues. She had tried to
convince Cheryl to seek some help but Cheryl refused.
(Exhibit 4, Report of Detective Mark Ayotte - Interview with Joyce Hanlon (Cheryl
Hanlon's mother).)
Erin Kessler, Cheryl Hanlon's daughter, was also interviewed by Detective
Ayotte. His report states that Ms. Hanlon had been experiencing mental problems and
problems in her relationship with Mr. Carlson. (Exhibit 5, Report of Detective
Mark Ayotte - Interview with Erin Kessler (Cheryl Hanlon's daughter).)
Detective Ayotte also interviewed Phill Hanlon, Cheryl Hanlon's older bother.
His report indicated that Phill told him Cheryl "talked crazy all the time." Further,
Phill stated that "Jeff was concerned about Cheryl. He says he received an e-mail from
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Jeff about a month ago expressing concern and saying he didn't know how much more he
could take." (Exhibit 6, Report of Detective Mark Ayotte - Interview with Phill Hanlon
(Cheryl Hanlon's older brother).)
There was also information, complied by Detective Ayotte, that Ms. Hanlon had a
drinking problem that contributed to her unusual mental state. The co-owner of Terry's
Bar, Rhoda Sherman, told Detective Ayotte:
Cheryl was friends with everyone. But added when she drank you didn't
want to be around her. She confirmed that because of how she was when
she drank she had been refused service in the bar.
Rhoda indicated that Cheryl loved to talk, and told all kinds of stories.
That was in part what caused some of the problems in the bar. People
didn't want to listen to her and she continued to bother them. She talked
about the dopers in California and her fear they may be after her. Rhoda
indicated she was concerned that Cheryl may have some mental health
issues and knows the family has talked about it. She feels the problem
began after Cheryl lost her job at Home Depot.
Rhoda said that Jeff had talked with her about Cheryl. He had told her
that after Cheryl had not been allowed service in Terry's she had
developed a new life with friends he didn't know. She is a different
person.
(Exhibit 7, Report of Detective Mark Ayotte - Interview with Rhoda Sherman (co-owner
of Terry's Bar).)
Danielle Anderson, a co-worker of Ms. Hanlon's, stated that Ms. Hanlon had told
her she was not happy with the relationship she was in and had recently gone out on a
date with another man. She also indicated that Ms. Hanlon was afraid of her roommate,
Bill Williams. (Exhibit 8, Lead Sheet 4 - Detective Greg Morgan interview with
Danielle Anderson (co-worker of Hanlon at Owyhee Plaza).)
Other lead sheets indicated that Ms. Hanlon had been drinking a lot lately and that
she was always arguing with her boyfriend. (Exhibit 9, Lead Sheet 8 - Officer Rogers
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interview with Cornelia Andrews (Elliot's Bartender).) Another lead sheet indicated that
Ms. Hanlon was unhappy with Jeff, was interested in other men, and was going to end
their relationship. (Exhibit 10, Lead Sheet 18 - Detective Greg Morgan interview with
LeAna Glicksir/Josie Terry (co-workers of Hanlon at Owyhee Plaza).) Detective Greg
Morgan interviewed Roger Hill; he indicated that he had been going out dancing with
Ms. Hanlon in the weeks prior to her death, and had even had a date with her that night
however, she failed to show up. (Exhibit 11, Lead Sheet 21 - Detective Greg Morgan
interview with Roger Hill (male friend who went out dancing with Hanlon).)
Still other police reports indicated that Ms. Hanlon had been drinking heavily,
was exhibiting mental problems, and was not happy in her relationship with Jeff Carlson.
(Exhibit 12, Lead Sheet 22 - Detective Anderson assigned to interview Laura Wanner
(contact with Hanlon at Gil's K-9.) Cheryl had become "upset and was crying" the
evening of February 28,2003; (Exhibit 13, Lead Sheet 75 - Greg Morgan & Mark Ayotte
interview of Patrick Packer (Friend of Hanlon/Carlson)(He indicated that the victim had
been having some problems (mental or drinking) for some time.); (Exhibit 14, Detective
Dave Smith - Handwritten notes, interview with Hanlon's Owyhee Plaza Hotel
supervisor Sandra Pack (Jeff drinking a lot - 2 days ago told (W) contemplating leaving
Jeff, Jeff acting differently lately.); and (Exhibit 15, Lead Sheet 83 - Dave Smith or Greg
Morgan interview with Andrew Leppert (friend of Hanlon) (Cheryl drinking very heavy
lately).)
This information, that trial counsel had ready access to, demonstrates that
Ms. Hanlon's life was not as pristine as the State attempted to portray. Trial counsel
should have used this information to demonstrate that Ms. Hanlon was not acting like the
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Cheryl that Mr. Carlson knew, was having mental health issues, and she was likely to
step out of their monogamous relationship and have consensual sex with a stranger.
Further, this evidence should have been used to show that Ms. Hanlon's actions at the
time of the crime put her at risk. As studies show, jurors view a defendant less deserving
of the death penalty in these types of situations. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and
Scott E. Sunby, Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and
Heeding what Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (2008).
As previously stated, Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim due in part to trial
counsels' failure to adequately cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case.
3. Failure To Challenge The State's Presentation Of DNA Evidence
Introduced Against Mr. Hall
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony challenging the
testimony of Shawn Weiss regarding the DNA evidence.
As noted previously, to prepare for the State's evidence, expert assistance is often
necessary. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1 ("Analyzing and
interpreting such evidence is impossible without consulting experts-whether
pathologists, serologists, microanalysts, DNA analysts, ballistics specialists, translators,
or others.") In this case, trial counsel failed to challenge the DNA testimony presented
by the State through Shawn Weiss.
Trial counsel's failure to adequately consult with an expert at trial and failure to
call an expert to testify left the jury with a muddled, confusing picture of the DNA
evidence. Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim due in part to trial counsels' failure to
adequately cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case.
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4. Failure To Adequately Investigate And/Or Examine The State's Guilt-
Phase Witnesses
i. JeffCarlson
Trial counsel should have done additional cross-examination using police lead
sheets. The witnesses providing information in those lead sheets directly contradict
Mr. Carlson's recollections regarding Cheryl Hanlon's mental problems, faithfulness,
issues in the relationship, and talking about getting married. Trial counsel should have
used Detective Ayotte's report of his initial interview with Mr. Carlson to impeach his
testimony. Instead, trial counsel simply referenced that Detective Ayotte took careful
notes in his report and asked Mr. Carlson whether Ms. Hanlon should have been driving
and if they argued the night of February 28, 2003.
ii. William (Bill) Williams
Trial counsel should have asked additional cross-examination questions of
Mr. Williams, using lead sheets and police reports to contradict Mr. Williams'
recollections regarding Ms. Hanlon's mental problems, faithfulness, issues in the
relationship with Mr. Carlson and what occurred when they all arrived at the house at the
same time. For example, according to Detective Ayotte's report, Mr. Williams did not
have a conversation with Ms. Hanlon that evening. However, Mr. Williams testified he
talked to her. Similarly, information provided in the lead sheets indicates Ms. Hanlon
was afraid of Mr. Williams. He also told Detective Ayotte he was going to have to move
out because Ms. Hanlon was acting so strangely. Instead of using this information, trial
counsel simply referenced the fact that Detective Ayotte took careful notes.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 68
000184
         
  
   
          
           
         
             
              
           
               
          
    
         
            
          
                
             
             
             
                 
              
           
      
iii. Daryl Lady
Trial counsel should have questioned Daryl Lady about the fact that he was
shown a photo line up on March 10,2003 at 6:05pm with Mr. Hall's booking photo in it,
and was unable to identify anyone in the line up as the subject he had seen with the
Ms. Hanlon on the night in question. (Exhibit 16, Ayotte interview with Daryl Lady).
Instead, trial counsel asked how many times he had seen Mr. Hall's picture in the media
in the last four years.
iv. Scott Hill
Trial counsel should have noted that Mr. Hill told police Ms. Hanlon was with
two men when she crossed at the light in front of his car. Instead, Mr. Hill testified he
only saw two people, Ms. Hanlon and Mr. Hall, that evening and did not testify that the
man on the bike was with them. (Tr. Vol. 9, p. 4403.) Furthermore, trial counsel should
have questioned Mr. Hill regarding his impression that Ms. Hanlon picked up a guy in a
bar and was going to have sex with him. (Exhibit 17, Lead Sheet 77).
N. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITED MISCONDUCT DURING GUILT
PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENTS
In closing argument, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by improperly
defining reasonable doubt in a way that diminished the State's burden and by improperly
vouching for the credibility ofwitnesses testimony.
While counsel for the prosecution has traditionally been afforded latitude in
argument, see e.g., State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct.App.1995),
there are limits that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. See e.g., State v.
Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 37 P.3d 18 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that cumulative effect of
prosecutorial misconduct, including improper closing argument, was not harmless error).
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Idaho appellate courts have recognized that argument "may not misrepresent or
mischaracterize the evidence," or "misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden."
See e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007). Closing argument
should not include counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a
witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id.; State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-
11, 594 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1979). The Court will set aside a conviction based on
prosecutorial misconduct when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to result in
fundamental error. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997).
Prosecutorial misconduct during argument is fundamental error where the comments are
so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice could not be remedied by an instruction
from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. State v.
Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990).
1. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Definition Of
Reasonable Doubt
The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 82, 822 P.2d 960, 979 (1991),
citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Supreme Court has held that an
instruction defining "reasonable doubt" may not use language that has the effect of
reducing the State's burden of proof. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). A deficient
reasonable doubt instruction is considered a structural defect requiring automatic reversal
because a verdict based on an improper reasonable doubt instruction vitiates all of the
jury's factual findings. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
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In this case, the State improperly reduced its burden by arguing:
The concept of reasonable doubt was in the jury instructions and you will
have that back with you, but I want to talk about for a minute that it has to
be a reasonable doubt. It's not beyond a shadow of a doubt; it's not
beyond all possible doubt and it's not beyond imaginary doubt.
(Tr. Vol. 10, p.5598, Ls.14-23.) The manner in which the State separated possible doubt
from imaginary doubt improperly diminished the State's burden. While true the State
need not prove its case beyond all possible doubt, the correct way to present the burden is
to say the State need not prove it beyond all possible or imaginary doubt because
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. However, the State must prove its case beyond all
reasonable possible doubts.
2. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Improperly Vouching For The
Credibility Of Witnesses' Testimony And By Presenting False And/Or
Misleading Argument Regarding The Testimony Of Such Witnesses
During closing argument the State improperly vouched for the credibility of two
witnesses by telling the jury there was no reason for them to lie while giving testimony.
It is misconduct for the State to vouch for the credibility of a witness, and in this case,
both witnesses had motivation to lie.
The state cannot create a materially false impression regarding the facts of the
case or the credibility of the witnesses. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935),
the Supreme Court made clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the
presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with "rudimentary demands of
justice." In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Court stated that, "[t]he same
result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
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uncorrected when it appears." Id., at 269; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
153 (1972)
Prosecutor falsehoods alone do not automatically entitle a petitioner to relief.
Relief is compelled when the false impressions are "material," which means when "there
is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The record must suggest a
reasonable likelihood that during deliberations the jurors could have considered the false
evidence or argument.
The State used the testimony of James Tackett to show Mr. Hall was with Ms.
Hanlon in the early hours of March 1,2003. (Tr. Vol. 10, p. 5603, Ls.6-11.) They also
used his testimony to demonstrate Mr. Hall was wearing a Nike beanie with two white
stripes that morning. (Tr. Vol. 10, p. 5604, Ls. 7-12.) Then, during closing arguments in
an attempt to validate his testimony, the State vouched for his credibility by arguing "[i]s
there any reason for James to lie to you? There isn't, ladies and gentlemen... there's no
reason for James to come in and lie to you about the events of March 1,2003." (Tr. Vol.
10, p. 5604, Ls. 13-22.) These statements were inappropriate and untrue.
During the investigation into Ms. Hanlon's death Detectives Morgan and Ayotte
interrogated James Tackett. Early in the investigation Mr. Tackett was not providing the
police with answers they deemed sufficient and so they told him he would be charged as
an accessory-after-the-fact:
MORGAN: Being an accessory-after-the-fact means that you have
knowledge a crime potentially and if you're withholding
that information. That's a felony in and of itself, which
you can do the exact same amount of time that the persons
responsible doing the crime will get.
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JAMES: What crime?
MORGAN: Well, we'll get to that. It doesn't make any difference. For
example, if somebody is going to do a burglary and you are
either the lookout or after the fact you know that this
person committed a burglary and seen some stolen property
or if you have knowledge of the crime and you don't take
the next logical step which is to call the police and report
the crime. Then it makes you just as guilty as the person
who actually did the crime. It is an obstruction of justice.
Under the law, when someone, you are considered to be a
good citizen you are expected to cooperate with the police
and report crimes. And if you have knowledge of a crime
and you withhold that, then you are an accessory-after-the-
fact, or if you were involved in the crime yourself, took
part in it, then it is a little bit different. This is just
knowledge. Okay?
JAMES: Okay.
(Exhibit 18, interrogation of James Tackett.) Only after these threats did Mr. Tackett
inform the police that he had seen Mr. Hall with Ms. Hanlon and that he had been
wearing a striped beanie. This demonstrates that Mr. Tackett, contrary to the State's
argument, had a reason to lie. Specifically, he was told by the police he could be given
the same punishment as the person who committed the crime, in this case death, if he did
not give the police the information they were requesting.
In a similar fashion, the State vouched for the credibility of Daryl Lady, an
acquaintance of Ms. Hanlon who saw her with a man in the early morning of March 1,
2003. The State argued:
Is there any motive for Mr. Lady to lie to you? There isn't. There's no
motive for him to come in here and tell you a lie about seeing Cheryl on
March 1 of2003 with the defendant. He has nothing to gain by it.
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(Tr. Vol. 10, p.5606, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Lady helped the police develop a composite sketch of
the man he saw that morning and testified about those events. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.4358, L.23 -
p.4391, L.7.)
Mr. Lady testified on October 4, 2007. Then, on October 13, 2007, the Idaho
Statesman website ran an article titled "Murder trial continues today for Erick Hall." One
reader commented that since Mr. Hall had previously been sentenced to death in the
Henneman case, a second trial seeking the death penalty was a waste of resources. In
response Mr. Lady posted the following comment:
justice for hanlons family and friends
Submitted by DarylMLady on Sat, 10/13/2007 - 11: 17am.
the trial for henneman is said and done. the jury gave him the death
penalty,this has no bearing on the hanlon case. The family and friends of
cheryl ann hanlon deserve justice. A second trial reduces the possabilities
of any errors in this case. a second jury will listen to the facts and give us
all justice. This is how are system should work, with justice. Daryl lady
Meridian Idaho
Idaho Statesman, Murder Trial Continues Today for Erick Hall,
http://www.idahostatesman.com/newsupdates/story1175109.html (accessed October 13,
2007). One week later, in response to another Idaho Statesman article entitled
"Convicted killer Erick Hall declines to testify on his behalf in Foothills murder trial"
Mr. Lady left another comment expressing his feelings regarding the Hanlon trial:
Erick Hall.
Submitted by DarylMLady on Sat, 10/20/2007 - 11:19am.
This has been a long and enduring case. Four and a half years have come
and gone since this all began march 1st of 2003. As of today there are 15
murder cases under prosecution in the district attorneys office. Mega hours
have been logged by city attorneys and law enforcement officials. My
thanks goes out to the hard work and dedication to those public officials
who have made our streets safer. the cost of this trial is astounding. justice
has been served. closier has been given to the families of Cheryl Hanlon
and Lynn Henniman. keep their smiles in your hearts. Remember to pay
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attention to those you love, tomarrow they could be taken from you. There
are no more sleepy hollows anymore. The streets are a dangerous place.
Be very awhere and cautious. Thanks again to our justice system. Daryl
M. Lady Meridian, Idaho.
Idaho Statesman, Convicted Killer Erick Hall Declines to Testify on His Behalf in
Foothills Murder Trial, http://www.idahostatesman.com/newsupdates/story/187188.html
(accessed October 20,2007).
These comments made by Mr. Lady demonstrate that contrary to the State's
assertion, he did have a motivation to lie when giving his testimony. Mr. Lady was
motivated by his desire to provide the Hanlon and Henneman families with justice and
closure. He was motivated by his desire to reduce the possibility that Mr. Hall would not
be subject to death because of a successful appeal. Finally, he was motivated by his
desire to have Mr. Hall convicted because of the long hours both the prosecutors and law
enforcement officials and put into the case.
The prosecutor's comments regarding reasonable doubt and the veracity of
witnesses constituted prosecutorial misconduct, which prejudiced Mr. Hall by allowing
the jury to convict based on an erroneous application of the law and facts.
O. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT DURING GUILT PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the State's closing
argument. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference the facts and legal arguments from See
supra, Claim N. Trial counsels' failure to object, and alternatively request a mistrial,
admonishment, and curative instruction constitutes deficient performance. Mr. Hall
asserts that but for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that
he would not have been convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
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P. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO REQUEST ADEQUATE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING
FELONY MURDER
Applicable Standards of Peiformance: Trial counsel "should request
instructions which present the applicable law in a manner most favorable to the defense."
Commentary to NLADA Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation,
Guideline 7.7 (citation and internal quotations omitted). "Where appropriate, counsel
should object to and argue against improper instructions proposed by the prosecution."
NLADA Guidelines, Guideline 7.7(c).
Counsel's trial duties are not over when the jury begins deliberations. The
court may decide to give supplemental instructions to the jury, either in
response to an inquiry by the jury or after a long time passes with no
verdict being returned. A response to any inquiry from the jury about a
point of law or fact may mark the turning point of deliberations. There
may be no standard instruction covering the area of inquiry. Counsel will
certainly want to ensure that the response is legally and/or factually
correct.
Commentary to NLADA Guidelines, Guideline 7.7.
Deficient Performance: Trial counsel failed to request accurate and favorable
pre-deliberation jury instructions defining the element "during the perpetration" for
purposes of the felony murder charge. In addition, counsel failed to propose accurate and
favorable supplemental instructions, and failed to federalize their objections to the
prosecution's proposals, in response to mid-deliberation jury questions about the felony
murder charge. Finally, counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to ensure the
observance of adequate procedural safeguards, including the presence of Mr. Hall and the
presence of the jury for the reading of the supplemental instructions.
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1. Jury Question No.1 - Day 2 of Deliberations
On October 18, 2007, at approximately 3:15 p.m., the jury was excused for the
purpose of beginning their deliberations. (R. Vol. VI, p.1130.) On October 19,2007, at
approximately 2:30 p.m., the jury presented a written question in a note addressed to the
Court, dated that same day, and signed by the presiding juror, Juror No. 82. (Tr. Vol. 10
p.5759, Ls.5-7.i1
The Court initiated a hearing on the question during which the State was
represented by counsel and present in the courtroom. Trial counsel were not present in
the courtroom, but rather participated by telephone?2 Mr. Hall was not present. There is
no indication in the record that Mr. Hall affirmatively waived his right to be present. At
the hearing, the court read the question into the record as follows: "We need a
clarification on 'Any murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a
rape.' Does this mean the death has to occur during the act of rape?" (Tr. Vol. 10,
p.5759, Ls.9-13.)
Trial counsel did not propose a clarifying instruction.23 Instead, counsel simply
objected to any further clarification.24 Over counsels' objection, the Court replied to the
jury in writing as follows:
21 It is unclear from the record whether Juror No. 82 signed the note in the course of his
role as the presiding juror or whether the question reflected that juror's individual
question.
22 It is unclear whether the record reflects the first time that the district court contacted
the parties for the purpose of informing them about the jurors' question.
23 While the Court and the parties were correct to point out that it is impossible to
speculate about the genesis of the question, there is one point that seems reasonably
established by the question. Specifically, the question reflects that at least one juror
believed that the death may have occurred before or after the rape; otherwise, there would
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Idaho case law provides that deaths which occur as part of the stream of
events during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate rape are first degree
murder. Beyond that, the Court will simply refer you back to the language
which you quoted in your question to the Court.
(Tr. Vol. 10, p.5770, Ls.3-8; see also Tr. Vol. 10, p.5775, Ls.2-4.) The jury was not
brought into the courtroom for the reading of the instruction; instead, the Court wrote the
instruction on the jury's original note and had it returned to the jury by the bailiff.
2. Jury Question No.2 - Day 3 of Deliberations
On October 20, 2007, at approximately 2:30 p.m., the jury presented a second
two-part written question in a note, addressed to the Court, and dated that same day. This
time however, the note was not signed by the presiding juror, but rather by Juror No.
97.15 The Court contacted the parties for the purpose of informing them about the
question within "seconds" of receiving the question. Approximately one hour later, the
have been no need for the question, since certainly if all jurors agreed, that the death
occurred "during the act of rape" that the death occurred "during the perpetration" of
rape. In addition, it is fair to presume that the jury had already acquitted Mr. Hall of
premeditated murder based on the manner in which the jury was instructed.
24 It is unknown whether trial counsel will provide any strategic rationale for their failure
to request a specific instruction. (See Tr. Vol. 10, p.5768, Ls.18-22.) ("MR. CHASTAIN:
'Judge, we got onto Casemaker through the Idaho State Bar and we came up with Fetterly
and the other ones the Court cited, but then our connection went down on all of our
computers to the bar web site . . . .''') Trial counsel has refused to discuss their
representation with post-conviction counsel absent the presence of the State's
representative. In any event, Mr. Hall asserts that any proffered strategy would be
unreasonable based on relevant law.
25 As the district court later indicated, this juror "has a Master's degree in linguistics and
words are important to him, and is an eighth grade educator, as I recall." The district
court later emphasized, "The person asking this question is not a person with a high
school education or, you know -- he is a person with two degrees and long experience.
And as I recall, the Master's level degree was in linguistics, so language is important to
him. I suppose in this business, given the gravity of this case, language is important to all
of us. So I think I should attempt to give him some response."
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court initiated a hearing on the question during which both parties, including Mr. Hall,
were present physically in the courtroom.
At the hearing, the Court read the question into the record as follows: "Question:
Part A - Regarding the term 'stream of events', could or does this include events
immediately preceding as well as immediately after the act in question; i.e. penetration of
the anus? Part B - Can you give a definition of the term 'perpetration'?" (Tr. Vol. 10,
p.5778, L.24 - p.5779, L.5.i6
The Court informed the parties that it was contemplating an instruction to Part A
as follows: "I am sorry, but I cannot further define 'stream of events'. The answer to your
part A question may lie in your own view of the evidence." (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5781, Ls.3-6.)
In other words, the court's suggestion was "essentially a non-answer" crafted to refer the
jury politely back to their original instructions. (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5781, L.7.) In response,
the State proposed an instruction.
MS. BENNETTS: Your Honor, we had a similar -- I think similar
opinion. We came up with a little different version of pretty much
exactly what the Court is saying. But I can read it for the Court and
counsel, if it would assist further. . . . But it's along the same lines.
"Whether an event" -- and this is just taken off of exactly what they
said. But "Whether an event before or after the act in question is
connected to the act in question making it part of the stream of events is a
factual question for you to decide."
(Tr. Vol. 10, p.5781, L.22 - p.5782, L.8) (Emphasis added). Contrary to the State's
assertion, its instruction was neither "pretty much what the Court" was saying, i.e.,
simply referring the jury to their instructions, nor based on "exactly" what the jury asked,
26 At this time, this claim is limited to trial counsels' performance as it relates to Part A of
the jury's question. Mr. Hall reserves the opportunity to address Part B during
depositions of trial counsel (should depositions be ordered) and to address Part B in his
Final Amended Petition, should circumstances warrant it.
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i.e., staying within the confines of the question. Instead, the State's instruction gave the
jury three inaccurate and prejudicial answers.
First, the State's answer informed the jury that the death could have occurred
before the rape, or conversely stated, that the rape could have occurred after the death for
purposes of establishing felony murder. This is a misstatement of the law. See State v.
Cheatham, 134 Idaho 565, 569-71, 6 P.3d 815, 819-21 (2000) (holding that the felony
murder "stream of events" rationale does not extend to felonies committed after the
murder). Based on the question and proposed instruction, it is likely that at least one
juror convicted on the basis of that factual scenario.
Second, the State's answer informed the jury that the death, if it did not occur
during the rape, did not have to occur immediately after the rape, or conversely stated
that the death could have occurred much later for the purposes of establishing felony
murder. This statement is misleading at best as it did not mirror the jury's question as
asserted by the State by notably omitting the "immediately" before or after language in
the question. The statement also suggests that the prosecution need not establish a
temporal relationship between the death and the rape to prove felony murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. As noted below, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a jury must
analyze the "temporal, spatial, and motivational relationships between the capital
homicide" and the predicate felony when determining whether the death occurred during
the perpetration of the felony. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79-80, 90 P.3d 298, 304-
305 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Third, the State's answer informed the jury that to satisfy the element of "during
the perpetration," (which was actually the heart of the question), the State need only
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prove that the death and the rape were "connected" in some unspecified way. As noted
above, the unlawful killing and the predicate felony must be temporally, spatially, and
motivationally related to satisfy the purposes of the felony murder rule; a mere
connection is not enough and otherwise too vague for the jury to apply in a constitutional
manner. See Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 79-80,90 P.3d at 304-305.
The instructions proposed by the State, and ultimately adopted by the Court
verbatim, violated Mr. Hall's due process rights by reducing the State's burden of
proving all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial counsel objected
without stating such grounds for objection, and simply proposed an instruction stating, "I
am sorry, but I can't further define 'stream of events' for you." (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5782,
Ls.22-25.)
In conjunction with objecting to the instruction given as noted above, trial counsel
also should have affirmatively requested a series of accurate and favorable instructions
for Mr. Hall. For example, trial counsel should have requested an instruction informing
the jury that "stream of events" extends to events following the initial penetration of the
anus (should the jury in fact determine beyond a reasonable doubt that such an act
constituted a crime); however, "stream of events" does not extend to events after the
cessation of the sexual acts. In other words, if and only if the jury found that Mr. Hall
killed Ms. Hanlon while engaged in anal sex, and the jury believed that the anal sex
constituted rape, then her death would have occurred during the "stream of events." In
the alternative, trial counsel should have requested an instruction that extended "stream
of events" solely to events "immediately" following the rape and that such events must be
related temporally (in time), spatially (in location), and motivationally (i.e., the jury must
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find that the murder occurred for reasons related to the rape) so as to constitute "one
continuous transaction" or to be part of "one indivisible act" and "part of the design" to
commit the charged crime of rape. In addition, for both instructions, trial counsel should
have requested that the jury be informed that the State bears the burden of proving
"during the perpetration" beyond a reasonable doubt.
As support for both instructions, counsel could have relied upon readily available
Idaho law, including but not limited to, State v. Lovelace, supra; State v. McLeskey, 138
Idaho 691, 69 P.3d 111 (2003); State v. Cheatham, 134 Idaho 565, 6 P.3d 815 (2000);
State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985), and State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho
283,527 P.2d 487 (1974). In Lovelace, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the jury guilt
phase verdicts of premeditated murder and kidnapping did not establish the felony-
murder aggravator for purposes of satisfying Ring because the jury had not been asked to
determine whether the death occurred during the perpetration of the kidnapping.27 The
Court could not find the Ring violation harmless because to make such a determination,
the finder of fact must analyze the "temporal, spatial, and motivational relationships
between the capital homicide" and the predicate felony, which was not done in that case.
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79-80, 90 P.3d 298, 304-305 (2004) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
In McLeskey, the question presented was very similar to the issue in Mr. Hall's
case. Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court considers what constitutes using a firearm
"while committing or attempting to commit" any of certain specified crimes, in that case
a burglary, for purposes of a firearm enhancement pursuant to I.e. § 19-2520. The
27 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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defendant asserted that the burglary was committed when he entered the victim's barn
with the intent to commit a theft and that there was no evidence that he used a firearm
while entering the barn. The Idaho Supreme Court, drawing heavily upon Fetterly and
Pratt, stated in part:
Both State v. Fetterly and State v. Pratt were based upon the meaning of
the phrase "in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate." ... The
phrase "in the perpetration of' a crime in Idaho Code § 18-4003(d) is
synonymous with the words "while committing" a crime in Idaho Code §
19-2520. In the instant case, there was evidence that the Defendant
discharged a firearm in the direction of Mr. Hossley while still on the
Hossley's property and while attempting to escape from the scene of the
burglary. Under those circumstances, there was evidence that the
Defendant used a firearm while committing a burglary.
McCleskey, 138 Idaho at 698,69 P.3d at 118.
In Fetterly, the defendant was charged with and convicted at jury trial of burglary,
grand theft, and first degree murder under both theories of premeditated and deliberate
murder, and felony murder. Fetterly, 109 Idaho at 769, 710 P.2d at 1205. On appeal, the
defendant argued that if a burglary was in fact committed, it had been completed before
the victim was killed. Id. at 771, 710 P.2d at 1207. The Court rejected the defendant's
argument, concluding that the victim's death was part of a stream of events which began
the evening the defendant and his co-defendant entered the victim's home, and ended the
following day when the victim's possessions were removed from the home, at which
point presumably the victim had been killed. Id. at 771-772, 710 P.2d at 1207-1208.
In Hokenson, the defendant was charged with and convicted at jury trial of first
degree murder, which was defined as either intentional murder or felony-murder during
the commission of a robbery. On appeal, the defendant argued that because the robbery
had terminated and he was under arrest and in police custody at the time the bomb, which
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he had brought to the robbery, exploded and killed a police officer, he could not be held
liable for the officer's death under the felony-murder rule. Hokenson, 96 Idaho at 287,
527 P.2d at 491. This Court rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that
'''homicide is committed in perpetration of the felony if the killing and the felony are
parts of one continuous transaction ....'" Id. at 288,527 P.2d at 492 (quoting People v.
Welch, 501 P.2d 225,233 (Cal. 1972)). The court further concluded that "liability would
be imposed where the conduct causing the death was done in furtherance of the design to
commit the felony." Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Finally, in Cheatham, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the definition of
"during the perpetration" of a felony, in that case, a robbery. The Court stated that
whether a murder is committed during the perpetration of a felony depends upon whether
the felony and the murder constituted "one indivisible act." State v. Cheatham, 134 Idaho
at 571, 6 P.3d at 821.
By failing to rely on readily available authority to support accurate and favorable
supplement instructions, trial counsel rendered deficient performance. In light of the
contested evidence and the clear indication in the record that the jury struggled with
finding the "during the perpetration" element beyond a reasonable doubt, there is a
reasonable likelihood that Mr. Hall would not have been convicted of first degree murder
but for trial counsels' failure to provide effective assistance.
In addition to trial counsels' failure to adequately object to erroneous instructions
and their failure to request accurate and favorable instructions, counsel failed to ensure
proper procedures were followed in response to the jury's questions. Specifically, trial
counsel failed to ensure Mr. Hall's presence during the hearing on the first jury question
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and failed to ensure that the supplemental instructions were read to the jury in the
courtroom.
Idaho Code § 19-2204 provides:
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement
between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any
point of law arising in the cause, they must require the officer to conduct
them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information required
must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called.
I.C. § 19-2204; see also State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 119 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2005).
In addition to this statutory right to presence at criminal proceedings, Mr. Hall
had a constitutional right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to be present at every critical stage of the
trial, including the giving of jury instructions. United States v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289
F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to be present during the giving ofjury instructions; Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d
830, 841-43 (9th Cir. 2009)) (holding that the giving of supplemental jury instructions is
a critical stage). By failing to ensure Mr. Hall's right to be present, trial counsel rendered
deficient performance.28 But for such deficient performance, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Similarly, trial counsel failed to ensure adequate procedural safeguards by not
objecting to the failure to bring the jury into the courtroom for the reading of the
instructions. As a consequence, the supplemental instructions not only lacked the
28 Because trial counsel has refused to discuss their representation with post-conviction
counsel unless the State's representative is also present, it is impossible to fully state this
claim. It is worth noting however that Mr. Hall's absence did not go without notice. As
the district court stated, "I was not asked to bring Mr. Hall up for that proceeding and I
did not do so." (Tr. Vol. 10 of 11, p.5779, Ls.14-15.)
-
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formality, and thus the importance, of the other instructions, there exists an unacceptable
risk that the entire jury did not read or hear the supplemental instructions. Thus, but for
trial counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Hall would
not have been convicted of first degree felony murder.
Q. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE MR. HALL'S ELIGIBLITY FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY ABSENT IN LIGHT OF THE JURY'S GUILT PHASE
FINDING THAT THE MURDER WAS NOT PREMEDITATED
Standard of Petformance: Trial counsel has a duty at all stages of the
proceedings in a capital case to identify, explore, research and raise all potential legal
claims and errors. See ABA Guideline 10.8 ("The Duty to Assert Legal Claims.").
Deficient Petformance: Trial counsel failed to move to preclude the State from
seeking the death penalty at the conclusion of the guilt phase proceedings based on the
lack of specific findings that Mr. Hall either intended to kill Cheryl Hanlon or exhibited a
reckless indifference to human life.
The State charged Mr. Hall with two alternate special circumstances to establish
the crime of first degree murder: (1) intentional premeditated murder; and (2) felony
murder. To establish the first special circumstance for first degree murder, the State had
to prove that Mr. Hall intended to kill Cheryl Hanlon with premeditation. The jury was
instructed that premeditation does not require any appreciable space of time between the
intention to kill and the killing. (R. Vol. VII, p.1320 (Jury Instructions, Instruction
No.12).) To establish the second special circumstance of first degree murder, the State
only had to prove that Cheryl Hanlon was killed during the perpetration of rape. The
State did not have to prove any mens rea element, e.g., that Mr. Hall intended to kill
Ms. Hanlon or that he acted in reckless indifference to her life. (R. Vol. VII, p.1320 (Jury
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Instructions, Instruction No.13).); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 149, 191 P.3d 217, 227
(2008) ("Stevens was charged with felony murder, a crime which lacks a mens rea
element."); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 866-67, 781 P.2d 197,203-04 (1989),z9
The State's theory of the case was that Mr. Hall formed the intent to rape and
murder as early as their interaction with Daryl Lady, Le., well before they arrived at the
Boise foothills; that Ms. Hanlon would never have consented to anal sex; that the
presence of pre-mortem injuries supports the finding of rape and premeditated murder;
that Mr. Hall murdered Ms. Hanlon in a very personal manner by intentionally strangling
her with a belt for at least three continuous minutes until she died from asphyxiation; and
that the method ofhis murder clearly demonstrated premeditation.
The defense theory of the case was apparently that all of Mr. Hall's interactions
with Ms. Hanlon were by chance and consensual, and that Ms. Hanlon's death was a
tragic accident. Specifically, the Defense theory was that Ms. Hanlon initiated contact
with Mr. Hall; that she voluntarily engaged in intercourse with him, including sexual
asphyxia; that at some point she passed out; that Mr. Hall panicked, and, believing that
she was dead, dragged her to a location where he partially concealed her body and
secured it to a tree branch which ultimately caused her death; and that Mr. Hall never
intended to take her life.
29 In Lankford, the Court gave the following example to illustrate the point:
... when the defendant unintentionally killed another person in the
commission of a felony-as where A set fire to B's house (arson) and
accidentally B or a member of his family was burned to death-the judges
held this to be murder (felony murder), though the defendant did not
intend to kill at all and a fortiori did not premeditate a killing.
ld., at 867, 781 P.2d at 204 (emphasis added).
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After the presentation of evidence and arguments, the jury was presented a special
verdict form for findings under both circumstances. The jury convicted Mr. Hall of
felony murder but acquitted him of premeditated murder, wholly rejecting the State's
theory of the case. Instead, the jury verdict demonstrates that the jury accepted the
defense's theory (at least in part), believing that the murder was accidental. The most
reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence and the verdict forms is that the
jury believed that a consensual sexual encounter at some point became nonconsensual;
that Ms. Hanlon was rendered unconscious at some point; that Mr. Hall unintentionally
killed Ms. Hanlon when he tied one end of a belt around her neck and the other around
the branch of a tree believing she had already died. In short, based on the evidence and
arguments presented, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury believed the murder was an
unintended consequence of Mr. Hall's criminal conduct. Based on the jury verdicts, and
the facts of the case, trial counsel should have moved to preclude the State from seeking
the death penalty.
Prejudice: But for trial counsels' failure to move to preclude the death penalty
based on the jury verdicts, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Hall would not have
been sentenced to death. In other words, if trial counsel had made the appropriate
motion, then Mr. Hall would have received a life sentence.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the long-standing principle of the Eighth
Amendment that "capital punishment must 'be limited to those offenders who commit 'a
narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them
'the most deserving of execution.'" Kennedy v. Louisiana, 544 U.S. _,128 S.Ct. 2641,
2650 (2008) (citations omitted.). Applying this principle the Supreme Court has held that
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the death penalty is disproportionate for certain crimes. See Coker v. Georgia (holding
that the death penalty was disproportionate for rape of an adult woman); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the death penalty is disproportionate for
a juvenile murderer); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002) (holding that the death
penalty is disproportionate for a mentally retarded murderer); and Kennedy v. Louisiana,
supra (holding that the death penalty is disproportionate for rape of a child). Likewise, in
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that the death penalty is a disproportionate penalty for felony murder
absent specific findings that the defendant had a sufficiently culpable mental state.
In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment was violated by
imposition of the death penalty on a person who aided and abetted a felony murder by
driving the getaway car in a robbery, but who did not himself "kill, attempt to kill, or
intend that a killing take place or that lethal force [would] be employed." Enmund, 458
U.S. at 784, 797. Five years later, in Tison, the Supreme Court held that the culpability
requirement imposed by Enmund could be satisfied by "major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life." Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
Enmund and Tison establish that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for
felony murder unless the defendant is a major participant in the felony and acts with a
sufficiently culpable mental state, i.e., at least a reckless indifference to human life.
Neither Enmund nor Tison expressly indicated whether the minimum mens rea
requirement of "intent" in Enmund or "reckless indifference" in Tison applied to all
felony murder cases, specifically, those involving actual killers. However, trial counsel
should have submitted that the Enmund and Tison mens rea requirements apply to all
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felony murder cases, including Mr. Hall's case.30 Trial counsel could have readily cited
to Loving v. Hart, 47 MJ. 438 (C.A.A.F. 1998), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces agreed.
In Loving, the defendant argued that an aggravating factor - that he was the actual
perpetrator of the killing in a felony murder - was constitutionally defective, because it
was unsupported by a unanimous finding of intent to kill or reckless indifference to the
value ofhuman life. Id. at 441. Addressing the issue, the court stated in part:
[L]eft unanswered after Enmund and Tison is the question whether a
person who "actually killed" may be sentenced to death absent a finding
that the person intended to kill. As highlighted by Justice Scalia in the
Loving [v. United States, 517 U. S. 748 (1996)] oral argument, the phrase
"actually killed" could include an accused who accidentally killed
someone during commission of a felony, unless the term is limited to
situations where the accused intended to kill or acted with reckless
indifference to human life. We note that Justice White, who wrote the
majority opinion in Enmund and joined the majority opinion in Tison, had
earlier written separately in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), expressing his view that "it violates the Eighth
Amendment to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the
defendant possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim." 438 U.S.
at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2983. Without speculating on the views of the current
membership of the Supreme Court, we conclude that when Enmund and
Tison were decided, a majority of the Supreme Court was unwilling to
affirm a death sentence for felony murder unless it was supported by a
finding of culpability based on an intentional killing or substantial
participation in a felony combined with reckless indifference to human
life. Thus, we conclude that the phrase, "actually killed," as used in
Enmund and Tison, must be construed to mean a person who intentionally
kills, or substantially participates in a felony and exhibits reckless
indifference to human life.
Loving v. Hart, 47 M.J. at 443.
In addition, trial counsel should also have argued that the imposition of the death
penalty for accidental killers, or at least those who do not intend to kill or do not exhibit a
30 See THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, THE DEATH PENALTY, AND ORDINARY ROBBERY-
BURGLARY MURDERS: A CALIFORNIA CASE STUDY, 59 Fla. L.Rev. 719 (2007).
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reckless indifference to human life, is disproportionate because it does not further the
societal purposes of the death penalty, namely retribution and deterrence. See e.g., Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) Goint
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Unless the imposition of the death penalty
on all felony murderers who actually kill regardless of their mental culpability
"measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional
punishment." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
The death penalty is unlikely to deter unintentional felony murders?1 As the
Supreme Court said in Enmund:
[I]t seems likely that "capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only
when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation," for if a
person does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force
will be employed by others, the possibility that the death penalty will be
imposed for vicarious felony murder will not "enter into the cold calculus
that precedes the decision to act."
The Supreme Court has made clear that retribution must be calibrated to the
defendant's culpability, which in tum depends on his mental state with regard to the
crime. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender.") In Enmund, the Supreme Court stated: "It is
fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than
causing the same harm unintentionally.'" Unless Idaho's death penalty statute is
construed to require that all felony murderers possess a sufficiently culpable mental state
under Enmund and Tison before they can be eligible for the death penalty, then a
31 Mr. Hall asserts that the death penalty does not serve as a deterrent to murder
generally. See infra, Claim NN.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 91
000207
             
             
                
              
            
               
            
      
            
     
            
            
             
             
            
      
             
              
             
               
           
    ti ally.'"       
             
               
                
     
      
murderer who raped and intended to kill his victim (but did not premeditate the murder or
commit it during the perpetration of the rape) could not receive the death penalty whereas
a person who raped but accidentally killed his victim during the perpetration of the rape
could be sentenced to death. As stated in Tison:
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required
in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the
crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 156. Failing to distinguish negligent or even accidental killers from
killers possessing the more culpable mental states required by Enmund and Tison ignores
the fundamental difference in their level of culpability.
In conclusion, trial counsel failed to appreciate the significance of the jury
verdicts in the context of fundamental death penalty jurisprudence, and specifically in the
context of the Supreme Court's holdings in Enmund and Tison. The jury rejected the
State's theory ofthe case, and accepted at least in part, the Defense theory of the case that
that the murder may have been accidental. But for trial counsels' failure to move the
Court to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty absent the requisite specific
findings of a sufficiently culpable mental state, Mr. Hall would not have been sentenced
to death.
R. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT DURING
SENTENCING-PHASE OPENING STATEMENTS BY IMPROPERLY
APPEALING TO THE EMOTION, PASSION, OR PREJUDICE OF THE
JURY
The State, In opemng the sentencing phase, "introduced" the jury to Lynn
Henneman. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5922, Ls.I0-12.) In doing so the prosecutor argued that like
Cheryl Hanlon, "Lynn Henneman, too, was a daughter; she was a sister; she was a wife
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and she was an aunt." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5922, Ls.l3-17.) The characterization of
Ms. Henneman through these multiple relationships was improper and amounts to
prosecutorial misconduct.
Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory
tactics are impermissible. See e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App.
2007). Verdicts must be based upon the evidence presented and the reasonable
inferences, not on an irrational response which may be triggered if the prosecution
unfairly strikes an emotion in the jury.
Here, by characterizing Ms. Henneman through these many relationships the
prosecutor was appealing to the passions or prejudices of the jury by asking the jury to
imagine themselves as the victim.32 This argument was improper and this Court cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's misconduct did not contribute to the
jury's verdict.
S. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING
SENTENCING-PHASE OPENING STATEMENTS
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the State's openmg
statement. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference the facts and legal arguments from Claim
R, supra. Trial counsels' failure to object, and alternatively request a mistrial,
admonishment, and curative instruction constitutes deficient performance. Mr. Hall
32 Because post-conviction counsel has been denied access to the jury questionnaires at
this time, it is impossible to say how many jurors were female and thus related personally
to these characterizations. Likewise, it is impossible to know which, if any, of the male
jurors have daughters, aunts, or sisters to whom they could have personalized this
argument.
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asserts that but for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that
he would not have been convicted ofmurder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
T. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO PRESENT
ADEQUATE SENTENCING PHASE OPENING STATEMENT
Like trial counsel's guilt phase opening statement, the sentencing phase opening
statement was wholly ineffective. Trial counsel conceded one of the State's aggravating
factors, completely failed to explain mitigation, and did not present a persuasive lens
through which to view the evidence.
At the start of sentencing phase opening statements, trial counsel conceded one of
the State's aggravating factors, an element of the crime of capital murder:
We must concede. We cannot defend the fact that Mr. Erick Hall had
been previously convicted ofmurder. The Court told you in instruction 43
-- and this is the first aggravating circumstance that the State alleges -- the
defendant was previously convicted of another murder... the defense has to
concede - indeed we stipulate - that Mr. Hall has been convicted of first
degree - of a previous murder and that's the murder of Lynn Henneman.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.5932, L.19- p. 5933, L. 13.)
It was not as though trial counsel had no choice in conceding the prior murder
conviction aggravating factor alleged by the State. For example, trial counsel could have
argued that because the prior conviction was not listed in the indictment and did not
occur before the death of Ms. Hanlon, it should not apply in Mr. Hall's case. See infra,
Claim GG. Despite having evidence to argue against this aggravating factor alleged by
the State, trial counsel chose to broadly concede the jury would find this aggravating
factor.
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After conceding that the jury would find one of the aggravating factors, trial
counsel told the jury that this case was not a case where exoneration would occur. (Tr.
Vol. 11, p.5934, Ls.3 - 18.) They explained that the State "got the right man" in both the
Henneman and Hanlon cases. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5934, Ls.l4-18.) Trial counsel also
explained that the "imposition of a second death sentence [was] unnecessary." However,
trial counsel failed to explain how the imposition of the death penalty would be unjust.
Trial counsel then explained that it was their "belief that you need to know a little
about the man that the State is asking you to have executed and so we are going to
present testimony from his family." (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 5934, Ls.19-22.) Trial counsel then
ran through their witnesses in a checklist fashion, without explaining what it was these
witnesses would testify to. In fact, trial counsel spent their time explaining why certain
witnesses would not be presenting live testimony and never explained to the jury what it
was witnesses would testify to.
Perhaps the most shocking aspect of the openmg statement is the complete
absence of any mention of mitigation, mercy, or compassion. Trial counsel should have
taken this opportunity to explain the specific mitigation in Mr. Hall's case. Instead of
describing the evidence they would present as mitigating, and explaining how this
evidence would call for a sentence less than death, trial counsel told the jury they merely
wanted "to give you an idea where Mr. Hall comes from; what his background is; who he
is; to some extent, how he got here today." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5935, Ls.4-9.) This
demonstrates that the purpose of mitigation is entirely lost on trial counsel.
Trial counsel's performance during sentencing phase opening statement was
objectively unreasonable. He never explained what "mitigation" meant or included and
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conceded the State's case in aggravation. But for trial counsel's failure, there is a
reasonable probability that Mr. Hall would have received a life sentence.
U. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED FROM THE HENNEMAN CASE
Trial counsel failed to litigate the nature and the scope of the evidence of the
Henneman case. In many respects, the sentencing in this case was not about Cheryl
Hanlon, but rather Lynn Henneman.
Between the State's opening remarks and its closing arguments, the State
referenced Lynn Henneman more than even Cheryl Hanlon. During the presentation of
evidence, the State admitted sixty-nine exhibits during the sentencing hearing; sixty-six
pertained to the Henneman case?3 The State effectively retried the Henneman case,
presenting the jury with everything from the smallest detail, e.g., photos of newspapers in
Ms. Henneman's hotel room, to graphic post-mortem, and even post-autopsy,
photographs of Ms. Henneman's body for no other reason than to inflame the passions of
the jury. (See e.g., Sentencing Hearing Exhibit, Nos. 46-52.) The State presented the face
of Lynn Henneman in multiple photographs. The State called fourteen sentencing-phase
witnesses, including one witness designated as a victim impact witness in the Hanlon
case. Eight of the fourteen witnesses pertained to the Henneman case, which
compromised most of the State's sentencing phase case. The State did not cross-examine
many of the defense sentencing phase witnesses; however, during the cross-examination
of Dr. Beaver, the State took the opportunity to gratuitously relate yet again many of the
facts from the Henneman case.
33 State's exhibit no. 69 was simply an exhibit list.
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With minor exceptions, trial counsel did not object to the nature and scope of the
evidence presented. Trial counsel should have argued that their stipulation was of a
constitutional dimension, see Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), and that in
conjunction with the inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the information and the lack
of guidance to the jury on how to apply it, the admission of the evidence would violate
Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Sections 6, 7 and 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.
V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DUE TO THE PROSECUTOR'S
IMPROPER USE OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT
The State presented victim impact argument and evidence during both phases of
the trial. Such evidence pertained to Cheryl Hanlon and Lynn Henneman.34 The victim
impact was irrelevant during both phases.
The State presented irrelevant victim impact evidence through William ("Bill")
Williams during the guilt phase of the trial. (Tr. Vol. 9, pp.4143, 4170, 4176.) The
impact of Ms. Hanlon's death on Mr. Williams was irrelevant to guilt-innocence issues.
Further, Mr. Williams could not be designated as a victim impact witness under Idaho
law. Thus, the evidence was improperly elicited, and trial counsel should have objected.
The State presented improper victim impact during their sentencing phase
closing arguments. The first words from the State were as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, Cheryl won't be there to welcome her new
grandbaby Hayden into the world. Cheryl won't be there to see Hayden
take his first steps. She won't be there to hold him in her arms for the first
34 As for the improper evidence and argument regarding Lynn Henneman, see supra,
Claim V, incorporated herein by reference.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 97000213
               
             
              
             
                 
             
                
 
       
        
            
             
      
          
               
             
              
             
          
           
           
            
                 
             
      
      
time and she won't be there to see him grow up. She won't do those
things. The defendant made sure of that.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6478, LsA-lO.) This argument is intended to inflame the passions of the
jury by describing a hypothetical future relationship between an unborn child and
grandmother that did not exist at the time of the offense, or even at the time of the trial on
the Henneman case. This argument applies to every murder and in this case does not
comply with the rationale of Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), or the "immediate
family" requirement ofLC. § 19-5306(3). Accordingly, this argument violates the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition, trial counsel should have objected to the presentation of victim impact
evidence/statements, prior to consideration of the aggravating circumstances, and the
failure to instruct the jury how to consider and apply the victim impact
evidence/statements in the weighing process.
w. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DUE TO
THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER USE OF VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct due to the State's improper
use of victim impact evidence and argument. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference the facts
and legal arguments from See supra, Claim V. Trial counsels' failure to object, and
alternatively request a mistrial, admonishment, and curative instruction constitutes
deficient performance. Mr. Hall asserts that but for counsels' deficient performance, there
is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of murder of the first
degree or sentenced to death.
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x. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY CHALLENGE EVIDENCE
OF PRIOR BAD ACTS
Mr. Hall asserts that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in the
following ways: 1) by failing to present to the jury all the relevant circumstances
surrounding the damaged handcuff incident; 2) by failing to litigate the admissibility of
and factual basis for uncharged bad acts; 3) by failing to litigate the admissibility of and
factual basis for prior convictions.
Prior to discussing these three categories of evidence, Mr. Hall asserts that for
each category, unless otherwise noted, trial counsel should have made the following
arguments. First, trial counsel should have argued that the evidence was not relevant to
any of the statutory aggravating circumstances and that its probative value was otherwise
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 401-403. Second, trial
counsel should have argued, at least for the uncharged bad acts, that their admission
violated his due process right to have the acts proven by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt as well as the presumption of innocence. Third, unless any of these bad
acts were relevant to statutory aggravators and unless the jury was instructed to consider
them only in the weighing of such individual statutory aggravators, then their admission
would violate the exclusive provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2515, due process under both
the state and federal constitutions, and the Eighth Amendment. Fourth, in support of
each of these arguments, trial counsel should have relied upon the heightened protections
under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in capital cases.
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1. The Damaged Handcuff
The State admitted evidence involving an incident in which Mr. Hall allegedly
damaged his handcuffs on a day when he was transferred from prison to the courthouse to
make an appearance at a pretrial hearing in this case. (R. Vol. 10, pp.6234-6246.) Due to
trial counsels' unwillingness to meaningfully cooperate with Mr. Hall's post-conviction
counsel, it is difficult, if not impossible, for Mr. Hall to make an informed decision how
and if this claim should be revised or withdrawn. For instance, Mr. Hall believes that one
reason why trial counsel did not litigate the handcuff incident is related to a potential
conflict of interest, or at a minimum, based in part on the complete breakdown in the
attorney-client relationship. Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel must be able to have
confidential conversations with trial counsel about this before Mr. Hall can make a fully
informed and intelligent decision whether to waive relevant privileges in pursuit of relief
under this claim.
2. Other Uncharged Bad Acts
The State presented evidence of other uncharged bad acts attributed to Mr. Hall.
(Tr. Vol. 8, pp.6198-6215 (Michelle Deen); pp.6216-6233 (April Sebastian).) Similar to
the reasons stated above, Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel must speak to trial counsel
to determine the extent, if any, trial counsel investigated all of these bad acts and whether
counsel made a fully informed decision in choosing not to challenge any or all of them.
3. Other Prior Convictions
The State introduced five judgments of conviction during the sentencing phase
including: convictions from the Henneman case; a statutory rape conviction from 1992;
an escape conviction from 1995; a grand theft by possession of stolen property conviction
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from 1991; and a burglary conviction from 1991. (R., Sentencing Hearing Exhibits, Nos.
67-68.) For the reasons noted above, Mr. Hall cannot make a fully informed decision
whether to revise this claim, or even to withdraw it in part or totality. Nevertheless, Mr.
Hall provides the following in support of this claim.
Trial counsel should have argued, both factually and legally, that the evidence
was irrelevant and highly prejudicial to Mr. Hall. Had trial counsel raised any number of
the legal grounds available to exclude the evidence, then the evidence would never have
been admitted. These grounds are discussed in tum.
i. Murder, Rape, And Kidnapping Convictions (Henneman Case)
The jury was informed that a prior jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of four statutory aggravating circumstances and determined that all four
outweighed the mitigation. Even if trial counsels' decision to inform the jury about Mr.
Hall's death sentence was reasonable, which it was not, there was no reason to inform the
jury of the full nature and scope of a prior jury's findings, as it tends to impermissibly
diminish their responsibility.
ii. Escape Conviction
Trial counsel should have argued that the escape conviction was inadmissible
because it was irrelevant and any probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice. I.R.E. 401, 403. Further, counsel should have argued that its introduction
would violate Mr. Hall's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair
trial and to present a defense. See supra, Claim X.
The facts underlying the 1994 escape conviction are so dissimilar to any possible
future circumstances that Mr. Hall will face in prison that the conviction should not have
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been introduced. (Exhibit 19.) Specifically, the escape occurred in 1994 when Mr. Hall
walked away from the dairy of the South Idaho Correctional Institution without
permission. The dairy is located outside the walls of the Idaho State Penitentiary. Any
argument that the facts of this "escape" were relevant to the propensity aggravating
circumstance should have been easily rebutted by trial counsel by referencing the facts of
the crime.
Further, for the jury to hear that Mr. Hall had an escape conviction, when that jury
was to decide between life imprisonment and the death penalty is beyond the pale given
the factual circumstances of the escape conviction. Had the jury imposed a life sentence,
there was no chance that Mr. Hall would be in circumstances similar to those surrounding
the 1994 escape-i.e., able to just walk away from the institution-yet the jury was left
with the possibility of Mr. Hall's future escape based upon his past "escape." Its
introduction was therefore totally irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
iii. Statutory Rape Conviction
The jury was informed that Mr. Hall had previously been convicted of statutory
rape; however, the jury had no way to know how to use this information; they were given
no proffer of evidence to establish the crime. Trial counsel should have submitted a
proffer for the jury's consideration such as the following:
Mr. Hall admitted to having consensual sexual intercourse with Norma
Jean Oliver in 1991. The State and Mr. Hall entered an agreement
whereby Mr. Hall would plead guilty to statutory rape defined in that case
as follows: "Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral,
anal or vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a
female where the female is under the age of eighteen (18) years." At the
time, Mr. Hall was twenty and Ms. Oliver was seventeen. Mr. Hall had
met Ms. Oliver at a bar prior to the rape. Mr. Hall claimed that he
believed that Ms. Oliver was eighteen. Mistake of age is not a defense to
statutory rape. The punishment for statutory rape is a minimum of one
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year and a maximum of life in prison. Mr. Hall was given a five year
sentence with parole eligibility in one year.
Without the proffer, the jury was asked to speculate about the circumstances of
the crime. It would not have been unreasonable for a jury to believe that Ms. Oliver was
a younger child, or even that statutory rape does not preclude forcible rape.
iv. Grand Theft Conviction
Trial counsel should have argued that the grand theft conviction was inadmissible
because it was irrelevant any probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice. I.R.E. 401, 403. Further, counsel should have argued that its introduction
would violate Mr. Hall's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair
trial and to present a defense. See supra, Claim X.
Trial counsel failed to argue that the facts surrounding the grand theft conviction
were factually irrelevant to the capital sentencing. The conviction involved a guilty plea
to possession of stolen property nearly seventeen years before the sentencing trial in this
case. The "official" version of the crime shows that someone other than Mr. Hall stole an
automobile - Mr. Hall's crime was possession of the stolen vehicle. (Exhibit 20.) The
property was a 1974 station wagon, with an estimated value of $400. The crime did not
involve any violence. The victim was not a person, but rather a business entity, B.P.
Auto Sales.
Y. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY NON-
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Evidence of non-statutory aggravating circumstances was introduced against
Mr. Hall including his prior convictions, as well as evidence of other alleged bad conduct
with former girlfriends and acquaintances. With the advent of jury sentencing, trial
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 103
000219
               
       
             
                 
             
    
            
            
            
              
          
             
             
              
                
             
                
               
  
         
       
   
        
               
            
      
counsel should have challenged the admissibility of all non-statutory aggravating
circumstances on the following grounds:
• That such evidence was not pled by way of Indictment or Information in
violation ofMr. Hall's state statutory and constitutional rights;
• That Mr. Hall was not given adequate notice as entitled by the State and
Federal due process clauses;
• That I.e. 19-2515, in its latest post-Ring incarnation, does not provide for
consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances;
• That consideration of non-statutory aggravators violates due process under
Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980);
• That the ability of the prosecutor to designate any evidence it wishes as a non-
statutory aggravating factor constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power; and
• That due to the lack of guidance available by Idaho law in the context of jury
sentencing, jury consideration of non-statutory aggravators violates the Eighth
Amendment.35
If deemed admissible, then trial counsel should have litigated the following:
• That due process under the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 13, and due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Sixth Amendment,
requires that the jury should be instructed that the prosecution bore the burden
of proving the existence of non-statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt; and
• That the jury should be instructed that they cannot consider non-statutory
aggravating circumstances when making their determination of whether a
statutory aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt or when
weighing the statutory aggravators against the mitigation.
35 The jury was not properly instructed on the manner in which to consider non-statutory
aggravating circumstances and likely weighed them during consideration of the
aggravating circumstances. "It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries
be carefully and adequately guided in their deliberations." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 193 (1976). In capital sentencing the jury's discretion must be "controlled by clear
and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application." McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303 (1987). Without adequate instruction how to apply the non-
statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury was given unbridled discretion in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
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In conclusion, trial counsel should have objected to non-statutory aggravating
circumstances based on Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs ofStrickland.
z. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THROUGH IMPROPER CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE EXPERT WITNESSES AND
DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO OBJECT TO SUCH MISCONDUCT AND IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A REDIRECT EXAMINATION
The State laid the groundwork for its sentencing phase theory to undermine
Mr. Hall's mitigating evidence through its cross-examination of Mr. Hall's mental health
experts, Dr. Craig Beaver and Dr. Pablo Stewart.
The following represents relevant excerpts from the prosecution's cross-
examination of Dr. Beaver, beginning with its very first question:
Q So, Doctor Beaver, I just want to make sure we are on the same sheet
of music here. The defendant has the capacity to understand right from
wrong. Isn't that correct?
A Yes.
Q And he can make choices. Isn't that correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. He is still responsible for the conduct for which he has been
convicted by the Lynn Henneman jury and now the Cheryl Hanlon jury.
Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And he is not mentally retarded; is he?
A No, I don't think so.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6390, Ls.II-22.)
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The following represents the only two substantive questions of the prosecution's
cross-examination of Dr. Stewart:
Q. . .. Mr. Hall understands right from wrong; does he not?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And Mr. Hall is capable of making choices; is he not?
A. ... He is capable of making choices. They tend to be pretty bad
one (sic). But yes, he is capable ofmaking choices.
(R., Sentencing Hearing Exhibit D.)
The State's questions were outside the scope of Dr. Beaver and Dr. Stewart's
testimony. Moreover, the questions were irrelevant to the mitigation issue. As the Idaho
Supreme Court recently stated in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008),
mental health evidence constitutes relevant mitigation even when no nexus exists
between it and the crime. In Lovelace, the Court emphasized that such questions to a
defendant's mental health witnesses are improper. Trial counsel should have objected to
this line of questioning. In addition, trial counsel should have conducted are-direct
examination to demonstrate that Mr. Hall's ability to make good choices was diminished
by his traumatic childhood, as well as his mental health and related problems.
AA. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Summary: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
present mitigating evidence and by failing to present evidence to rebut the State's case in
aggravation, all of which was available upon reasonable investigation. As a result, the
jury was presented with incomplete information upon which to base their decision to
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impose the death penalty. Had the jury been presented a complete picture of Erick Hall,
there is a reasonable probability that they would have imposed a life sentence.
Trial counsel built their sentencing case almost entirely around Mr. Hall's
previous murder conviction and death sentence. Their apparent goal was for the jury to
somehow twist one of the State's aggravating circumstances around and find that it was
actually a mitigating circumstance. In an obligatory fashion, trial counsel presented some
testimony aimed at helping the jury understand "a little about the man that the State is
asking you to have executed." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5934, Ls.l9-22.) However, trial counsel
presented this testimony in a way that demonstrated they did not think the jury would
find it meaningful.
At the start of the penalty phase, trial counsel told the Curt they were going to
present the testimony of friends, family, a psychiatrist, and a psychologist. They then
stated, "[bJut honestly, is it going to have any force and meaning? I doubt it. If it didn't
work in the Henneman case, how is it going to work here?" (Tr. p. 5871, Ls.6-9.) Trial
counsel knew that they would need to present more mitigation than was presented in the
Henneman case. Instead, they presented half as much mitigation as was presented in the
Henneman case. (R., pp.l181-1186) (compare to Exhibit 21, court minutes of
Henneman mitigation case presented by defense).
Trial counsel presented expert testimony from both a psychologist and
psychiatrist - however, the testimony lacked impact and direction. There was also some
evidence presented by friends and family of Mr. Hall. Again, this testimony was
underwhelming and presented an incomplete picture of who Mr. Hall is. Trial counsel
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made it clear they were simply going through the motions of sentencing without giving
any thought to the force and meaning of their presentation.
Standard ofPeiformance: In a capital trial, trial counsel has a duty to conduct a
thorough investigation in preparation for the penalty phase. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545
u.s. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362 (2000). This includes both the duty to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation,
and a duty to conduct an investigation into the State's case in aggravation. The ABA
Guidelines provide in part:
At that [penalty] phase, trial counsel must both rebut the
prosecution's case in favor of the death penalty and affirmatively
present the best possible case in favor of a sentence other than death.
If the defendant has any prior criminal history, the prosecution can be
expected to attempt to offer it in support of a death sentence. Trial counsel
accordingly must comprehensively investigate-together with the defense
investigator, a mitigation specialist, and other members of the defense
team-the defendant's behavior and the circumstances of the conviction.
Only then can counsel protect the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right
to deny or rebut factual allegations made by the prosecution in support of
a death sentence, and the client's Eighth Amendment right not to be
sentenced to death based on prior convictions obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights. If uncharged prior misconduct is arguably
admissible, trial counsel must assume that the prosecution will attempt to
introduce it, and accordingly must thoroughly investigate it as an integral
part of preparing for the penalty phase. Along with preparing to counter
the prosecution's case for the death penalty, trial counsel must develop an
affirmative case for sparing the defendant's life. A capital defendant has
an unqualified right to present any facet of his character, background, or
record that might call for a sentence less than death. This Eighth
Amendment right to offer mitigating evidence "does nothing to fulfill its
purpose unless it is understood to presuppose that the defense lawyer will
unearth, develop, present, and insist on the consideration of those
'compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties
of humankind.'" Nor will the presentation be persuasive unless it (a) is
consistent with that made by the defense at the guilt phase and (b) links
the evidence offered in mitigation to the specific circumstances of the
client.
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ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1 (emphasis added). In short, the
constitutional demand on counsel to conduct a thorough investigation of the penalty
phase is high.
Presentation of some mitigating evidence, even if strong, is not enough if other
mitigating evidence is available upon reasonable investigation. In Rompilla, the Supreme
Court found counsel ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate mitigation
investigation despite consulting with mental health experts and conducting an
investigation into the defendant's background. Specifically, trial counsel failed to
examine a court file on the defendant's prior conviction for rape and assault where the
file included additional mitigating evidence. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court found
counsel ineffective based on an inadequate mitigation investigation despite the fact that
counsel arranged psychological testing for their client and obtained some government
records to assist in developing their client's social history. Finally, in Williams, the
Supreme Court found counsel ineffective in failing to adequately investigate their client's
background despite a "competently handled guilt phase of the trial." Id. at 395-96. Thus,
the Supreme Court has recognized the effectiveness of counsel's assistance will be
subjected to great scrutiny in a capital case.
Deficient Performance: This claim is divided into six subclaims: subclaim 1)
addresses trial counsel's failure to investigate and present testimony from Mr. Hall's
family; subclaim 2) addresses trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present
evidence of Mr. Hall's good character as an adult; subclaim 3) addresses trial counsel's
failure to investigate and present the testimony of Erick Hall's foster parents and foster
brother; subclaim 4) addresses trial counsel's failure to present testimony from expert
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witnesses; subclaim 5) addresses trial counsel's failure to present redacted portions of the
March 2003 interrogation tape and subclaim 6) addresses trial counsel's failure to present
photographs, artwork, and visual aids.
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of
Erick Hall's Traumatic Childhood Through Live Testimony Of Family
Members
Trial counsel failed to prepare and present meaningful mitigation evidence
through the testimony of Mr. Hall's family. Counsel did not interview all available
family members who could have provided compelling testimony of Mr. Hall's life, and
failed to present compelling testimony from family members they did interview. In fact,
trial counsel only presented live testimony from two ofMr. Hall's family members.
Courts have recognized the unique significance and strength of humanizing
mitigation evidence presented through family members. See e.g., Mayfield v. Woodford,
270 F.3d 915,932 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting the importance of "family members
relating additional humanizing stories" in finding counsel ineffective in failing to present
available mitigating evidence); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). The
importance of humanizing a defendant through family members stories is reflected in the
ABA Guidelines.
Family members and friends can provide vivid first-hand accounts of the
poverty and abuse that characterize the lives of many capital defendants.
These witnesses can also humanize the client by allowing the jury to see
him in the context of his family, showing that they care about him, and
providing examples of his capacity to behave in a caring, positive way,
such as attempting to protect other family members from domestic
violence or trying to be a good parent and provider.
Commentary to ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.11 (footnotes omitted).
Trial counsel failed to elicit testimony from family members in the form of
"stories" or "vignettes" for the purpose of making the mitigation real. It is well
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understood that a specific story of a particular horrific instance of abuse resonates with
juror's more than general assertions that the defendant was abused. John H. Blume, Sheri
Lynn Johnson, and Scott E. Sunby, Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of
Knowing and Heeding what Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1035,
1040 (2008). Instead of presenting a mitigation case through the use of family members
stories about the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse suffered by Mr. Hall as a child,
trial counsel did little more than throw a handful of mitigation at the jury, half-heartedly
hoping someone would catch something.
v. Shannon Pambrun
Shannon Pambrun is Mr. Hall's older half-brother. Shannon and Mr. Hall share
the same mother, Jean Hall McCracken.36 Shannon presented testimony at the sentencing
phase of Mr. Hall's trial. However, his testimony was grossly inadequate due to trial
counsels' failure to question him. Shannon provided an affidavit to post-conviction
counsel in the Henneman case. (Exhibit 22, affidavit of Shannon Pambrun.) In that
affidavit, he detailed numerous incidences of abuse, neglect, and molestation experienced
by Mr. Hall. This affidavit was readily available to trial counsel. However, trial counsel
failed to use most of the information provided therein when questioning Shannon. As a
result, the jury was not presented with stories of powerful mitigating evidence Shannon
had to offer.
For example, as the older brother, Shannon recalls Erick's strange behaviors,
which began when Erick was very young. As a baby, Erick would be happy one
moment, then cry uncontrollably for no apparent reason the next. He could have
36 Erick's birth certificate lists Shannon's father, Roy Pambrun, as Erick's father, but
their mother has always maintained that Frank McCracken is Erick's biological father.
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provided testimony that Erick would have extreme mood swings even at a young age,
could be explosive when someone touched his head or the back of his neck, and would
become "someone else" at times. His anger would dissipate as quickly as it came.
Shannon could have testified that Erick began hearing voices when he was approximately
eight years old. Sometimes when Shannon would fight with Erick, Shannon "knew that
he was not Erick but someone else." (Exhibit 22, affidavit of Shannon Pambrun.)
Shannon also could have confirmed that Frank beat his mother while she was
pregnant. He could have testified that his mother used alcohol heavily and was a "closet
drinker." Shannon could have told the jury Jean abused alcohol during her pregnancies.
(Exhibit 22.)
Shannon was not asked to testify about any issues related to sexual molestation.
This is particularly shocking considering Shannon could have provided details about how
molestation was an ongoing family theme, and added details not provided by Shawnra.
Erick's Uncle Allen tried to molest all of the boys, including Erick. Shannon could have
stated that his Uncle Mark was molesting the children. One of Jean's boyfriends
molested at least two of the girls. Several of Jean's boyfriends sexually abused the
children. Moreover, Jean was sexually inappropriate to the boys, kissing and hugging
Shannon inappropriately, and inappropriately kissing Frankie. Shannon could have also
confirmed that there was sexual activity between many of the siblings and cousins, a
strong indicator that the children grew up in a sexually abusive environment. (Exhibit
22.) Trial counsel did not ask Shannon about any of this information.
Given the extent of Shannon's knowledge, the corroboration his testimony would
have provided, and the information already available to trial counsel in his affidavit, it is
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unbelievable trial counsel failed to elicit this testimony. There is a reasonable probability
that the information Shannon could have provided would have changed the outcome of
the sentencing trial such that Mr. Hall would have received a life sentence.
vi. Shawnra McCracken Hemming
Shawnra McCracken Hemming is Erick's older half-sister. Shawnra testified at
the sentencing phase of the Henneman trial, provided post-conviction counsel in the
Henneman case with an affidavit, and testified at the sentencing phase of the Hanlon trial.
Trial counsel failed to elicit powerful mitigating testimony that was readily available
from Shawnra.
Specifically, Shawnra could have provided testimony that Erick's father, Frank
McCracken, used to choke Erick's mother, Jean Hall, in front of the children. (Exhibit
23, testimony of Shawnra Hemming at Henneman sentencing trial.) It was important for
the jury to hear this testimony in light of the State's theory of how Ms. Hanlon died.
Shawnra's testimony could have given the jury an understanding of Erick, otherwise not
presented by trial counsel.
Further, she could have provided testimony about Shannon's sexual abuse of
Kenny, maternal cousin, Frank constantly calling his daughter's whores and sluts, Frank
using marijuana with his children, Erick's imaginary friends, John McGuire taking nude
pictures of the girls, how neighborhood children would pay to watch Erick's siblings and
cousins engage in sexual activity. (Exhibit 24, 8/8/04 interview of Shawnra Hemming.)
Trial counsel should have questioned her regarding the fact that Frank constanly told
Erick he was not his biological son, how Frank would use acid with his children, and how
Jean would steal Shawnra's babysitting money for her own use. (Exhibit 23, 10/25/04
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interview with Shawnra Hemming.) Because trial counsel has refused to cooperate with
Mr. Hall's reinvestigation of this case it is impossible to fully state this claim.
vii. Betty Jean Kirk Douglas
Betty Jean Kirk is Erick's cousin. She testified at the sentencing phase of the
Henneman trail. Her prior testimony was read into the record by trial counsel's secretary.
The failure to present live testimony from Betty Jean was ineffective. See irifra, Claim
BB. Trial counsel's investigator interviewed Betty Jean. In this interview she provided
them with information regarding Erick's history of "black outs." She described how
when Erick was a child he would fight, black out, and then not remember what had
happened during the fight. (Exhibit 25, interview of Betty Jean Kirk dated 2/8/07.) She
described how during these periods when Erick was blacking out it appeared from his
eyes that "he just wasn't there." (Exhibit 25.) Betty Jean Kirk could have provided
powerful mitigating testimony to the jury about Mr. Hall's history of blacking out.
Because trial counsel did not present this testimony, the jury was unaware of this
important information about Erick. Trial counsel has refused to cooperate with
Mr. Hall's reinvestigation of this case therefore it is impossible to at this time to fully
state this claim.
In addition to family members who did present testimony at sentencing. Mr. Hall
asserts that trial counsel should have presented testimony from other family members. If
these family members were unavailable to testify at trial, then, at a minimum, trial
counsel should have presented their prior testimony or affidavit. Mr. Hall asserts that the
State was willing to stipulate to the admission of some of the prior testimony. (Tr. Vol.
11, p.5897, 1.17-24.) However, even if the State was unwilling to stipulate to the
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admission of prior testimony or affidavits, it was admissible. See e.g., Green v. Georgia,
442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that the trial court erred in a capital case by excluding
proffered mitigation evidence under a state hearsay rule).
viii. Deanna McCracken
Deanna McCracken is Erick's younger sister. Deanna testified at the sentencing
phase of the Henneman trial, but did not testify in this case. It is unclear why she did not
testify. Because trial counsel has refused to cooperate with Mr. Hall's reinvestigation of
this case it is impossible to at this time to fully state this claim. However, at a minimum,
trial counsel should have provided the jury with a copy of Deanna's previous testimony.
In fact, the State stipulated to allowing the presentation of her prior testimony. (Tr. Vol.
11, p.5897, Ls.17-24.)
ix. Tamara McCracken
Tamara McCracken is Erick's older half-sister. Tamara testified at the sentencing
phase of the Henneman trial, but did not testify at the sentencing phase of this case. It is
unclear why she did not testify. Trial counsel has refused to cooperate with Mr. Hall's
reinvestigation of this case therefore it is impossible to at this time to fully state this
claim. However, at a minimum, trial counsel should have provided the jury with a copy
of Tamara's previous testimony.
x. Jean Hall McCracken
Jean, Erick's mother, passed away in January of 2007. Prior to her death, she
provided post-conviction counsel in the Henneman case with an affidavit in which she
details mitigating circumstances of Erick's life. (Exhibit 26.) Trial counsel should have
sought to admit this affidavit during the sentencing phase of the trial.
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In her affidavit, Jean admits that she used drugs during her pregnancy with Erick.
Jean provides further confirmation and further evidence of head injuries sustained by
Erick, as well as incidents where Erick "would almost black out in terms of being
conscious of what he was doing, saying, or engaged in." Jean also describes similar
experiences she has had, suggesting a genetic component to Erick's behaviors. Based on
a layperson's perspective, but bolstered by her intimate knowledge of Erick's childhood
behaviors, Jean believes that Erick is bipolar. Additionally, Jean experienced the loss of
a loved-one by violence when her father was murdered in 1998. Thus, Jean would have
bridged the gap between the loss the victim's family felt and the loss that a convicted
murderer's mother feels. Like so many of Erick's family members and friends, Jean
loved him and did not want to see him executed.
Because of trial counsel's failure to present this affidavit, the jury did not hear
powerful mitigating evidence that Mr. Hall's parents do accept responsibility for their
failures, and just as importantly, both love their son...despite his failures. See us. v.
Honken, 381 F.Supp.2d 936 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (noting that jury considered mitigating
value in the fact that the defendant was loved by his mother, and the emotional trauma
that she would feel from the execution of her son).
The jury should have heard her stories, and the stories of other relatives; because
only by hearing their stories could the jury truly have understood Erick's childhood and
"the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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xi. Frank McCracken, Sr.
Frank McCracken, Sr., Erick's father, previously provided an affidavit in the
Henneman case where he acknowledged that he was physically and verbally abusive to
Jean in front ofthe children. He reported signs of abuse to Erick following Erick's return
from a juvenile detention center. "When Erick came back to California from the boy's
home in 1986-87 he had markings on his back from having an iron pressed into his
body." Frank concluded that he loves Erick, "he is my son, he's always been my son,
and he will always be my son." (Exhibit 27.) Frank did not testify at Erick's trial.
xii. Frank McCracken, Jr. ("Frankie '')
Frankie McCracken is Erick's older half-brother. Frankie also provided post-
conviction counsel in the Henneman case with an affidavit. Frankie further confirmed
the degree of violence in the McCracken family. Frankie has also experienced significant
problems in the criminal justice system, having spent eight years in prison. (Exhibit 28.)
Frankie did not testify at Erick's trial.
xiii. TijJaney Conner
Tiffaney Conner is Erick's youngest half-sister. She also provided an affidavit to
post-conviction counsel in the Henneman case. This affidavit was readily available to
trial counsel. While she has no real memories of Erick as a child, she treasures a picture
of him holding her when she was a baby. Tiffaney feels a strong connection to Erick as
an adult and loves him. She hopes to continue a relationship with him despite his
incarceration. "My letters are my most prized possession of my brother." (Exhibit 29.)
Tiffaney did not testify at Erick's trial.
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xiv. Kenneth Douglas
Kenneth Douglas is Erick's cousin. Again, he has provided an affidavit to post-
conviction counsel in the Henneman case. Kenneth related further instances of violence
in Erick's childhood. He also described another serious head injury when Erick fell off a
second story roof and hit his head on a rock sidewalk. Also, apparently drawing from a
layperson's perspective, Kenneth describes Erick's childhood behaviors as characteristic
of "manic depressive, Bi-Polar, and schizophrenic." (Exhibit 30.) Kenneth did not testify
at Erick's trial.
xv. John Thompson
John Thompson is Erick's younger brother. John described the disruption in the
household and characterizes Erick's childhood mood swings as a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde" split personality. John also confirmed Shannon's abuse of Erick. (Exhibit 31.)
Despite having provided post-conviction counsel with an affidavit, trial counsel did not
have John testify at Erick's trial.
xvi. Kimberly Bacon
Kimberly Bacon was married to Erick's older brother, Shannon, and knew Erick
when Erick was a teenager. Like others, she provided post-conviction counsel with an
affidavit in the Henneman trial that was readily available for trial counsel's use. She
provided more information confirming family accounts of Shannon's explosive,
unpredictable violence. Her testimony would have bolstered claims that Shannon was
extremely abusive, would have added accounts of Erick witnessing Shannon's violence
against Kimberly, and would have described the relationship between Shannon and Erick
as one in which "Shannon kept Erick around so he could have a scapegoat." Kimberly,
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who since meeting Erick has worked at Columbia River Mental Health for two years as a
specialist, describes Erick's behavior as a teenager as "mentally ill, incompetent, and
[having] developmental delays," suffering from "severe attachment disorder," "major
mental instability issues," and "extreme mood swings." (Exhibit 32.) Kimberly did not
testify at Erick's trial.
2. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of
Erick Hall's Good Behavior As An Adult
During sentencing proceedings, the defense offered testimony from family
members and two experts that described Erick Hall's horrific childhood. However, trial
counsel failed to adequately investigate and present testimony of Mr. Hall's life as an
adult. The jury was left with the impression that there were no mitigating circumstances
in Mr. Hall's adult life.
Had trial counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating circumstances
of Mr. Hall's adolescence and adulthood including mitigating evidence near the time of
the crime, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have imposed a life
sentence, because they would have seen that Mr. Hall had redeeming qualities, and was
not defined solely by the actions for which the jury convicted him.
This information was readily available for trial counsel to present. Like with the
testimony of family members, post-conviction counsel for Mr. Hall in the Henneman case
uncovered evidence of caring, loving relationships with many individuals who provided
affidavits including: i) Wendy Levy, ii) Timothy Turley, iii) Laura Turley, iv) Amber
Lynn (Peterson) Fox, and v) and Jennifer Demunbrun. Mr. Hall asserts that, at a
minimum, these individuals affidavits should have been presented to the jury.
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i. Wendy Levy
Wendy Levy testified at Mr. Hall's sentencing. However, her testimony lacked
direction or depth. At trial Ms. Levy testified that when she first met Mr. Hall she
"tripped over him." However, trial counsel failed to highlight this point or follow up
with a question about why she would have tripped on Mr. Hall. Instead, as if hurriedly
running through a script, they moved on to their next question. Ms. Levy would have also
testified that Mr. Hall played with her children, including her special-needs daughter. Mr.
Hall assisted with chores, provided food and money to the family when they were
hungry, and otherwise attempted to provide for the family. He was never violent in any
manner with any of the members of the family. He was a talented artist, playful, a good
worker, and protective of Wendy and her children. (Exhibit 33.)
ii. Timothy Turley
Tim Turley is a long-time friend of Mr. Hall's who testify during the penalty
phase. Tim met Mr. Hall around 1987 or 1988. They became good friends. Tim's
family came to know and love Mr. Hall, and his daughters still refer to him as "Uncle
Erick." Tim considers Mr. Hall to be his brother. Mr. Hall is the godfather to one of
Tim's children. In the summer of 2000, Mr. Hall prevented Tim from committing
suicide:
In the summer of 2000, Erick happened to show up at my house. I had
been out of prison for a few months, and was having a very difficult time.
I had been planning to kill myself that day, and had a gun. I was in the
process of putting the gun up to my head and in my mouth. Erick ran over
to me and knocked the gun out of my mouth. He picked me up, took me
out to his car, and drove around with me for several hours. He gave me
food, cigarettes, and talked to me until I got to the point where I could
think again and figure out what to do. A week or two after that I left Idaho
and moved to a different state to try to put my life back together.
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(Exhibit 34.) Mr. Hall was an advocate for the underdog, and Tim never feared Mr. Hall
or saw him behave in a violent manner. Mr. Hall tried to help Tim quit drugs. Trial
counsel should have elicited this information from Tim in a compelling way.
iii. Laura Turley
Laura Turley is Tim Turley's cousin's ex-wife. Laura was not called to testify,
but would have provided the jury with mitigating evidence about Erick Hall. She and Mr.
Hall became pen pals and frequently talked on the telephone when Mr. Hall was
incarcerated in 1993. Laura states that Mr. Hall was her "Rock of Gibraltar," and was a
steady, positive, important part of her life. Mr. Hall called her when she was in labor,
and became the godfather of her youngest daughter. Mr. Hall was always loving,
friendly, and giving. Laura has never seen Mr. Hall act in a frightening or violent
manner. (Exhibit 35.)
iv. Jennifer Demunbrun
Jennifer Demunbrun is Wendy Levy's daughter. She did not testify. Jennifer
would have testified that Mr. Hall lived with her family when she was approximately
twelve years old. She referred to Mr. Hall as her uncle. Mr. Hall was a great babysitter:
He was gentle, he never raised his voice toward us, he never hit us, and he
did not neglect us or leave us alone. Erick treated us as though we were
his children. He took us to the park to feed the ducks, cooked meals for
us, and if we were sick he would encourage us to eat or take our medicine.
Erick never behaved in a violent manner with any members of my family.
(Exhibit 36) Mr. Hall took care of Jennifer when she was sick in 2000 or 2001. He
would wake her up to eat, to drink water, to take medicine, and he watched Jennifer's
children for her. Clearly, trial counsel should have called Jennifer to testify on Mr. Hall's
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behalfor at a minimum, provided the jury with a copy ofher affidavit obtained during the
Henneman post-conviction.
v. Amber Lynn (Peterson) Fox
Amber Lynn Fox was a friend and roommate of Jennifer Demunbrun. Amber had
a consensual sexual relationship with Erick Hall. They had sex a few times over the
course of a month. Mr. Hall was always gentle with her and never engaged in rough or
abusive behavior. Mr. Hall never choked her or engaged in any other bizarre or violent
behavior with Amber. (Exhibit 37.)
3. Trial Counsel Failed To Locate, Interview, And Present The Testimony Of
Erick Hall's Foster Parents And Foster Brother
In the capital sentencing context, it is critically important for the trial team to
investigate all aspects of the client's upbringing, including any foster homes or
institutions at which the client was housed or incarcerated. ABA Guidelines,
Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("If the client was incarcerated, institutionalized or placed
outside of the home, as either a juvenile or an adult, the defense team should investigate
the possible effect of the facility's conditions on the client's contemporaneous and later
conduct.") In Mr. Hall's case, the trial team failed to uncover or present critical
witnesses to sexually abusive foster care situations, as well as mitigating evidence of the
extraordinary depths of Mr. Hall's emotional and psychological fragility from positive
but short-lived foster care placement.
i. Linda McQuery And JeffLangston
Erick was placed in foster care with Linda McQuery when he was sixteen years
old. The trial team never attempted to ascertain the circumstances of that placement.
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The trial team's failure to adequately investigate Erick's foster placement with
Ms. McQuery had dire and utterly avoidable consequences.
Post-conviction investigators in the Henneman case located and interviewed
Erick's foster brother, Jeff Langston, who was placed with Erick under Linda McQuery's
care. Mr. Langston has provided an affidavit in which he states he was seduced by Linda
McQuery and maintained an incestuous sexual relationship with her during the two
months that he and Erick resided at McQuery's house. (Exhibit 38, p.3.) Jeff was
seventeen years old; Erick was sixteen years old. Trial counsel had access to the
information contained in Jeff Langston affidavit. The McQuery household, along with
confirmation of family incest and abuse described by Erick's brother Shannon, would
have established the pervasive nature of Erick's exposure to perverse, incestuous familial
relationships. In a murder case involving rape, this was highly relevant information for
the jury's consideration.
Jeff Langston also provided powerful mitigating evidence of psychological
disorders, including poor attention to hygiene, mood swings, and odd and erratic
behavior. Jeff stated that Erick described hearing voices, and observed Erick making odd
comments as though he was reacting to voices speaking to him. He described how Erick,
without provocation, would begin "ranting and raving" and "pacing and waving his arms
around." (Exhibit 38, pp.3.)
ii. Harry And Sophronia Selby
The trial team also failed to present testimony from Harry and Sophronia Selby.
Erick was placed with Harry and Sophronia in the fall of 1985, in Tillamook, Oregon.
The Selbys were Erick's foster parents for approximately five and one-half months.
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(Exhibit 39, p.3 (Affidavit of Sophronia Selby).) Both Harry and Sophronia provided
heartbreaking and valuable mitigating information about Erick. Sophronia described
Erick being dropped off at the foster home:
[The placement service] dropped Erick off at the Selby home. Erick did
not have any personal belongings with him. He only had the clothes he
was wearing. The clothes that Erick was wearing were very dirty and
smelled. It was obvious from the smell that the clothes had not been
washed in a long time. They also smelled like cigarette smoke.
Erick stayed in the clothes he arrived in for almost a week. We were
finally able to convince him to shower and change....
(Exhibit 39, p.3.)
Erick's hygiene was problematic while he lived with the Selby's. They were
lucky to get him to shower a couple of times a week. They remember Erick being very
quiet, overly scared and insecure. He was extra cautious in everything he did in the
home, and went out of his way not to be noticed. Erick always stayed physically close to
Harry Selby and, other than attending school, it was about four months before Erick went
outside the house without Harry. Additionally, they also reported Erick suffered
frequently from severe headaches. (Exhibit 39.)
Shortly after Erick's placement, the Selbys visited Erick's home in order to obtain
his belongings. The yard was unkempt, the paint was cracking, and there was garbage all
along the porch. The door to the house was ajar. Two young girls answered Harry
Selby's knock. They were dirty, minimally dressed, and their hair was uncombed. They
were home alone. From what Harry could see through the door, the floor was very dirty,
and there was garbage strewn about the floor. (Exhibit 39.)
Sophronia Selby believes that Erick had been sexually abused. Erick never
wanted to take his coat off, regardless of the weather. He always insisted on remaining
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fully clothed, and would not shower or change even though he had a private bathroom.
(Exhibit 39, p.5.) Harry Selby noted that, "Erick used his clothing as some sort of
protection." (Exhibit 39, p.3.) Erick was uncomfortable with demonstrations of affection,
such as hugs. (Exhibit 39, p.5.) When the Selbys told Erick they had been informed he
was leaving their care, Erick seemed resigned, sad, and "seemed to start closing in within
himself again." (Exhibit 39, p.5.)
The trial team's failure to present this readily available information from the
Selbys had a significant impact on Erick's sentencing trial. The Selbys confirm that
Erick's home was a mess, and the young children were dirty and left unattended. The
Selbys could have provided powerful testimony of a very frightened teenager, plagued by
the baggage of his childhood, literally afraid of the external world beyond his clothing.
Thus, the result of the inadequate investigation of the case in mitigation was that the jury
was deprived of the description of Erick as a profoundly troubled, fearful, vulnerable, and
anxious teenager. This information could have bridged the gap between the testimony
provided about Erick's troubled childhood to the adult who the jury found guilty of
committing these crimes.
4. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate, Prepare And Present
Evidence Through Expert Witness Testimony
With respect to experts, counsel must act reasonably in deciding whether or not to
seek or retain a particular expert. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir.
2001) ("Trial counsel acted reasonably by retaining an expert ... [and] could reasonably
rely on this initial expert investigation [where the defendant] did not show that the expert
retained revealed that further investigation would be productive."). Trial counsel must
also act reasonably in preparing those experts as witnesses.
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When experts request necessary information and are denied it, when testing
requested by expert witnesses is not performed, and when experts are placed on the stand
with virtually no preparation or foundation, a capital defendant has not received effective
assistance of counsel. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 327-334 (1st Cir. 2005) (analyzing why trial counsel's
failure to thoroughly investigate a "not arson" defense in an arson case, and consult with
an arson expert, was not an informed, tactical decision, but was deficient performance);
see also Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[W]hen the defense's
only expert requests relevant information which is readily available, counsel inexplicably
does not even attempt to provide it, and counsel then presents the expert's flawed
testimony at trial, counsel's performance is deficient.")
The clear lesson from the jury research and from the experience of seasoned
capital litigators is that all categories of investigation including lay witnesses, experts,
and corroborating documentary history playa critical role in the defense of capital cases:
[T]he most successful defense cases used a combination of different types
of testimony to create a coherent, harmonious theme that spanned both the
guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Using lay experts whenever possible;
"family and friend" witnesses for emotional input and to flesh out the case
in mitigation; and professional experts to complement, but not
overshadow, the testimony of the two other groups, provides the greatest
chance of securing the client a sentence of life.
Melissa E. Whitman, Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life Versus Death
Decisions Are Made, What Persuades, and How to Most Effectively Communicate the
Needfor a Verdict ofLife, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 263, 278 (1999).
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 126000242
           
               
             
               
              
               
             
               
           
              
       
             
            
             
           
            
            
             
         
           
         
           
            
/    / i     1     
      
i. Dr. Craig Beaver
Trial counsel called Dr. Craig Beaver as their second witness. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.
6341, L. 14.) Because of Dr. Beaver's "obligations in a different courtroom", his
testimony was presented "out of order." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6326, Ls.I-6.) It is generally
known that when dealing with mitigation, expert testimony should be presented after the
lay witness testimony. This allows the experts to use the testimony provided by the other
witnesses and build upon it. Because of trial counsel's failure to call Dr. Beaver at the
end of their case in mitigation, he was unable to build upon the testimony of other
witnesses. It is anticipated that the evidence will demonstrate trial counsel failed to
adequately consult with and prepare Dr. Beaver for his testimony, and that trial counsel
failed to provide Dr. Beaver with all of the discovery, records, and information that was
necessary for him to reach an informed conclusion regarding Mr. Hall's mental health
status.
ii. Dr. Pablo Stewart
Dr. Pablo Stewart was unavailable to present live testimony during the penalty
phase of Mr. Hall's trail. See infra, Claim BB. It is anticipated that the evidence will
demonstrate trial counsel failed to adequately consult with and prepare Dr. Stewart for his
testimony, and that trial counsel failed to provide Dr. Stewart with all of the discovery,
records, and information that was necessary for him to reach an informed conclusion
regarding Mr. Hall's mental health status.
iii. Failing To Consult With Dr. Cunningham
Dr. Mark Cunningham, a forensic psychologist, was a defense expert who
testified during the sentencing phase of the Henneman trial. It is anticipated the evidence
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will demonstrate trial counsel and their experts failed to consult with Dr. Cunningham.
He could have provided trial counsel and their experts with valuable mitigating evidence
that was otherwise not presented at trial.
For example, Dr. Cunningham could have provided information to rebut the
"propensity" aggravating circumstance. Trial counsel knew the State sought to prove the
propensity aggravator and should have recognized the need not only to present an
affirmative case in mitigation, but also a case in rebuttal. As noted by the ABA
Guidelines,
In addition to humanizing the client, counsel should endeavor to show that
the alternatives to the death penalty would be adequate punishment.
Studies show that "future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital
jurors, and is thus 'at issue' in virtually all capital trials," whether or not it
is argued by the prosecution or is a statutorily mandated sentencing
consideration. Accordingly, counsel should give serious consideration to
making an explicit presentation of information on this subject.
Exhibit 1, ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11 (footnote omitted).
Dr. Cunningham, unlike Dr. Beaver, specializes in assessing the future
dangerousness of capital defendants. (R., p.258 (C.V noting scholarship regarding risk
assessment; Exhibit 40 (Affidavit of Dr. Cunningham), pp.2-5.) While Dr. Beaver
assesses future dangerousness on occasion, it is not his area of expertise in contrast to
Dr. Cunningham. Dr. Cunningham has the bulk of expertise and experience assessing
future dangerousness in capital cases. Dr. Beaver offered minimal testimony regarding
Mr. Hall's future dangerousness, and did not specifically cite to studies identifying
factors indicating Mr. Hall did not present a danger in prison. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6384, L.25 -
p.6389.L.4.)
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Mr. Hall asserts that the evidence will show that Dr. Cunningham could have
provided other useful infonnation to Dr. Beaver and Dr. Stewart. However he cannot
fully state this claim at this time as trial counsel has failed to cooperate with his post-
conviction investigation.
iv. Failing To Consult With An Independent Qualified Expert
Regarding MRI And PET Scan Results
It is anticipated that the evidence will show that trial counsel failed to consult with
an independent qualified expert regarding the MRI and PET scan results. Instead, it
appears that trial counsel relied on the preliminary interpretation of the radiologist who
perfonned these tests. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with an
independent qualified expert. Trial counsel should have been aware that under Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 71 (1985), they are entitled to their own independent expert.
5. Trial Counsel Failed To Present Redacted Portions Of The March 2003
Interrogation Tape
During the guilt phase of the trial, the State played redacted portions of Mr. Hall's
March 2003 interview with Detectives Morgan and Smith. This interview contained
highly damaging and prejudicial infonnation. At the end of the interrogation, Mr. Hall
shared a wealth of mitigating infonnation. It appears that trial counsel intended to




I had raised this with counsel. We may have parts
of - should we get to a sentencing phase, we may
have parts of the interview with he and Detective
Morgan and Mr. Hall that we would want to play.
The State has agreed -
Replay, you mean?
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MR. CHASTAIN: No. There's other parts that-
THE COURT: I see.
MR. CHASTAIN: -- may be relevant, in terms ofmitigation.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHASTAIN: And the State has agreed to stipulate those in, rather
than take Detective Smith away from other plans he
has this weekend. And it's - in fact, the State has
actually kindly made us a disc of part of it, and so -
they actually provided it to us. An also, we may
well need to have the equipment still here.
MS. BENNETTS: Absolutely...Absolutely, Your Honor. I told
counsel all along that I made that disc for them and
that we would have no objection playing it during
mitigation.
(Tr. Vol. 10, p.5476, L. 16 - p.5477, L.18.)
This portion of the interview contained graphic first hand accounts of the abuse
Mr. Hall suffered throughout his life. (Exhibit 41, pp. 124-133.) He shares experiences
of his father grabbing his neck and throwing him across the room, of being hung up on a
rafter and then having his father beat him with a belt, kick, and punch him until his arm
was dislocated. He also shares how his father would knock him out and when he came to
his father resumed beating him, and how his father intentionally let a pit bull repeatedly
bite him. He also detailed his adolescence living on the street, eating garbage, and living
in foster homes.
Given the horrific counts of abuse detailed by Mr. Hall in the interview, and the
fact that the State stipulated to its admission, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
present this powerful mitigation to the jury.
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6. Trial Counsel Failed To Present Photographs, Artwork, And Visual Aids
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the State admitted fifty (50) different
photographs into evidence. Comparatively, trial counsel did not admit a single
photograph into evidence. The one illustrative piece of evidence entered by trial counsel
was a remedial black and white, hand drawn diagram of Mr. Hall's family tree. (See,
Sentencing Hearing Exhibit, B.) Trial counsel should have attempted to humanize Mr.
Hall to the jury by the use of compelling visual aids. For example, during Shawnra
Hemming's testimony she described about how Mr. Hall "draws beautiful pictures." (Tr.
Vol. 11, p.6324, Ls.13-14.) Trial counsel should have presented the jury with examples
of Mr. Hall's artwork. (Exhibit, 42, art work by Erick Hall.) Similarly, trial counsel
should have presented the jury with pictures from Erick's childhood so the jury could
better visualize the testimony about Erick as a child. (Exhibit 43, photos of Erick's
childhood.)
In short, trial counsel did not adequately investigate and prepare for the penalty
phase or present and explain to the jury the significance of all the available mitigating
evidence. Despite having admitted that the mitigating evidence presented in the
Henneman case was not enough, trial counsel proceeded to present less in this case. Had
they presented all the available information, there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have given Mr. Hall a life sentence.
BB. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO PRESENT LIVE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND/OR
FAILURE TO ALLOW A CONTINUANCE TO PRESENT LIVE
TESTIMONY
Standard of performance: The ABA Guidelines provide that "it is critically
important to construct a persuasive narrative in support of the case for life, rather than to
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simply present a catalog of seemingly unrelated mitigating factors." (Exhibit 1, ABA
Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11.) Trial counsel failed to present a
"persuasive narrative" by resorting to video depositions and transcripts of prior testimony
ofmitigation witnesses in lieu of live testimony.
One reason that live testimony is more effective than deposition testimony,
whether played by video or read into evidence, is that jurors tend to relate better to live
witnesses, are less likely to be distracted, and are more attentive. The fact that live
testimony is more persuasive to a jury is a matter of common understanding. For
example, in Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), the
appellate court considered a petitioner's claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by allowing the prosecution to use the deposition testimony of an
expert in lieu of live testimony. The expert's deposition was read into evidence at the
sentencing hearing. Id. Petitioner claimed that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving
his right to confront the prosecution's expert. Id. The appellate court rejected his claim,
holding that he could not establish that he had been prejudiced, based in large part upon
the recognition that live testimony is inherently more persuasive than deposition
testimony.
We conclude any claim of prejudice in this case would also qualify as
mere speculation. In fact, the decision to use a deposition instead of live
testimony may have inured to the benefit of the petitioner. If [the
prosecution's expert] had appeared in person at the trial, there is at least
the possibility that his stature or demeanor might have tended to accredit
his testimony. An impressive witness is a persuasive witness. The
reading of the deposition into evidence might have been less effective
for the state.
Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
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Live testimony is also important so jurors can assess a witness' credibility. In
United States v .Yida, 498 F.3d 945 (3rd Cir. 2007), prosecutors attempted to admit a
transcript of previous testimony given by a witness who had been deported. The court
did not allow the transcript to be read to the jury and noted the importance of live
testimony, emphasizing that "[l]ive testimony gives the jury (or other trier of fact) the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying." Id. at 951. The
court further explained how "[t]ranscripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when
subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because all persons
must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 950. The Idaho
Supreme Court has stated "It is the jury's function to assess the demeanor of the
witnesses and make a determination of credibility....This Court will not second-guess the
jury's determination on credibility or the weight to be given to witnesses' testimony."
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003). It is impossible to assess
the demeanor of the witnesses whose testimony is not presented directly to the jury and,
therefore, it is impossible to determine how much weight to give their testimony.
The superiority of live testimony has long been praised in our judicial system.
See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) ("The primary object of
the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions ... being used against
the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."); see also NLRB
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v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2nd Cir.1951) ("[T]hat part of the
evidence which the printed words do not preserve . . . is the most telling part, for on the
issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating
factors...."); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77,80 (2nd Cir.
1949) ("The liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may
be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.") (internal
quotations omitted).
Deficient performance: Trial counsel presented only eight witnesses In the
sentencing phase. Only three of those were family members; of which only two gave in-
court live testimony to the jury. The third family member, Betty Jean Kirk, had her prior
testimony from a different case three years earlier, simply read into the record. Of the
remaining five non-family member witnesses, the most vital testimony, that of Dr. Pablo
Stewart, was presented to the jury in two parts. The first part consisted of the playing of
a videotaped deposition; the second part consisted of reading the transcript of the
remainder of the deposition. The presentation of live witness testimony, including cross-
examinations by the State, lasted a mere three hours. (R. Vol. VI, p.1180 (Shawnra
Hemming, 48 minutes (16:04:31-16:52:40)); p.1181 (Dr. Craig Beaver, 69 minutes
(9:19:03-10:22:11; 10:52:53 - 10:58:26)); p.1183 (Shannon Pambrun, 20 minutes
(10:58:36 - 11:18:08)); p.1183 (Isabel Cookie Quirk, 24 minutes (11:43:17-12:07:12));
p.1184 (Timothy Turley, 12 minutes (13:40:21-13:52:34)); p.1184 (Wendy Levy, 8
minutes (13:52:45-14:00:41)).) The presentation of recorded or read testimony lasted
two hours. (R. Vol. VI, p.1181 (Betty Jean Kirk, 23 minutes (11 :20:07-11 :43:01));
Dr. Pablo Stewart, 1 hour and 40 minutes (14:01:07-15:08:44; 15:34:26-15:43:50;
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16:04:36-16:28:15)).) Thus, the entire mitigation case lasted a mere five hours, forty
percent of which consisted of out-of-court recorded or read testimony.
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Present Live Testimony Of Dr. Pablo Stewart
The reading of Dr. Stewart's prior testimony to the jury was particularly
disturbing. The content and import of Dr. Stewart's testimony was lost in the process of
playing the videotape and reading of that testimony. The videotape froze at least on one
occasion. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6461, Ls.7-23.) The difficulties with the recording also afforded
the State three (3) opportunities to play their cross-examination to the jurors, thus
reinforcing the State's recurring theme that Mr. Hall knew right from wrong and was able
to choose not to kill.
Dr. Stewart's testimony, as read by trial counsel's secretary, was distracting and
incomprehensible. By reading Dr. Stewart's testimony, the testimony changed from that
of a dynamic, engaging witness to the dry, monotone voice of a person who did not
understand the words or content of what she was presenting. Submission of such
important testimony in this manner was ineffective. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738, 771 (1990) (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I therefore
conclude that a capital defendant's right to present mitigating evidence cannot fully be
realized if that evidence can be submitted only through the medium of a paper record.").
In particular, Mr. Hall asserts that several jurors were either sleeping or
inattentive during critical portions of Dr. Stewart's testimony. In fact, it appears that the
video deposition of Dr. Stewart was so boring, tedious, or difficult to watch that it
became the subject of a joke between the Court and trial counsel.
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, I'm going to want to replay Doctor Stewart's
testimony during my closing.
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THE COURT:
MR. CHASTAIN:
Yes, sir. Yes, sir. You might find yourself alone in
here. For the record, I'm just joking.
So was I, Your Honor.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p. 6476, Ls. 3 - 8.)
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange for Dr. Stewart to present live
testimony because arrangements had been made to accommodate the schedules of other
witnesses. Trial counsel and the Court made no objection to the State's indication they
would need to conclude early on a Friday because their witness would not be available to
testify until the following Tuesday. (Tr. Vol. 9, p, 4868, L. 16 - p. 4869, L. 20.)
Likewise, the Court was willing to grant the State an early recess so they could
effectively present a closing argument. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 6457, L. 4 - 24.) The Court was
also willing to allow a victim impact statement to be presented out of order. (Tr. Vol. 10,
p. 5874, L.13 - 19.) This same latitude should have been given to trial counsel's
presentation of Dr. Stewart's testimony.
Trial counsel was aware that the State's case was moving far more quickly than
originally anticipated. (Tr. Vol. 10, p. 5309, L. 24 - p. 5310, L.7; p. 5327, L. 2-10.)
Although they brought Dr. Stewart's unavailability to the Court's attention, trial counsel
failed to move the Court to hold the jury until Dr. Stewart could present live testimony.
Because they did not make a motion, the Court never ruled that it would not hold the jury
until Dr. Stewart was available for live testimony. Furthermore, even if the Court was
unwilling to hold the jury, the State had agreed to allow Dr. Stewart to present his
testimony out of order. (Tr. Vol. 10, p.5325, Ls. 15-17; p. 5450, Ls. 3-8.)
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Certainly, once trial counsel became aware of Dr. Stewart's unavailability they
should have taken steps to ensure that their presentation of mitigation would take up
enough time to allow for Dr. Stewart to present live testimony. For example, if trial
counsel presented all the mitigation evidence available to them, their case would have
lasted long enough that Dr. Stewart would have been able to testify in person. See supra,
Claim BB.
Trial counsel was also on notice that there were technical difficulties with the
video deposition of Dr. Stewart and should have taken steps to ensure that these problems
were corrected before playing the tape to the jury. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 6460, L. 19 - p. 6416,
L.5.) However, trial counsel had not reviewed the video to discover what exactly the
problems were. Trial counsel indicated that Tuckers had provided a transcript of the
video because of the technical problems. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 6461, Ls. 15-21.) It is unclear
how they were able to provide the transcript given the problems with the recording.
In addition, and in the alternative, the Court had an independent duty to ensure
Mr. Hall's trial counsel were not prevented from performing duties essential to subjecting
the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing. In certain circumstances, it is "so
unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance" there is a per se violation of
the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 660, 661 (1984). Mr. Hall
asserts that the Court's failure to ensure trial counsel was able to present the live
testimony of experts was tantamount to the complete denial of counsel, and no showing
of prejudice is necessary.
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2. Trial Counsel Failed To Present Live Testimony OfBetty Jean Douglas
Betty Jean Kirk's testimony, which was previously given in Mr. Hall's first trial,
was also read into the record.37 Again, trial counsel's failure to present her testimony in
person was ineffective. By having someone else read Betty Jean's former testimony, the
emotion and feeling was absent. Trial counsel was also unable to further question Betty
Jean regarding new information she had provided in interviews since her original
testimony. Perhaps most shocking is how, in an interview with trial counsel's
investigator, Betty Jean described how Erick would fight with his siblings, "black out,"
and not remember the details of the fight after. (Exhibit 25, interview of Betty Jean Kirk
dated 2/8/07.) She described how during these periods of blacking out it appeared from
his eyes that "he just wasn't there." (Exhibit 25.) Betty Jean Kirk could have provided
powerful mitigating testimony about Mr. Hall's history of blacking out. This would have
supported his assertion he did not remember the events surrounding the death of Ms.
Hanlon.38
Prejudice: Trial counsel presented nearly half of its case in mitigation through
video depositions and the reading of prior testimony. The failure to secure the in-court
live testimony of witnesses was grossly inadequate to present a compelling case in
37 The presentation of Betty Kirk's testimony was elicited by prior trial counsel, Amil
Myshin and D.C. Carr, and constituted an aspect of a pending claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
38 The Court, at sentencing, indicated that Mr. Hall tried to "rationalize his choices and
his claimed lack of memory by saying he would not have done such horrible things had
he not been drinking. And to claim, again in cowardly fashion, that he simply doesn't
remember because he was drinking." (Tr. Sentencing Hearing of January 3, 2008, p.182,
L.20 - p.183, L.5.) These statements by the Court demonstrate the importance of having
testimony to support Mr. Hall's claim that he blacked out during the incident.
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mitigation. But for trial counsel's failure, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Hall
would have received a life sentence.
Cc. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
HAVING MR. HALL WEAR PRISON CLOTHING AND SHACKLES
DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE TRAIL
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to
the jury absent a trial court determination that restraints are justified by a state interest
specific to the particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, _, 125 S.Ct.
2007,2009 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)). See supra, Claim 1.
Mr. Hall was shackled and clothed in bright orange prison garb during the
sentencing phase of his trial. In this case, there are indications that trial counsel made a
conscious choice to present Mr. Hall to the jury in prison garb and shackles. However,
their decision was objectively unreasonable. Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 479, 481 (2000)
("[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but whether
they were reasonable") (internal citations omitted); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523
(2000) ("[w]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision...was
itself reasonable") (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). Allowing Mr. Hall
to be presented to the jury wearing shackles and prison clothing was a signal to the jurors
that he was dangerous, even in the courtroom. It also dehumanized him to the jury, and
made it easier to impose the death penalty because it lessened the jury's burden in
determining sentence.
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DD. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
It can hardly be questioned that closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the
issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
858, 860-62 (1975) (holding it violates the Sixth Amendment to preclude closing
argument). Not only must trial counsel investigate and present mitigation, see e.g.,
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), but
counsel must also explain the meaning and purpose of mitigating evidence. Pizzuto v.
Arave, 385 P.3d 1247, 1252 (2004) (citing Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("To perform effectively in the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel must
conduct sufficient investigation and engage in sufficient preparation to be able to present
and explain the significance of all the available [mitigating] evidence."); see also
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 399. In this case, trial counsel did not explain the
meaning and purpose of the mitigation evidence to the jury.
During the penalty phase, defense counsel offered the testimony of eight
mitigation witnesses including two family members who testified as to the childhood and
character of Mr. Hal1.39 Dr. Craig Beaver and Dr. Pablo Stewart40 testified regarding
mitigation, including facts of Mr. Hall's upbringing such as incest, drug abuse, physical
and verbal abuse, and neglect. Trial counsel however failed to explain the purpose of
mitigation and how their testimony was mitigating, and instead allowed the prosecution
39 Betty Jean Kirk, Erick's cousin, provided testimony in the Henneman case. This prior
testimony was read into the record by trial counsel's secretary.
40 Dr. Stewart's testimony was presented by way of a video deposition.
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to mislead the jury regarding the definition and purpose of mitigation by failing to object
to the prosecution's closing argument mischaracterizing the definition ofmitigation.
During the penalty phase, witnesses provided compelling descriptions of Erick as
emotionally, physically, and sexually abused. Erick's brother Shannon provided
testimony to the jury that Erick was the "forgotten child." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6403, Ls.ll-
12.) Wendy Levy testified that Erick was one of her "lost boys." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6450,
Ls.23-25.) Trial counsel should have incorporated these descriptions of Erick as lost and
forgotten, in conjunction with the other mitigation testimony, into a powerful theme for
closing arguments.
In contrast to the State's closing arguments, trial counsel presented no exhibits
and did not use visual aids or presentations of any sort. Trial counsel, at a minimum,
could have shown pictures of Erick Hall as a child, institutional records, and
demonstrative aids explaining mitigation and weighing to the jury. Overall, trial counsel
failed to paint a picture of Mr. Hall as an abused, abandoned, neglected, and impaired
individual whose "choices" were severely limited by the circumstances of his life.
Trial counsel instead minimized the jury's responsibilities by emphasizing that
Mr. Hall had already been sentenced to death for the murder of Lynn Henneman, stating
that a second death sentence would be of no import because the State could only execute
him once. This argument essentially told the jury that their service was a waste of time.
Trial counsel's closing argument also increased the likelihood, not only that Mr. Hall
would be sentenced to death again, but also that he would be sentenced to death on the
basis of the Henneman murder conviction when trial counsel argued that Ms. Hanlon's
death provided "justice" vis a vis evidence linking Mr. Hall to the Henneman homicide.
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Unbelievably, trial counsel felt that Mr. Hall's death sentence would be the only
meaningful mitigation evidence they could offer the jury. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5871, Ls.2-11.)
Trial counsel indicated they felt that when it came time to "ask the jury for mercy" they
needed to let the jury know about Mr. Hall's previous death sentence. (Tr. Vol. 11,
p.5869, Ls.l9-22.) They also felt that disclosing a death sentence would be the only way
of "convincing a jury to show any kind of mercy to Mr. Hall." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5871,
Ls.12-19.) However, when it came time to actually ask the jury for mercy, trial counsel
simply informed the jury about Mr. Hall's death sentence and completely omitted the part
about asking for mercy.
Trial counsel presumably based their decision to inform the jury of Mr. Hall's
death sentence on Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994). (Tr. Vol. 11, p.5865, L.23.)
There, the Supreme Court held the admission of evidence that a capital defendant was
previously sentenced to death in another case did not deprive the defendant of a fair
sentencing. This is because the Court found there was no way to know how the prior
death sentence influenced the jury and to make this determination "would be an exercise
in speculation, rather than reasoned judgment." Id. at 14.
However, assuming arguendo that even under the circumstances of this case, the
introduction of a previous death sentence does not violate due process under the United
States Constitution, under the Idaho Constitution, the introduction of this evidence
violated Mr. Hall's right to due process. In Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163
(1989), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the scope of Idaho's due process provision in
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is not "necessarily bound by the
interpretation given to due process by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 40, 785
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P.2d at 165. The introduction of Mr. Hall's previous death sentence rendered the trial so
unfair it violated his right to due process under the Idaho Constitution.
Trial counsel's decision to use Mr. Hall's death sentence as mitigation and the
only argument in closing was objectively unreasonable. Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 479,
481 (2000) ("[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but
whether they were reasonable") (internal citations omitted); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 523 (2000) ("[w]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's
decision...was itselfreasonable") (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). Trial
counsel did not conduct any voir dire asking if the jurors would find a prior death
sentence mitigating. Instead of making a reasoned decision, trial counsel engaged in
speculation as to whether the jury would find this mitigating. There is empirical
evidence, consistent with common sense, that the most aggravating circumstance is the
prior murder conviction aggravator. Specifically, according to the findings of the
Capital Jury Project, 70% of South Carolina jurors who actually sat in capital cases
believed that the death penalty was the only acceptable punishment for someone
previously convicted of murder.41 Thus, trial counsel's decision to use a prior death
sentence as mitigation, especially without conducting any voir dire on the topic, was
unreasonable and ineffective.
41 The studies and findings from the Capital Jury Project have been cited directly or
indirectly in cases throughout the country. See e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
356 (2004); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170 (l994); United States v.
Young, 376 F.Supp.2d 787, 797 (6th Cir. 2005); People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 357
n.ll (N.Y. 2004); People v. Cahill, 809 N.E.2d 561, 600-602 (N.Y. 2003). Of course,
not all courts have cited the findings for the same propositions and not all courts give the
findings the same weight, some have even disregarded them. See e.g., Wilson v. Sirmons,
2008 WL 3166975 (lOth Cir. 2008); Us. v. Duncan, 2008 WL 544847 (D. Idaho 2008).
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This decision dehumanized Mr. Hall, and made it easier to impose the death
penalty, i.e., it lessened the jury's burden in determining sentence. Once Mr. Hall was
dressed in prison clothing he lost his personal identity and simply became a prisoner.
Instead of allowing the jury to view Mr. Hall as a human being with a unique individual
identity, trial counsel presented him as a prisoner, one of many. The fact that trial
counsel also failed to argue any humanizing mitigation during closing arguments further
compounded the jury's view of Mr. Hall as a generic inmate rather than an individual
who deserved their mercy.
Trial counsel also misstated the weighing process during closing by arguing:
And when you look at weighing the mitigating circumstances
against the aggravating circumstances, that's for you folks to do. I would
like to say that we could get a scale out here and you could pile up
everything the State says and pile up everything that the defense says that
makes an aggravating circumstance or a mitigating circumstance and that
you can decide from where the scale comes down.
But the law in this case doesn't come from a formula. There's no
mathematical way you can figure it out. And for you folks, as you make
this decision, your decision is going to have to come from here
(indicating), come from here (indicating) and decide - decide what is
right.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6505, Ls.9-23.) Idaho's death penalty statute requires that all of the
mitigation presented by the defense be weighed against each of the statutory aggravators
it has found as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
774 P.2d 299 (1989).
Viewing the closing statement in its entirety, there is no question that it was
objectively unreasonable and ineffective. Trial counsels failure to explain to the jury the
significance of any of the mitigating evidence presented by their witnesses, decision to
argue a prior death sentence as mitigating, and misstatement of the weighing process was
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ineffective. But for trial counsel's failure, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Hall
would have received a life sentence.
EE. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING SENTENCING PHASE
AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Applicable Legal Standards: "The desire for success should never induce [the
prosecutor] to obtain a verdict by argument based upon anything except the evidence in
the case and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same."
State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 268, 152 P. 1054, 1058 (1915). While counsel for the
prosecution has traditionally been afforded latitude in closing argument, there are limits
that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 181
P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583, 587-588 (Ct.
App. 2007). Where prosecutorial misconduct is shown, the test for harmless error is
whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of
the trial would not have been different absent the misconduct. State v. Martinez, 136
Idaho 521, 523, 37 P.3d 18, 20 (Ct. App. 2001). However, in some circumstances, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that, "if there is a pattern of repetitious misconduct
by an individual prosecutor or a particular prosecutor's office," then reversal might be
necessary despite a finding that the error was otherwise harmless. Phillips, 144 Idaho at
88, 156 P.3d at 590 (citing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168,205-206 (1986)).
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1. Improper Argument Limiting The Scope Of Relevant Mitigation To
Circumstances Causally Connected To The Commission Of The Crime
And Circumstances That Rendered Mr. Hall Incapable Of Choosing Not
To Commit The Crime
The State made a closing argument which essentially was split into two parts; the
first part focused on the aggravating circumstances, while the second part focused on
undermining the mitigation evidence presented during the sentencing hearing. The State
argument about Mr. Hall's mitigation impeded the jury's consideration of valid
mitigating evidence by mischaracterizing the law. Specifically, the State argued that
relevant mitigation is limited either to circumstances that remove the defendant's ability
to choose not to engage in criminal conduct or to circumstances that are causally
connected to the defendant's criminal conduct. The following represents the State's
argument on this point:
And we know in both cases, that the defendant had a choice not to kill
and he chose to kill both Lynn and Cheryl.
* * *
ADHD ... doesn't reduce his accountability. It doesn't cause him to kill
Cheryl or Lynn and it certainly doesn't reduce his accountability. The
same thing with PTSD. It doesn't reduce his accountability.
* * *
We know he is not mentally retarded and you know that from all the
evidence that you have seen in this case. . . . So what about the
defendant's childhood? Well sure, it was a bad childhood.
However, why does someone ... become a murderer and murder two
women brutally? ... [R]eally we don't know. All we know is that the
defendant can make choices, that he can choose to kill and that he can
choose not to kill. ... His childhood does not reduce his
accountability. You know people who have had bad backgrounds, who
have come from a poor upbringing, who haven't had all of the advantages.
They overcome that. A lot of folks do. He had a choice to overcome it
and he didn't.
* * *
Ladies and gentlemen, his background doesn't reduce his
accountability. Even Doctor Beaver had to admit that the defendant is
still responsible for his conduct.
* * *
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He has had opportunity after opportunity to tum this around, to become
productive, to choose not to kill. He hasn't done it.
* * *
What else do we know about the defendant and his ability to understand
right and wrong and make choices? Well this letter that he wrote to the
family of Lynn Henneman is very telling because it's articulate. . ..
Certainly articulate, thoughtful. Not the words of someone who doesn't
understand right from wrong and who doesn't know choices. Certainly
not lacking intelligence. What about the capability to make a choice or
to make choices? I think that's very important, ladies and gentlemen.
And Pablo Stewart told you the defendant is capable of making choices.
Doctor Beaver told you the defendant can make choices. Well what does
that mean? It means he has free will. He has the ability to decide not to
kill. . .. How do we know that? Well, he has made choices not to kill on
several occasions, to exercise self-control, to back off, not kill somebody.
What about Lisa Hogarth? ... He didn't kill her. What about Michelle
Deen? ... He made the choice not to kill. Evelyn Dunaway.... He didn't
kill Evelyn.
* * *
He can make good choices. He makes bad choices. But the point is he
can make a choice not to kill. He is capable of committing two
murders. And these are complicated murders, ladies and gentlemen.
This isn't heat of passion, fly off the handle and kill somebody.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6481, Ls.13-15; p.6491, L.25 - p.6492, L.6; p.6492, L.16 - p.6493, L.19;
p.6494, Ls.12-15; p.6495, Ls.5-7; p.6495, L.23 - p.6497, L.8; p.6498, Ls.I0-16.)
The State continued its attack on Mr. Hall's mitigating evidence in the conclusion
to their rebuttal argument, stating:
And finally, I ask you to think about this: We, each of us, are defined by
the choices that we make. We, each of us, take responsibility for those
choices. The defendant is no different. He made the choice to rape and
murder Cheryl and those choices led him to this day, to this courtroom and
to this moment. He is responsible for the choices and I ask you to hold
him accountable and to impose the death penalty.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6508, L.24 - p.6509, L.7.)
The State's arguments impeded the jury from gIvmg full and meaningful
consideration and effect to mitigation in three ways. First, the State equated mitigation
with first-phase defenses that would have lowered the degree of the crime (i.e., heat of
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 147000263
       rn     
          
   
             
              
            
          
          
            
           
            
            
                
                 
           
            
              
  
   
              
             
         
 '            
             
          
             
     
                
             
             
              
               
        
       
           
             
               
      
passion), or completely negated the defendant's mens rea or another element of the crime
(i.e.., the inability to choose not to commit murder).42 Second, the State argued that a
nexus of the proffered mitigation and the crime must exist to reduce moral culpability,
i.e. that the reason why the crime was committed was because of Mr. Hall's traumatic
childhood or that his mitigation caused him to murder and rape.43 Third, the State misled
the jury by referencing the lack of evidence which, if it existed, would have precluded the
need for a jury determination of the death penalty at all, such as mental retardation. See
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); I.C. § 19-2515A (3) ("If [prior to the sentencing
hearing] the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally
retarded, the death penalty shall not be imposed.").
2. Improper Argument Discouraging The Consideration Of Mercy
At the close of trial counsel's ten-minute closing argument about Mr. Hall's prior
murder and death sentence, counsel stated, "I ask you to vote for life." (Tr. Vol. 11,
p.6507, Ls.13-14; R. Vol. 6, p.l189.) In rebuttal, the State argued the following:
When you go back and deliberate, I ask you to consider a few things.
Where was the mercy when the defendant beat Cheryl? Where was the
mercy when he anally raped her? Where was the mercy when he strangled
42 Indeed, the State's sentencing phase argument mirrored its guilt phase argument where
the State had argued in part:
In the early morning hours of March I, 2003, the defendant had choices.
He had a choice to kill; he had a choice not to kill. He had a choice to
stop; he had a choice not to stop. In the early morning hours of March
first, he made his choices. He chose to kill. He chose to murder. He
chose to rape and he chose not to stop.
(Tr. Vol. 10 of II, p.5597, L.25 - p.5598, L.6.)
43 The jury selection process revealed that the jurors were quite confused about the
difference between the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial, as well as the
definition ofmitigation. The State's argument capitalized on this confusion.
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the last breath out of her body? Where was the mercy then, ladies and
gentlemen?
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6508, Ls.l4-19; p.6508, L.24 - p.6509, L.7.)
The State's argument is improper for three reasons. First, the argument was a
general response applicable to all first degree murder cases as opposed to a rebuttal to
trial counsel's argument. As such, the State's argument is inconsistent with the basis for
permitting the State an opening and a rebuttal summation.
Second, the argument violates the purpose of the Idaho death penalty statute, as
required by the Eighth Amendment, which is to narrow the class of first degree murderers
subjected to the death penalty. As noted, the State's argument applies equally to all first
degree murder cases, since mercy for the victim is irreconcilable with the intent and/or
circumstances associated with the commission of such offenses.
Third, the State's argument constitutes an impermissible appeal to the jury's
passions. See e.g., Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2008). In Nowell, the court
addressed the following prosecutorial argument: "Mercy. State asks that you recommend
mercy if mercy is warranted. And mercy wasn't given in this case, not by Mr. Nowell,
not by Mr. Bellamy. There was no mercy there, none whatsoever." Id., at 606-07. On
appeal, the court noted that similar arguments had been condemned in another capital
case where a prosecutor had argued:
If you are tempted to show this defendant mercy, if you are tempted to
show him pity, I'm going to ask you to do this, to show him the same
amount of mercy, the same amount of pity that he showed Jason Hicks on
September 1, 1995, and that was none.
Id., at 607. As the Supreme Court of Florida concluded, "this line of argument is
blatantly impermissible." Id.; see also, Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549, 1555-58 (lIth
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Cir. 1993) (affirming habeas relief based on the prosecutor's closing sentencing argument
which discouraged the jury from considering mercy for the capital defendant).
3. Improper Argument Relying On Prejudicial Photographs To Inflame The
Passions Of The Jury
Mr. Hall does not have access to the photographs that the State presented in this
case and therefore reserves the right to withdraw this sub-claim or otherwise amend it
upon receipt of the photographs utilized. This claim however is raised in good faith
based on Mr. Hall's experience with the State in the Hennemen case.
4. Improper Argument Relying Disproportionately On The Henneman Case
To Inflame The Passions Of The Jury
The State spent the majority of its closing argument discussing the Lynn
Henneman murder. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.6478, L.23 - p.6486, LA; p.6492, L.24 - p.6493, L.1;
p.6498, Ls.13-23.) In fact, the State referenced Lynn Henneman by name more than they
mentioned Cheryl Hanlon. In this sense, the State sought the death penalty for a second
time against Mr. Hall, in both cases, relying on the fact that Mr. Hall has been convicted
of murdering Lynn Henneman.
The State elicited evidence and presented argument well beyond that relevant to
aggravating circumstances. For instance, in regard to the prior murder conviction
aggravator and the propensity aggravator, the State argued in part:
You know about Lynn Henneman. You have heard a lot during the course
of the sentencing part of this case about Lynn. You know that she went
missing after a short layover overnight in Boise on September 24 of 2000.
You know that her family searched for her, combed the Greenbelt,
combed the river, found people who might have seen her at the Tablerock
Brewpub. We know that she was at the art museum first that evening and
then she went to Tablerock to have dinner and that she went back onto the
Greenbelt to go back to the hotel. We know that her body was found two
miles downstream down the river from the hotel. And you know where it
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was found and how it was found. You also know that the defendant has
stipulated that he was convicted of a prior murder of Lynn Henneman.
* * *
We know that Lynn was minding her own business walking down the
greenbelt going back to the hotel on the evening of September 24, 2000.
We know that she wouldn't take up with a stranger. We know that
because her sister told you that she wouldn't do that. Sure, she is friendly
and she loved her job, she loved people, but she wouldn't take up with the
likes of the defendant, Erick Hall.
* * *
He committed a sexual assault ofLynn. We know that it was vaginal rape
because his DNA was found on the vaginal swabs. We know that he cut
her shorts because you recall the testimony of Darla Stowe, who was a
crime scene investigator at the time; and she told you that it was a cut, like
a knife cut, and that the seams were ripped from that and they were ripped
across the front and down the sides. So we know that this was a violent,
sexual assault. We know that Lynn's body was bound nearly naked, but
for the ligature of her sweater around her neck and the shirt that bound her
wrists.... These are the shorts ofLynn Henneman....
* * *
You saw the impact wounds to Lynn Henneman's head. There were five
of them. You saw the multiple injuries to Cheryl's body, to the head,
internal injuries. He repeatedly stomped and beat her. You recall these
injuries to Lynn Henneman's head. What else do we know? Both cases,
ligature strangulation. With Lynn, the defendant used her own sweater to
strangle her around the throat. And you recall that it was found around her
neck in a knot. We also know that he used her own shirt to bind her
wrists.
* * *
He dumped Lynn's body in the Boise River. And we know that he had let
her body lay there for 12 hours. And you will recall Doctor Groben's
testimony about that. That the lividity pattern indicated to him that she
had been laying on her stomach for 12 hours. And it had to be 12 hours to
set that kind of pattern. So he let her body lay for 12 hours before he
dumped her body in the river.
* * *
With Lynn, he attempted to burn her wallet. You recall the testimony of
Lisa Hogarth and the officers involved in this case, that Lynn's wallet was
found over at Carl's Junior, which is where Lisa worked at that time. You
recall the testimony that Lisa said he would go to Carl's Junior and visit
her there. It made a lot of sense that he would try to hide the evidence and,
in fact, try to burn it. And you recall the testimony of the officer that the
edges of a lot of the items that were in her wallet were burned. We know
he buried Cheryl's clothes in an attempt to conceal the murder and he
ditched her pickup down the back roads, as he put it, here in Boise. What
else did he do? Well, he took property from both victims. We know that
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he took Lynn Henneman's wallet and her ring. And her ring was never
found. We also know that he stole Cheryl's ring and watch and neither of
those items were ever found. So how do you know beyond that that the
defendant is a predisposed killer; that he has an affinity to kill? Well,
think about what happened here. He grabs Lynn Henneman off the
greenbelt in broad daylight, a public place, where you have heard
testimony regarding how often the greenbelt is used. And you saw the
pictures of under the bridge. He grabs her off the greenbelt, down to the
river, beats her over the head, rapes her and murders her. That's an
affinity to kill, ladies and gentlemen. This is a stranger. He didn't know
her. There was no provocation. No reason Lynn should be dead.
* * *
She -- Lynn didn't have voluntary contact with the defendant. And you
recall the testimony of where her property was found, strewn along the
river over 225 feet. What does that tell you? It tells you she was
running for her life and the defendant caught her, grabbed her, got her
down, raped her and killed her. This is the testimony that you recall where
her property was found -- her shoulder bag; museum items; a little further
down, shorts, about 225 feet from her sandal that was found near the Chart
House. And you recall how close her sandal was found to the Chart
House -- the picture of where the Chart House is in relation to that sandal.
He grabbed her off in broad daylight in a place where there are people.
That's an affinity to kill.
* * *
He is capable of committing two murders. And these are complicated
murders, ladies and gentlemen. This isn't heat of passion, fly off the
handle and kill somebody. Complicated murders; having to grab
somebody off the greenbelt, hide the body for 12 hours, dump it in the
river and do it on a public place where people walk by; pretty complicated.
Took steps to conceal, that we talked about. And what about this?
Capable of avoiding capture for two and-a-half years on the Lynn
Henneman murder.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6478, L.24 - p.6479, L.19; p.6480, L.2l - p.648l, L.3; p.648l, L.16 -
p.6482, L.3-l2; p.6482, L.15 - p.6483, L.l; p.6483, Ls.8-l5; p.6483, L.2l - p.6485, L.5;
p.6485, L.ll - p.6486, L.l; p.6498, Ls.l3-23.) (Emphasis added.)
Even if the argument was relevant, it was crafted in a manner to inflame the
passions of the jury. The prejudice from this argument must be considered in conjunction
with all claims for post-conviction relief, but especially as it relates to the State's opening
statement and the presentation ofevidence about Lynn Henneman.
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5. Improper Argument Asserting That Cheryl Hanlon's Life Would Be
Devalued Should The Jury Impose A Life Sentence For Her Murder
In the State's rebuttal sentencing phase closing argument, the prosecutor argued in
part the following:
So counsel asked "Why a second death penalty?", ladies and gentlemen;
and the answer is very simple. Cheryl Hanlon. That's why. Cheryl's life
had worth. Cheryl's life mattered. It had meaning. It had value. It
counted. It makes no sense to argue that the defendant gets a free pass on
a second murder, that because he murdered somebody else before he
happened to murder her, that he gets a free pass. He deserves the same
punishment. He deserves to be held accountable.
* * *
Counsel told you in his opening statement three days ago that a life
sentence is the only sentence that would have meaning in this case. But
actually, it would be meaningless because the defendant does have a life
sentence already for the rape and kidnapping of Cheryl Hanlon -- or Lynn
Henneman. Excuse me.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6507, L.18 - p.6508, L.13.) This argument is improper because it
diminishes the jury's responsibility for imposing a death sentence and diverts their
attention from their constitutional role to assess the appropriateness of the death penalty
in this individual case. While the jury must be reminded that Ms. Hanlon was also a
unique individual, it is inappropriate to compare her value to Ms. Henneman for the
purpose of convincing the jury to impose a death sentence for her murder.
6. Improper Argument Comparing The Worth OfLynn Henneman To Mr.
Hall
The prosecutor attacked the worth of Mr. Hall as a human being by comparing
him to Ms. Henneman. In relevant part, the prosecutor argued:
We know that Lynn was minding her own business walking down the
greenbelt going back to the hotel on the evening of September 24, 2000.
We know that she wouldn't take up with a stranger. We know that
because her sister told you that she wouldn't do that. Sure, she is friendly
and she loved her job, she loved people, but she wouldn't take up with the
likes of the defendant, Erick Hall.
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(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6480, L.21 - p.6481, L.3.) This argument improperly demeaned the value
of Mr. Hall's life by insinuating that he is the kind of person with whom any respectable
person would not associate.
7. Improper Argument Asserting That Mr. Hall's Family Members Turned
Out Normal
The prosecution argued that the fact that Mr. Hall's family members did not
become murderers demonstrated that Mr. Hall could likewise have chosen not to be a
murderer.
We know that the people who testified in this case, bless their hearts, that
they have overcome the bad background that they came from. Shawnra
testified. She came from the same background. Horrible background.
Look at her. She's got a job. She has a family. She has two kids. She has
overcome it. She is raising those kids to be good, productive people.
Bless her heart. She overcame it. The same with Shannon. Got a job. He
actually said he made really good money working on silos; has a family;
has a wife. He overcame it. Bless his heart. Betty Kirk. You didn't hear
from her, but we read the transcript of what she said. Same thing. She
came from the same bad background. Bless her heart. She is productive,
has ajob.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6493, L.20 - p.6494, L.11.) This argument is improper because it is not
true. While Mr. Hall's family members have not committed the same crimes as Mr. Hall,
they have each struggled in varying degrees with the abuse and neglect in their
backgrounds. Further, the argument encourages the jury to reject valid and otherwise
uncontested mitigating evidence by focusing not on the individual characteristics of Mr.
Hall but rather on his family members.
8. Improper Argument Mischaracterizing Testimony
In the course of attacking the mitigation presented at the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor mischaracterized the testimony of defense experts. In particular, the
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prosecutor asserted that Mr. Hall had no cognitive disabilities based on the testimony of
Dr. Beaver. In relevant part, the prosecutor argued:
What about this so-called cognitive ability or disability? Well, think
about what Doctor Beaver said yesterday. There was neuroimaging done,
PET scans, MRIs to look at the defendant's brain. And he testified that
that imaging was broadly within normal limits. So, ladies and gentlemen,
there is no cognitive disability here.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.6492, Ls.7-14.) It is well-established that it is improper for the prosecutor
to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence. See e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,
85, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).
FF. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING
SENTENCING PHASE AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the State's closing
argument. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference the facts and legal arguments from Claim
EE, supra. Trial counsels' failure to object, and alternatively request a mistrial,
admonishment, and curative instruction constitutes deficient performance. Mr. Hall
asserts that but for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that
he would not have been convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
GG. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE HENNEMAN
CASE PROCEEDING TO TRIAL BEFORE THE HANLON CASE
Trial counsel failed to object to the Henneman trial preceding the Hanlon trial
where the order of the trials determined the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances in Mr. Hall's respective cases. Specifically, by failing to object to the
Henneman trial going first, trial counsel allowed the State the opportunity to charge an
additional aggravator in the Hanlon trial, namely that Mr. Hall had been previously
-
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convicted of murder. But for trial counsels' failure to object to the Henneman case going
first, Mr. Hall would have received a life sentence in the Hanlon case since the only
aggravator for which he was sentenced to death was the prior murder conviction
aggravator.
HH. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE PRIOR
MURDER CONVICTION AGGRAVATOR
Mr. Hall was sentenced to death on just one of the five aggravating circumstances
that the jury found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravator required the State
to prove that Mr. Hall "was previously convicted of another murder." Idaho Code 19-
2515(9)(a). Trial counsel should have challenged the aggravating circumstance in the
following ways: 1) the aggravator was neither presented to the Grand Jury nor charged in
the Indictment; 2) the aggravator only applies in cases where the murder conviction
existed prior to commission of the offense sought to be enhanced; 3) the aggravator could
not be applied without offending various constitutional principles; and 4) the jury's
verdict on this aggravator was inconsistent with its verdict on the propensity aggravator.
The aggravator was not properly charged: Trial counsel should have challenged
the Indictment in Mr. Hall's case as constitutionally insufficient in stating the essential
facts of an offense for which Mr. Hall could be sentenced to death by failing to include
the prior murder conviction aggravating circumstance.
The Idaho Constitution provides that, "No person shall be held to answer... unless
on presentment or indictment... or on information..." IDAHO CaNST., art. I, § 8. The
indictment or the information "shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged." I.C.R. 7(b); I.C. § 19-1409(2)
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(requiring "[a] statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise
language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended.").
Whether regarded as elements or functional equivalents of elements, the facts
necessary to increase the maximum punishment of a murder from life to death are
essential facts to give a defendant adequate notice of what is intended. See Sattazahn v.
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) ("[I]fthe existence of any fact (other than a prior
conviction) increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that
fact - no matter how the State labels it - constitutes an element, and must be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt."). Accordingly, the failure to charge Mr. Hall with the
statutory aggravating circumstance violated the Sixth Amendment notice requirements,
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and Article I, § 8 of the Idaho
Constitution, as well as I.C.R. 7(b) and I.C. § 19-1409(2). See Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466,483 n.10 (2000) ("The judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer
limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury."); United States v.
Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 942-43 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Grand Jury Clause applied
to aggravators as functional equivalents to elements); State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974,
1027-28 (N.J. 2004) (holding that aggravating factors, as elements of a greater offense of
capital murder must be submitted to a grand jury and returned in an indictment pursuant
to the state constitution); Cf State v. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho 632, 634-35, 95 P.2d 132, 134-35
(1939) (holding that where the State seeks to punish a defendant as a persistent violator
of the law, the former convictions relied upon must be alleged in the Indictment); but see
Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 784, 102 P.3d 1099,1103 (2004) ("Ring did not elevate
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those statutory aggravating circumstances into elements of a crime, nor did it create a
new crime.").
Here the Indictment did not contain the prior murder aggravating factor. Because
this essential element was omitted from the Indictment, trial counsel were ineffective in
failing to challenge the omission as precluding the State from seeking a death sentence
against Mr. Hall. As a result of trial counsel's failure to challenge the Indictment,
Mr. Hall was sentenced to death based on a deficient charging document. Under these
circumstances, Mr. Hall was clearly prejudiced by trial counsel's ineffective assistance
and must be resentenced with the aid of effective trial counsel.
The aggravator did not apply: Trial counsel should have argued that this
aggravator must have existed at the time of his crime, i.e., that at as of March 1, 2003,
Mr. Hall had previously been convicted of another murder. This interpretation is
consistent with the plain language of the statute itself and exemplified by the fact that the
State was unable to comply with the initial time limitations for giving notice of
aggravators under I.C. § 18-400A and was not included in the Indictment. In addition,
the plain language is consistent with the statutory scheme in existence at the time;
specifically, that all the statutory aggravating factors related to circumstances that either
preceded or accompanied the commission of the charged murder. The death penalty
statute's sole focus on the character of the defendant preceding or surrounding the
commission of the murder is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that at the time of Mr.
Hall's offense, as the Court recognized, the propensity aggravator applied only to
circumstances prior to or surrounding the commission of the murder. Moreover,
application of the plain meaning of the statute prevents the State from manipulating the
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proceedings to ensure the presence of an aggravating circumstance. See supra, Claim Y.
Further, application of the plain meaning of the statute would not have precluded the
State from admitting evidence of the prior offense pursuant to the propensity aggravator
since the prior offense, unlike the conviction, did precede the commission of the charged
murder.
While the Idaho Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to address this issue,
trial counsel could have relied on the holding and analysis in State v. Allison, 923 P.2d
1224 (Or. App. 1996), including the cases cited therein, as additional support for a
motion to preclude the State from relying on this aggravator. In Allison, the Oregon
Court of Appeals considered the meaning of "previously been convicted" of a crime in
the context of its recidivist statute.
The term "previous" is generally understood to mean "going or existing
before in time: earlier." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1798 (unabridged 1976). By itself, that definition seems straightforward
enough. The problem is that it establishes that "previous" has meaning
only in relation to another event, and the language of the statute provides
few clues as to what the voters intended that other event to be.
* * *
So far as we can tell, there are at least three possibilities. First, a defendant
who has "previously been convicted" could refer to a defendant who, at
any time before the sentencing, has been found guilty of a crime listed in
ORS 137.635(2). . .. Given that a defendant already has been found
guilty of a listed crime before sentencing, however, he or she always will
have been "previously" convicted of a listed crime. Thus, any conviction,
even a first-time conviction of a single crime, would constitute a "previous
conviction" under the statute. Such a construction is unlikely; it effectively
reads out of the statute any distinction between a defendant's "conviction"
and a "previous conviction."
* * *
Second, the statute could be read to mean that a person who has just been
found guilty of one of the listed crimes may be subject to determinate
sentencing if, at any time before that conviction, that person had been
convicted of a listed crime.... That construction, however, does not draw
any distinction as to when the crimes were committed. Thus, because of
the fortuity of a court's scheduling or a prosecutor's method of charging, a
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defendant who committed two separate crimes may end up receiving a
conviction on the later crime first, resulting in a "previous conviction" on
a subsequently committed crime. That certainly is an odd result.
* * *
Third, the statute could be read to mean that a person who has just been
found guilty of one of the crimes listed in ORS 137.635(2) may be subject
to the statute if he or she had been found guilty of another listed crime, not
merely any time before sentencing, but before commission ofthe crime for
which defendant is being sentenced. . . . As in the case of the second
alternative construction, there is a distinction maintained between a
"conviction" and a "previous conviction." In contrast with the second
alternative, however, this one does not lead to any absurd or unlikely
results. To the contrary, this construction comports with the manner in
which the term "previous conviction" generally is understood in habitual
offender statutes and the manner in which that term, and others like it,
have been construed in most other jurisdictions in which habitual offender
statutes have been adopted.
* * *
We conclude that ORS 137.635 applies when a person who has been
found guilty of one of the crimes listed in that statute already had been
convicted of one of those crimes before committing the crime for which he
or she is to be sentenced. The evidence is undisputed that defendant had
not been convicted of any crime listed in ORS 137.635 before committing
the crimes for which he was sentenced in this case. The trial court
therefore erred in applying the statute.
Allison, 923 P.2d at 1227-33.
In addition, trial counsel should have argued that "conviction" means final
conviction. Since the Henneman case was pending appeal, and because Mr. Hall was
actively challenging the integrity of that conviction in state post-conviction proceedings,
Mr. Hall had not been previously convicted ofmurder prior to his sentencing.
The aggravator offended various constitutional principles as applied to Mr.
Hall's case: Trial counsel should have challenged the application of the aggravator as a
violation ofthe Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Constitutions of
the State of Idaho by drawing upon the nature of aggravating circumstances as
established by Apprendi at its progeny.
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The Sixth Amendment requires that "[0]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 490. "[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 2004) (emphasis in
original)). There are three ways an aggravating factor can constitutionally increase a
maximum sentence. A jury can find the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The defendant can waive his Apprendi rights by stipulating to
"the relevant facts or consent[ing] to judicial factfinding." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310.
Finally, either the judge or the jury can find "the fact of a prior conviction." Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490. The fact that a judge can find the "fact of a prior conviction" does not
change the nature of that fact as the functional equivalent of an element of a crime.
Because Mr. Hall had already been convicted and punished for the Henneman murder,
that same fact could not be used to establish the prior murder conviction statutory
aggravating circumstance in the Hanlon case under the double jeopardy protections of the
U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and statutes of the State ofIdaho.
Trial counsel should also have challenged the application of the aggravator as a
violation of the Ex Post Facto and Due Process clauses of the United States and Idaho
constitutions. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits "[e]very law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed." Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522 (2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 390 (---).) The punishment of death for proof of a prior murder conviction did not
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exist at the time of the commission of the crime for which Mr. Hall was tried. Although
the aggravator existed in the Idaho Code, and although the prior murder had occurred, the
prior conviction had not.44 Because aggravating circumstances are functional equivalents
of a crime. The factual basis for an element of the crime did not exist at the time the
crime was committed. To permit the State to add an element which inflicts greater
punishment than permitted absent that element violates the Ex Post Facto and Due
Process clauses.
The jury entered inconsistent verdicts: Trial counsel should have moved for a
judgment of acquittal or judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict on the prior
conviction aggravator on the basis that the jury's verdict on the prior murder conviction
aggravator is inconsistent with the jury's verdict on the propensity aggravator and likely
reflects that the jury considered irrelevant evidence regarding the circumstances
surrounding the Henneman murder when weighing this aggravator where only the fact of
a prior murder conviction was relevant. Specifically, it is inconsistent for the jury to find
the prior murder conviction aggravator to outweigh the mitigation but not likewise find
the same for the propensity aggravator where the propensity aggravator was based on the
prior murder in addition to other aggravating facts.45
II. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO THEIR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE IDAHO'S DEATH PENALTY
SCHEME AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
44 The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of prior crimes used to
enhance punishment and have declined to find an ex post facto violation. McDonald v.
Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901).
45 Petitioner maintains that other non-statutory aggravating facts were impermissibly
introduced. Petitioner also maintains that the prejudice stemming from trial counsels'
deficient closing argument explains the inconsistent verdicts. Accordingly, this claim is
stated in the alternative to Claim Y and Claim DD.
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Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge Idaho's death
penalty scheme as unconstitutional for the following infirmities: 1) the inclusion of
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad aggravating circumstances; 2) the lack of a
provision providing adequate notice of the aggravating circumstances; 3) the lack of a
provision requiring jury findings regarding facts found in aggravation and mitigation of
punishment; 4) the lack of a definition for "sufficiently compelling" necessary for
meaningful weighing; and 5) the failure to assign a burden of proof for the weighing
process.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge
The Constitutionality Of The Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
Although Mr. Hall was sentenced to death for only one aggravating
circumstance, i.e., the prior murder conviction aggravator, the State was permitted to
present evidence well beyond the scope of that aggravator as part of its case to prove four
other aggravating circumstances. As such, trial counsels' failure to challenge the
constitutionality of these aggravators led to the admission of otherwise inadmissible and
highly prejudicial evidence.
Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise challenges
that the Idaho Supreme Court, and even in one case, the United States Supreme Court,
have previously rejected. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 (noting
that "counsel also has a duty . . . to preserve issues calling for a change in existing
precedent; the client's life may well depend on how zealously counsel discharges this
duty.") Indeed, the importance of challenging existing precedent has been demonstrated
over the past few years, where the Supreme Court has agreed to revisit issues and
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overrule precedent in capital cases.46 This is especially the case in light of the recent
change to jury sentencing.47
The propensity aggravating circumstance: Trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the "propensity" aggravating circumstance
and its related instructions as follows: 1) that by asking a jury to find that a defendant
"probably" constitutes a continuing threat to society, the language of the aggravator itself
unconstitutionally lowers the State's burden of proof; 2) that the instructions did not limit
the scope of admissible evidence to other acts involving murder or sufficiently violent
conduct; 3) that the instructions did not limit the term "society" to a prison context; and
4) that the propensity aggravator duplicates other statutory aggravators.
First, trial counsel should have challenged the aggravator on the grounds that it
unconstitutionally lowers the State's burden of proof by asking a jury to find that a
defendant "probably" constitutes a continuing threat to society. See Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 586-587 (2002); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court's
instructions did not cure this defect. Specifically, Jury Instruction No. 47 provided:
The phrase "exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably
constitute a continuing threat to society" means conduct showing that the
defendant is more likely than not to be a continuing threat to society.
Such finding cannot be based solely upon the fact that you found the
defendant guilty of murder. In order for a person to have a propensity to
commit murder, the person must be a willing, predisposed killer, a killer
who tends toward destroying the life of another, one who kills with less
46 See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
47 Prior to jury sentencing, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on the "important distinction"
between judge and jury in upholding various constitutional challenges to Idaho's death
penalty scheme. See e.g., State v. Lanliford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214
(1989) (recognizing that Idaho's "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating
circumstance may be unconstitutional if relied upon in a jury sentencing).
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than the normal amount of provocation. Propensity requires a proclivity,
susceptibility, and even an affinity toward committing the act ofmurder.
(R. Vol. VII, p. 1320, (Jury Instruction no. 47).) The jury instruction simply defines
"probably" as "more likely than not," a preponderance of the evidence standard which
unconstitutionally diminishes the State's burden of proof. But see State v. Sivak, 105
Idaho 900, 04-905, 674 P.2d 396, 400-401 (1983) (rejecting the claim that the "probably"
language diminished the State's burden of proof).
Second, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of prior conduct to
prior murders, or at minimum, to prior conduct showing a propensity to commit murder.
This is important because the jury was presented with evidence of other acts that did not
involve murder, or even extreme violence, e.g., burglary, grand theft, statutory rape, and
other bad acts. See supra, Claim X.
Third, the limiting instruction did not limit consideration of Mr. Hall's
"continuing threat to society" to an incarcerated environment. The jury was not
informed, and Mr. Hall was not given notice, of whether the State had to prove that Mr.
Hall (1) constituted a continuing threat to prison society, (2) a free society, or (3) both. In
other words, the relevant "society" is left undefined by the statute or the instruction.48 To
be valid under the Eighth Amendment and the circumstance of this case, the jury should
have been instructed that "society" was limited to prison.
Fourth, the Court's limiting instruction did not distinguish this aggravator from
the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (herein "HAC") aggravator. Thus, the jury
could have determined that both aggravating circumstances existed on the single finding
48 Accordingly, trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to
the prison context.
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that the defendant enjoys to kill. Specifically, "cruel" as used in the "HAC" aggravator
means murder "with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others."
(Emphasis added). This definition is sufficiently similar to "propensity," which is
described a person with "an affinity toward committing the act of murder," to render the
"propensity" aggravator unconstitutionally duplicative.
The HAC aggravating circumstance: Trial counsel should have argued that this
statutory aggravating circumstance, set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e), is unconstitutional
on its face and as applied. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). In Maynard, the
Supreme Court held that a similar aggravating circumstance under the Oklahoma death
penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 363-365. In State v. Lanliford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d
197 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the aggravator, distinguishing Maynard
based on the Oklahoma statute at issue, stating,
There is, however, an important distinction between the Oklahoma and
Idaho aggravating circumstance statutes. The distinction is that Oklahoma
has jury sentencing while Idaho adheres to judicial sentencing in capital
murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are terms of art that are
commonly understood among the members of the judiciary. As a result,
the potential for inconsistent application that exists as a result of jury
sentencing is eliminated where the judge sentences.
Id. at 877, 781 P.2d at 214. Of course, this distinction no longer applies. Accordingly,
the question is whether an adequate limiting construction was given.
The Court instructed the jury as follows:
The terms especially "heinous," "atrocious," or "cruel," are considered
separately; but in combination with "manifesting exceptional depravity."
The terms heinous, atrocious or cruel are intended to refer to those first-
degree murders where the actual commission of the first-degree murder
was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the
norm of first-degree murders. A murder is especially heinous if it is
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extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means outrageously
wicked and vile. Cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain
with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
The statutory aggravating factor does not exist unless the murder was
especially heinous, especially atrocious, or especially cruel, and such
heinousness, atrociousness or cruelty manifested exceptional depravity. It
might be thought that every murder involves depravity. However,
exceptional depravity exists only where depravity is apparent to such an
extent as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence.
The terms "especially heinous manifesting exceptional depravity,"
"especially atrocious manifesting exceptional depravity," or "especially
cruel manifesting exceptional depravity" focus upon a defendant's state of
mind at the time of the offense, as reflected by his words and acts.
(R. Vol. VII, p. 1320, (Jury Instruction no. 44).)
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate. While the instruction
adds words, those words do not add meaning of constitutional significance. In short, the
limiting construction does not genuinely narrow the class of murderers eligible for the
death penalty and does not adequately guide the jury's discretion. But see Leavitt v.
Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 835-837 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Idaho's aggravator has been
adequately defined by limiting instructions, while not condoning the actual choice of
words). In particular, and a point not addressed in Leavitt, the limiting instruction was
inadequate because it did not necessarily preclude the jury's consideration of
circumstances occurring after the victim's death when determining whether the
aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851 P.2d 370, 390 (1993)
(holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor: "[t]he murder is
complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body would not constitute
the manner in which the murder was committed").
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The utter disregard aggravating circumstance: Trial counsel should have argued
that this statutory aggravating circumstance, set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f), is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
The Court instructed the jury as follows:
"Exhibited utter disregard for human life," with regard to the murder or
the circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or
circumstances surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost,
callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.
"Cold-blooded" means marked by absence of warm feeling: without
consideration, compunction, or clemency, matter of fact, or emotionless.
"Pitiless" means devoid of or unmoved by mercy or compassion. A "cold-
blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a slayer who kills without feeling or
sympathy. The utter disregard factor refers to the defendant's lack of
conscience regarding killing another human being.
(R. Vol. VII, p. 1320, (Jury Instruction noA5).)
The Supreme Court has held that Idaho's limiting instruction is sufficient under
the Eighth Amendment. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993). The limiting
instruction was satisfactory because it defined a "state of mind that is ascertainable from
surrounding facts." Id. at 1541-1542. Because some murderers do exhibit feeling, the
Court also determined that the aggravator genuinely narrowed the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty. Id. Nevertheless, trial counsel should have objected to this
instruction as inadequate to save the aggravating circumstance, thus at a mInImUm,
absolutely ensuring preservation of the issue, for a higher court.
The limiting instruction was also inadequate because it did not necessarily
preclude the jury's consideration of circumstances occurring after the victim's death
when determining whether the aggravator existed, by failing to define the language
"circumstances surrounding [the murder's] commission," to circumstances during the
commission of the murder. But see State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 103-04,967 P.2d 702,
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717-18 (1998) (permitting consideration of post-mortem conduct in consideration of the
"utter disregard" aggravator). This point was not addressed by the Supreme Court in
Creech.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge
The Lack Of Notice Of All Evidence Relied Upon In Proving The
Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
Due process requires that the State provide notice of the factual basis for the
aggravators alleged. The State charged Mr. Hall with four aggravating circumstances by
Indictment.49 The aggravators were submitted to a grand jury in a supplemental
proceeding during which no additional evidence was presented than that ultimately
presented during the guilt phase of Mr. Hall's trial. However, during the sentencing
phase of Mr. Hall's trial, the State submitted additional evidence.
In the absence of a clear and concise factual statement to support the State's
reliance of this aggravator, or any aggravator, merely citing to the statutory language in
I.C. § 19-2515 is, in and of itself, was inherently insufficient to provide Mr. Hall with
notice of the basis of the allegations against him in violation of the Sixth Amendment and
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 8 of Constitution of the State ofIdaho, , as well as I.c.R., Rule 7(b) and I.C. §
19-1409(2) (requiring "[a] statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and
concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended.").
Assuming the Court would have denied a motion to strike the aggravators on the
grounds of inadequate notice, trial counsel should have requested a pretrial evidentiary
49 The State was improperly allowed to effectively amend the Indictment to charge an
additional aggravating circumstance, prior murder conviction. See infra, Claim GG.
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hearing. The purpose of the hearing would have been four-fold: (1) to provide notice to
the defense so that they could adequately prepare for sentencing; (2) to ensure that the
evidence was reliable; (3) to ensure that the facts offered in support of the aggravating
circumstances existed by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) to ensure that the
noticed aggravating circumstances were based on independent evidence. Trial counsel
should have relied on grounds for the motion including the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As a result of trial counsel's
failure, they were inadequately prepared to defend the case at sentencing.
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge
The Lack Of A Provision Requiring Jury Findings Regarding Facts Found
In Aggravation And Mitigation Of Punishment
Prior to the new death penalty statute, a capital defendant was statutorily entitled
to written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set
forth in writing any mitigating factors considered. I.C. § 19-2515(f) (2000). The written
findings requirement served to further two purposes: 1) to ensure that the imposition of a
death sentence is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required, and (2) to protect a
capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,
414-15,631 P.2d 187, 196-97 (1981). Without the findings, an appellate court cannot
determine whether the fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was
presented, whether the evidence supports the aggravating factors found, whether the fact-
finder engaged in unconstitutional duplication of facts for multiple aggravators, and
whether the fact-finder properly weighed all factors. Osborn, at 415, 631 P.2d at 197; see
also Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,210,731 P.2d 192,205 (1986) (holding that a fact-
finder may consider the same evidence considered in relation to a different aggravator so
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I
long as it finds additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of that particular
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt).
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives his right to
Jury sentencing, the district court is still required to make written findings of the
aggravation, mitigation considered, and the weighing process. I.C. § 19-2515(8)(b). In
contrast, when a defendant chooses not to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury, he
must forgo the written findings requirement; a jury is only required to indicate on special
verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and "whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the
aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be
unjust." I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a).
Because the jury is not required to make these findings, a defendant who chooses
to have a jury sentencing is forced to relinquish his constitutional right to have his
sentence meaningfully reviewed by the district court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on
direct appeal and as a part of its mandatory sentencing review under I.C. § 19-2827.
Without a complete record, the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court are precluded
from conducting a meaningful review which includes a determination whether imposition
of the death sentence was reasoned and objective or the result of arbitrariness and
passion. See e.g., Osborn, at 415, 631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the lower court are
not set forth with reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its review on
an inadequate record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate review'
demanded by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v.
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Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased
potential of arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty by juries).
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring all these
findings to which a capital defendant was entitled under preexisting law. Mr. Hall has
been deprived of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have this Court
and an appellate court make a meaningful determination of whether his sentence was the
product a reasoned and objective, as opposed to an arbitrary and unguided, analysis.
In addition, trial counsel should have asserted that the new death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because it forces a defendant to choose between his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because of
trial counsel's ineffectiveness, Mr. Hall lost the necessary predicate for his right to a
meaningful review. Mr. Hall's death sentence should thus be vacated and he should be
afforded a new sentencing proceeding where the sentencer is required to provide
adequate written findings.
I 4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To ChallengeThe Lack Of A Definition For "Sufficiently Compelling" Necessary For
Meaningful Weighing
According to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, a defendant cannot be sentenced to
death unless it is first found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation.
See e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) (holding
that a defendant can be sentenced to death, only if it is found "that all the mitigating
circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances
found and make imposition of death unjust.") Accordingly, if the mitigation outweighs
the gravity of each of the aggravators, by any degree, then the defendant cannot be
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sentenced to death. Mr. Hall further submits that under Idaho law, even where the
mitigation is only of equal weight to the gravity of the aggravation, the maximum
punishment is fixed life.
Trial counsel should have challenged the death penalty statute because it does not
provide that the individual aggravators must outweigh the mitigation. The death penalty
statute provides in relevant part that the jury shall return a special verdict stating:
If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed
against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the
death penalty would be unjust.
I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a)(ii). The statute does not define "sufficiently compelling" as
requiring the aggravation to "outweigh" the mitigation. The jury instructions likewise
provided no definition for "sufficiently compelling" and did not require that the jury find
that individual aggravators each "outweighed" the mitigation.
There is simply no way of knowing whether the jury imposed a death sentence
even if they believed the mitigation was of equal weight to the aggravation. Indeed, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury believed that the mitigation outweighed the
aggravation, but not in such a manner or degree as to make imposition of the death
penalty unjust. It may very well be that the jury believed that the mitigation must
substantially outweigh the aggravation for the imposition of the death penalty to be unjust
under the facts of this case. This violated Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
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5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge
The Lack Of A Provision Assigning The Burden Of Proof To The State
To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The Aggravation Is Not
Outweighed By The Mitigation
As noted above, a defendant cannot be sentenced to death, even if aggravators are
found, unless the State proves and the jury finds that the mitigation when weighed against
the individual aggravators is not sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be
unjust. I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a)(ii). Unless this additional finding is made, a defendant
cannot be sentenced to death, and the maximum punishment is life without the possibility
of parole. Accordingly, based on the rule of law set forth in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), this finding represents a finding that must be presented to a jury and found to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court enunciated the rule of law:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 600 (citations omitted). Accordingly, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel in failing to challenge the Idaho death penalty scheme for removing from the
State the burden of proving this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, by failing to assign the burden upon the State, the new death penalty
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant to disprove an
element, or functional equivalent of an element, or even just an essential fact. This
violates the defendant's rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
(addressing due process); but see State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 417, 631 P.2d 187, 199
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(1981) (holding pre-Ring, that the scheme does not violate due process because the
weighing process is not part of an element of the offense).
JJ. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILING TO ARGUE THAT THE CONVICTION OF RAPE MERGED
WITH MURDER
The jury found Mr. Hall guilty of the crimes of rape and felony murder (murder in
the perpetration of rape). 50 The Judgment of Conviction contains convictions and
sentences for both crimes. Under the doctrine of merger, Mr. Hall could not be convicted
and sentenced on the rape, as it merged as a lesser included offense into the felony
murder conviction. See Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 213, 731 P.2d 192, 208 (1986)
(applying the doctrine of merger to vacate Sivak's robbery conviction and directing the
district court to dismiss the robbery conviction on remand where the robbery served as
the predicate felony in Sivak's felony murder conviction).
KK. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILING TO REQUEST SENTENCING PHASE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Trial counsel failed to request jury instructions which 1) properly defined and
limited the scope of the aggravating circumstances, see supra, Claim DD; 2) properly
defined "sufficiently compelling" and the weighing process, see supra, Claim DD; 3)
prohibited the jury from considering the same evidence for multiple aggravating
circumstances, see supra, Claim DD; and 4) guided the jury's consideration of non-
statutory aggravating circumstances and victim impact statements. See supra, Claim DD.
The relevant claims noted above are each incorporated herein by reference.
50 The Judgment of Conviction states that Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder
under both theories of premeditated murder and felony murder when in fact the verdicts
and the sentencing hearing reflect that he was only convicted under the felony murder
theory. This is a typographical error that could be fixed by a motion to correct the
Judgment of Conviction.
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In addition, trial counsel should have requested an instruction that the jury must
weigh each individual aggravating circumstance against the cumulative mitigation. On
this issue, the Court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows:
You must each decide for yourself whether all mitigating circumstances
presented, when weighed against each statutory aggravating circumstance
proven by the State, are sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of
the death penalty unjust.
(R. Vol. VII, p. 1320, (Jury Instruction no. 49).) This instruction is consistent with Icn
1718, and is technically an accurate statement of the statutory language. See I.C. § 19-
2515 (8)(a)(ii). However, this instruction does not adequately define what it means to
weigh all mitigation against "each" statutory aggravating circumstance. This is reflected
in the numerous decisions in which district court judges throughout the state struggled
with similar language and weighed all the mitigation against each of the aggravators
cumulatively instead of individually. See e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774
P.2d 299 (1989).
LL. DEPRIVATION OF THE FFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILING TO CHALLENGE EXECUTION BY LETHAL INJECTION AS
A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Idaho prescribes execution by lethal injection.51 I.C. § 19-2716 (" ...punishment of
death shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of
an ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent ....")
Executing Mr. Hall by lethal injection is unconstitutional, however. See, e.g., Harbison v.
51 Post-conviction counsel is aware a new statute governing lethal injection is waiting the
governor's signature. However, post-conviction counsel is unaware of any IDOC policy
regarding the exact protocol for execution by lethal injection. Further, it is becoming
readily apparent that lethal injection is not the painless, "humane" manner of execution it
was once portrayed, and can cause excruciating pain, albeit sometimes masked by a
paralytic agent.
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Little, 511 F.Supp.2d 872,2007 WL 2821230 (M.D.Tenn. 2007). In (holding Tennessee's
new lethal injection procedures are cruel and unusual, because they present "a substantial
risk of unnecessary pain" violate death row inmate Edward Jerome Harbison's
constitutional protections under the Eighth Amendment, and noting that the protocols do
not adequately ensure that inmates are properly anesthetized during lethal injections, a
problem that could "result in a terrifying, excruciating death"); But See, Baze v. Rees, ---
us. ----, 128 s.et. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008). (Rejecting the challenge to Kentucky's
lethal injection procedure).
MM. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO RAISE INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS
Trial counsel were ineffective in failing to raise international law challenges to
Mr. Hall's conviction and sentence, which prejudiced him under Strickland. But See
Medellin v. Texas 552 U. S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (stating neither the World
Court's judgment in the Avena litigation (holding Vienna Convention claims must be
honored by the courts of signatory nations) nor the President's Memorandum directing
Texas to provide a forum for Avena related claims constitute directly enforceable federal
law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions.
Additionally, the Vienna Convention may constitute an international commitment, but it
and similar treaties are not binding against the states unless enabling statutes are passed
or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is ratified on that
basis.).
The convictions and sentences entered against Mr. Hall were obtained in violation
of international law. Specifically, his death sentence was obtained in violation of The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits death
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 177000293
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sentences where (a) the accused will endure a prolonged incarceration on death row
which violates Article 7, (b) the accused does not have access to a meaningful clemency
process, which violates Article 6, (c) the accused is arbitrarily deprived of his life, which
violates Article 6, and (d) the accused is denied his rights to due process, which violates
Article 14. Mr. Hall's death sentence was also obtained in violation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article XXVI (guaranteeing an "impartial"
hearing to the accused), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The ICCPR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment were signed and ratified by the United States. Idaho may not impose or
execute Mr. Hall's death sentence without violating the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which states:
All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., Article VI, § 2.
Moreover, Mr. Hall's death sentence does and will violate the American
Convention of Human Rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, which have not yet been signed by the United
States, but which inform Customary International Law. The United States is obligated to
pay heed to Customary International Law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 670
(1900) ("[I]nternationallaw is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
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depending upon it are duly presented for their determinations.") Mr. Hall's death
sentence further violates the principle ofjus cogens. Ajus cogens norm is an elementary
right of humanity, so basic as to be recognized by the international community as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 53; Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law, § 102. The execution of the
mentally ill violates this principle.
NN. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY
FAILING TO MOVE TO STRIKE THE DEATH PENALTY AS A
VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, BY
FAILING TO REQUEST A SEPARATE JURY HEAR THE PENALTY
PHASE OF MR. HALL'S CASE
In Idaho, the same jury that sits for the guilt-phase of a capital trial sits for the
special sentencing hearing if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder. Findings
by researchers with the Capital Jury Project indicate that this procedure, including jurors'
beliefs about the death penalty in general, present problems of a constitutional
dimension.
The Capital Jury Project has made the following relevant findings regarding juror
decision-making:
• Jurors engage in premature death penalty decisions;
• The jury selection process fails to remove a large number of death
biased jurors;
• Jurors fail to comprehend and/or follow death penalty instructions;
• Jurors often hold erroneous beliefs that the death sentence is
required;
• Jurors seek to evade responsibility for the decision imposing the
death penalty;
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 179000295
            
              
                
             
              
     
       
          
       
       
         
     
                 
             
             
            
 
            
 
        
             
  
          
           
 
           
  
      
• Racism plays a role in the determination and imposition of the
death penalty.
The Capital Jury Project has made the following statistical findings:
• Approximately 50% of all jurors studied absolutely thought they
knew what punishment should be given during the guilt phase of
the trial and prior to the start of the sentencing phase (30%
absolute for imposing the death penalty and 20% absolute for not
imposing the death penalty). The jurors did not wavier from these
decisions, which were made prior to the sentencing phase.
• 60% of jurors with a pro death penalty position did not change
their premature death penalty position and 97% of all pro death
penalty jurors felt strongly about their pro-death penalty position
during the guilt phase of the trial.
• 30% of all jurors fail to understand the instruction that aggravation
must be proven a beyond a reasonable doubt.
• 30-40% of jurors fail to understand jury instructions, legal
standards and legal considerations regarding mitigation evidence.52
• 24-71 % of jurors believed that the death penalty was the only
acceptable punishment for six specific types ofmurder.
• 37-44% of jurors understood that the death penalty would be
required if the defendant would be dangerous in the future or the
defendant's conduct is heinous, vile or depraved.
• Only 15% of jurors believe that individual jurors or the jury as a
whole is/are responsible for the defendant's punishment
(imposition of the death penalty).
• Jurors in all 14 states underestimated (by statistical median
averaging) the sentence which the defendant would receive if the
death penalty was not imposed.53
• At sentencing, jurors who estimated the non-death penalty
sentence to be 20 years or longer are 11.8% less likely to impose
52 This was particularly evident in this case during voir dire, and was compounded by
trial counsels' deficient performance during the jury selection process. See supra, Claim
DD.
53 See People v. LaValle, supra, 817 N.E.2d at 357-58.
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the death penalty over jurors who estimated the non-death penalty
sentence to be from 0-9 years.
In short, Mr. Hall submits that the findings by the Capital Jury Project
demonstrate that the death penalty continues to be imposed in an arbitrary, capricious and
random manner, in violation of the Eighth Amendment as set out in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). In support of this claim, Mr. Hall relies on the analysis and factual
findings in the case law cited herein, as well as an order entered by the New Mexico State
First Judicial District Court (County of Santa Fe), in which the court granted, in part, a
motion to dismiss the death penalty by ordering a separate jury to hear the penalty phase
of a capital case. (Exhibit 44.) In addition, Mr. Hall incorporates by reference the
argument, including the referenced law review articles, in the attached memorandum in
support of a motion to declare the federal death penalty act unconstitutional in the case of
United States v. Joseph Edward Duncan, III (Exhibit 45.) If granted an evidentiary
hearing on this claim, Mr. Hall intends to elicit testimony from at least one person who
participated in the Capital Jury Project studies.
II. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this
Honorable Court:
1. For an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Mr. Hall's claims for post-
conviction relief;
2. For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against him; and
3. For such other further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable.
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DATED this 7th day of April, 2009.
NICOLE OWENS
Co-counsel for Mr. Hall
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada )
Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That I am. the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the contents
thereof, and that the facts contained therein are true and correct as I verily believe based
upon his review of the record, conversations with Petitioner.
DATED this _day of April, 2009.
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of April, 2009.
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at _
My commission expires _
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this i h day of April, 2009 served a true and
correct copy of the forgoing AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF as indicated below:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
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INTRODUCTION
This revised edition ofthe ABA Guidelinesfor the Appointment andPerformance ofDefense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases is the product ofa two-year long drafting effort. In April 2001, the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants and the ABA Special Committee on
Death Penalty Representationjointly sponsored the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines Revision Project
to update the Guidelines, which were originally adopted by the ABA House ofDelegates in 1989. An
Advisory Committee ofexperts was recruited to review and identify necessary revisions, including
representatives from the following ABA and outside entities: ABA Criminal Justice Section; ABA
Section of Litigation; ABA Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities; ABA Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants; ABA Special Committee on Death Penalty
Representation; National Association ofCriminal Defense Lawyers; National Legal Aid and Defender
Association; Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel; Habeas Assistance and Training Counsel; and
State Capital Defenders Association.
Expert capital litigators were retained as consultants to the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines
Revision Project to incorporate the decisions of the Advisory Committee into preliminary drafts of
revisions. Drafts were considered by Advisory Committee members during several day-long meetings
in Washington, D.C. as well as follow-up discussions. The final working draft ofthe revisions was
approved by the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants and the ABA
Special Committee on Death Penalty Representation. The ABA House of Delegates approved the
revised edition ofthe Guidelines on February 10,2003.
The final product, this revised edition of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, is the result of an extensive and
conscientious drafting and review process by experts in the field of death penalty litigation. The
revised edition provides comprehensive, up-to-date guidance for professionals who work in this
specialized and demanding field and helps to ensure effective assistance of counsel for all persons
charged with or convicted ofcapital crimes.
11
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Guideline 1.1 Objective and Scope of Guidelines
A. The objective of these Guidelines is to set forth a national standard of practice for the
defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation for all
persons facing the possible imposition or execution ofa death sentence by any
jurisdiction.
B. These Guidelines apply from the moment the client is taken into custody and extend
to all stages ofevery case in which the jurisdiction may be entitled to seek the death
penalty, including initial and ongoing investigation, pretrial proceedings, trial, post-
conviction review, clemency proceedings, and any connected litigation.
Definitional Notes
Throughout these Guidelines:
I. As in the first edition, "should" is used as a mandatory term.
2. By ''jurisdiction'' is meant the government under whose legal authority the death sentence
is to be imposed. Most commonly, this will be a state (as opposed to, e.g., a county) or the
federal government as a whole. The term also includes the military and any other relevant
unit ofgovernment (e.g., Commonwealth, Territory). Where a federal judicial district or
circuit is meant, the Commentary will so state.
3. The terms "counsel," "attorney," and "lawyer" apply to all attorneys, whether appointed,
retained, acting pro bono, or employed by any defender organization (e.g., federal or state
public defenders offices, resource centers), who act on behalfofthe defendant in a capital
case. When modified by "private," these terms apply to both pro bono and retained
attorneys.
4. The term "custody" is used in the inclusive sense ofHensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S.
345,350-51 (1973).
5. The term "post-conviction" is a general one, including (a) all stages ofdirect appeal within
the jurisdiction and certiorari (b) all stages of state collateral review proceedings (however
denominated under state law) and certiorari, (c) all stages offederal collateral review
proceedings, however denominated (ordinarily petitions for writs ofhabeas corpus or
motions pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2255, but including all applications of similar purport,
e.g., for writ oferror coram nobis), and including all applications for action by the Courts
ofAppeals or the United States Supreme Court (commonly certiorari, but also, e.g.,
applications for original writs ofhabeas corpus, applications for certificates ofprobable
cause), all applications for interlocutory relief (e.g., stay ofexecution, appointment of
counsel) in connection with any of the foregoing. Ifa particular subcategory ofpost-
conviction proceeding is meant, the language ofthe relevant Guideline or Commentary
will so state.
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7. The terms "capital case" and "death penalty case" are used interchangeably.
8. The terms "defender organization," "Independent Authority," and "Responsible Agency"
are defined in Guideline 3.1 and accompanying Commentary
9. The term "Legal Representation Plan" is defined in Guideline 2.1.
History ofGuideline
The Commentary to the original edition ofthis Guideline stated that it was designed to
express existing "practice norms and constitutional requirements." This thought has been moved
to the black letter in order to emphasize that these Guidelines are not aspirational. Instead, they
embody the current consensus about what is required to provide effective defense representation
in capital cases.
The first edition of this Guideline stated that the objective in providing counsel in death
penalty cases should be to ensure the provision of"quality legal representation." The language
has been amended to call for "high quality legal representation" to emphasize that, because of the
extraordinary complexity and demands of capital cases, a significantly greater degree of skill and
experience on the part of defense counsel is required than in a noncapital case.
The Guidelines formerly covered only "defendants eligible for appointment of counsel."
Their scope has been revised for this edition to cover "all persons facing the possible imposition
or execution ofa death sentence." The purpose ofthe change is to make clear that the obligations
of these Guidelines are applicable in all capital cases, including those in which counsel is retained
or providing representation on a pro bono basis. The definition of"counsel" reflects this change.
The use of the term ''jurisdiction'' as now defined has the effect ofbroadening the range of
proceedings covered. In accordance with current ABA policy, the Guidelines now apply to
military proceedings, whether by way ofcourt martial, military commission or tribunal, or
otherwise.
In accordance with the same policy, the words "from the moment the client is taken into
custody" have been added to make explicit that these Guidelines also apply to circumstances in
which an uncharged prisoner who might face the death penalty is denied access to counsel seeking
to act on his or her behalf (e.g., by the federal government invoking national security, or by state
authorities exceeding constitutional limitations). This language replaces phraseology in the
former Guidelines which made them applicable to "cases in which the death penalty is sought."
The period between an arrest or detention and the prosecutor's declaration of intent to seek the
death penalty is often critically important. In addition to enabling counsel to counsel his or her
client and to obtain information regarding guilt that may later become unavailable, effective
advocacy by defense counsel during this period may persuade the prosecution not to seek the
death penalty. Thus, it is imperative that counsel begin investigating mitigating evidence and
assembling the defense team as early as possible - well before the prosecution has actually
determined that the death penalty will be sought.
These Guidelines, therefore, apply in any circumstance in which a detainee of the
government may face a possible death sentence, regardless ofwhether formal legal proceedings
have been commenced or the prosecution has affirmatively indicated that the death penalty will be
2
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sought. The case remains subject to these Guidelines until the imposition ofthe death penalty is
no longer a legal possibility. In addition, as more fully described in the Commentary, these
Guidelines also recognize that capital defense counsel may be required to pursue related litigation
on the client's behalfoutside the confines of the criminal prosecution itself.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2{c) & cmt.
("Role ofDefense Counsel in Capital Cases"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.1
(3d ed. 1992) ("Objective").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.2
cmt. (3d 00. 1992) ("Capital Cases").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
Standard 5-6. I (3d ed. 1992) ("Initial Provision ofCounsel").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-6.2
(3d ed. 1992) ("Duration ofRepresentation").
ABA, House ofDelegates Resolution 8C (adopted Feb. 5, 2002)
Commentary
Introduction
In 1932, Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Powell v.
Alabama, a death penalty case, acknowledged that a person facing criminal charges "requires the
guiding hand ofcounsel at every step in the proceedings against him.'"
More than seventy years later, death penalty cases have become so specialized that defense
counsel have duties and functions definably different from those ofcounsel in ordinary criminal
cases.2
The quality ofcounsel's "guiding hand" in modem capital cases is crucial to ensuring a
reliable determination ofguilt and the imposition ofan appropriate sentence. Today, it is
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,69 (1932).
See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,855 (1994) (noting the uniqueness and complexity
ofdeath penalty jurisprudence); see also Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Lift: Effective Assistance
ofCounsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending
the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REv. 695 (1991); Welsh S.
White, Effective Assistance ofCounsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard ofCare, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REv. 323 (1993).
3
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universally accepted that the responsibilities of defense counsel in a death penalty case are
uniquely demanding, both in the highly specialized legal knowledge that counsel must possess and
in the advocacy skills he or she must master. At every stage ofa capital case, counsel must be
aware of specialized and frequently changing legal principles and rules. Counsel must be able to
develop strategies applying existing rules in the pressure-filled environment ofhigh-stakes,
complex litigation, as well as anticipate changes in the law that might eventually result in the
appellate reversal of an unfavorable judgment.
As one writer has explained:
Every task ordinarily performed in the representation of a criminal defendant is
more difficult and time-consuming when the defendant is facing execution. The
responsibilities thrust upon defense counsel in a capital case carry with them
psychological and emotional pressures unknown elsewhere in the law. In addition,
defending a capital case is an intellectually rigorous enterprise, requiring command
ofthe rules unique to capital litigation and constant vigilance in keeping abreast of
new developments in a volatile and highly nuanced area of the law.3
Due to the extraordinary and irrevocable nature of the penalty, at every stage ofthe
proceedings counsel must make "extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused.,,4 As discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 228-29, these efforts may need to include litigation or
administrative advocacy outside the confines of the capital case itself (e.g. , pursuit of information
through a state open records law,5 administrative proceedings to obtain or correct a military
record, a collateral attack to invalidate a predicate conviction,6 litigation ofa systemic challenge to
the jury selection procedures of a jurisdiction or district,7 or to a jurisdiction's clemency process).8
Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 357-58 (1995) (footnote omitted).
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-1.2(c), in
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d
ed.1993).
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,526 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(involving successor federal habeas corpus petition based on documents released as a result of
new interpretation ofGeorgia Open Records Act by Georgia Supreme Court).
For example, the defendant prevailed in Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988)
(disallowing use ofprior conviction used in aggravation) only after the same pro bono counsel
successfully litigated People v. Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d 339, 342 (1987) (vacating that conviction).
See infra text accompanying note 21.
Cj Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 219 (1988) (involving federal habeas corpus petitioner
who succeeded on jury discrimination claim where factual predicate was discovered in
independent litigation against the county).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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Structure of the Guidelines
This Commentary provides a general overview ofthe areas in which counsel must be
prepared to perform effectively and be given appropriate governmental support in doing so. These
areas are addressed more specifically in subsequent Guidelines and commentaries. While there is
some inevitable overlap, Guidelines 1.1 10.1 contain primarily principles and policies that should
guide jurisdictions in creating a system for the delivery ofdefense services in capital cases, and
Guidelines 10.2-10.15.2 contain primarily performance standards defining the duties ofcounsel
handling those cases.
Representation at Trial
Trial attorneys in death penalty cases must be able to apply sophisticated jury selection
techniques, including rehabilitation ofvenire members who initially state opposition to the death
penalty and demonstration of bias on the part ofprospective jurors who will automatically vote to
impose the death penalty if the defendant is convicted on the capital charge.9 Counsel must be
experienced in the utilization ofexpert witnesses and evidence, such as psychiatric and forensic
evidence, and must be able to challenge zealously the prosecution's evidence and experts through
effective cross-examination.1O
An attorney representing the accused in a death penalty case must fully investigate the
relevant facts. Because counsel faces what are effectively two different trials - one regarding
whether the defendant is guiltrofa capital crime, and the other concerning whether the defendantshould be sentenced to death1 - providing quality representation in capital cases requires counsel
to undertake correspondingly broad investigation and preparation. Investigation and planning for
both phases must begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case, even before the
prosecution has affirmatively indicated that it will seek the death penalty.12 Counsel must
9
10
See infra Guideline 10.10.2.
See infra text accompanying notes 88-97.
II
12
See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438-446 (1981); Comm. on Civ. Rts., Ass'n of
the Bar ofthe City ofN.Y., Legislative Modification ofFederal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases,
44 REc. ASS'N OF THE BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 848, 854 (1989) [hereinafter Legislative
Modification] ("[For a lawyer], taking such a case means making a commitment to the full legal
and factual evaluation oftwo very different proceedings (guilt and sentencing) in circumstances
where the client is likely to be the subject of intense public hostility, where the state has devoted
maximum efforts to the prosecution, and where one must endure the draining emotional effects of
one's personal responsibility for the outcome.")
See infra text accompanying notes 159-63; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-
396 (2000) (notwithstanding fact that trial counsel "competently handled the guilt phase ofthe
trial," counsel's failure to begin to prepare for sentencing phase until a week before trial fell below
professional standards, and counsel "did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation ofthe defendant's background"); id at 415 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("counsel's
failure to conduct the requisite, diligent investigation into his client's troubling background and
unique personal circumstances" amounted to ineffective assistance ofcounsel); ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: Standard 4-4.1 (a), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
5
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promptly obtain the investigative resources necessary to prepare for both phases, including at
minimum the assistance ofa professional investigator and a mitigation specialist, as well as all
professional expertise appropriate to the case.13 Comprehensive pretrial investigation is a
necessary prerequisite to enable counsel to negotiate a plea that will allow the defendant to serve a
lesser sentence,14 to persuade the prosecution to forego seeking a death sentence at trial, or to
uncover facts that will make the client legally ineligible for the death penalty.ls At the same time,
counsel must consciously work to establish the special rapport with the client that will be
necessary for a productive professional relationship over an extended period ofstress.16
With respect to the guilt/innocence phase, defense counsel must independently investigate
the circumstances of the crime, and all evidence - whether testimonial, forensic, or otherwise -
purporting to inculpate the client. To assume the accuracy ofwhatever information the client may
initially offer or the prosecutor may choose or be compelled to disclose is to render ineffective
assistance ofcounsel. The defense lawyer's obligation includes not only finding, interviewing, and
scrutinizing the backgrounds of potential prosecution witnesses, but also searching for any other
potential witnesses who might challenge the prosecution's version ofevents, and subjecting all
forensic evidence to rigorous independent scrutiny. Further, notwithstanding the prosecution's
burden of proof on the capital charge, defense counsel may need to investigate possible
affirmative defenses - ranging from absolute defenses to liability (e.g., self-defense or insanity) to
partial defenses that might bar a death sentence (e.g., guilt ofa lesser-included offense). In
addition to investigating the alleged offense, counsel must also thoroughly investigate all events
surrounding the arrest, particularly if the prosecution intends to introduce evidence obtained
pursuant to alleged waivers by the defendant (e.g., inculpatory statements or items recovered in
searches ofthe accused's home).
Moreover, trial counsel must coordinate and integrate the presentation during the guilt
phase ofthe trial with the projected strategy for seeking a non-death sentence at the penalty
phase.17
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) ("Defense counsel should conduct
a prompt investigation ofthe circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits ofthe case and the penalty in the event of conviction. . .. The duty to
investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts





See infra Guideline 10.4(C) and accompanying Commentary.
See infra Guidelines 10.9.1-2
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (mental retardation).
See infra Guideline 10.5 and accompanying Commentary.
17 See infra Guideline 10.10.1 and accompanying Commentary. See also Stephen B. Bright,
Developing Themes in Closing Argument and Elsewhere: Lessonsfrom Capital Cases, LITIG., Fall
2000, at 40; Lyon, supra note 2, at 708-11; Mary Ann Tally, Integrating Theoriesfor Capital
Trials: Developing the Theory ofLife, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1998, at 34.
6
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At that phase, defense counsel must both rebut the prosecution's case in favor ofthe death
penalty and affirmatively present the best possible case in favor ofa sentence other than death. I8
Ifthe defendant has any prior criminal history, the prosecution can be expected to attempt
to offer it in support ofa death sentence. Defense counsel accordingly must comprehensively
investigate - together with the defense investigator, a mitigation specialist, and other members of
the defense team - the defendant's behavior and the circumstances ofthe conviction.19 Only then
can counsel protect the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right to deny or rebut factual allegations
made by the prosecution in support ofa death sentence,20 and the client's Eighth Amendment right
not to be sentenced to death based on prior convictions obtained in violation ofhis constitutional
rights? I
Ifuncharged prior misconduct is arguably admissible, defense counsel must assume that
the prosecution will attempt to introduce it, and accordingly must thoroughly investigate it as an
integral part ofpreparing for the penalty phase.22
Along with preparing to counter the prosecution's case for the death penalty, defense
counsel must develop an affirmative case for sparing the defendant's life.23 A capital defendant
has an unqualified right to present any facet ofhis character, background, or record that might call
for a sentence less than death.24 This Eighth Amendment right to offer mitigating evidence "does
nothing to fulfill its purpose unless it is understood to presuppose that the defense lawyer will
unearth, develop, present and insist on the consideration ofthose 'compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties ofhumankind.",25 Nor will the presentation be
persuasive unless it (a) is consistent with that made by the defense at the guilt phase and (b) links
18
19
See infra Guideline 10.11 and accompanying Commentary.
See irifra text accompanying note 298.
20
21
See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1994); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578,587 (1988). Counsel's obligation to prevent the
prosecution from using unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions in support ofa death
sentence may well require counsel to litigate collateral challenges to such prior convictions in the
jurisdictions or Districts where those convictions were obtained. See, e.g., Lackawanna County
Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402-04 (2001).
22
23
See infra text accompanying notes 299-302.
See infra text accompanying notes 275-89.
24
25
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,602-
03 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth
Amendment, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1301, 1316-17 (1997) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
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the client's behavior to the evidence offered in mitigation?6
Finally, trial counsel, like counsel throughout the process, must raise every legal claim that
may ultimately prove meritorious, lest default doctrines later bar its assertion. "[T]he courts have
shown a remarkable lack of solicitude for prisoners - including ones executed as a result - whose
attorneys through no fault ofthe prisoners were not sufficiently versed in the law ... [to] consider
the possibility that a claim long rejected by local, state, and federal courts might succeed in the
future or in a higher court.,,27
The Commentary to the first edition of this Guideline noted that "many indigent capital
defendants are not receiving the assistance ofa lawyer sufficiently skilled in practice to render
quality assistance," and supported the statement with numerous examples. The situation is no
better today.28 Indeed, problems with the quality ofdefense representation in death penalty cases
26 See infra Guideline 10.11 and accompanying Commentary.
27
28
JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 11.2(a), at 482 (4th ed. 2001). Thus, for example, within a single week in the
spring of2002, the Supreme Court rendered two major rulings favorable to capital defendants.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (holding that the Constitution bars execution
ofmentally retarded individuals); Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2248, 2443 (2002) (applying
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) to capital cases). In both cases, the Court squarely
overruled governing precedent. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that the
Constitution does not bar the execution of mentally retarded individuals); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 679 (1990) (upholding same statute later invalidated in Ring against same challenge);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (stating that Walton remained good law). It
would have been appropriate (and indeed, some Justices might believe, required on pain of
forfeiture) for capital counsel to assert these claims at every stage in the proceedings, even though
they were then plainly at odds with the governing law. See infra Guideline 10.8 and
accompanying Commentary.
One current example is the potential categorical unconstitutionality of the execution of
juveniles. In light of a growing body of scientific evidence regarding the diminished culpability of
juveniles, Eighth Amendment considerations, and international laws and treaties forbidding the
execution for crimes committed while under the age of 18, four current Justices have suggested
that the Court should absolutely bar the execution of such offenders. See In re Stanford, 123 S.
Ct. 472 (2002). Counsel would be remiss not to assert the claim, notwithstanding that the Court
has previously rejected it. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). A similar example is
discussed infra at note 350.
See generally James S. Liebman, The Overproduction ofDeath, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
2030,2102-08 (2000); Spec. Comm. on Capital Representation & Comm. on Civ. Rts., Ass'n of
the Bar of the City ofN.Y., The Crisis in Capital Representation, 51 REc. OF ASS'N OF THE BAR
OF CITY OF N.Y. 169, 185-87 (1996) [hereinafter Crisis in Capital Representation]; Stephen B.
Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Notfor the Worst Crime butfor the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835 (1994); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance ofCounsel and the Stickland Prejudice Requirement,
75 NEB. L. REv. 425, 427-33 (1996); Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1923 (1994). See also infra at note 153.
8
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have been so profound and pervasive that several Supreme Court Justices have openly expressed
concern. Justice Ginsberg told a public audience that she had "yet to see a death case among the
dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant
was well represented at trial" and that "people who are well represented at trial do not get the
death penalty.,,29 Similarly, Justice O'Connor expressed concern that the system "may well be
allowing some innocent defendants to be executed" and suggested that "[p]erhaps it's time to look
at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate compensation for
appointed counsel when they are used.,,30 As Justice Breyer has said, ''the inadequacy of
representation in capital case" is "a fact that aggravates the other failings" of the death penalty
system as a whole.31
In the past, post-conviction review has often been relied upon to identify and correct
untrustworthy verdicts.32 However, legal changes in the habeas corpus regime,33 combined with
Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Justice Supports Death Penalty Moratorium, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 9,2001.
Crystal Nix Hines, Lack ofLawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital Cases, N.Y. DMES, July 5,
2001, at AI.
See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2448 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). The "failings"
to which Justice Breyer refers are many of the same ones that led the ABA to call for a
moratorium on the imposition ofthe death penalty. See ABA, Report Accompanying
Recommendation 107, *3 (Feb. 3, 1997) ("Today, administration ofthe death penalty, far from
being fair and consistent, is instead a haphazard maze of unfair practices with no internal
consistency.").
See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 147-
48 (2001) (listing numerous modem examples of injustices in capital cases redressed on federal
habeas corpus); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 27, § 11.2(c) (same).
In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the
AEDPA), which imposed substantial restrictions on the availability of federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners. The AEDPA established strict deadlines for the filing of a federal habeas petition,
limits on the scope of review ofstate court decisions, restrictions on the availability ofevidentiary
hearings to develop facts in support of constitutional claims, and placed stringent constraints on
federal courts' consideration ofadditional applications for review by the petitioner. See generally
28 U.S.C. § 2244-2264. There is significant cause for concern that these provisions may "greatly
diminish the reliability of the capital system's review process and ofthe capital verdicts that the
system produces." James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"? AEDPA and Error
Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 427 (2001). See also ABA Panel Discussion,
Dead Man Walking Without Due Process? A Discussion ofthe Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of1996,23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 163, 166-75 (1997); Marshall J.
Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus And The New Federalism After The Anti-Terrorism
AndEffective Death Penalty Act of1996,30 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 337, 387 (1997); Larry W.
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381, 386-93 (1996). One
reason for this concern is that portions ofthe legislation seemed to reduce the level of scrutiny that
the federal courts could give to state capital convictions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), (e) (providing
that writ may not be granted unless state proceedings resulted in a decision that was "contrary to
or involved an unreasonable application ofclearly established Federal law," or ''was based on an
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the Congress' defunding ofpost-conviction defender organizations (PCDOs) in 1995,34 make it
less likely that such traditional "fail-safes" will continue to operate properly in the future. Under
the standards set out by the Supreme Court for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel,35 even seriously deficient performance all too rarely leads to reversal.36 Hence,
jurisdictions that continue to impose the death penalty must commit the substantial resources
necessary to ensure effective representation at the trial stage.37 In mandating the provision of
high quality legal representation at the trial level of a capital case, this Guideline recognizes the
simple truth that any other course has weighty costs - to be paid in money and delay ifcases are
reversed at later stages or in injustice ifthey are not.
Post-conviction Review
Ensuring high quality legal representation in capital trials, however, does not diminish the
need for equally effective representation on appeal, in state and federal post-conviction
proceedings, and in applications for executive clemency. Because each ofthose proceedings has a
unique role to play in the capital process, because both legal and social norms commonly evolve
unreasonable determination ofthe facts").
See Crisis in Capital Representation, supra note 28, at 200-05 (presenting state-by-state
analysis of impact ofdefunding ofPCDOs); Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding ofthe Post
Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial ofthe Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 863
(1996) (emphasizing the important role that the former PCDOs played in assuring fairness in
habeas corpus review ofcapital convictions); see also Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is
There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 540-43 (1996).
35 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
36
37
See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
ofcertiorari) ("Ten years after the articulation of [the Strickland] standard, practical experience
establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to protect a defendant's right to be
represented by something more than 'a person who happens to be a lawyer."') (quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984»; Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can
Do to Improve the Delivery ofCriminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 293, 346 (2002)
("[Alll who have seriously considered the subject agree that Strickland has not worked either to
prevent miscarriages ofjustice or to improve attorney performance."); William S. Geimer, A
Decade ofStrickland 's Tin Hom: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining ofthe Right to Counsel, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995) ("Strickland has been roundly and properly criticized for
fostering tolerance ofabysmal lawyering"); Legislative Modification, supra note 11, at 862 n.28
(criticizing ''the strong presumptions of attorney effectiveness mandated by Strickland' as applied
to capital cases: "Whatever benefits counter-factual presumptions may have in other areas of the
law, they are certainly out of place when a human life hangs in the balance.").
See, e.g., REpORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 177, 179
(Apr. 2002), available at http://www.doc.state.il.us/ccp/reports/commission-report
(recommending that the Illinois legislature "significantly improve the resources available to the
criminal justice system in order to permit the meaningful implementation of reforms in capital
cases," including the full funding of the defense, which "should significantly improve the quality
ofdefense representation ofcapital defendants").
10
000316
             ·   
            
               
               
             
             
              
                
                   
          
  
             
            
             
                
    
             
                 
                 
              
              
               
         
               
         J    
                
               
               
                 
II               
             
                
                 
             
            
              
               
             
     
            
              
              




ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases' February 2003
over the course ofa case, and because of ''the general tendency ofevidence of innocence to
emerge only at a relatively late stage in capital proceedings,,,38 jurisdictions that retain capital
punishment must provide representation in accordance with the standards ofthese Guidelines "at
all stages ofthe case." (Subsection B) Post-judgment proceedings demand a high degree of
technical proficiency, and the skills essential to effective representation differ in significant ways
from those necessary to success at trial. In addition, death penalty cases at the post-conviction
stage may be subject to rules that provide less time for preparation than is available in noncapital
cases.39 Substantive pleadings may have to be prepared simultaneously with, or even be delayed
for, pleadings to stay the client's execution.4o For post-judgment review to succeed as a safeguard
against injustice, courts must appoint appropriately trained and experienced lawyers.
A. Representation on Direct Appeal
The Constitution guarantees effective assistance ofcounsel on an appeal as ofright.41 The
"guiding hand ofcounsel" must lead the condemned client through direct review. Appellate
counsel must be intimately familiar with technical rules of issue preservation and presentation, as
well as the substantive state, federal, and international law governing death penalty cases,
including issues which are "percolating" in the lower courts but have not yet been authoritatively
resolved by the Supreme Court.42 Counsel must also be capable ofmaking complex strategic
decisions that maximize the client's chances ofultimate success in the event that the direct appeal
is resolved unfavorably.43
Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative
Proposalsfor Evaluating Post-trial Evidence ofInnocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 316 (1991).
Under the AEDPA, "special habeas corpus procedures" may apply to federal habeas
corpus petitions in capital cases ifa state's post-conviction procedures satisfy certain
prerequisites. See 28 U.S.C. § 2263. Thus, the deadline for filing ofa federal habeas corpus
petition by capital prisoners in qualifying "opt-in" states is 180 days, id., in contrast to the one-
year limitations period that would otherwise apply. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In addition, the
AEDPA's "opt-in" procedures accelerate the time for review ofthe case by the district court and
the court ofappeals, 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(I)(A), (c)(1)(A), and restrict a capital habeas corpus
petitioner's ability to amend a petition after the state files its response. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(3)(B).
See also Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality ofthe
Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing ofHabeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row
Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451,487-92 (1991) (discussing why a six-month
limit does not provide an attorney with adequate time to prepare a habeas petition properly).
40
41
See infra text accompanying notes 331-36.
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1985).
42 See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1986) (holding that appellate counsel in a
Virginia capital case had waived a legal issue by not raising it at an earlier stage ofappeal; the
novelty ofthe issue in Virginia was no excuse because it had been raised, though unsuccessfully,
in an intermediate appellate court ofanother state).
43 See infra Guideline 10.15.1 and accompanying Commentary.
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B. Collateral Review Proceedings
Habeas corpus and other procedures for seeking collateral reliefare especially important in
capital cases.44 Quality representation in both state and federal court is essential iferroneous
convictions are to be corrected.45
1. State Collateral Review Proceedings
Counsel's obligations in state collateral review proceedings are demanding.46 Counsel
must be prepared to thoroughly reinvestigate the entire case to ensure that the client was neither
actually innocent nor convicted or sentenced to death in violation ofeither state or federal law.
This means that counsel must obtain and read the entire record of the trial, including all transcripts
and motions, as well as proceedings (such as bench conferences) that may have been recorded but
not transcribed. In many cases, the record is voluminous, often amounting to many thousands of
pages. Counsel must also inspect the evidence and obtain the files of trial and appellate counsel,
again scrutinizing them for what is missing as well as what is present.
See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994) ("[Q]uality legal representation is
necessary in capital habeas corpus proceedings in light of 'the seriousness of the possible penalty
and ... the unique and complex nature of the litigation.''') (citation omitted); LIEBMAN & HERTZ,
supra note 27, § 2.6.
A recent comprehensive study finds that of every 100 death sentences imposed, 47 are
reversed at the state level, on direct appeal or collateral review. An additional 21 are overturned
on federal habeas corpus. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN, ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN
CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, pt. I, app. A, at 5-6 (2000). These statistics indicate the importance
of providing qualified counsel for both state and federal proceedings.
Some states provide attorneys at public expense to death-sentenced prisoners seeking state
post-conviction relief, but others do not. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A
Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction ofDeath Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1,83-99 (2002) (providing state-by-state list); Jennifer N. Ide, The Case of
Exzavious Lee Gibson: A Georgia Court's (Constitutional) Denial ofa Federal Right, 47 EMORY
LJ. 1079, 1099-1110 (1998); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Remy Voisin Starns, Folly By Fiat:
Pretending that Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Postconviction
Proceedings, 45 Loy. L. REv. 55, 56 (1999). Moreover, even in those states that nominally do
provide counsel for collateral review, chronic underfunding, lack of standards, and a dearth of
qualified lawyers willing to accept appointment have resulted in a disturbingly large number of
instances in which attorneys have failed to provide their clients meaningful assistance. See, e.g.,
TEx. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, ch. 7
(2002), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/study/study.html (reporting that a review of
103 post-conviction petitions filed by court-appointed counsel in Texas death penalty cases
between 1995 and 2000 indicated that 25 percent ofthe petitions were 15 pages long or less, and
that counsel offered no evidence outside the trial record in 40 percent ofthe cases reviewed).
These considerations suggest that counsel should continue to test the solidity ofMarray v.
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Like trial counsel, counsel handling state collateral proceedings must undertake a thorough
investigation into the facts surrounding all phases ofthe case. It is counsel's obligation to make
an independent examination ofall of the available evidence - both that which the jury heard and
that which it did not - to determine whether the decision maker at trial made a fully informed
resolution ofthe issues ofboth guilt and punishment.
Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1977, there have been more than 100 known
wrongful convictions in capital cases in the United States.47 As further described infra in the text
accompanying notes 196-200, these resulted from a variety ofcauses, including the testimony of
unreliable jailhouse informants,48 the use ofdubious or fraudulent forensic scientific methods,49
See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER: Innocence and the Death Penalty, available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfor.org/innoc.html (last visited December 18, 2002) (stating that
there are 102 people that have been wrongly convicted ofcapital crimes). See generally JIM
DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM
THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED (2000); C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT 63-82
(1996); NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES
IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, "'Until I Can be Sure:' How the Threat ofExecuting the Innocent has Transformed
the Death Penalty Debate," in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY (Stephen P. Garvey,
ed. 2003); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, "The Execution of the Innocent," in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 223 (James Acker et aI., eds. 1998)
See Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (citing "insidious reliability
problems" as basis for imposing major procedural restrictions on use ofjailhouse informants);
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: EIGHTEEN REFORMS TO THE DEATH PENALTY, at
52 (2001) (A "category ofevidence that has a particularly high chance of being an outright lie,
exaggerated, or otherwise erroneous is the testimony ofjailhouse informants. Their confinement
provides evidence of their questionable character, motivates them to lie in order to improve the
conditions oftheir confinement or even secure their release, and often affords access to
information that can be used to manufacture credible testimony."). See, e.g., Ted Rohrlich, Jail
House Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a Dozen Cases, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1990, at Al (detailing
perjuries committed by Leslie White, an inmate at the Los Angeles County jail who demonstrated
to authorities and reporters how he concocted false confessions, and noting confession ofanother
informant, Stephen Jesse Cisneros, to perjury in five murder cases).
See generally BriefofAmici Curiae Five Innocent Former Death Row Inmates &
Centurion Ministries, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (No. 93-7901) (reviewing generally
unscrupulous practices by investigators and prosecutors that can lead to false convictions); Paul
Duggan, Oklahoma Reviews 3,000 Convictions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A2 (discussing
Oklahoma review of3,000 convictions based on work ofJoyce Gilchrist, an Oklahoma City police
chemist, who went far beyond what was scientifically knowable in conducting forensic
investigations of local crime); Davidson Goldin, Fifth Trooper Pleads Guilty in Scandal, N.V.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at A29 (describing scandal in which New York state troopers transferred
fingerprints ofpotential suspects to crime scenes to enhance their cases); Mark Hansen, Out ofthe
Blue, 82 A.B.A. J. 50 (1996) (describing dentist, widely discredited by his peers, who claimed to
be able to match bite marks to the teeth that made them); Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab
13
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prosecutorial misconduct, and incompetence ofdefense counsel at trial. Because state collateral
proceedings may present the last opportunity to present new evidence to challenge the conviction,
it is imperative that counsel conduct a searching inquiry to assess whether any mistake may have
been made.
Reinvestigation ofthe case will require counsel to interview most, ifnot all, ofthe critical
witnesses for the prosecution and investigate their backgrounds. Counsel must determine if the
witness's testimony bears scrutiny or whether motives for fabrication or bias were left uncovered
at the time oftrial. Counsel must also assess all ofthe non-testimonial evidence and consider such
issues as whether forensic testing must now be performed, either because some technology, such
as DNA, was unavailable at the time oftrial or because trial counsel failed to ensure that
necessary testing took place.5o
Counsel must conduct a similarly comprehensive reevaluation ofthe punishment phase to
verify or undermine the accuracy ofall evidence presented by the prosecution, and to determine
whether the decisionmaker was properly informed ofall relevant evidence,51 able to give
appropriate weight to that evidence,52 and provided with a clear and legally accurate set of
instructions for communicating its conclusion.53
2. Federal Habeas Corpus
In addition to requiring counsel to undertake all the tasks just described in Section B(1),
federal collateral proceedings present another set ofobstacles - ones that highlight the importance
ofquality representation. From 1973 to 1995, capital habeas corpus petitioners obtained relief at
many times the rate of non-capital ones54 and they should continue to do so in the future. But
Work ofExpert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,2002, at A24 (Montana and Washington
reviewing over 100 cases based on questionable forensic testimony ofArnold Melnikoff);
Armando Villafranca, Bradford Cites Lab Furor, Urges Freeze on Death Row, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, March 7, 2003 (reporting legislative testimony of Houston Police Chief urging that
no execution dates be set for seven Death Row inmates whose cases may have been affected by
shoddy work of Houston police crime laboratory, which was found in a state audit to have had
numerous shortcomings in preservation and testing ofDNA evidence; infra note 198.
See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1089, 1098-
99 (2001) (pro bono counsel on state post-conviction discovered exculpatory semen stain
evidence, which "having been appropriately turned over by the government, lay unappreciated in
the files of former defense counsel").
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370-71 (2000) (granting habeas corpus reliefto
petitioner whose trial counsel failed to find and present mitigating evidence).
52 See infra Guideline 10.10.2 and accompanying Commentary.
53 For examples ofdeath sentences overturned for failure to comply with this requirement,
see Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001), McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), and
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and Davis v. Mitchell, 2003 WL 222741 (6th Cir. Feb. 4,
2003).
-
54 See James S. Liebman, et aI., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,
14
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federal habeas corpus actions are governed by a complex set ofprocedural rules.55 Counsel must
master these thoroughly.56 Moreover, restrictions on the availability of federal habeas relief for
state prisoners imposed by the AEDPA will continue to raise numerous novel legal issues.
C. Executive Clemency
Executive clemency plays a particularly important role in death penalty cases, as it
"provides the [government] with a final, deliberative opportunity to reassess this irrevocable
punishment.,,57 Because post-judgment proceedings have traditionally provided very limited
opportunity for review ofquestions ofguilt or innocence, clemency is "the historic remedy for
preventing miscarriages ofjustice where judicial process has been exhausted.,,58 As the Supreme
Court has recognized, "history is replete with examples ofwrongfully convicted persons who have
been pardoned in the wake ofafter-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.,,59 Recent
advances in the use of DNA technologies, combined with restrictions on the availability of post-
conviction review, have elevated the important role that clemency has played as the "fail-safe" of
the criminal justice system,60 and increased the demands on counse1.61 Moreover, wholly apart
78 TEX. L. REv. 1839, 1849 (2000) (federal habeas reliefwas granted in 40 percent of599 cases
between 1973 and 1995 in which the judgment remained intact after direct appeal and state post-
conviction review). Cf Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION supra note 47, at 417,427 ("By the most generous
estimates, the rate in non-capital cases does not exceed 7%, and, if the appropriate statistical
methodology is applied, the actual number is less than 1%.").
See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) (limits on asserting ineffective
assistance ofcounsel as "cause" for procedural default); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)
("fundamental miscarriage ofjustice" exception to procedural default rule); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989) (non-retroactivity of"new rules" of constitutional procedure); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (limiting review ofconstitutional claims due to procedural default).
Indeed, on the website of the New York Times, its Supreme Court reporter, Linda Greenhouse, has
described the Court's habeas jurisprudence as "so complex as to be almost theological" (posted
July 6, 2001).
See Legislative Modification, supra note 11, at 854 ("The post-conviction handling of
capital cases is a legal specialty requiring mastery ofan intricate body offast-changing
substantive and procedural law.")
Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the




Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993).
Id. at415.
60 See Kathleen M . Ridolfi, Not Just an Act ofMercy: The Demise ojPost-Conviction Relief
and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43,68-77 (1998).
61 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 50, at 1100-03 (describing detailed oral and written
15 000321
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from questions ofguilt or innocence, executive clemency has been granted in death penalty cases
for a broad range ofhumanitarian reasons.62 Recognizing these considerations, the Supreme
Court has begun to apply due process protection to clemency proceedings.63 Thus, in addition to
assembling the most persuasive possible record for the decisionmaker, counsel must carefully
examine the possibility ofpressing legal claims asserting the right to a fuller and fairer process.64
The Imperative ofa Systemic Approach
General statements ofexpectations about what lawyers should do will not themselves
ensure high quality legal representation. Indeed, Guidelines confined to such statements would be
ones "that palter with us in a double sense, that keep the word of promise to our ear, and break it
to our hope.'065 Attorney error is often the result of systemic problems, not individual deficiency.
66 The provision ofcounsel for indigent capital defendants is too frequently made through ad hoc
appointment, a system inimical to effective representation.67 Although defender offices generally
have the experience and dedication to provide high quality legal representation in capital cases,
they are commonly overworked and inadequately funded. And private counsel often discover too
late that they have taken on a task for which they are unqualified68 or lack sufficient resources.
The Guidelines that follow, therefore, not only detail the elements ofquality representation, but
mandate the systematic provision of resources to ensure that such representation is achieved in
fact, whether counsel is individually assigned, employed by a defender office, or privately retained
presentations made to two Governors ofVirginia by a six-lawyer team to secure DNA testing for
death row inmate Earl Washington that resulted in his exoneration). See also irifra Guideline
10.15.2 and accompanying Commentary
See Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman
Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289, 297-99 (1993) (identifying 29 cases between 1972 and 1993 in
which death-sentenced inmates had their death sentences commuted to terms of life imprisonment
through executive clemency procedures).
See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998); see also Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (invalidating Florida procedure for determining whether inmate
was mentally competent to be executed).
See, e.g., Wilson v. United States Dist. Ct., 161 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming





WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 8.
See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 356.
See infra Guideline 2.1(C) and accompanying Commentary.
68 See, e.g., Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472 (4th Cir. 1991) (failure of retained counsel
to appreciate exculpatory significance of scientific evidence produced by prosecution). See
generally Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (guarantee of Sixth Amendment applies
equally whether counsel is retained or appointed).
16
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with or without compensation.69
Conclusion
Unless legal representation at each stage ofa capital case reflects current standards of
practice, there is an unacceptable "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty.,,70 Accordingly, any jurisdiction wishing to impose a
death sentence must at minimum provide representation that comports with these Guidelines.71
69
70
See infra Guidelines 4.1 and 9.1 and accompanying Commentary.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
71 Cf Legislative Modification, supra note 11, at 848 ("[F]or so long as the death penalty
continues to exist in this country, capital inmates are entitled to procedures - including ones for
the provision ofcompetent counsel- that result in the full and fair review oftheir convictions and
sentences. Correlatively, any state which chooses to impose death sentences must accept the
obligation ofproviding mechanisms for assuring that those sentences are legally and factually
correct at the time oftheir execution.").
17 000323
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Guideline 2.1 Adoption and Implementation of a Plan to Provide High
Quality Legal Representation in Death Penalty Cases
A. Each jurisdiction should adopt and implement a plan formalizing the means by which
high quality legal representation in death penalty cases is to be provided in
accordance with these Guidelines (the "Legal Representation Plan").
B. The Legal Representation Plan should set forth how the jurisdiction will conform to
each of these Guidelines.
C. All elements of the Legal Representation Plan should be structured to ensure that
counsel defending death penalty cases are able to do so free from political influence
and under conditions that enable them to provide zealous advocacy in accordance
with professional standards.
History ofGuideline
The obligation to create a formal "Legal Representation Plan" for provision of
representation in death penalty cases was contained in Guideline 3.1 of the original edition.
Subsection B is new and is designed to make it easier for jurisdictions to determine the necessary
contents of a Plan. Subsection C is drawn from several sections ofthe original edition.
Related Standards
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.2 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Systems for legal representation").
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.3 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Professional independence").
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.4 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Supporting services").
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.5 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Training and professional development").
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.6 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Funding").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-4.1
(3d ed. 1992) ("ChiefDefender and Staff').
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 1 (2002) ("The
public defense function, including the selection, funding and payment ofdefense counsel, is
independent").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDSARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.8 (1973) ("Selection ofPublic Defenders").
18
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NAT'L ADVISORY COMMN ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.9 (1973) ("Performance ofPublic Defender Function").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 10 (1970) ("Office ofDefender General").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.4 (1976) ("State Level Organization with Centralized
Administration").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.10 (1976) ("The Defender Commission").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.11 (1976) ("Functions of the Defender Commission").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES Standard 2.18 (1976) (Administration ofDefense System Funds").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.2 (1989) ("Independence from Judiciary and Funding
Source").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 3.1 (1989) ("Establishment ofa Legal Representation
Plan").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES Standard II-I (1984) ("Policy
Board").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 11-2 (1984)
("Members").
Commentary
Each jurisdiction should take effective measures to formalize the process by which high
quality legal representation will be provided in capital cases. This may be done by statute, court
order, regulation or otherwise. The critical element is that the plan be judicially enforceable
against the jurisdiction.72 Experience shows, however, that a plan is most likely to succeed if it is
embodied in a statute. That route maximizes judicial neutrality in passing on claims ofnon-
compliance, and tends to result in greater transparency and access to public funds than do the
other options.
See, e.g., Spalding v. Dugger, 526 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1988) (holding that under statute
creating office for post-conviction capital representation, "each defendant ... is entitled, as a
statutory right, to effective legal representation," and may enforce that right in post-conviction
proceedings).
19 000325
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The Legal Representation Plan should provide standards and procedures that apply to
capital cases on a jurisdiction-wide basis. National professional groups concerned with criminal
justice issues have for decades advocated that defender services be organized on a statewide
basis.73 Specifically, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards endorse statewide organization "as the
best means for service provision.,,74 Jurisdiction-wide organization and funding can best
ameliorate local disparities in resources and quality of representation, and insulate the
administration of defense services from local political pressures.75
This last item is, of course, ofcritical concern. "It is essential that both full-time defenders
and assigned counsel be fully independent, free to act on behalfof their clients as dictated by their
best professional judgment. A system that does not guarantee the integrity of the professional
relation is fundamentally deficient in that it fails to provide counsel who have the same freedom of
action as the lawyer whom the person with sufficient means can afford to retain.,,76
See, e.g., NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON
DEFENSE SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES FINAL
REpORT (1976) (calling for a statewide organization with a centralized administration to "ensure
uniformity and equality of legal representation and supporting services and to guarantee
professional independence for individual defenders"); Nat'l Conf. ofComm'rs on Unif. State
Laws, Prefatory Note to UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONER'S MODEL PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT, in
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 267-
268 (1970) (approving recommendation ofNational Defenders Conference that every state
establish a statewide public defender system ''to assure better coordination and consistency of
approach throughout the state, [provide] better consultation with the several branches of state
government, [...] reduce the administrative burden on court personnel and provide more efficient
and more experienced defense counsel services to needy persons accused ofcrime"); TASK FORCE
ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REpORT: THE COURTS 52-53 (1967) (recommending that "each State should finance
assigned counsel and defender systems on a regular and statewide basis").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5-
1.2(c) and cmt. (3d ed. 1992, black letter approved 1990, commentary completed 1992).
Mississippi, for example, has recently moved from a county-based to a state-based system
forthe provision ofcapital defense services. See Julie Goodman, Inmates on Death Row Given
Last Hope, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 13,2002, at Bl (discussing post-conviction
defense office); Emily Wagster, Capital Defense Job Filled; State Office to Provide Lawyersfor
Indigent, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), July 7, 2001, at A2 (discussing trial defense office).
Similarly, California has adopted statewide qualifications for appointed trial counsel in capital
cases effective January 1,2003. See Cal. Rules ofCt., R. 4.117.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.3
cmt. (3d ed. 1992). See also, ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM,
Principle 1 and cmt. (2002) ("The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and
payment of defense counsel, is independent.") ("The public defense function should be
independent from political influence and subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner
and to the same extent as retained counsel. To safeguard independence and to promote efficiency
and quality of services, a non-partisan board should oversee defender, assigned counsel, or
20
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Therefore, as Guideline 2.1 (C) mandates, any acceptable Legal Representation Plan must
assure that individual lawyers are not subject to formal or informal sanctions (e.g., through the
denial of future appointments, reductions in fee awards, or withholding ofpromotions in
institutional offices) for engaging in effective representation.77 The same principle applies to the
overall architecture of the system. Thus, for example, the head ofa public defender office must be
subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as a lawyer in
private practice - and not be subject to institutional arrangements that might enable his or her re-
appointment to be blocked by judges irked at the zealous advocacy conducted by his or her office.
Moreover, the system must be structured so as to assure that each client receives defense
services "in accordance with professional standards." (Subsection C) For example, it is predictable
that there will be conflicts of interest among various actors in the criminal justice system (e.g. co-
defendants, co-operating witnesses), who may play different roles in different cases, and the plan
must provide a mechanism to assure conflict-free representation.78
contract systems. Removing oversight from the judiciary ensures judicial independence from
undue political pressures and is an important means of furthering the independence ofpublic
defense. The selection of the chief defender and staff should be made on the basis ofmerit, and
recruitment ofattorneys should involve special efforts aimed at achieving diversity in attorney
staff").
For example, under the North Carolina's Indigent Defense Services Act of2000, a 13-
member Indigent Defense Services Commission (consisting often members appointed by, but
independent of, the state Bar, the Governor, the ChiefJustice, and the legislature, and three
members chosen collectively by those ten) appoints a Capital Defender who is responsible only to
it. The Capital Defender supervises a staffofattorneys and also oversees the representation
provided by a roster ofprivate lawyers and public defenders who have been certified to provide
representation in capital cases. See www.ncids.org (last visited March 7, 2003). Cf Retarding
Due Process, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, at AIO (editorial criticizing Florida
legislation permanently barring any appointed capital defense attorney seeking compensation in
excess of fee schedule from another appointment).
For instance, although it may not violate the Sixth Amendment for defense counsel to have
previously represented the victim, see Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), it certainly
violates ethical norms, see BriefofLegal Ethicists and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002) (No. 00-9285)
and would not be permitted by any acceptable plan for capital representation. Cf Ex parte
McCormick, 645 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (reversing two capital convictions
because same counsel represented both co-defendants).
21
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Guideline 3.1 Designation of a Responsible Agency
A. The Legal Representation Plan should designate one or more agencies to be
responsible, in accordance with the standards provided in these Guidelines for:
1. ensuring that each capital defendant in the jurisdiction receives high quality
legal representation, and
2. performing all the duties listed in Subsection E (the "Responsible Agency").
B. The Responsible Agency should be independent of the judiciary and it, and not the
judiciary or elected officials, should select lawyers for specific cases.
C. The Responsible Agency for each stage of the proceeding in a particular case should
be one of the following:
Defender Organization
1. A "defender organization," that is, either:
a. a jurisdiction-wide capital trial office, relying on staff attorneys,
members ofthe private bar, or both to provide representation in death
penalty cases; or
b. a jurisdiction-wide capital appellate and/or post-conviction defender
office, relying on staff attorneys, members of the private bar, or both to
provide representation in death penalty cases; or
Independent Authority
2. An "Independent Authority," that is, an entity run by defense attorneys with
demonstrated knowledge and expertise in capital representation.
D. Conflict of Interest:
1. In any circumstance in which the performance by a defender organization of a
duty listed in Subsection E would result in a conflict of interest, the relevant
duty should be performed by the Independent Authority. The jurisdiction
should implement an effectual system to identify and resolve such conflicts.
2. When the Independent Authority is the Responsible Agency, attorneys who
hold formal roles in the Independent Authority should be ineligible to
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E. The Responsible Agency should, in accordance with the provisions of these
Guidelines, perform the following duties:
1. recruit and certify attorneys as qualified to be appointed to represent
defendants in death penalty cases;
2. draft and periodically publish rosters of certified attorneys;
3. draft and periodically publish certification standards and procedures by
which attorneys are certified and assigned to particular cases;
4. assign the attorneys who will represent the defendant at each stage of every
case, except to the extent that the defendant has private attorneys;
5. monitor the performance of all attorneys providing representation in capital
proceedings;
6. periodically review the roster of qualified attorneys and withdraw certification
from any attorney who fails to provide high quality legal representation
consistent with these Guidelines;
7. conduct, sponsor, or approve specialized training programs for attorneys
representing defendants in death penalty cases; and
8. investigate and maintain records concerning complaints about the
performance of attorneys providing representation in death penalty cases and
take appropriate corrective action without delay.
History ofGuideline
The obligation ofthe Legal Representation Plan to designate a "Responsible Agency" for
the appointment ofcounsel in death penalty cases was contained in Guideline 3.1 of the first
edition. Subsection B makes it clear that the Responsible Agency should be an independent
entity, and that lawyer selection should not be performed by the judiciary or elected officials.
Subsection C is new and describes the acceptable kinds ofResponsible Agencies. Subsection Dis
new and specifies the obligations ofthe Responsible Agency in the event ofa conflict of interest.
Lastly, part of subsection E is new and details the other duties of the Responsible Agency,
including the duty to ensure that qualified attorneys are available to represent defendants in death
penalty cases, the duty to promptly investigate complaints about the performance ofattorneys, and
the duty to take corrective action withoutdelay.
Related Standards
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.2 (3d
ed. I 992) ("Systems for legal representation").
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.3 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Professional independence").
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ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-4.1 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Chief Defender and Staff").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.8 (1973) ("Selection ofPublic Defenders").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act
Section 10 (1970) ("Office ofDefender General").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.10 (1976) ("The Defender Commission").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.11 (1976) ("Functions ofthe Defender Commission").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.12 (1976) ("Qualifications of the Defender Director and Conditions
ofEmployment").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.13 (1976) ("The Governing Body For Assigned Counsel Programs").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Standard 2.18 (1976) ("Administration ofDefense System Funds").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.2 (1989) ("Independence from Judiciary and Funding
Source").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 3.1 (1989) ("Establishment of Legal Representation
Plan").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 3.2.1 (1989) ("Creation ofBoard").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 3.2.2 (1989) ("Functions ofBoard").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline II-I (1984)
("Purposes/ Policy Board").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline 11-2 (1984)
("Members").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline 11-3 (1984) ("Duties").
24
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Commentary
As indicated in Guideline 2.1(C) and the accompanying Commentary, the Legal
Representation Plan must ensure that the capital defense function remains free from political
influence. One important mechanism for accomplishing this goal is granting the authority for
training, assigning, and monitoring capital defense lawyers to one or more entities independent of
the judiciary and wholly devoted to fostering high quality legal defense representation.
This Guideline, based on accumulated experience, contemplates two structures that
jurisdictions might employ.
1. In the first structure, the jurisdiction has created (a) a jurisdiction-wide capital trial
organization, relying on staff attorneys, and, optionally, members of the private bar, and/or (b) a
jurisdiction-wide capital appellate and/or post-conviction defender organization, relying on staff
attorneys, and, optionally, members ofthe private bar. (Collectively, "defender organizations,,).79
In this structure, the defender organizations may both provide representation and perform
all the functions listed in Subsection E as appropriate to their portion of the system, with one key
exception. No defender organization may perform any function that would involve it in a conflict
of interest, e.g., monitoring its own performance under Guideline 7.1 (A), investigating or
disposing ofa complaint against such a lawyer pursuant to Guideline 7.1 (B) against one of its
staff lawyers, or making the appointment of counsel in a situation in which there exists a
professional conflict. Thus, for example, if two defendants with antagonistic defenses were
charged with a capital crime, the agency could assign itself to defend one ofthem but could play
no role in the assignment ofcounsel to the other. Similarly, a defender organization could not
monitor the quality of its own performance (Subsection E (5».
Accordingly, this structure also contemplates the existence ofan "Independent Authority,"
which will at minimum deal with conflicts such as these.
2. In the second structure, an "Independent Authority," an entity run by defense
attorneys with demonstrated knowledge and expertise in the representation ofpersons facing the
possible imposition or execution ofa death sentence, performs all the functions listed in
Subsection E but does not itself provide representation.
While serving the organization in a formal role, whether paid or unpaid (e.g., officers,
directors, staffmembers), attorneys should not be eligible for appointment to death penalty cases.
For example, in 1995, New York enacted a comprehensive legislative plan for a "capital
defender office" (CnO) to provide representation and legal assistance in capital cases. NY. JUD.
LAW § 35-b(3) (McKinney 2001). The cno is authorized to represent capital defendants and also
to advise and assist other appointed counsel in such cases. The office assists in determining
qualification standards and presenting training programs for attorneys seeking to become certified
to accept appointments. Other states have similar programs for providing representation in post-
conviction proceedings. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'TCODE § 68661 (West Supp. 2002) (creating
California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, which is authorized to provide representation and
serve as a resource in state and federal post-conviction proceedings).
25 000331
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The idea is that attorneys should not be appointed by an entity in whose operations they are
playing a material role. Thus, this provision does not extend to persons who are simply providing
occasional advice to the entity.
The agency performing the function in the particular case, whether a defender organization
or the Independent Authority, is referred to as "the Responsible Agency."
The Responsible Agency must assess the qualifications ofattorneys who wish to represent
capital defendants, conducting a meaningful review ofeach request for inclusion on the roster of
qualified counsel in light ofthe criteria listed in Guideline 5.1. In order to make informed
decisions on eligibility, the Responsible Agency should have sufficient flexibility to gather as
much relevant information as possible to secure a fair picture of the applicant's ability and
experience. The Responsible Agency should utilize whatever sources of information it deems
appropriate, including in-court observations, writing samples, and information-gathering from the
applicant, from judges before whom the applicant has appeared, and from attorneys, supervisors,
and former clients who are familiar with the applicant's professional abilities. The performance
standards established pursuant to Guidelines 10.1 et seq. should also be used to evaluate the prior
performance in capital cases of attorneys seeking to establish eligibility for renewal placement on
the roster ofqualified counsel.
In assigning attorneys to capital cases, the overriding consideration must always be to
provide high quality legal representation to the person facing a possible death sentence.
Adherence to a "strict rotation" system for assigning counsel in the interest of fairness to attorneys
should never take precedence over the interests of the capital defendant in receiving the best
possible representation. Rather, in making assignments of counsel to a particular capital case, the
Responsible Agency should give careful consideration to counsel's qualifications, skills, and
experience; any aspects of the case that make assignment ofa lawyer with specific qualifications
or skills necessary or particularly appropriate (e.g., counsel's ability to speak the client's native
language); and the relative onerousness of prospective lawyers' existing caseloads. It is also
appropriate to give consideration to maintaining continuity of counsel where the defendant has
previously been represented by a qualified lawyer at an earlier stage of the proceedings, provided
that (a) counsel is also deemed qualified to represent the client at the subsequent stage ofthe
proceedings and (b) counsel's representation of the client at successive stages of the proceedings
does not present a conflict of interest.80 Given the extraordinary demands and pressures placed on
counsel in a capital case,81 the Responsible Agency should, in accordance with Guideline 4.1
(A)(I), ensure that at every stage ofthe proceedings the defendant is represented by counsel who
are in a position to provide high quality legal representation. This may require the agency to
furnish resources, in the form ofadditional counselor otherwise,82 to private counsel.83




See supra Guideline 1.1 and accompanying Commentary.
See infra Guideline 4.1 and accompanying Commentary.
83 Specifically, the Responsible Agency should in every capital case determine whether
retained or pro bono counsel meets the qualification standards set forth in Guideline 5.1 infra and,
if not, provide as many additional qualified attorneys as are appropriate under the circumstances
26
000332
                
                 
                
     
             
           
             
               
                
             
               
            
          
             
             
                
              
     
             
             
                
               
              
           
              
              
             
             
               
                
              
                
              
                
                
             
               
 
        
        
            
                




ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
The remaining elements ofthis Guideline reflectthe longstanding view ofthe ABA that
''jurisdictions that have the death penalty should establish and fund organizations to recruit, select,
train, monitor, support, and assist attorneys involved at all stages ofcapital litigation and, if
necessary, to participate in the trial of such cases.,,84 Several of these functions are described in
greater detail in subsequent Guidelines.85 The common theme, however, is that the provision of
consistently high quality legal representation requires that the duties given to the Responsible
Agency by this Guideline be performed by an entity with the authority and resources to discharge
them vigorously.
ofthe case. In accordance with Guideline 4.1(B), the Responsible Agency must also assure that
counsel have the necessary support services.
ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House ofDelegates (Feb. 1990), reprinted in
Toward a More Just and Effictive System ofReview in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L.
REv. 1,9 (1990).
See, e.g., infra Guideline 7.1 (removal ofattomeys from roster); Guideline 8.1 (training
programs).
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Guideline 4.1 The Defense Team and Supporting Services
A. The Legal Representation Plan should provide for assembly ofa defense team that
will provide high quality legal representation.
1. The defense team should consist of no fewer than two attorneys qualified in
accordance with Guideline 5.1, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist.
2. The defense team should contain at least one member qualified by training
and experience to screen individuals for the presence of mental or
psychological disorders or impairments.
B. The Legal Representation Plan should provide for counsel to receive the assistance of
all expert, investigative, and other ancillary professional services reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide high quality legal representation at every stage of
the proceedings. The Plan should specifically ensure provision of such services to
private attorneys whose clients are financially unable to afford them.
1. Counsel should have the right to have such services provided by persons
independent of the government.
2. Counsel should have the right to protect the confidentiality of communications
with the persons providing such services to the same extent as would counsel
paying such persons from private funds.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 8.1 of the original edition. In keeping the team
approach described in the Commentary, Subsection A has been added to provide for the assembly
ofa "defense team." The first sentence of Subsection B is based on the original version of the
Guideline and has been revised to emphasize that the purpose ofproviding adequate support
services is to further the overall goal of providing "high quality legal representation," not merely
"an adequate defense." The second sentence is taken from Standard 5-1.4 ofthe ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services. Subsections B (1) and B (2) are new and reflect
the decision to include private attorneys in these Guidelines.
Related Standards
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-1.1 (1989) ("Roles of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Professionals in the Criminal Process").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.4
(3d ed. 1992) ("Supporting services").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-2.4
("Special Assistants, Investigative Resources, Experts"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1 ("Duty to
28
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Investigate"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.14 (1973) ("Supporting Personnel and Facilities").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.15 (1973) ("Providing Assigned Counsel").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 2 (1970) ("Rights to Representation, Services, and Facilities").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 12 (1970) ("Personnel and Facilities").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline 111-8 (1984) ("Support Staffand
Forensic Experts").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-9 (1984) ("Investigators").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-I0 (1984) ("Compensation").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES §3.1 (1976) ("Assigned Counsel Fees and Supporting Services").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES §3.4 (1976) ("Nonpersonnel Needs in Defender Offices").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.6 (1989) ("Support Services").
Commentary
Introduction
In a capital case reaffirming that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to the
"basic tools ofan adequate defense," the United States Supreme Court stated:
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself
assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is
fundamentally unfair ifthe [prosecution] proceeds against an indigent defendant
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building ofan effective defense.86
86 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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It is critically important, therefore, that each jurisdiction authorize sufficient funds to
enable counsel in capital cases to conduct a thorough investigation for trial, sentencing, appeal,
post-conviction and clemency, and togrocure and effectively present the necessary expert
witnesses and documentary evidence. 7
The Team Approach to Capital Defense
National standards on defense services have consistently recognized that quality
representation cannot be rendered unless assigned counsel have access to adequate supporting
services, including, "expert witnesses capable of testifying at trial and at other proceedings,
personnel skilled in social work and related disciplines to provide assistance at pretrial release
hearings and at sentencini' and trained investigators to interview witnesses and to assemble
demonstrative evidence." 8
This need is particularly acute in death penalty cases. The prosecution commits vast
resources to its effort to prove the defendant guilty ofcapital murder. The defense must both
subject the prosecution's evidence to searching scrutiny and build an affirmative case of its own.89
Yet investigating a homicide is uniquely complex and often involves evidence ofmany different
types. Analyzing and interpreting such evidence is impossible without consulting experts -
whether pathologists, serologists, microanalysts, DNA analysts, ballistics specialists, translators,
or others.9o
In particular, mental health experts are essential to defending capital cases. Neurological
and psychiatric impairment, combined with a history of physical and sexual abuse, are common
among persons convicted of violent offenses.91 Evidence concerning the defendant's mental
status is relevant to numerous issues that arise at various junctures during the proceedings,
See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.4





See Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases Committee on Defender Services,
Judicial Conference ofthe United States, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations
Concerning the Cost and Quality ofDefense Representation at 24 (1998) [hereinafter Federal
Death Penalty Cases] (discussing federal death penalty cases), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/1COVER.htm (reporting that "both the prosecution and the
defense rely more extensively on experts in death penalty cases" than in other criminal cases).
See e.g., Alec Wilkinson, A Night at the Beat House, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 1995, at
68 (discussing how counsel used an expert to show that victim was not killed in the prosecuting
jurisdiction but dragged to the crime scene after her death; client eventually exonerated and
released).
See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context ofCapital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic ofMitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547 (1995); Dorothy O. Lewis et aI., Psychiatric,
neurological, andpsychoeducational characteristics of15 Death Row inmates in the United
States, 143:7 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838-45 (1986).
30
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including competency to stand trial, sanity at the time ofthe offense, capacity to intend or
premeditate death, ability to comprehend Miranda warnings, and competency to waive
constitutional rights. The Constitution forbids the execution ofpersons with mental retardation,92
making this a necessary area of inquiry in every case. Further, the defendant's psychological and
social history and his emotional and mental health are often of vital importance to the jury's
decision at the punishment phase.93 Creating a competent and reliable mental health evaluation
consistent with prevailing standards ofpractice is a time-consuming and expensive process.94
Counsel must compile extensive historical data, as well as obtaining a thorough physical and
neurological examination. Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain
scans, blood tests or genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists
may also be necessary.95
Counsel's own observations ofthe client's mental status, while necessary,96 can hardly be
expected to be sufficient to detect the array ofconditions (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder, fetal
alcohol syndrome, pesticide poisoning, lead poisoning, schizophrenia, mental retardation) that
could be ofcritical importance. Accordingly, Subsection A (2) mandates that at least one member
of the defense team (whether one ofthe four individuals constituting the smallest allowable team
or an additional team member) be a person qualified by experience and training to screen for
mental or psychological disorders or defects and recommend such further investigation of the
subject as may seem appropriate.
Although mental health issues are so ubiquitous in capital defense representation that the
provision of resources in that area should be routine, it bears emphasis that every situation will
also have its own unique needs. The demands ofeach case - and each stage of the same case -
will differ. Jurisdictions must therefore construe this Guideline broadly, keeping in mind the
superior opportunity ofdefense counsel to determine what assistance is needed to provide high
quality legal representation under the particular circumstances at hand and counsel's need to
explore the potential of a variety ofpossible theories. For example, it might well be appropriate
for counsel to retain an expert familiar with the cultural context by which the defendant was
shaped, or a professional researcher to track down elusive archival records. While resources are
not unlimited, of course, jurisdictions should also be mindful that sufficient funding early in a case
may well result in significant savings to the system as a whole.97
92
93
See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 323-24.
94
95
See John H. Blume, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Cases: The Elements ofa Competent
and Reliable Mental Health Examination, THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 1995, available at
http://www.dpa.state.ky.us/rwheeler/blume/blume.html.
See Douglas S. Liebert & David V. Foster, The Mental Health Evaluation in Capital
Cases: Standards ofPractice, 15:4 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 43-64 (1994).
% See infra Guidelines 10.5 and 10.15.1(E)(2) and accompanying Commentary.
97 For example, in light of the constitutional prohibition on the execution of the mentally
retarded, see Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), significant resources spent at the pretrial
phase in investigating and presenting the defendant's retardation status will be amply repaid in
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Effective Assistance of Experts
Subsections B (1) and B (2) are aimed at insuring that the fact ofpublic funding does not
diminish the quality of the assistance that counsel is able to obtain from experts. Thus, unless
counsel agrees otherwise, the defendant is entitled to experts independent of the government; the
jurisdiction may not meet its obligations by relegating him to the state mental hospital or the state
crime laboratory.98 Similarly, doctrines ofprivilege, work product, and the like should protect the
communications between counsel and the experts just as they would if the experts were being paid
with private funds. Procedures for the auditing of public funds should be structured so as to
preserve this confidentiality.
The Core Defense Team
In addition to employing the particular nonlegal resources that high quality legal
representation requires in each individual case, the standard ofpractice demands that counsel have
certain specific forms ofassistance in every case. This Guideline accordingly requires that those
resources be provided.99
A. The Investigator
The assistance ofan investigator who has received specialized training is indispensable to
discovering and developing the facts that must be unearthed at trial or in post-conviction
proceedings. Although some investigative tasks, such as assessing the credibility of key trial
witnesses, appropriately lie within the domain of counsel, the prevailing national standard of
practice forbids counsel from shouldering primary responsibility for the investigation. Counsel
lacks the special expertise required to accomplish the high quality investigation to which a capital
defendant is entitled and simply has too many other duties to discharge in preparing the case.
Moreover, the defense may need to call the person who conducted the interview as a trial
witness. 100 As a result, an investigator should be part of the defense team at stage ofa capital
proceeding.
entirely, very possibly by agreement with the prosecution or (b) the issue is decided against the
defendant, thus minimizing the likelihood of it being raised later. Similarly, it is not only
expensive, but also extremely unjust for exculpatory evidence about which trial counsel should
have learned from an expert to lie undiscovered until post-conviction proceedings many years
later - years during which an innocent person is incarcerated. See Freedman, supra note 50, at
1094-95, 1098-99.
Ofcourse, non-lawyer professionals on the staffofdefender organizations are, even if on
the public payroll, "independent ofthe government" for this purpose.
This Guideline contemplates that defense counsel will be primarily responsible for
selection of the remaining members of the defense team. (Guideline lOA infra discusses in
greater detail the division of this responsibility among the attorneys on the team.) The
Responsible Agency should, however, be prepared to provide assistance in finding qualified
individuals to fill these roles.
-
100 See infra Guideline 10.7 and accompanying Commentary.
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B. The Mitigation Specialist
A mitigation specialist is also an indispensable member ofthe defense team throughout all
capital proceedings. Mitigation specialists possess clinical and information-gathering skills and
training that most lawyers simply do not have.101 They have the time and the ability to elicit
sensitive, embarrassing and often humiliating evidence (e.g., family sexual abuse) that the
defendant may have never disclosed. They have the clinical skills to recognize such things as
congenital, mental or neurological conditions, to understand how these conditions may have
affected the defendant's development and behavior, and to identify the most appropriate experts to
examine the defendant or testify on his behalf.
Perhaps most critically, having a qualified mitigation specialist assigned to every capital
case as an integral part ofthe defense team insures that the presentation to be made at the penalty
phase is integrated into the overall preparation of the case rather than being hurriedly thrown
together by defense counsel still in shock at the guilty verdict.102 The mitigation specialist
compiles a comprehensive and well-documented psycho-social history of the client based on an
exhaustive investigation; analyzes the significance of the information in terms of impact on
development, including effect on personality and behavior; finds mitigating themes in the client's
life history; identifies the need for expert assistance; assists in locating appropriate experts;
provides social history information to experts to enable them to conduct competent and reliable
evaluations; and works with the defense team and experts to develop a comprehensive and
cohesive case in mitigation.103
The mitigation specialist often plays an important role as well in maintaining close contact
with the client and his family while the case is pending. The rapport developed in this process can
be the key to persuading a client to accept a plea to a sentence less than death. 104
For all of these reasons the use ofmitigation specialists has become "part of the existing
'standard ofcare'" in capital cases, ensuring "high quality investigation and preparation ofthe
penalty phase.,,105
See Dwight H. Sullivan et aI., Raising the Bar: Mitigation Specialists in Military Capital
Litigation, 12 CIv. RTS. LJ. 199,206-11 (2002).
See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev Law & Soc. Change 245, 250 (1990/1991) (Many attorneys make no
preparations whatsoever for the sentencing phase; because they believe that a lawyer should try to
win rather than plan to lose, they "are devastated when the client is convicted and afterward just
throw in the towel"); See infra Guideline 10.10.1 and accompanying Commentary; text
accompanying notes 271-74.
See Russell Stetler, Why Capital Cases Require Mitigation Specialists, Indigent Defense
(NLADA July/Aug. 1999); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE CAPITAL TRIAL PROJECT, DEATH PENALTY
MITIGATION MANUAL FOR TRIAL ATTORNEYS ch. 2 (2001) ("The Mitigation Specialist and the
Team Approach") [hereinafter TEXAS DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION MANUAL].
104
105
See infra text accompanying note 178.
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Counsel Not Compensated by Public Funds
Finally, in the relatively rare case in which a capital defendant retains counsel,
jurisdictions must ensure that the defendant has access to necessary investigative and expert
services if the defendant cannot afford them. "Inability to afford counsel necessarily means that a
defendant is unable to afford essential supporting services, such as investigative assistance and
expert witnesses. The converse does not follow, however. Just because a defendant is able to
afford retained counsel does not mean that sufficient finances are available for essential services..
. .. Supporting services [should] be made available to the clients of retained counsel who are
unable to afford the required assistance."I06 Ofcourse, the same observations apply where
counsel is serving pro bono or, although originally retained, has simply run out ofmoney.
jurisdictions routinely authorize the payment of funds for mitigation experts pursuant to state
statute, court rule, case law or defense motion, e.g., South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-26(c)
and State v. Bailey, 424 S.E.2d 503, 507 (S.C.1992) ("In today's capital trial, the defendant is
entitled to produce mitigation evidence concerning his childhood and family background in
mitigation ofhis criminal conduct, so that the jury may impose life imprisonment as an alternative
to the death sentence. In preparing this evidence, the attorney must employ investigators in the
course ofthoroughly researching the defendant's entire life."); Tennessee, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-
14-207(b) and Tenn. S. Ct. R. 13, § 5; Illinois, 725 Ill. Compo Stat. 124/10 (West 2002);
Washington; Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.31.110; New York; Colorado, New Jersey; and
Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 17-12-90 et seq. In federal capital trials, mitigation experts are
routinely appointed and compensated under 21 U.S.c. § 848(q).
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.4 cmt.
(3d ed. 1992). See also Edward C. Monahan & James J. Clark, Funds/or Resources/or Indigent
Defendants Represented by Retained Counsel, CHAMPION, Dec. 1996, at 16.
34
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Guideline 5.1 Qualifications of Defense Counsel
A. The Responsible Agency should develop and publish qualification standards for
defense counsel in capital cases. These standards should be construed and applied in
such a way as to further the overriding goal of providing each client with high quality
legal representation.
B. In formulating qualification standards, the Responsible Agency should insure:
1. That every attorney representing a capital defendant has:
a. obtained a license or permission to practice in the jurisdiction;
b. demonstrated a commitment to providing zealous advocacy and high
quality legal representation in the defense of capital cases; and
c. satisfied the training requirements set forth in Guideline 8.1.
2. That the pool of defense attorneys as a whole is such that each capital
defendant within the jurisdiction receives high quality legal representation.
Accordingly, the qualification standards should insure that the pool includes
sufficient numbers of attorneys who have demonstrated:
a. substantial knowledge and understanding of the relevant state, federal
and international law, both procedural and substantive, governing
capital cases;
b. skill in the management and conduct of complex negotiations and
litigation;
c. skill in legal research, analysis, and the drafting of litigation
documents;
d. skill in oral advocacy;
e. skill in the use of expert witnesses and familiarity with common areas
of forensic investigation, including fingerprints, ballistics, forensic
pathology, and DNA evidence;
f. skill in the investigation, preparation, and presentation of evidence
bearing upon mental status;
g. skill in the investigation, preparation, and presentation of mitigating
evidence; and
h. skill in the elements oftrial advocacy, such as jury selection, cross-
examination of witnesses, and opening and closing statements.
35 000341
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History ofGuideline
This Guideline has been substantially reorganized for this edition. In the original edition,
it emphasized quantitative measures ofattorney experience - such as years of litigation experience
and number ofjury trials - as the basis for qualifying counsel to undertake representation in death
penalty cases. In this revised edition, the inquiry focuses on counsel's ability to provide high
quality legal representation.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.2
(3d ed. 1992) ("Eligibility to Serve").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.15 (1973) ("Providing Assigned Counsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 1.2 (1997) ("Education, Training, and Experience of
Defense Counsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline 11.3 (1984) ("Duties").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.9 (1989) ("Standards for Performance ofCounsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.1{b) (1989) ("Establishment and General Operation of
Assigned Counsel Roster").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.1.1 (1989) ("Qualifications ofAttorneys").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 2.15 (1976) ("Establishing the Assigned Counsel Panel").
Commentary
Under Guideline 3.1, it is the duty of the Responsible Agency to provide capital defendants
with attorneys who will give them high quality legal representation. This Guideline amplifies that
duty. It is designed to be outcome-focused and to leave the Responsible Agency maximum
flexibility. The Guideline sets forth the necessary qualifications for all attorneys {Subsection B
(1)), and also requires that "the pool ofdefense attorneys as a whole is such that each capital
defendant within the jurisdiction receives high quality legal representation." (Subsection B (2)).
The qualification standards set by the Responsible Agency must be such as to bring about this
result.
This functional approach is new to this edition.
36
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases' February 2003
As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, the abilities that death penalty defense
counsel must possess in order to provide high quality legal representation differ from those
required in any other area oflaw. Accordingly, quantitative measures ofexperience are not a
sufficient basis to determine an attorney's qualifications for the task. An attorney with substantial
prior experience in the representation ofdeath penalty cases, but whose past performance does not
represent the level ofproficiency or commitment necessary for the adequate representation ofa
client in a capital case, should not be placed on the appointment roster.107
There are also attorneys who do not possess substantial prior experience yet who will
provide high quality legal representation in death penalty cases. lOS Such attorneys may have
specialized training and experience in the field (e.g., as law professors), may previously have been
prosecutors, or may have had substantial experience in civil practice.109 These attorneys should
receive appointments if the Responsible Agency is satisfied that the client will be provided with
high quality legal representation by the defense team as a whole.
In order to make maximum use ofthe available resources in the legal community overall,
the Responsible Agency needs to devise qualification standards that build upon the contribution
that each lawyer can make to the defense team, while ensuring that the team is of such a size and
aggregate level ofexperience as to be able to function effectively.
See Bright, supra note 28, at 1871 n.209 ("Standards for the appointment ofcounsel,
which are defined in terms ofnumber ofyears in practice and number of trials, do very little to
improve the quality of representation since many ofthe worst lawyers are those who have long
taken criminal appointments and would meet the qualifications").
Because, as the second sentence ofSubsection A emphasizes, the overriding goal is to
provide high quality legal representation to the client in the individual case, it may also be
appropriate for the appointing authority to certify an attorney for a limited purpose, e.g., to
represent a particular client with whom he or she has a special relationship.
Superior post-conviction death penalty defense representation has often been provided by
members ofthe private bar who did not have prior experience in the field but who did have a
commitment to excellence. See, e.g., Kelly Choi, Against All Odds, THE AMERICAN LAWYER,
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Guideline 6.1 Workload
The Responsible Agency should implement effectual mechanisms to ensure that the
workload of attorneys representing defendants in death penalty cases is maintained at a level
that enables counsel to provide each client with high quality legal representation in
accordance with these Guidelines.
History 0/Guideline
The original edition of this Guideline stated that "attorneys accepting appointments
pursuant to these Guidelines ... should not accept appointment" if their workload would interfere
with the provision of"quality representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations."
Although that admonition has been retained in Guideline I0.3, this Guideline, which in
accordance with Guideline 1.1 applies to all defense counsel (not just appointed members of the
private bar), has been added to make clear that it is the responsibility ofthe jurisdiction creating
the system to establish mechanisms for controlling attorney workloads.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-5.3
(3d ed. 1992) ("Workload").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.3 ("Delays;
Punctuality; Workload") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 5 (2002)
("Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering ofquality representation").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.12 (1973) ("Workload of Public Defenders").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.1 (1976) (Establishing Maximum Pending Workload Levels for
Individual Attorneys").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.2 (1976) (Statistics and Record Keeping").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.3 (1976) (Elimination ofExcessive Caseloads").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-12 (1984) (Case
and Work Overload").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.1(c) (1989) ("Establishment and General Operation of
38
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Assigned Counsel Roster").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.12 (1989) ("Workload ofAttorneys").
Commentary
In order to achieve the goal ofproviding capital defendants with high quality legal
representation, the caseloads oftheir attorneys must be such as to permit the investment ofthe
extraordinary time and effort necessary to ensure effective and zealous representation in a capital
case. As the ABA Defense Services Standards note:
One ofthe single most important impediments to the furnishing ofquality defense
services for the poor is the presence of excessive caseloads. All too often in
defender organizations, attorneys are asked to provide representation in too many
cases. Unfortunately, not even the most able and industrious lawyers can provide
quality representation when their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive
workloads, moreover, lead to attorney frustration, disillusionment by clients, and
weakening of the adversary system. I 10
A numerical set ofcaseload standards for appointed counsel, standing alone, would not
ensure high quality legal representation. While national caseload standards should in no event be
exceeded, the concept of "workload" (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as case complexity,
support services, and an attorney's nonrepresentational duties) is a more accurate measurement of
counsel's ability to provide quality representation. In assessing appointed counsel's workload, the
Responsible Agency must also consider whether counsel has adequate access to essential support
staff such as investigators, mitigation specialists, paralegals, and legal secretaries. Counsel's
workload, including legal cases and other work, should never be so large as to interfere with the
rendering ofquality representation or lead to the breach ofethical obligations, and counsel is
obligated to decline to undertake additional cases above such levels. II I
In accordance with these principles, the Responsible Agency should assess the workload of
eligible attorneys prior to appointment to ensure that counsel's workload will enable counsel to
provide high quality legal representation. To assist in assessing workloads, some defender offices
have established workload guidelines that are useful in determining whether the workload ofa
particular attorney is excessive. These guidelines may be consulted as one measure of appropriate
workloads. I12
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-5.3
cmt. (3d ed. 1992). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1997);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1997) ("A lawyer's workload should
be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately.").
III See infra Guideline 10.3 and accompanying Commentary.
112 See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guidelines 4.1,5.1 5.3 (1976); NAT'LADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.12
(1973). These standards all acknowledge the need to determine acceptable workloads, and all
39 000345
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
Studies have consistently found that defending capital cases requires vastly more time and
effort by counsel than noncapital matters. For example, a study ofthe California State Public
Defender revealed that attorneys there spent, on average, four times as much time on capital
representation as on cases with any other penalty, including those involving a maximum possible
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. I 13 In terms ofactual numbers ofhours invested in
the defense ofcapital cases, recent studies indicate that several thousand hours are typically
required to provide appropriate representation. For example, an in-depth examination of federal
capital trials from 1990 to 1997 conducted on behalfof the Judicial Conference of the United
States found that the total attorney hours per representation in capital cases that actually proceeded
to trial averaged 1,889.1l4
Workloads for lawyers handling direct appeals should also be maintained at levels that are
consistent with providing high quality legal representation. Like the responsibilities of counsel at
trial, appellate work in a capital case is time-consuming and difficult. A capital trial record, which
appellate counsel must review in full and with care, typically runs to thousands or even tens of
thousands of pages -- even before, pursuant to Guideline 10.7 (B) (2), counsel investigates the
possibility that the record may be incomplete. Once appellate counsel has reviewed the record, he
or she must conduct especially wide-ranging legal research, canvassing both state and federal
judicial opinions, before drafting the opening brief. Given the gravity ofthe punishment, the
unsettled state ofthe law, and the insistence of the courts on rigorous default rules, it is incumbent
upon appellate counsel to raise every potential ground oferror that might result in a reversal of the
defendant's conviction or punishment. ll5 Further, counsel must aggressively examine the
government's brief and research its legal assertions in order to prepare an adequate reply.
Preparing for and presenting oral argument requires counsel to invest still more hours. In
California, where the Office of the State Public Defender handled capital appeals in the California
Supreme Court, a 1989 study concluded that attorneys handling such cases should be responsible
for two to three briefs per year. I 16
acknowledge within the standards themselves or in commentary the myriad factors that must be
considered in weighing workload. Only the National Advisory Commission sets forth suggested
numerical maximums for caseloads; those numbers are provided with the caveat "that particular
local conditions - such as travel time - may mean that lower limits are essential." The National
Advisory Commission standard does not address death penalty workloads.
Richard J. Wilson & Robert L. Spangenberg, State-Postconviction Representation of
Defendants Sentenced to Death, 72 JUDICATURE 331,336-337 (1989) (collecting and reviewing
studies).
Federal Death Penalty Cases, supra note 89, at 14. This figure was only for the number of
hours expended through the end oftrial court proceedings, and did not include any post-conviction
representation.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. Moreover, counsel must continue to
investigate the facts. See infra Guideline 10.7 (A).
NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & SPANGENBERG GROUP, WORKLOAD AND PRODUCTIVITY
STANDARDS: A REpORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 82-93 (1989).
40
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Similarly, the workloads ofcounsel handling collateral proceedings must be carefully
limited to allow for high quality legal representation. A 1998 survey of the time and expenses
required in Florida capital post-conviction cases concluded that "the most experienced and
qualified lawyers at Florida's post-conviction defender office, the Office ofCapital Collateral
Representation have estimated that, on average, over 3,300 lawyer hours are required to take a
post-conviction death penalty case from the denial ofcertiorari by the United States Supreme
Court following direct appeal to the denial ofcertiorari" through that state's post-conviction
proceedings. I 17
It is the duty of the Responsible Agency to distribute assignments in light ofeach
attornets duty under the Rules ofProfessional Conduct to "provide competent representation to a
client" 18, which requires "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation,,119 necessary
for a complex and specialized area of the law. Thus, the Responsible Agency must monitor
private counsel in accordance with Guideline 7.1, and provide them with additional assistance as
necessary. And the Independent Authority must monitor the defender organizations ofthe
jurisdiction and stand ready to supplement their resources with those ofthe private bar.
Regardless of the context, no system that involves burdening attorneys with more cases
than they can reasonably handle can provide high quality legal representation. In the capital
context, no such system is acceptable.
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, AMENDED TIME AND EXPENSE ANALYSIS OF POST-CONVICTION
CAPITAL CASES IN FLORIDA 16 (1998).
118 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.1 (2002).
119 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.1 CMT. 1 (2002); ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2(d), in ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1997). The comment to that Rule says that "a
lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled
competently." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 6 (1997). See also NAT.
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Guideline 7.1 Monitoring; Removal
A. The Responsible Agency should monitor the performance of all defense counsel to
ensure that the client is receiving high quality legal representation. Where there is
evidence that an attorney is not providing high quality legal representation, the
Responsible Agency should take appropriate action to protect the interests of the
attorney's current and potential clients.
B. The Responsible Agency should establish and publicize a regular procedure for
investigating and resolving any complaints made by judges, clients, attorneys, or
others that defense counsel failed to provide high quality legal representation.
C. The Responsible Agency should periodically review the rosters of attorneys who have
been certified to accept appointments in capital cases to ensure that those attorneys
remain capable of providing high quality legal representation. Where there is
evidence that an attorney has failed to provide high quality legal representation, the
attorney should not receive additional appointments and should be removed from the
roster. Where there is evidence that a systemic defect in a defender office has caused
the office to fail to provide high quality legal representation, the office should not
receive additional appointments.
D. Before taking final action making an attorney or a defender office ineligible to receive
additional appointments, the Responsible Agency should provide written notice that
such action is being contemplated, and give the attorney or defender office
opportunity to respond in writing.
E. An attorney or defender office sanctioned pursuant to this Guideline should be
restored to the roster only in exceptional circumstances.
F. The Responsible Agency should ensure that this Guideline is implemented
consistently with Guideline 2.1(C), so that an attorney's zealous representation of a
client cannot be cause for the imposition or threatened imposition of sanctions
pursuant to this Guideline.
History ofGuideline
In the original edition, this Guideline provided that an attorney should receive no
additional capital appointments ifcounsel had "inexcusably ignored basic responsibilities ofan
effective lawyer, resulting in prejudice to the client's case." In this edition, the standard has been
changed to prohibit future appointment where counsel "has failed to provide high quality legal
representation." The change was made because the former language was considered insufficiently
stringent. Subsection B is based on Commentary to the original edition ofthe Guideline.
Subsections C-E are taken from Subsections A and C ofthe original edition ofthe Guideline.




                
    
             
             
            
            
     
            
           
           
             
             
           
             
            
               
              
   
               
          
            
     
             
        
           
            
            
    
   
             
            
                
              
            
              
              
                
  
 
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases' February 2003
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.3
(3d ed. 1992) ("Rotation ofassignments and revision of roster").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-6.3
(3d ed. 1992) ("Removal").
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 10 (2002)
("Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according
to nationally and locally adopted standards").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.4 (1989) ("Supervision ofAttorneys").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.4.2 (1989) ("Monitoring").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5 (1989).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.1 (1989) ("Penalties Less Thank Removal").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.2 (1989) ("Removal from Program Rosters").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.3 (1989) ("Reinstatement After Removal").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.4 (1976) ("Supervision and Evaluation ofDefender System
Personnel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.5 (1976) ("Monitoring and Evaluation ofAssigned Counsel Program
Personnel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
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Commentary
Consistent with its duty to ensure that high quality legal assistance is afforded to indigent
capital defendants, the Responsible Agency should monitor the performance ofall capital defense
counsel, including defender offices. "Admittedly, this is not an easy task and there obviously are
difficulties present in having third parties scrutinize the judgments of private counsel. On the
other hand, the difficulty ofthe task should not be an excuse to do nothing.,,120
While the Responsible Agency should investigate and maintain records regarding any
complaints made against assigned counsel by judges, clients and other attorneys,121 an effective
attorney-monitoring program in death penalty matters should go considerably beyond these
activities. The performance of each assigned lawyer should be subject to systematic review based
upon publicized standards and procedures.122 Counsel should be removed from the roster when
counsel has failed to represent a client consistently with these Guidelines.123
In fulfilling its monitoring function, the Responsible Agency should not attempt to micro-
manage counsel's work;124 most lawyering tasks may reasonably be performed in a variety of
ways. In order to preserve the nature of the attorney-client relationship, counsel for the accused
must have the freedom to represent their client as they deem professionally appropriate. Clients,
moreover, should have the right to continue satisfactory relationships with lawyers in whom they
have reposed their confidence and trust. Rather, the responsibility of the Responsible Agency is to
ensure that, overall, the attorney is providing high quality legal representation. Where counsel
fails to do so, whether because ofa mental or physical impairment,125 or for any other reason, the
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.3








The standard for denying additional appointments to death penalty lawyers should be more
strictly applied than the standard for denying additional appointments in non-capital cases. In
non-capital criminal cases, the standard provides that "where there is compelling evidence that an
attorney consistently has ignored basic responsibilities, the attorney's name should be removed
from the roster after notice and hearing, with the possibility of reinstatement after removal if
adequate demonstration of remedial measures is shown." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.3 cmt. (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis added). As
these Guidelines make clear, low quality representation ofa capital defendant may have
irrevocable consequences. Accordingly, the Responsible Agency should not wait for an attorney
to "consistently ignore basic responsibilities."
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-
1.3 cmt. (3d ed. 1992).
It cannot always be safely assumed that counsel who has been determined to be qualified
based on past performance will represent current or future clients satisfactorily. Circumstances
can change. For example, the attorney may begin suffering from illness, chemical dependency or
other handicap unknown to the appointing authority, the court or the client. See Kirshmeier, supra
note 28, at, 455-60 (discussing cases in which defendants were represented by lawyers who were
44
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Responsible Agency should intervene. This may occur on the Responsible Agency's own motion
or as a result ofa request by the defendant or the court.126
In keeping with the paramount objective ofprotecting the rights and interests of the
defendant, Subsection E provides that the Responsible Agency should have a regularized
procedure for investigating and resolving complaints of inadequate representation. The procedure
should recognize that many people (e.g., family members ofthe client, witnesses whom the
attorney has interviewed or not interviewed) may be in a position to provide important
information. The procedure should be publicized accordingly.
The Responsible Agency must monitor cases, and take appropriate action in the event of
any substandard performance. If the jurisdiction has defender organizations, the Independent
Authority monitoring them must review such problems with an eye towards rectifying both
deficiencies on the part of individual staff lawyers and any structural flaws that those deficiencies
may reveal. If inadequate training, office workload, or some other systemic problem has resulted
in representation of lower quality than required by these Guidelines and the situation is not
corrected, the Independent Authority should remove the office from the roster.
Because of the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty, counselor offices that
have been removed from the roster should be readmitted only upon exceptional assurances that no
further dereliction ofduty will occur. The Responsible Agency should not readmit counselor the
office to the roster unless it determines that the original removal was in error, or finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the problem which led to the removal ofcounselor the office has been
identified and corrected. It may condition readmission on specific actions (e.g., proofof reduction
in workload, proofof additional training and/or experience, substance abuse counseling, or
correction of systemic defects in an office).
intoxicated, abusing drugs, or mentally ill).
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE JUDGE Standard
6-1.1(a) (2d ed. 1986) ("The trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of
the accused and the interests ofthe public in the administration ofcriminal justice. The adversary
nature ofthe proceedings does not relieve the trial judge ofthe obligation of raising on his or her
initiative, at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly
promote ajust determination of the trial.").
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Guideline 8.1 Training
A. The Legal Representation Plan should provide funds for the effective training,
professional development, and continuing education of all members ofthe defense
team.
B. Attorneys seeking to qualify to receive appointments should be required to
satisfactorily complete a comprehensive training program, approved by the
Responsible Agency, in the defense of capital cases. Such a program should include,
but not be limited to, presentations and training in the following areas:
1. relevant state, federal, and international law;
2. pleading and motion practice;
3. pretrial investigation, preparation, and theory development regarding
guilt/innocence and penalty;
4. jury selection;
5. trial preparation and presentation, including the use of experts;
6. ethical considerations particular to capital defense representation;
7. preservation of the record and of issues for post-conviction review;
8. counsel's relationship with the client and his family;
9. post-conviction litigation in state and federal courts;
10. the presentation and rebuttal of scientific evidence, and developments in
mental health fields and other relevant areas of forensic and biological
science;
11. the unique issues relating to the defense of those charged with committing
capital offenses when under the age of 18.
c. Attorneys seeking to remain on the roster or appointment roster should be required
to attend and successfully complete, at least once every two years, a specialized
training program approved by the Responsible Agency that focuses on the defense of
death penalty cases.
D. The Legal Representation Plan should insure that all non-attorneys wishing to be
eligible to participate on defense teams receive continuing professional education
appropriate to their areas of expertise.
46
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
History ofGuideline
The importance of training was addressed in Guideline 9.1 of the original version ofthe
Guidelines for lawyers seeking to receive appointments in capital cases. Subsections A and D
have been added to this revised edition to emphasize that the Legal Representation Plan must
provide for specialized training ofall members of the defense team involved in the representation
ofcapital defendants. Subsections B and C are based on the original edition ofthe Guideline.
This revised edition ofthe Guideline has been amended to emphasize that qualified training
programs must be "comprehensive" in scope. Thus the eleven areas oftraining set forth in
Subsection B are new and are intended to indicate the broad range of topics that must be covered
in order for an initial training program to meet minimum requirements. The requirement of
participation in a continuing legal education program every two years is also a minimum; many
capital defense counsel have discovered that they must attend training programs more frequently
in order to provide effective legal representation.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.5
(3d ed. 1992) ("Training and Professional Development").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-2.6 (3d ed.
1993) ("Training Programs'') in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 9 (2002)
("Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal education").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.15 (1973) ("Providing Assigned Counsel").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.16 (1973) ("Training and Education ofDefenders").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 10 (1970) ("Office of Defender General").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, DEFENDER TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT
STANDARDS (1997).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES § III-17 (1984) ("Professional
Development").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass 'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.7 (1976) (Training StaffAttorneys In A Defender System").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass 'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.8 (1976) (Training Assigned Counsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
47
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.2 (1989) ("Orientation").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.3.1 (1989) ("Entry-Level Training").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.3.2 (1989) ("In-Service Training").
Commentary
As indicated in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high quality legal
representation in capital cases requires unique skills. Accordingly, the standard ofpractice
requires that counsel have received comprehensive specialized training before being considered
qualified to undertake representation in a death penalty case.127 Such training must not be
confined to instruction in the substantive law and procedure applicable to legal representation of
capital defendants, but must extend to related substantive areas of mitigation and forensic science.
In addition, comprehensive training programs must include practical instruction in advocacy
skills, as well as presentations by experienced practitioners.
Once an attorney has been deemed qualified to accept appointments in capital cases, the
standard ofgractice requires counsel to regularly receive formal training in order to keep abreast
of the field. 28 Continuing legal education, which is required by many state bars as a matter of
course for all attorneys, is critically important to capital defense attorneys. As the Commentary to
Guideline 1.1 indicates, they must not only have mastery of current developments in law,
forensics, and related areas, but also be able to anticipate future ones.129
In recognition of the central role that ongoing training plays in the provision ofeffective
capital defense representation, a number of professional organizations, including the National
Association ofCriminal Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the
Habeas Assistance Project, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the office of the
Kentucky Public Advocate, and the Association of the Bar of the City ofNew York, have
regularly devoted significant resources to providing educational programs of the quality
contemplated by this Guideline.
See, e.g., New York Capital Defender Office, Minimum Standards for Lead Counsel and
Associate Counsel in Capital Cases, available at http://www.nycdo.org/35b/35b-std.html
(requiring that applicants submit "a description of specialized training programs regularly
attended, such as the NITA, the National Criminal Defense College, or bar association criminal
justice programs" and specifying that "an attorney shall not be considered eligible to be appointed
as lead counselor associate counsel in a capital case unless the Capital Defender Office shall
certify that the attorney satisfactorily has completed a basic capital training program prescribed by
the Capital Defender Office").
As one authority has noted, capital defense counsel must exhibit "constant vigilance in
keeping abreast ofnew developments in a volatile and highly nuanced area ofthe law." Vick,
supra note 3, at 358.
129 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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Guideline 9.1 Funding and Compensation
A. The Legal Representation Plan must ensure funding for the full cost of high quality
legal representation, as defined by these Guidelines, by the defense team and outside
experts selected by counsel.
B. Counsel in death penalty cases should be fully compensated at a rate that is
commensurate with the provision of high quality legal representation and reflects the
extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty representation.
1. Flat fees, caps on compensation, and lump-sum contracts are improper in
death penalty cases.
2. Attorneys employed by defender organizations should be compensated
according to a salary scale that is commensurate with the salary scale of the
prosecutor's office in the jurisdiction.
3. Appointed counsel should be fully compensated for actual time and service
performed at an hourly rate commensurate with the prevailing rates for
similar services performed by retained counsel in the jurisdiction, with no
distinction between rates for services performed in or out of court. Periodic
billing and payment should be available.
C. Non-attorney members of the defense team should be fully compensated at a rate that
is commensurate with the provision of high quality legal representation and reflects
the specialized skills needed by those who assist counsel with the litigation of death
penalty cases.
1. Investigators employed by defender organizations should be compensated
according to a salary scale that is commensurate with the salary scale of the
prosecutor's office in the jurisdiction.
2. Mitigation specialists and experts employed by defender organizations should
be compensated according to a salary scale that is commensurate with the
salary scale for comparable expert services in the private sector.
3. Members of the defense team assisting private counsel should be fUlly
compensated for actual time and service performed at an hourly rate
commensurate with prevailing rates paid by retained counsel in the
jurisdiction for similar services, with no distinction between rates for services
performed in or out of court. Periodic billing and payment should be
available.
D. Additional compensation should be provided in unusually protracted or
extraordinary cases.
E. Counsel and members of the defense team should be fully reimbursed for reasonable
incidental expenses.
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History ofGuideline
This Guideline was Guideline 10.1 in the original edition. The express disapproval of flat
or fixed fee compensation provisions and statutory fee maximums is new to this edition. The
provision is in keeping with Guideline 10.1{A) ofthe original edition, which mandates that
counsel be fully compensated at a reasonable hourly rate ofcompensation, and follows the
Commentary to Standard 5-2.4 ofthe ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense
Services, which observes that "[t]he possible effect of such rates is to discourage lawyers from
doing more than what is minimally necessary to qualify for the flat payment." Subsection B (2) is
new to the Guideline and has been added to provide for compensation ofattorneys employed by
defender organizations. Subsection B (3) is based on the original edition ofthe Guideline, but a
provision has been added indicating that there should be no distinction between the hourly rates of
compensation for services performed in or out ofcourt. Subsection C is new to this edition and
provides for compensation of the other members ofthe defense team. Subsection D is new to this
edition. Subsection E is based on the original edition.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.4
(3d ed. 1992) ("Compensation and expenses").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 21-2.4, 22-4.3 (2d ed. 1980).
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.7 (1973) ("Defender to be Full-Time and Adequately
Compensated").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.11 (1973) ("Salaries for Defender Attorneys").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 11 (1970) ("Local Offices").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 13 (1970) ("Court Assigned Attorneys").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.7.1 ("Assigned Counsel Fees"), 4.7.2 ("Method of
Compensation"), 4.7.3 ("Payment ofExpenses"), and 4.7.4 ("Only Authorized Compensation")
(1989).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE
SERVICES § 3.1 (1976) ("Assigned Counsel Fees and Supporting Services").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 3.2 (1976) ("Defender System Salaries").
50
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-IO (1984)
("Compensation").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GoVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-II (1984)
("Special Case Compensation").
Commentary
In order to fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide effective legal representation for
poor people charged with crimes,13O "[g]ovemment has the responsibility to fund the full cost of
quality legal representation."l3l This means that it must "firmly and unhesitatingly resolve any
conflicts between the treasury and the fundamental constitutional rights in favor ofthe latter.,,132
As Subsection A ofthis Guideline emphasizes, each jurisdiction is responsible for paying
not just the direct compensation ofmembers of the defense team, but also the costs involved in
meeting the requirements ofthese Guidelines for high quality legal representation (e.g., Guideline
4.1, Guideline 8.1).
As a rough benchmark, jurisdictions should provide funding for defender services that
maintains parity between the defense and the prosecution with respect to workload, salaries, and
resources necessary to provide quality legal representation (including benefits, technology,
facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals, investigators, mitigation specialists, and access
to forensic services and experts). In doing so, jurisdictions must he mindful that the prosecution
has access at no cost to many services for which the defense must pay. A prosecution office will
not only benefit from the formal resources of its jurisdiction (e.g., a state crime laboratory) and co-
operating ones (e.g., the FBI), but from many informal ones as well. For example, a prosecutor
seeking to locate a witness in a distant city can frequently enlist the assistance of a local police
department; defense counsel will have to pay to send out an investigator. Yet funding for defense
services usually lags far behind prosecution funding. 133




ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.6
& cmt. (3d ed. 1992).
Pruett v. State, 574 So. 2d 1342, 1354 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Makemson v. Martin County,
491 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987)).
Studies indicate that funding for prosecution is, on the average, three times greater than
funding that is provided for defense services at both the state and federal levels. ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.6 cmt. (3d ed. 1992) (footnote
omitted). See also, ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 8
(2002) ("There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources
and defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the justice system.") ("There should be
parity ofworkload, salaries and other resources (such as benefits, technology, facilities, legal
research, support staff, paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services and experts)
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In particular, compensation ofattorneys for death penalty representation remains
notoriously inadequateY As Justice Blackmun observed in 1994:
[C]ompensation for attorneys representing indigent capital defendants often is
perversely low. Although a properly conducted capital trial can involve hundreds
ofhours of investigation, preparation, and lengthy trial proceedings, many States
severely limit the compensation paid for capital defense. . .. As a result, attorneys
appointed to represent capital defendants at the trial level frequently are unable to
recoup even their overhead costs and out-of-pocket expenses, and effectively may
be required to work at minimum wage or below while funding from their own
pockets their client's defense. 135
Low fees make it economically unattractive for competent attorneys to seek assignments
and to expend the time and effort a case may require. A 1993 study ofcapital representation in
Texas, for example, showed that "more experienced private criminal attorneys are refusing to
accept court appointments in capital cases because ofthe time involved, the substantial
infringement on their private practices, the lack ofcompensation for counsel fees and expert
services and the enormous pressure that they feel in handling these cases.,,136 Similarly, a survey
ofMississippi attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants in capital cases found that 82%
would either refuse or be very reluctant to accept another appointment because of financial
considerations.137 A 1998 study of federal death penalty cases reported that "[a]lthough the hourly
rate of compensation in federal capital cases are higher than those paid noncapital federal criminal
addition to actual overhead and expenses. Contracts with private attorneys for public defense
services should never be let primarily on the basis of cost; they should specify performance
requirements and the anticipated workload, provide an overflow or funding mechanism for excess,
unusual or complex cases, and separately fund expert, investigative, and other litigation support
services. No part ofthe justice system should be expanded or the workload increased without
consideration of the impact that expansion will have on the balance and on the other components
ofthe justice system. Public defense should participate as an equal partner in improving the
justice system. This principle assumes that the prosecutor is adequately funded and supported in
all respects, so that securing parity will mean that defense counsel is able to provide quality legal
representation.").
See, e.g., Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense
Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1992); Anthony Paduano & Clive
A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability ofSub-Minimum Wages PaidAppointed Counsel in
Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 281 (1991); Vick, supra note 3; Albert L. Vreeland, II, The
Breath ofthe Unfee 'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance ofCounsel in






McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1257-58 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A Study ofRepresentation in Capital Cases in Texas (1993), at
Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 134, at 31 n.148.
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cases, they are quite low in comparison to hourly rates for lawyers generally, and to the imputed
hourly cost ofoffice overhead.,,138
While compensation is generally inadequate for representation at trial, it is even worse -
and indeed, in a number ofjurisdictions, nonexistent - for representation in state collateral
proceedings.139 Recent studies have estimated that thousands ofattorney hours are required to
represent a death-sentenced prisoner in such cases.140 Not surprisingly, few attorneys are willing
to take on this responsibility for negligible compensation. As a result, a substantial and growing
number ofcondemned inmates who have completed direct review are without legal
representation.141
It is such inmates - and the justice system - rather than lawyers (who can always move to
more lucrative fields) that are victimized when jurisdictions fail to fulfill their financial
responsibilities. What is "most important [is that] the quali~ ofthe representation often suffers
when adequate compensation for counsel is not available.,,1 2 This is not a merely theoretical
concern. It is demonstrably the case that, by discouraging more experienced criminal defense
lawyers from accepting appointments in capital cases, inadequate compensation has often left
capital defense representation to inexperienced or outright incompetent counsel. A series of
studies in several death penalty states have found that appointed counsel in death penalty cases
have been subject to professional disciplinary action at significantly higher rates than other
lawyers.143
These realities underlie the mandate of this guideline that members of the death penalty
defense team be fully compensated at a rate commensurate with the provision of high quality legal
representation. The Guideline's strong disapproval ofso-called "flat fees," statutory caps, and





For a survey ofstate practices regarding appointment and compensation ofpost-conviction
counsel, see Hammel, supra note 46, and THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, ABA POSTCONVICTION
DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION PROJECT, AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES IN STATE POSTCONVICTION DEATH PENALTY
CASES (1996).
As discussed in the text accompanying note 117 supra, a 1998 study oftime and expenses
required in Florida capital post-conviction cases concluded that on average, over 3,300 lawyer
. hours are required to represent a death-sentenced prisoner in Florida's post-conviction
proceedings. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 117, at 16.
See Decl. Bryan A. Stevenson in Barbour v. Haley, No. 01-D-1530-N (M.D. Ala.), 17
(stating that there are dozens ofdeath row inmates in Alabama without legal representation
because ofthe $1000 per case cap on compensation for state collateral appeals); Smith & Starns,
supra note 46, at 106-19 (discussing state provisions for appointment ofcounsel and states that
fail to appoint or compensate counsel).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.4
cmt. (3d ed. 1992).




                
                 
     
             
             
             
             
               
            
  
                
             
        i7z      
               
             
            
            
               
             
  
              
                
            
          
             
            
            
            
  
                
             
            
         
           OI I     
              
               
               
      
           
    
         
 
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
other arbitrary limitations on attorney compensation is based upon the adverse effect such
schemes have upon effective representation. l44 Rather, compensation should be based on the
number ofhours expended plus the effort, efficiency, and skill of counsel.145 When assigned
counsel is paid a predetermined fee for the case regardless ofthe number ofhours of work actually
demanded by the representation, there is an unacceptable risk that counsel will limit the amount of
time invested in the representation in order to maximize the return on the fixed fee. l46
Moreover, any compensation system that fails to reflects the extraordinary responsibilities
and commitment required ofcounsel in death penalty cases,147 that does not provide for extra
payments to counsel when unusually burdensome representation is provided, or that does not
provide for the periodic payment of fees, will not succeed in obtaining the high quality legal
representation required by these Guidelines.
For better or worse, a system for the provision ofdefense services in capital cases will get




ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.4 cmt.
(3d ed. 1992).
See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 460, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1992) ("[I]t would be
foolish to ignore the very real possibility that a lawyer may not be capable ofproperly balancing
the obligation to expend the proper amount of time in an appointed criminal matter where the fees
involved are nominal, with his personal concerns to earn a decent living by devoting his time to
matters wherein he will be reasonably compensated. The indigent client, ofcourse, will be the one
to suffer the consequences ifthe balancingjob is not tilted in his favor. ") (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
148 Cf Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (granting habeas
corpus because "Macias was denied his constitutional right to adequate counsel in a capital case in
which actual innocence was a close question. The state paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour.
Unfortunately, the justice system got only what it paid for.").
54
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Guideline 10.1 Establishment of Performance Standards
149
A. The Responsible Agency should establish standards of performance for all counsel in
death penalty cases.
B. The standards of performance should be formulated so as to insure that all counsel
provide high quality legal representation in capital cases in accordance with these
Guidelines. The Responsible Agency should refer to the standards when assessing the
qualifications or performance of counsel.
C. The standards of performance should include, but not be limited to, the specific
standards set out in these Guidelines.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is former Guideline 11.1 with only stylistic revisions.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.1 ("The
Function of the Standards"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.1
(3d ed. 1992) ("Objective").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1997).
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.1 (1989) ("Provision ofQuality Representation").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.9 (1989) ("Standards for Performance ofCounsel").
Commentary
The Structure ofGuideline 10
Guideline 10 mandates the establishment ofperformance standards designed to insure the
provision ofhigh quality legal representation. Compliance with Guideline 10 may therefore be
relevant to a determination as to whether a jurisdiction meets the requirements ofChapter 154 of
the AEDPA, which provides governments with procedural advantages ifthey choose to establish
effectual mechanisms "for the appointment, compensation, and payment ofreasonable litigation
expenses ofcompetent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings" brought by indigent capital
prisoners, and "provide standards ofcompetency for the appointment ofsuch counsel.,,149
28 U.S.C. § 2261(b). The standards ofother Guidelines, e.g., Guideline 2.1 (Legal
Representation Plan), Guideline 5.1 (Qualifications ofCounsel), Guideline 7.1 (Monitoring), and
55 000361
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
Guideline 10.1 directs the Responsible Agency to promulgate performance standards.
Guidelines 10.2 10.15.1 contain specific standards that should be included in any set of
performance standards. They do not constitute a complete set ofperformance standards, however.
They address only those aspects ofdefense representation in which death penalty cases differ
from other types ofcriminal casesl50 and omit those that are applicable to the defense ofcriminal
cases generally. Such standards should, however, also be included in the set established by the
Responsible Agency, with the understanding that in capital cases the acceptable level ofadherence
to those standards must be higher than in non-capital ones. "Death is different,,,151 and, as
discussed in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, death penalty cases have become so specialized
that defense counsel in such cases have duties and functions definably different from those of
counsel in ordinary criminal cases. At every stage of a capital case, counsel must be aware of
specialized and frequently changing legal principles and rules, become educated regarding a wide
range ofmental health issues and scientific technologies, and be able to develop strategies for
applying them in the pressure-filled environment of high-stakes, complex litigation. The level of
attorney competence that may be tolerable in noncapital casesl52 can be fatally inadequate in
capital ones.153 The standards of performance established under this Guideline should accordingly
Guideline 9.1 (Compensation and Funding), should also guide the determination as to whether a
jurisdiction has "opted in" to Chapter 154.
There is a general description ofthese in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, supra.
Guideline 10 should be read against the background provided by that Commentary.




For general standards regarding the performance of criminal defense counsel, see ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4, in ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993); INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIAnON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
ANNOTATED, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1979); and NAT'LLEGAL
AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION
(1997).
For example, as discussed in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, the current Supreme Court
standard for effective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),
requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance undermined the reliability ofthe conviction or sentence. However, "[m]yriad cases
in which defendants have been executed confirm that Strickland's minimal standard for attorney
competence in capital cases is a woeful failure. Demonstrable errors by counsel, though falling
short of ineffective assistance, repeatedly have been shown to have had fatal consequences."
Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation ofthe American Bar
Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Callingfor a
Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 18 (1996). In case after case,
attorneys who failed to present any evidence in mitigation ofthe death penalty, or who presented a
bare minimum of such evidence, have been found to satisfy Strickland. See, e.g., Chandler v.
United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204
(2001). Yet "the failure to present mitigation evidence is a virtual invitation to impose the death
penalty." White, supra note 2, at 341.
56
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insure that all aspects ofthe representation conform to the special standard ofpractice applicable
to capital cases. 154
Consistent with the overall purpose of these Guidelinesl55 the specific standards of
Guidelines 10.2-15.2 are intended to describe appropriate professional conduct. Compliance with
those standards may therefore be relevant in the judicial evaluation ofthe performance ofdefense
counsel to determine the validity ofa capital conviction or death sentence.156 They should in any
event be utilized by the Responsible Agency in determining the eligibility ofcounsel for
appointment or reappointment to capital cases and when monitoring the performance of
counsel.157
The standards established by the Responsible Agency should clearly state that performance
in the capital context should be measured with reference to the special expertise required in capital
cases. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 355, 561 A.2d 1082, 1089 (NJ. 1989); NEBRASKA
COMM'N ON PuB. ADVOCACY, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN CAPITAL AND
NON-CAPITAL CASES. Review by the Responsible Agency should likewise be intensified,
compared to the scrutiny that might be given under a system to appoint counsel in non-capital
cases. See, e.g., text accompanying note 123 supra.
ISS See supra Guideline 1.I(A).
156 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed. 1980) for proposition that ''trial counsel [in a capital
case have an] obligation to conduct a thorough investigation ofthe defendant's background," and
concluding that defense counsel performed deficiently in failing to conduct a diligent investigation
into his client's background).
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Guideline 10.2 Applicability of Performance Standards
Counsel should provide high quality legal representation in accordance with these
Guidelines for so long as the jurisdiction is legally entitled to seek the death penalty.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.3 of the original edition and has been revised for
consistency with Guideline 1.1.
Related Standards
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 3 (2002)
("Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified ofappointment,
as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel").
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REpORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.1 (1973) ("Availability ofPublicly Financed
Representation in Criminal Cases").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.5 (1989) ("Early Representation").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 2.6 (1989) ("Duration and Continuity ofRepresentation").
Commentary
The Supreme Court has stated that the "existence [ofa death penalty statute] on the statute
books provide[s] fair warning as to the degree ofculpability which the State ascribes to the act of
murder.,,158 In accordance with Guideline 1.1 (B), once a client is detained under circumstances in
which the death penalty is legally possible, counsel should proceed as if it will be sought.
As described in the text accompanying footnotes 12-13 supra, early investigation to
determine weaknesses in the State's case and uncover mitigating evidence is a necessity, and
should not be put off in the hope that the death penalty will not be requested, or that the request
will be dropped at a later point.159 Moreover, early investigation may uncover mitigating
158 Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 297 (1977).
159 In a number ofcases, courts have found no bar to the prosecution pursuing a death
sentence, despite belated notice to the defense. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 555, 917
P.2d 692, 698 (1996) (affirming death sentence where state filed its written notice 87 days later
than deadline provided for under state law, because defendant had actual notice that State intended
to pursue death penalty); People v. District Court, Gilpin County, 825 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Colo.
1992) (concluding defendant received adequate notice of intent to seek death penalty where
prosecution never stated death penalty would not be sought and notice was filed forty-one days
before trial, even though discovery had been completed and date for filing pretrial motions had
58
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circumstances or other information that will convince the prosecutor to forego pursuit ofa death
sentence. 160
Jurisdictions vary in whether the defense must be formally notified as to whether the
prosecution will seek the death penalty.161 If required notice has not been given, counsel is under
passed).
See, e.g., State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628,642,904 P.2d 245, 254 (Wash. 1995) (noting
that under state law, before the death penalty can be sought, "there must be 'reason to believe that
there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency,''' and "[i]nput from the
defendant as to mitigating factors is normally desirable, because the subjective factors are better
known to the defendant") (quoting State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1,24-25,691 P.2d 929
(Wash. 1984), cert. denied, 47 U.S. 1094 (1985», cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1026 (1996); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-10.030 (1998) [hereafter UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL] ("At the time an indictment charging a defendant with an offense subject
to the death penalty is filed or unsealed, or before a United States Attorney's Office decides to
request approval to seek the death penalty, whichever comes first, the United States Attorney
should give counsel for the defendant a reasonable opportunity to present any facts, including any
mitigating factors, to the United States Attorney for consideration.").
Some jurisdictions require the defense be provided formal notice ofthe government's
intent to seek the death penalty well before the guilt/innocence phase. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P.
15.1(g)(I) (requiring a prosecutor to provide the defendant notice of intent to seek the death
penalty "no later than 60 days after the arraignment in superior court"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
412(b) (2002) (providing that a person convicted of first degree murder must be sentenced to life
imprisonment unless the State notifies the person in writing at least 30 days prior to trial that it
intends to seek a sentence ofdeath, and of the aggravating circumstances on which it intends to
rely) (as part ofan ongoing codification of Maryland law, this section has been repealed by 2002
Md. Laws 26, § 1, effective Oct. 1,2002; an analogous provision has been enacted by 2002 Md.
Laws 26, § 2, to be codified as MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-201 (a»; NEV. SUP. CT. R.
250(4)(c) ("No later than 30 days after the filing ofan information or indictment, the state must
file in the district court a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice must allege all
aggravating circumstances which the state intends to prove and allege with specificity the facts on
which the state will rely to prove each aggravating circumstance."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
250.40(1 2) (McKinney 2002) ("A sentence ofdeath may not be imposed upon a defendant
convicted ofmurder in the first degree unless ... the people file with the court and serve upon the
defendant a notice of intent to seek the death penalty ... within one hundred twenty days ofthe
defendant's arraignment upon an indictment charging the defendant with murder ...."); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.040(2), (3) (West 2002) (stating the state is precluded from seeking the
death penalty unless written notice is served on the defendant or counsel ''within thirty days after
the defendant's arraignment upon the charge ofaggravated first degree murder unless the court,
for good cause shown, extends or reopens the period for filing and service ofthe notice"); UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 160, § 9-10.030 ("Ifthe United States Attorney decides
to request approval to seek the death penalty, the United States Attorney's Office should inform
counsel for the defendant."). Others do not. See, e.g., District Court, Gilpin County, 825 P.2d
1000, 1002 (Colo. 1992) ("There is no Colorado statute requiring the prosecutor to give notice of
intent to seek the death penalty."); Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d. 964, 970 (Fla. 1981) ("When one is
charged with murder in the first degree, he is well aware ofthe fact that it is a capital felony
59
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no duty to invite a death penalty prosecution. While preparing for a capital case when notice has
not been given, counsel should also prepare to challenge any prosecution efforts that should be
barred for failure to give notice.162
Counsel must continue to treat the case as capital "until the imposition ofthe death penalty
is no longer a legal possibility.,,163
punishable by a maximum sentence of death."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); Williams v.
State, 445 So. 2d 798, 804 (Miss. 1984) ("Anytime an individual is charged with murder, he is put
on notice that the death penalty may result."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985). Injurisdictions
where the prosecutor is not required to give notice of the intent to seek the death penalty, due
process requires that the defendant be provided adequate notice. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S.
110, 119-21 (1991) (holding due process was violated where the trial court imposed a death
sentence after the prosecution stated it would not recommend a death sentence and the trial judge
was silent following the state's decision).
See, e.g., Holmberg v. De Leon, 189 Ariz. 109, 112-13,938 P.2d 1110 (1997) (granting
defense motion to strike State's notice of intent to seek death penalty on ground that it violated
state court rule requiring notice within 30 days ofarraignment); State v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 11 P.3d 1209, 1211, 1215 (Nev. 2000) (concluding trial court acted within its discretion in
denying prosecution motion for leave to file untimely notice of intent to seek death penalty;
defense opposed motion). In accordance with the text accompanying notes 4 through 8 supra,
counsel should be mindful of the possibility that it may be appropriate to pursue the challenge
through some collateral proceeding (e.g., application for a writ ofprohibition).
163 History ofGuideline 1.1, supra.
60
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Guideline 10.3 Obligations of Counsel Respecting Workload
Counsel representing clients in death penalty cases should limit their caseloads to the level
needed to provide each client with high quality legal representation in accordance with these
Guidelines.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 6.1 of the original edition.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard
5-5.3 (3d ed. 1992) ("Workload").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.3
("Delays; Punctuality; Workload") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
REpORT OF THE TASKFoRCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.12 (1973) ("Workload ofPublic
Defenders").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.1 (1976) ("Establishing Maximum Pending
Workload Levels for Individual Attorneys").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.2 (1976) ("Statistics and Recordkeeping").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.3 (1976) ("Elimination ofExcessive Caseloads").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND
AWARDING GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-12
(1984) ("Case And Work Overload").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 1.3 (1994) ("General Duties ofDefense
Counsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.1 (c) (1989) ("Establishment and General Operation
ofAssigned Counsel Roster").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.1.2 (1989) ("Workloads ofAttorneys").
61 000367
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Commentary
It is each attorney's duty under the Model Rules ofProfessional Responsibility neither to
accept employment when it would ''jeopardize the lawyer's ability to render competent
representation"l64 nor to handle cases without "adequate preparation.,,165 Applying these
professional norms to the special context of defense representation in death penalty cases, this
Guideline mandates that attorneys maintain a workload consistent with the provision of high
quality legal representation, bearing in mind the considerations discussed in the Commentary to
Guideline 6.1
Once having agreed to represent a capital client, counsel should control their overall
workload so as to be able to do so effectively. Counsel who determine, in the exercise ofbest
professional judgment, that accepting new cases or continuing with old ones will lead to providing
capital defense representation of less than high quality should take such steps as may be
appropriate to reduce pending or projected caseloads, such as seeking assistance from the
Responsible Agency, refusing further cases and moving to withdraw from existing cases.
In short, an attorney whose workload threatens to cause a breach ofhis or her obligations
under these Guidelines has a duty to take corrective action. Counsel in that situation may not
simply attempt to muddle through.
164 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.1 note, at 8. (1999).
165 Id. at Rule 1.1 cmt. 5. Cf David J. Williams, Letter to the Editor, LA. B. J., Aug.lSep.
2002, at 86 (Letter from counsel to Leslie Dale Martin, who was executed on May 10, 2002,
stating, "[T]he caseload ofthe lead counsel was such that he only had time to read through the file
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Guideline 10.4 The Defense Team
A. When it is responsible for designating counsel to defend a capital case, the
Responsible Agency should designate a lead counsel and one or more associate
counsel. The Responsible Agency should ordinarily solicit the views of lead counsel
before designating associate counsel.
B. Lead counsel bears overall responsibility for the performance of the defense team,
and should allocate, direct, and supervise its work in accordance with these
Guidelines and professional standards.
1. Subject to the foregoing, lead counsel may delegate to other members of the
defense team duties imposed by these Guidelines, unless:
a. The Guideline specifically imposes the duty on "lead counsel," or
b. The Guideline specifically imposes the duty on "all counsel" or "all
members of the defense team."
C. As soon as possible after designation, lead counsel should assemble a defense team by:
1. Consulting with the Responsible Agency regarding the number and identity of
the associate counsel;
2. Subject to standards ofthe Responsible Agency that are in accord with these
Guidelines and in consultation with associate counsel to the extent practicable,
selecting and making any appropriate contractual agreements with non-
attorney team members in such a way that the team includes:
a. at least one mitigation specialist and one fact investigator;
b. at least one member qualified by training and experience to screen
individuals for the presence of mental or psychological disorders or
impairments; and
c. any other members needed to provide high quality legal representation.
D. Counsel should demand on behalf of the client all resources necessary to provide high
quality legal representation. If such resources are denied, counsel should make an
adequate record to preserve the issue for post-conviction review.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is new. It supplements Guideline 4.1.
Related Standards
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEAL11I STANDARDS Standard 7-1.1 (1984)
63 000369
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("Roles ofMental Health and Mental Retardation Professionals In The Criminal Process").
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-5.7 (1985)
("Evaluation and Adjudication ofCompetence To Be Executed; Stay ofExecution; Restoration of
Competence").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-2.4
("Special Assistants, Investigative Resources, Experts") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1 ("Duty To
Investigate") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REpORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS, Standard 13.14 (1973) ("Supporting Personnel And
Facilities").
NAT-'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REpORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.15 (1973) ("Providing Assigned Counsel").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 2 (1970) ("Right To Representation, Services, And Facilities").
NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Model Public Defender Act,
Section 12 (1970) ("Personnel And Facilities").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Ass 'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 3.1 (1976) ("Assigned Counsel Fees And Supporting Services").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 3.4 (1976) ("Nonpersonnel Needs In Defender Offices").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-8 (1984) ("Support
StaffAnd Forensic Experts").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-9 (1984)
("Investigators").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-IO (1984)
("Compensation"). -
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation").
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
64
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ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.6 (1989) ("Support Services").
Commentary
As reflected in Guideline 4.1 and the accompanying Commentary, the provision ofhigh
quality legal representation in capital cases requires a team approach that combines the different
skills, experience, and perspectives of several disciplines. l66 The team approach enhances the
quality of representation by expanding the knowledge base available to prepare and present the
case, increases efficiency by allowing attorneys to delegate many time-consuming tasks to skilled
assistants and focus on the legal issues in the case,167 improves the relationship with the client and
his family by providing more avenues ofcommunication, and provides more support to individual
team members.168
This Guideline contemplates that the Responsible Agency will ordinarily169 begin by
designating lead counsel for a rarticular case and then, in consultation with that counsel, designate
one or more associate counsel. 70 As described in Subsection B, the role of lead counsel is to
direct the work of the defense team in such a way that, overall, it provides high quality legal
representation in accordance with these GUidelines and professional standards. Accordingly, lead
counsel is free to allocate the duties imposed by these Guidelines to appropriate members of the
defense team, with two exceptions: (1) duties (such as the one contained in Subsection C) that are
specifically imposed on "lead counsel," and (2) duties (such as the one contained in Guideline
10.13) that are specifically imposed on "all counsel" or "all members ofthe defense team."
After designation, lead counsel should assemble the rest of the defense team. The




See TEXAS DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 103.
See Mahoney v. Pataki, 98 N.Y.2d 45,54, 772 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (2002).
TEXAS DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 103.
169
170
This term is meant to accommodate the variety ofexigent circumstances under which the
provision of high quality legal representation might require a different procedure. For example,
the client may be so situated that the professionally responsible course is to have a relatively
junior attorney deal with the immediate situation, designating lead counsel subsequently. Or the
client might insist on having a particular retained or pro bono attorney inVolved irtthe
representation.
Cf. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(2) (McKinney 2002) ("With respect to counsel at trial and at a
separate sentencing proceeding, the court shall appoint two attorneys, one to be designated 'lead'
counsel and the other to be designated 'associated' counsel. "); Cal. Rules ofCt., R. 4.117(c)(I)
(effective Jan. 1,2003) ("If the court appoints more than one attorney, one must be designated
lead counsel and ... at least one other must be designated associate counsel."). Because the
Responsible Agency has a continuing duty to monitor the performance ofthe defense team to
insure that it is providing high quality legal representation at every stage of the case (Guideline
7.1), the Responsible Agency may appropriately change these designations to reflect
developments in the case (e.g., it moves to a new post-conviction stage, or lead counsel becomes
ill).
65 000371
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counsel should structure the team in such a way as to distinguish between experts who will playa
"consulting" role, serving as part ofthe defense team covered by the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine, and experts who will be called to testifY, thereby waiving such
protections.17I This may well require, in the words of the Guideline, "appropriate contractual
arrangements," Subsection C (2).
However, Subsection C (2) provides that the Responsible Agency may impose standards
on the composition ofthe defense team that are in accord with these Guidelines. Examples would
include a requirement that a staffattorney ofa defender organization utilize in-house resources in
the first instance, that compensation levels be limited to levels consistent with Guideline 9.1 (C), or
that non-attorneys meet appropriate professional qualifications.
The defense team should include at least two attorneys, a fact investigator, and a mitigation
specialist. The roles of these individuals are more fully described in the commentaries to
Guidelines 1.1 and Guideline 4.1. In addition, as also described in the Commentary to Guideline
4.1, the team must have a member (who may be one ofthe foregoing or an additional person) with
the necessary qualifications to screen individuals (the client in the first instance, but possibly
family members as the mitigation investigation progresses) for mental or psychological disorders
or defects and to recommend such further investigation ofthe subject as may seem appropriate.
The team described in the foregoing paragraph is the minimum. In many cases, more than
two attorneys are necessary - for example, a specialist to assist with motions practice and record
preservation, or an attorney who is particularly knowledgeable about an area of scientific
evidence. 172 As discussed in the Commentary to Guideline 4.1, because mental health issues
pervade capital cases a psychologist or other mental health expert may well be a needed member
of the defense team. As the Commentary to Guideline 4.1 also discusses, additional expert
assistance specific to the case will almost always be necessary for an effective defense.
Lead counsel is responsible, in the exercise of sound professional judgment, for
determining what resources are needed and for demanding that the jurisdiction provide them.
Because the defense should not be required to disclose privileged communications or strategy to
the prosecution in order to secure these resources,173 counsel should insist on making such
requests ex parte and in camera.174
See James J. Clark et aI., The Fiend Unmasked: Developing the mental health dimensions
ofthe defense, in KENTUCKY DEP'T OF PuB. ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH & EXPERTS MANUAL
ch. 8 (6th ed. 2002), available at http://www.dpa.state.ky.us/library/manuals/mental/Ch08.html;
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MENTAL HEALTH Standard 7-1.1 & cmt., in ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (1989) (mental health and mental retardation
experts serving as consultants are agents ofthe attorney, subject to the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine); accord id. Standard 7-3.3 cmt; see also supra Guideline
4. 1(B)(2).
Cf Freedman, supra note 50, at 1089 n.l (each of six primary attorneys and eleven other
named professionals were "critical to saving Mr. Washington's life").
173
174
See supra Guideline 4.1 (B)(2).
Many jurisdictions provide, by statute or case law, that requests for expert assistance may
66
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If such requests are denied, counsel should make an adequate record to preserve the issue
for post-conviction review. 175
be made ex parte so that indigent defendants are not required to divulge confidential work product
or strategy to the prosecution. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 192-94 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997); Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 120 (Ala. 1996); State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423,
428-29 (Tenn. 1995); Ex parte Lexington County, 314 S.C. 220, 228, 442 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1994)
(equal protection concerns require hearing to be both ex parte and in camera); Brooks v. State,
259 Ga. 562, 565-66, 385 S.E.2d 81,84 (1989) (while state could be heard on fiscal issues,
showing of need for expert should be made ex parte), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990);
McGregor v. State, 733 P.2d 416, 416 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) ("[T]o allow participation, or even
presence, by the State would thwart the Supreme Court's attempt to place indigent defendants, as
nearly as possible, on a level ofequality with nonindigent defendants.");18 U.S.C. §
3006(A)(e)(l) (providing for ex parte hearings for requests for investigative, expert or other
services for indigent defendants); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9(a) (West Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-4508 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21(a) (West Supp. 2002); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 7.135 (Michie 1998); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-26(C)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1997).
Under the AEDPA, such a record may be critical to the ability ofthe client to succeed on
federal habeas corpus. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000); see generally Stephen
B. Bright, Obtaining Funds/or Experts and Investigative Assistance, THE CHAMPION, June 1997,
at 31,33; Edward C. Monahan & James J. Clark, Funds/or Defense Experts: What a National
Benchmark Requires, THE CHAMPION, June 1997, at 12.
67
000373
             ·   
               
   
                
                
                  
                
                
                
                 
                
               
             
)(e)(1              
              
               
               
            
                    
               
            
               
        
 
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
Guideline 10.5 Relationship with the Client
A. Counsel at all stages of the case should make every appropriate effort to establish a
relationship of trust with the client, and should maintain close contact with the client.
B. 1. Barring exceptional circumstances, an interview of the client should be
conducted within 24 hours of initial counsel's entry into the case.
2. Promptly upon entry into the case, initial counsel should communicate in an
appropriate manner with both the client and the government regarding the
protection of the client's rights against self-incrimination, to the effective
assistance of counsel, and to preservation of the attorney-client privilege and
similar safeguards.
3. Counsel at all stages of the case should re-advise the client and the government
regarding these matters as appropriate.
C. Counsel at all stages of the case should engage in a continuing interactive dialogue
with the client concerning all matters that might reasonably be expected to have a
material impact on the case, such as:
1. the progress of and prospects for the factual investigation, and what assistance
the client might provide to it;
2. current or potential legal issues;
3. the development of a defense theory;
4. presentation of the defense case;
5. potential agreed-upon dispositions of the case;
6. litigation deadlines and the projected schedule of case-related events; and
7. relevant aspects of the client's relationship with correctional, parole, or other
governmental agents (e.g., prison medical providers or state psychiatrists).
History ofGuideline
This Guideline collects, and slightly expands upon, material that was found in Guidelines
11.4.2, 11.6.1, and 11.8.3 of the original edition. The major revisions make this standard apply to
all stages ofa capital case and note expressly counsel's obligation to discuss potential dispositions
ofthe case with the client.
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Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1
("Establishment ofRelationship"), Standard 4-3.2 ("Interviewing the Client"), Standard 4-3.8
("Duty to Keep Client Informed"), and Standard 4-5.2 ("Control and Direction of the Case"), in
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d
ed.1993).
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF APuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 3 (2002)
("Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified ofappointment,
as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 1.3(c) ("General Duties ofDefense Counsel"), Guideline
2.2 ("Initial Interview") (1997).
Commentary
The Problem
Immediate contact with the client is necessary not only to gain information needed to
secure evidence and crucial witnesses, but also to try to prevent uncounseled confessions or
admissions and to begin to establish a relationship oftrust with the client.
Anyone who has just been arrested and charged with capital murder is likely to be in a
state ofextreme anxiety. Many capital defendants are, in addition, severely impaired in ways that
make effective communication difficult: they may have mental illnesses or personality disorders
that make them highly distrustful or impair their reasoning and perception of reality; they may be
mentally retarded or have other cognitive impairments that affect their judgment and
understanding; they may be depressed and even suicidal; or they may be in complete denial in the
face ofoverwhelming evidence. In fact, the prevalence of mental illness and impaired reasoning
is so high in the capital defendant population that "[i]t must be assumed that the client is
emotionally and intellectually impaired.,,176 There will also often be significant cultural and/or
language barriers between the client and his lawyers. In many cases, a mitigation specialist, social
worker or other mental health expert can help identify and overcome these barriers, and assist
counsel in establishing a rapport with the client.
See Rick Kammen & Lee Norton, Plea Agreements: Working with Capital Defendants,
THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 2000, at 31, available at
http://www.dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/marOO/plea.html;seealsoLewis.supranote91.at
840 (finding 40% ofdeath row inmates to be chronically psychotic); Dorothy O. Lewis et aI.,
Neuropsychiatric, psychoeducational, andfamily characteristics of14juveniles condemned to
death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584,585 (1988) (finding 50% of death
sentenced juveniles in survey suffered from psychosis and all were severely abused as children).
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Counsel's Duty
Although ongoing communication by non-attorney members ofthe defense team is
important, it does not discharge the obligation of counsel at every stage of the case to keep the
client informed of developments and progress in the case, and to consult with the client on
strategic and tactical matters. Some decisions require the client's knowledge and agreement;177
others, which may be made by counsel, should nonetheless be fully discussed with the client
beforehand.
Establishing a relationship of trust with the client is essential both to overcome the client's
natural resistance to disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an
effective penalty phase defense, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 101-04 supra, and to
ensure that the client will listen to counsel's advice on important matters such as whether to testify
and the advisability of a plea.178 Client contact must be ongoing. An occasional hurried interview
with the client will not reveal to counsel all the facts needed to prepare for trial, appeal, post-
conviction review, or clemency. Similarly, a client will not - with good reason - trust a lawyer
who visits only a few times before trial, does not send or reply to correspondence in a timely
manner, or refuses to take telephone calls. It is also essential for the defense team to develop a
relationship of trust with the client's family or others on whom the client relies for support and
advice.
Often, so-called "difficult" clients are the consequence of bad lawyering - either in the
past or present.179 Simply treating the client with respect, listening and responding to his
concerns, and keeping him informed about the case will often go a long way towards eliciting
confidence and cooperation. I80
See, e.g., Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (ineffective assistance for
counsel to fail to obtain client's explicit prior consent to strategy ofconceding guilt to jury in
opening statement in effort to preserve credibility for sentencing), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 980
(2000).
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.2 & cmt.,
in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
(3d ed. 1993). See also Kevin M. Doyle, Heart o/the Deal: Ten Suggestions/or Plea Bargaining,
THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1999, at 68 (counsel should not expect client to accept plea bargain unless
opinion is founded on experience and leg work investigating the case); White, supra note 2, at
371,374 (thorough investigation and relationship oftrust key to persuading client to accept
appropriate plea offer).
See White, supra note 2, at 338 ("Often, capital defendants have had bad prior experiences
with appointed attorneys, leading them to view such attorneys as 'part of the system' rather than
advocates who will represent their interests. Appointed capital defense attorneys sometimes
exacerbate this perception by harshly criticizing their clients' conduct or making it clear that they
are reluctant to represent them. A capital defendant who experiences, or previously has
experienced, these kinds ofjudgments understandably will be reluctant to trust his attorney.").
A lawyer can frequently earn a client's trust by assisting him with problems he encounters
in prison or otherwise demonstrating concern for the client's well being and a willingness to
advocate for him. See id.; Lee Norton, Mitigation Investigation, in FLORIDA PuBLIC DEFENDER
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Overcoming barriers to communication and establishing a rapport with the client are
critical to effective representation. Even apart from the need to obtain vital information,181 the
lawyer must understand the client and his life history.182 To communicate effectively on the
client's behalf in negotiating a plea, addressing ajury, arguing to a post-conviction court, or
urging clemency, counsel must be able to humanize the defendant. That cannot be done unless the
lawyer knows the inmate well enough to be able to convey a sense oftruly caring what happens to
him. 183
Counsel's Duties Respecting Uncooperative Clients
Some clients will initially insist that they want to be executed - as punishment or because
they believe they would rather die than spend the rest oftheir lives in prison; some clients will
want to contest their guilt but not present mitigation. It is ineffective assistance for counsel to
simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect overwhelming feelings ofguilt or despair
rather than a rational decision. l84 Counsel should initially try to identify the source of the client's
hopelessness. Counsel should consult lawyers, clergy or others who have worked with similarly
situated death row inmates. Counsel should try to obtain treatment for the client's mental and/or
emotional problems, which may become worse over time. One or more members ofthe defense
team should always be available to talk to the client; members ofthe client's family, friends, or
clergy might also be enlisted to talk to the client about the reasons for living; inmates who have
accepted pleas or been on death row and later received a life sentence (or now wish they had),
may also be a valuable source of information about the possibility of making a constructive life in
prison. A client who insists on his innocence should be reminded that a waiver of mitigation will
not persuade an appellate court ofhis innocence, and securing a life sentence may bar the state
from seeking death in the event of a new trial.185
ASS'N, DEFENDING ACAPITAL CASE IN FLORIDA 25 (2001). Accordingly, such advocacy is an
appropriate part of the role ofdefense counsel in a capital case. Indeed, a lawyer who displays a
greater concern with habeas corpus doctrine than with recovering the radio that prison authorities
have confiscated from the client is unlikely to develop the sort of a relationship that will lead to a
satisfactory legal outcome.
One important example is the fact that the client is mentally retarded - a fact that the client
may conceal with great skill, see, e.g., James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414, 484-86 (1985), but one which counsel
absolutely must know. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (holding that
mentally retarded defendants may not constitutionally be executed).




See Norton, supra note 180, at 5; White, supra note 2, at 374-75 (jury will be less likely to
empathize with defendant if it does "not perceive a bond between the defendant and his attorney").
See infra Guideline 10.7(A) and accompanying Commentary; Kammen & Norton, supra
note 176, at 32.
See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123
S.Ct. 732 (2003).
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Counsel in any event should be familiar enough with the client's mental condition to make
a reasoned decision - fully documented, for the benefit of actors at later stages of the case -
whether to assert the position that the client is not competent to waive further proceedings. 186
The Temporal Scope ofCounsel's Duties
The obligations imposed on counsel by this Guideline apply to all stages of the case. Thus,
post-conviction counsel, from direct appeal through clemency, must not only consult with the
client but also monitor the client's personal condition for potential legal consequences.187 For
example, actions by prison authorities (e.g., solitary confinement, administration ofrsychotropic
medications) may impede the ability to present the client as a witness at a hearing, I8 and changes
in the client's mental state (e.g., as a result ofthe breakup ofa close relationship or a worsening
physical condition) may bear upon his capacity to assist counsel and, ultimately, to be executed.189
In any event, as already discussed, maintaining an ongoing relationship with the client minimizes
the possibility that he will engage in counter-productive behavior (e.g., attempt to drop appeals,
act out before a judge, confess to the media). Thus, the failure to maintain such a relationship is
professionally irresponsible.19o
See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-402 (1993) (setting forth minimum
competency standard that the Constitution requires).
187 See infra text accompanying note 338.
188 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (defendant was constitutionally entitled to
have administration ofanti-psychotic drugs cease before trial).
189 See infra text accompanying note 339.
190 See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1A(a) (2002) ("A lawyer shall
keep a client reasonably informed about the status ofa matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.").
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Guideline 10.6 Additional Obligations of Counsel Representing a Foreign
National
191
A. Counsel at every stage of the case should make appropriate efforts to determine
whether any foreign country might consider the client to be one of its nationals.
B. Unless predecessor counsel has already done so, counsel representing a foreign
national should:
1. immediately advise the client of his or her right to communicate with the
relevant consular office; and
2. obtain the consent of the client to contact the consular office. After obtaining
consent, counsel should immediately contact the client's consular office and
inform it of the client's detention or arrest.
a. Counsel who is unable to obtain consent should exercise his or her best
professional judgment under the circumstances.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is new and reflects developments in law and practice since the original
edition.
Related Standards
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April 24,
1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. 6820.
Commentary
The right to consular assistance is contained in Article 36 ofthe Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, a multilateral treaty ratified unconditionally by the United States in 1969.
Under its provisions, an obligation rests on local authorities to promptly inform detained or
arrested foreign nationals of their right to communicate with their consulate. At the request of the
foreign national, local authorities must contact the consulate and permit consular communication
and access.
There is considerable evidence that American local authorities routinely fail to comply
with their obligations under the Vienna Convention.191
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 380 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding
Paraguayan national's argument for stay ofexecution not wholly without merit where the United
States government had submitted an amicus brief acknowledging that the Vienna Convention had
been violated); Sandra Babcock, The Role ofInternational Law in United States Death Penalty
Cases, 15 LEIDEN J. INT. L. 367, 368 (2002) (describing violations as "widespread and
uncontested"). See also Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
U.S.A.) (Order on Request for the Indication ofProvisional Remedies) (Feb. 5, 2003) (text
accessible at http://www.icj-ij .org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus_order_20030205 .PDF)
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Any such failure is likely to have both practical and legal implications. As a practical
matter, consuls are empowered to arrange for their nationals' legal representation and to provide a
wide range of other services. These include, to name a few, enlisting the diplomatic assistance of
their country to communicate with the State Department and international and domestic tribunals
(e.g., through amicus briefs), assisting in investigations abroad, providing culturally appropriate
resources to explain the American legal system, arranging for contact with families and other
supportive individuals. As a legal matter, a breach ofthe obligations ofthe Vienna Convention or
a bilateral consular convention may well give rise to a claim on behalfofthe client.
Enlisting the consulate's support after obtaining the client's consent to do so should therefore
be viewed by counsel as an important element in defending a foreign national at any stage ofa death
penalty case,192 and counsel should also give careful consideration to the assertion ofany legal rights
that the client may have as a result ofany failure ofthe government to meet its treaty obligations.
Subsection B(2)(a) recognizes, however, that cases do vary. A range ofconsiderations may
make clients reluctant to have their consular office informed of their detentions. In many
circumstances, such as those in which clients simply fear embarrassment if word of their plight
reaches home, the attorney should counsel the client to overcome the reluctance. But if the client is a
political dissident and the likely effect of informing the consulate would be to cause adverse
(ordering United States to take all necessary measures to insure that three Mexican nationals under
state death sentences are not executed pending resolution ofMexico's claim "that the United
States has systematically violated the rights of Mexico and its nationals under Article 36 ofthe
Vienna Convention").
Furthermore, counsel should be alert to the fact that the United States has bilateral consular
treaties with over 50 countries which may impose obligations additional to those under the Vienna
Convention, see www.travel.state.gov/notification5.html#provisions (listing treaties). One
example is Article 16 ofthe Consular Convention Between the United States and the United
Kingdom, 3 U.S.T. 3426 (1952), which currently covers 32 independent countries around the
world that were formerly entities within the British Empire.
See Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 710 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (granting post-conviction
relief because it was ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to "inform Petitioner he could have
obtained financial, legal and investigative assistance from his consulate"); see also Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 380 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Editorial: On a Foreign Death Row,
WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1998, at A15 (noting that under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, "[a] citizen is entitled to the protection and advice of his or her government when
caught in a foreign legal system and a foreign language," granting that citizen access to "a
translator, local counsel and diplomatic pressure ifneeded"). Foreign governments often have
formal assistance programs in place for nationals facing the death penalty in the United States.
See, e.g., Ana Mendieta, Mexico Will AidNationals in US; Fund Will Help 45 Death Row
Inmates, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at 18 (describing creation of legal assistance program
to defend the rights ofMexican nationals sentenced to death in the United States and bolster
recognition of rights under the Vienna Convention); Court Blocks Execution ofCanadian in
Texas, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1998, at A47 ("Canada ... regularly seeks clemency for Canadians
sentenced to death abroad").
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consequences to his relatives without obtaining any assistance with the case, the attorney might
reasonably abide by the client's direction to withhold notification. The matter should, however, be
kept under continuing review, since conditions may well change over time.
Subsection A is included in the Guideline to emphasize that the determination ofnationality
may require some effort by counsel. A foreign government might recognize an American citizen as
one of its nationals on the basis ofan affiliation (e.g. one grandparent ofthat nationality) that would
not be apparent at first glance.
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Guideline 10.7 Investigation
A. Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct thorough and independent
investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty.
1. The investigation regarding guilt should be conducted regardless of any
admission or statement by the client concerning the facts of the alleged crime,
or overwhelming evidence of guilt, or any statement by the client that evidence
bearing upon guilt is not to be collected or presented.
2. The investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any
statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be
collected or presented.
B. 1. Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct a full examination of the
defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. This obligation
includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the defense
team and examining the files of prior counsel.
2. Counsel at every stage have an obligation to satisfy themselves independently
that the official record of the proceedings is complete and to supplement it as
appropriate.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on portions of Guideline 11.4.1 of the original edition. Changes in
this Guideline clarify that counsel should conduct thorough and independent investigations
relating to both guilt and penalty issues regardless of overwhelming evidence of guilt, client
statements concerning the facts ofthe alleged crime, or client statements that counsel should
refrain from collecting or presenting evidence bearing upon guilt or penalty.
Subsection B (l) is new and describes the obligation ofcounsel at every stage to examine
the defense provided to the client at all prior phases ofthe case. Subsection B (2) is also new and
describes counsel's ongoing obligation to ensure that the official record ofproceedings is
complete.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1 ("Duty to
Investigate"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation").
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Commentary
At every stage ofthe proceedings, counsel has a duty to investigate the case thoroughly.193
This duty is intensified (as are many duties) by the unique nature ofthe death penalty, has been
emphasized by recent statutory changes,194 and is broadened by the bifurcation ofcapital trials.195
This Guideline outlines the scope ofthe investigation required a capital case, but is not intended to
be exhaustive.
Guilt/Innocence
As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 47-49, between 1973 and 2002 some 100
people were freed from death row in the United States on the grounds of innocence.196
Unfortunately, inadequate investigation by defense attorneys - as well as faulty eyewitness
identification, coerced confessions, prosecutorial misconduct, false jailhouse informant
testimony,197 flawed or false forensic evidence;98 and the special vulnerability ofjuvenile
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1,4-6.1,
in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
(3d ed. 1993); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass 'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation").
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which, as amended by the AEDPA, precludes certain claims
from federal habeas corpus review if the petitioner "has failed to develop the factual basis" of
them "in State court proceedings." See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (construing
this section).
See generally Lyon, supra note 2; Vick, supra note 3. Numerous courts have found
counsel to be ineffective when they have failed to conduct an adequate investigation for
sentencing. See, e.g. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (counsel ineffective for
failing to uncover and present evidence ofdefendant's "nightmarish childhood," borderline mental
retardation, and good conduct in prison); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1070 (lIth Circuit
2002) (counsel ineffective for failing to "investigate, obtain, or present any mitigating evidence to
the jury, let alone the powerful mitigating evidence ofBrownlee's borderline mental retardation,
psychiatric disorders, and history ofdrug and alcohol abuse"); infra note 203.
See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER: Innocence and the Death Penalty, available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfor.org/innoc.html (last visited November 5,2002) (stating that there
are 102 people that have been wrongly convicted ofcapital crimes).
See generally Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (canvassing special
unreliability ofsuch testimony and restricting its use); supra note 48.
Recent years have seen a series ofscandals involving the prosecution's use, knowingly or
unknowingly, ofscientifically unsupportable or simply fabricated forensic evidence by
governmental agents. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, OFF. INSP. GEN., The FBI Laboratory: An
Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives Related and Other
Cases (1997) (Eighteen-months investigation into charges by whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst
that FBI Laboratory mishandled "some ofthe most significant prosecutions in the recent history of
77
000383
                
 
                
                  
              
                
  
l  
               
                
           
        
     ence,1        
           
           
        s       
      
               
                
               
  
               
              
              
            
               
              
             
            
            
         
           
               
           
               
          
              
            
          






ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
suspects - have contributed to wrongful convictions in both capital and noncapital cases. l99 In
capital cases, the mental vulnerabilities of a large portion ofthe client population compound the
possibilities for error.2oo This underscores the im~ortance ofdefense counsel's duty to take
seriously the possibility of the client's innocence, 01 to scrutinize carefully the quality of the
state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses.202
In this regard, the elements of an appropriate investigation include the following:
1. Charging Documents:
Copies of all charging documents in the case should be obtained and
examined in the context ofthe applicable law to identify:
a. the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s)
alleged to make the death penalty applicable;
b. the defenses, ordinary and affirmative, that may be available to the
substantive charge and to the applicability ofthe death penalty;
c. any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as statutes of
limitations or double jeopardy) that can be raised to attack the
charging documents; and
the Department ofJustice" finds "significant instances of testimonial errors, substandard
analytical work, and deficient practices"); Paul C. Gianelli, The Abuse ofScientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases: The Needfor Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 439,
442-69 (1997) (summarizing numerous cases); supra note 49.
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How
TO MAKE IT RIGHT (Signet 2001 ed.).
See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2251-52 (2002) ("Mentally retarded
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes."); see also Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981).
As this Guideline emphasizes, that is so even where circumstances appear overwhelmingly
indicative ofguilt. A recent study that includes both capital and non-capital DNA exonerations
has found that in 23 percent of the cases the client had confessed notwithstanding his innocence.
See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 199, at 92. See also Dan Morain, Blind Justice; John Cherry's
Killing Left Many Victims; Was the Accused One ofThem? L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1989, View, at 6
(noting that Jerry Bigelow confessed many times, including to the media and was eventually
found to be innocent).
See Steven M. Pincus, "It's Good to be Free": An Essay About the Exoneration ofAlbert
Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 27, 33 (2001).
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d. defense counsel's right to obtain information in the possession of the
government, and the applicability and validity ofany obligation that
might arise to provide reciprocal discovery.
2. Potential Witnesses:
a. Barring exceptional circumstances, counsel should seek out and
interview potential witnesses, including, but not limited to:
(I) eyewitnesses or other witnesses having purported knowledge
ofevents surrounding the alleged offense itself;
(2) potential alibi witness;
(3) witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history that
might affect the likelihood that the client committed the
charged offense(s), the degree ofculpability for the offense,
including:
(a) members ofthe client's immediate and extended family
(b) neighbors, friends and acquaintances who knew the client or
his family
(c) former teachers, clergy, employers, co-workers, social
service providers, and doctors
(d) correctional, probation or parole officers;
(4) members ofthe victim's family.
b. Counsel should conduct interviews ofpotential witnesses in the
presence ofa third person so that there is someone to call as a
defense witness at trial. Alternatively, counsel should have an
investigator or mitigation specialist conduct the interviews. Counsel
should investigate all sources ofpossible impeachment ofdefense
and prosecution witnesses.
3. The Police and Prosecution:
Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the possession of the
prosecution or law enforcement authorities, including police reports,
autopsy reports, photos, video or audio tape recordings, and crime scene
and crime lab reports. Where necessary, counsel should pursue such efforts
through formal and informal discovery.
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4. Physical Evidence:
Counsel should make a prompt request to the police or investigative agency
for any physical evidence or expert reports relevant to the offense or
sentencing. With the assistance ofappropriate experts, counsel should then
aggressively re-examine all ofthe government's forensic evidence, and
conduct appropriate analyses of all other available forensic evidence.
5. The Scene:
Counsel should view the scene ofthe alleged offense as soon as possible.
This should be done under circumstances as similar as possible to those
existing at the time of the alleged incident (e.g., weather, time ofday, and
lighting conditions).
Penalty
Counsel's duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence is now well established.203
The duty to investigate exists regardless ofthe expressed desires ofa client.204 Nor may counsel
"sit idly by, thinking that investigation would be futile.,,205 Counsel cannot responsibly advise a
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (counsel ineffective for failing
to uncover and present evidence ofdefendant's "nightmarish childhood," borderline mental
retardation, and good conduct in prison); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002)
(counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence ofclient's brain damage due to
prolonged pesticide exposure and repeated head injuries, and failing to present expert testimony
explaining "the effects of the severe physical, emotional, and psychological abuse to which Caro
was subjected as a child"), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2645 (2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d
417,449-51 (6th Cir. 200 I) (though counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence is well
established, counsel failed to investigate and present evidence that defendant had been abandoned
as an infant in a garbage can by his mentally ill mother, was raised in a brothel run by his
grandmother where he was exposed to group sex, bestiality and pedophilia, and suffered from
probable brain damage and borderline personality disorder), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1639 (2002);
Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257,307-08 (3d Cir. 2001) (counsel ineffective for failing to investigate
and present evidence ofdefendant's abusive childhood and "psychiatric testimony explaining how
Jermyn's development was thwarted by the torture and psychological abuse he suffered as a
child"); supra note 195.
See Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (counsel ineffective for
"latch[ing] onto" client's assertions he did not want to call penalty phase witnesses and failing to
conduct an investigation sufficient to allow their client to make an informed decision to waive
mitigation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 837 (1989); see also Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1136-41
(9th Cir. 2002),petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. Sept. 13,2002) (No. 02-434).
Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980); accord Austin v. Bell, 126
F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1997) (counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase of the trial, on grounds that he "did not think that it would do any good,"
constituted ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1079 (1998).
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client about the merits ofdifferent courses ofaction, the client cannot make informed decisions,
and counsel cannot be sure ofthe client's competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has
first conducted a thorough investigation with respect to both phases ofthe case.206
Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, "anything in the life of
the defendant which might militate against the appropriateness ofthe death penalty for the
defendant,,,207 "penalty phase preparation requires extensive and generally unparalleled
investigation into personal and family history.,,208 In the case ofthe client, this begins with the
moment of conception?09 Counsel needs to explore:
(1) Medical history (including hospitalizations, mental and physical
illness or injury, alcohol and drug use, pre-natal and birth trauma,
malnutrition, developmental delays, and neurological damage);
(2) Family and social history (including physical, sexual or emotional abuse;
family history ofmental illness, cognitive impairments, substance abuse, or
domestic violence; poverty, familial instability, neighborhood environment
and peer influence); other traumatic events such as exposure to criminal
violence, the loss ofa loved one or a natural disaster; experiences of racism
or other social or ethnic bias; cultural or religious influences; failures of
government or social intervention (e.g., failure to intervene or provide
See, e.g., Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825,838-39 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
342 (2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 447 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1639
(2002); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In addition to hampering
[defense counsel's] ability to make strategic decisions, [defense counsel's] failure to investigate
[defendant's background] clearly affected his ability to competently advise [defendant] regarding
the meaning ofmitigation evidence and the availability of possible mitigation strategies."); United
States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[C]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a
strategic choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation when s/he has not yet obtained the
facts on which such a decision could be made."); Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 1350 (5th
Cir. 1984) (petitioner entitled to relief if record shows that "counsel could not make a valid
strategic choice because he had made no investigation"), cert. denied, 469 U.s. 924 (1984).
Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903,908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987». See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb.
1999, at 35; see also, ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House ofDelegates (Feb.
1990), reprinted in Toward a More Just and Effective System ofReview in State Death Penalty
Cases, supra note 84, at 63.
Norton, supra note 180, at 2 (mitigation investigation must encompass client's "whole
life"); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE OF ALA., ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL ch. 12
(3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL]; Lyon, supra note 2, at
703 (observing that "mitigation begins with the onset of the [defendant's] life" because "[m]any
[defendants'] problems start with things like fetal alcohol syndrome, head trauma at birth, or their
mother's drug addiction during pregnancy"); Vick, supra note 3, at 363.
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necessary services, placement in poor quality foster care or juvenile
detention facilities);
(3) Educational history (including achievement, performance, behavior, and
activities), special educational needs (including cognitive limitations and
learning disabilities) and opportunity or lack thereof, and activities;
(4) Military service, (including length and type of service, conduct, special
training, combat exposure, health and mental health services);
(5) Employment and training history (including skills and performance, and
barriers to employability);
(6) Prior juvenile and adult correctional experience (including conduct while
under supervision, in institutions of education or training, and regarding
clinical services);
The mitigation investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may
affect the investigation of first phase defenses (e.g., by suggesting additional areas for questioning
police officers or other witnesses), decisions about the need for expert evaluations (including
competency, mental retardation, or insanity), motion practice, and plea
negotiations.210
Accordingly, immediately upon counsel's entry into the case appropriate
member(s) of the defense team should meet with the client to:
1. discuss the alleged offense or events giving rise to the charge(s), and any
improper police investigative practice or prosecutorial conduct which
affects the client's rights;
2. explore the existence of other potential sources of information relating to
the offense, the client's mental state, and the presence or absence of any
aggravating factors under the applicable death penalty statute and any
mitigating factors; and
3. obtain necessary releases for securing confidential records relating to any of
the relevant histories.
Counsel should bear in mind that much of the information that must be elicited for the
sentencing phase investigation is very personal and may be extremely difficult for the client to
discuss. Topics like childhood sexual abuse should therefore not be broached in an initial
interview. Obtaining such information typically requires overcoming considerable barriers, such
as shame, denial and repression, as well as other mental or emotional impairments from which the
client may suffer. As noted supra in the text accompanying note 101, a mitigation specialist who
is trained to recognize and overcome these barriers, and who has the skills to help the client cope
210 See supra text accompanying notes 11-26.
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with the emotional impact of such painful disclosures, is invaluable in conducting this aspect of
the investigation.
It is necessary to locate and interview the client's family members (who may suffer from
some of the same impairments as the client), and virtually everyone else who knew the client and
his family, including neighbors, teachers, clergy, case workers, doctors, correctional, probation or
parole officers, and others.2l1 Records - from courts, government agencies, the military,
employers, etc. - can contain a wealth ofmitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to
childhood abuse, retardation, brain damage, and/or mental illness,212 and corroborating witnesses'
recollections. Records should be re~uested concerning not only the client, but also his parents,
grandparents, siblings, and children. 13 A multi-generational investigation frequently discloses
significant patterns of family dysfunction and may help establish or strengthen a diagnosis or
underscore the hereditary nature ofa particular impairment.214 The collection of corroborating
information from multiple sources - a time- consuming task - is important wherever possible to
ensure the reliability and thus the persuasiveness of the evidence?1
Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 321; Lyon, supra note 2, at 703-04; Vick, supra note 3, at
366-67.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000) (counsel ineffective where they "failed
to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing
Williams' nightmarish childhood, not because ofany strategic calculation but because they
incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Had they done so, the jury would
have learned that Williams' parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and
his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been
committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents'
incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were
released from prison, had been returned to his parents' custody.") (footnote omitted); Jermyn v.
Hom, 266 F.3d 257,307 (3d Cir. 2001) (counsel ineffective for failing to obtain school records
that disclosed childhood abuse); see also ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note
209; TEXAS DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 103, ch. 3; Norton, supra note
180, at 32-38.
In order to verify or corroborate witness testimony about circumstances and events in the
defendant's life, defense counsel must "assemble the documentary record ofthe defendant's life,
collecting school, work, and prison records ''which might serve as sources ofrelevant facts. Vick,
supra note 3, at 367; see also Lyon, supra note 2, at 705-06.
Norton, supra note 180, at 3 (counsel should "investigate at least three generations" ofthe
client's family).
215 See id (advocating "triangulation" ofdata).
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Counsel should use all appropriate avenues including signed releases, subpoenas, court
orders, and requests or litigation pursuant to applicable open records statutes, to obtain all
potentially relevant information pertaining to the client, his or her siblings and parents, and other
family members, including but not limited to:
a. school records
b. social service and welfare records




g. criminal and correctional records
h. family birth, marriage, and death records
i. alcohol and drug abuse assessment or treatment records
j. INS records
If the client was incarcerated, institutionalized or placed outside of the home, as either a
juvenile or an adult, the defense team should investigate the possible effect ofthe facility's
conditions on the client's contemporaneous and later conduct.216 The investigation should also
explore the adequacy of institutional responses to childhood trauma, mental illness or disability to
determine whether the client's problems were ever accurately identified or properly addressed.217
The circumstances of a particular case will often require specialized research and expert
consultation. For example, if a client grew up in a migrant farm worker community, counsel
should investigate what pesticides the client may have been exposed to and their possible effect on
a child's developing brain.218 Ifa client is a relatively recent immigrant, counsel must learn about
the client's culture, about the circumstances of his upbringing in his country oforigin, and about
the difficulties the client's immigrant community faces in this country.219
See TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND
WHAT WE MUST Do ABOUT IT (1999).
See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms ofMoral Disengagement
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1467 (1997) (noting damaging
effects of "social conditions and experiences" often inflicted on institutionalized juvenile
offenders).
See Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2645 (2002)
(described supra note 203).
See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (positive testimony from defendant's
family, combined with expert testimony about difficulty ofadolescent immigrants from Hong
Kong assimilating to North America would have humanized client and could have resulted in a
life sentence for defendant convicted of 13 murders).
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Miscellaneous Concerns
Counsel should maintain copies ofmedia reports about the case for various purposes,
including to support a motion for change ofvenue, if appropriate, to assist in voir dire ofthe jury
regarding the effects ofpretrial publicity, to monitor the public statements ofpotential witnesses,
and to facilitate the work ofcounsel who might be involved in later stages ofthe case.
Counsel must also investigate prior convictions, adjudications, or unadjudicated offenses
that could be used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence. Ifa prior
conviction is legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside.220 Counsel may also find
extenuating circumstances that can be offered to lessen the weight ofa conviction, adjudication, or
unadjudicated offense.221
Additional investigation may be required to provide evidentiary support for other legal
issues in the case, such as challenging racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty
or in the composition ofjuries.222 Whether within the criminal case or outside it, counsel has a
duty to pursue appropriate remedies if the investigation reveals that such conditions exist.223
As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 247-59, counsel should consider making
overtures to members of the victim's family - possibly through an intermediary, such as a clergy
person, defense-victim liaison, or representative ofan organization such as Murder Victim's
Families for Reconciliation - to ascertain their feelings about the death penalty and/or the
possibility of a plea.224
220
221
See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 586 (1988); supra note 6.
See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
222 See, e.g., Miller-el v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 431659 ***cite to sec. I(B)*** (U.S. Feb. 25,
2003) (ruling for habeas petitioner in reliance on evidence presented at hearings on jury
discrimination claim conducted prior to trial and in state post-conviction proceedings); Sara
Rimer, In Dallas, Dismissal ofBlack Jurors Leads to Appeal by Death Row Inmate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13,2002, at A24 (discussing memoranda and training manuals from prosecutor's office
documenting policy of racial discrimination injury selection); Stephen B. Bright, Challenging
Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 22.
223 See supra Guideline 10.10.2; text accompanying note 7.
224 See Russell Stetler, Working with the Victim's Survivors in Death Penalty Cases, THE
CHAMPION, June 1999, at 42; see also Michael Janofsky, Parents ofGay Obtain Mercy for His
Killer, N.Y. DMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al (stating that the prosecutor decided to drop the death
penalty in the Matthew Shepard case because the parents of the victim requested him to do so).
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Guideline 10.8 The Duty to Assert Legal Claims
A. Counsel at every stage of the case, exercising professional judgment in accordance
with these Guidelines, should:
1. consider all legal claims potentially available; and
2. thoroughly investigate the basis for each potential claim before reaching a
conclusion as to whether it should be asserted; and
3. evaluate each potential claim in light of:
a. the unique characteristics of death penalty law and practice; and
b. the near certainty that all available avenues of post-conviction relief
will be pursued in the event of conviction and imposition of a death
sentence; and
c. the importance of protecting the client's rights against later contentions
by the government that the claim has been waived, defaulted, not
exhausted, or otherwise forfeited; and
d. any other professionally appropriate costs and benefits to the assertion
of the claim.
B. Counsel who decide to assert a particular legal claim should:
1. present the claim as forcefully as possible, tailoring the presentation to the
particular facts and circumstances in the client's case and the applicable law
in the particular jurisdiction; and
2. ensure that a full record is made of all legal proceedings in connection with the
claim.
C. Counsel at all stages of the case should keep under consideration the possible
advantages to the client of:
1. asserting legal claims whose basis has only recently become known or
available to counsel; and
2. supplementing claims previously made with additional factual or legal
information.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.5.1 (The Decision to File Pretrial Motions) and
Guideline 11.7.3 (Objection to Error and Preservation of Issues for Post Judgment Review) of the
original edition. New language makes clear that the obligations imposed by this Guideline exist at
every stage ofthe proceeding and extend to procedural vehicles other than the submission of
86
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motions to the trial court.
In Subsection A (3)(b), the phrase "near certainty" is new and replaces the word
"likelihood" from the original edition. The change reflects recent scholarship indicating that
appellate and post-conviction remedies are pursued by almost 100% ofcapital defendants who are
convicted and sentenced to death.
Subsections Band C are new to this edition.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.6 ("Prompt
Action to Protect the Accused") and Standard 4-4.5 ("Compliance with Discovery Procedure"), in
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d
ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 5.1 ("The Decision to File Pretrial Motions").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 5.3 ("Subsequent Filing ofPretrial Motions").
Commentary
"One of the most fundamental duties ofan attorney defending a capital case at trial is the
preservation ofany and all conceivable errors for each stage ofappellate and post-conviction
review. Failure to preserve an issue may result in the client being executed even though reversible
error occurred at trial.,,225 For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be especially
aware not only of strategies for winning at trial,226 but also of the heightened need to fully
preserve all potential issues for later review.
As the text ofthe first sentence of Subsection A makes clear, this obligation is not limited
to trial counselor to motions made to the trial court. For example, if a state post-conviction court
rules on the merits of a claim for relief, the claim will be available for federal review even if the
Stephen B. Bright, Preserving Error at Capital Trials, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1997, at 42-
43. For example, John Eldon Smith was executed by the State ofGeorgia even though he was
sentenced to death by a jury selected from a jury pool from which women were unconstitutionally
excluded. The federal courts refused to consider the issue because Mr. Smith's lawyers failed to
preserve it. Mr. Smith's co-defendant was also sentenced to death from ajury selected from the
same pool. The issue was preserved in the co-defendant's case, and the co-defendant's conviction
and death sentence were vacated. At retrial, the co-defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
See NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION Guideline 5.1 (1995) (listing potential motions).
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state's rules required the issue to be raised at trial.227 So, too, it may be appropriate for counsel to
proceed on some claims (e.g., double jeopardy) by seeking an interlocutory supervisory writ from
an appellate court228 or by otherwise seeking relief outside the confines of the capital litigation
itself.229
As discussed in the text accompanying note 27 supra, most jurisdictions have strict waiver
rules that will forestall post-judgment relief if an issue was not litigated at the first opportunity.
An issue may be waived not only by the failure to timely file a pretrial motion, but also because of
the lack ofa contemporaneous objection at trial, or the failure to request a jury instruction, or
counsel's failure to comply with some other procedural requirement established by statute, court
rule or caselaw. Counsel must therefore know and follow the procedural requirements for issue
preservation and act with the understanding that the failure to raise an issue by motion, objection
or other appropriate procedure may well forfeit the ability ofthe client to obtain reliefon that
issue in subsequent proceedings.
Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual,
sequestered voir dire on death-qualification ofthe jury) or a more common motion shaped by the
capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel
should be sure to litigate all of the possible legat230 and factuat231 bases for the request. This will
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985); see also Stewart v. Smith, 122 S. Ct. 2578
(2002) (per curiam).
See, e.g., Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46,454 N.E.2d 522, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1983)
(granting writ of prohibition sought by non-capital suspect to preclude investigation by improperly
designated prosecutor). Cf Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201,684 N.Y.S.2d 177
(1998) (invalidating portion ofNew York death penalty statute in proceeding for writ of
prohibition brought by prosecutor), cert. denied, 527 U.s. 1015(1999).
229 See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
230
231
Counsel should always cite to any arguably applicable provision of the United States
Constitution, the state constitution, and state law as bases for granting a claim. A reviewing court
may refuse to consider a legal theory different from that put forward originally. See Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (refusing to consider violation ofDue Process Clause of federal
constitution because defense counsel in state courts relied solely upon due process clause of state
constitution). For example, courts have refused to consider an assertion that a statement was taken
in violation ofthe Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it was argued in earlier proceedings
only that the statement was obtained in violation ofthe Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). Counsel should also present all of
the relevant facts at as early as feasible. See generally Bright, supra note 225, at 43, 44.
In this regard, as Subsection C indicates, counsel should bear in mind that in capital
litigation the courts tend to be much more responsive to supplemental presentations than they
might be in other contexts. See, e.g., Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982); Spaziano v.
State, 660 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1995) (granting motions filed by defendant facing fifth death warrant
that "seek to open by rehearing an appeal that was finalized more than thirteen years ago and a
postconviction proceeding that was terminated with a denial ofrehearing more than nine years
ago," and ordering a remand that eventually resulted in an in-court recantation by a key witness
88
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increase the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for
post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied.
Because ofthe possibility that the client will be sentenced to death, counsel must be
significantly more vigilant about litigating all potential issues at all levels in a capital case than in
any other case.232 As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, counsel also has a duty to
preserve issues calling for a change in existinf precedent; the client's life may well depend on
how zealously counsel discharges this duty.23 Counsel should object to anything that appears
unfair or unjust even if it involves challenging well-accepted practices.234
Because "[p]reserving all possible grounds can be very difficult in the heat ofbattle during
trial,,,235 counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any issues that counsel
anticipate will arise at trial. All ofthe grounds should be set out in the motion.236 Similarly,
requests for rulings during the course of post-conviction proceedings (e.g., for investigative
resources) should be made fully and formally.
and a life sentence, see DNA Tests to be Done in '74 Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 13,2002 at
B3).
232 See Bright, supra note 225, at 43 ("Failure to make an objection for fear of alienating the
judge or jury may be a valid consideration in a case in which there is a good chance ofacquittal or
the length of sentence will be so short that appellate review will be irrelevant to the client. But in
a capital case, it may deprive the client of a life.,.saving reversal on direct appeal or in habeas
corpus proceedings.").
233 See supra text accompanying note 27. Ifa claim, whether then meritorious or not, is being
litigated anywhere in the country, counsel is likely to be charged with knowledge that the "tools to
construct their constitutional claim" exist and be expected to raise it. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 133 (1982). In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), counsel failed to raise a "losing" issue
on behalfofMr. Smith in one state court because the state supreme court had recently held the
issue was meritless. Mr. Smith raised the issue in all subsequent state and federal proceedings,
and, well before these were concluded, the United States Supreme Court ruled favorably on the
question. However, because ofcounsel's previous decision to forego the presentation ofa claim
that was then meritless, Mr. Smith was executed.
For example, execution by electrocution has become de facto unconstitutional because
state governments have concluded that challenges to the practice have merit, even though the
contrary precedent remains in place. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); compare Alabama:
Optional Execution by Injection, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2002, at A20 (discussing how Alabama
enacted a law making lethal injection the state's primary method ofexecution when it looked as if
the Supreme Court might rule that the electric chair was cruel and unusual punishment); Sarah




Bright, supra note 225, at 45.
See ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 209, at 53.
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In accordance with Subsection B (2), counsel should ensure that there is a complete record
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions, statements ofgrounds,
questioning ofwitnesses or venire members, oral and written arguments ofboth sides, discussions
among counsel and the court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the parties. Ifa court refuses to
allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the
substance ofthe court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record ofwhat
transpired in the unrecorded proceeding.237 Counsel should also ensure that the record is clear
with regard to the critical facts to support the claim. For example, if counsel objects to the
peremptory strike ofa juror as race-based, counsel should ensure that it is clear from the record
not only that the prosecutor struck a particular juror, but the race of the juror, ofevery other
member of the venire, and the extent to which the unchallenged venire members shared the
characteristics claimed to be justifying the challenge.238
Further, as reflected in Guideline 10.7(B)(2), counsel at all stages ofthe case must
determine independently whether the existing official record may incompletely reflect the
proceedings, e.g., because the court reporter took notes but did not transcribe them or because the
court clerk does not include legal memoranda in the record transmitted to subsequent courts, or
because ofofficial negligence or misconduct.
As the nonexclusive list of considerations in Subsection A (3) suggests, there are many
instances in which counsel should assert legal claims even though their prospects of immediate
success on the merits is at best modest. Examples of such circumstances (in addition to those in
which counsel needs to forestall later procedural defenses (Subsection A (3)(c», include instances
where:
the claim should be preserved in light of foreseeable future events (e.g., the
completion ofan investigation, a ruling in a relevant case); or
asserting the claim may increase the government's incentive to reach an agreed-
upon disposition;239 or the presentation made in support of the claim may favorably
influence other relevant actors (e.g., the Governor).
See Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993); Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 714-15
(Tex. 1972); 4M Linen Co. v. W.P. Balard & Co., 793 S.W.2d 320,323 (Tex. App. 1990), writ
denied (Oct 31, 1990), rehearing ofwrit oferror overruled (Jan 9, 1991).
238 Bright, supra note 225, at 46.
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Guideline 10.9.1 The Duty to Seek an Agreed-Upon Disposition
A. Counsel at every stage of the case have an obligation to take all steps that may be
appropriate in the exercise of professional judgment in accordance with these
Guidelines to achieve an agreed-upon disposition.
B. Counsel at every stage of the case should explore with the client the possibility and
desirability of reaching an agreed-upon disposition. In so doing, counsel should fully
explain the rights that would be waived, the possible collateral consequences, and the
legal, factual, and contextual considerations that bear upon the decision. Specifically,
counsel should know and fully explain to the client:
1. the maximum penalty that may be imposed for the charged offense(s) and any
possible lesser included or alternative offenses;
2. any collateral consequences of potential penalties less than death, such as
forfeiture of assets, deportation, civil liabilities, and the use of the disposition
adversely to the client in penalty phase proceedings of other prosecutions of
him as well as any direct consequences of potential penalties less than death,
such as the possibility and likelihood of parole, place of confinement and good-
time credits;
3. the general range of sentences for similar offenses committed by defendants
with similar backgrounds, and the impact of any applicable sentencing
guidelines or mandatory sentencing requirements;
4. the governing legal regime, including but not limited to whatever choices the
client may have as to the fact finder and/or sentencer;
5. the types of pleas that may be agreed to, such as a plea ofguilty, a conditional
plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere or other plea which does not
require the client to personally acknowledge guilt,along with the advantages
and disadvantages of each;
6. whether any agreement negotiated can be made binding on the court, on
penal/parole authorities, and any others who may be involved;
7. the practices, policies and concerns of the particular jurisdiction, the judge
and prosecuting authority, the family of the victim and any other persons or
entities which may affect the content and likely results of plea negotiations;
8. concessions that the client might offer, such as:
a. an agreement to proceed waive trial and to plead guilty to particular
charges;
b. an agreement to permit a judge to perform functions relative to guilt or
sentence that would otherwise be performed by a jury or vice versa;
91 000397
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c. an agreement regarding future custodial status, such as one to be
confined in a more onerous category of institution than would
otherwise be the case;
d. an agreement to forego in whole or part legal remedies such as appeals,
motions for post-conviction relief, and/or parole or clemency
applications;
e. an agreement to provide the prosecution with assistance in
investigating or prosecuting the present case or other alleged criminal
activity;
f. an agreement to engage in or refrain from any particular conduct, as
appropriate to the case;
g. an agreement with the victim's family, which may include matters such
as: a meeting between the victim's family and the client, a promise not
to publicize or profit from the offense, the issuance or delivery of a
public statement of remorse by the client, or restitution;
h. agreements such as those described in Subsections 8 (a)-(g) respecting
actual or potential charges in another jurisdiction;
9. benefits the client might obtain from a negotiated settlement, including:
a. a guarantee that the death penalty will not be imposed;
b. an agreement that the defendant will receive a specified sentence;
c. an agreement that the prosecutor will not advocate a certain sentence,
will not present certain information to the court, or will engage in or
refrain from engaging in other actions with regard to sentencing;
d. an agreement that one or more of multiple charges will be reduced or
dismissed;
e. an agreement that the client will not be subject to further investigation
or prosecution for uncharged alleged or suspected criminal conduct;
f. an agreement that the client may enter a conditional plea to preserve
the right to further contest certain legal issues;
g. an agreement that the court or prosecutor will make specific
recommendations to correctional or parole authorities regarding the
terms of the client's confinement;
h. agreements such as those described in Subsections 9 (a)-(g) respecting
actual or potential charges in another jurisdiction.
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C. Counsel should keep the client fully informed of any negotiations for a disposition,
convey to the client any offers made by the prosecution, and discuss with the client
possible negotiation strategies.
D. Counsel should inform the client of any tentative negotiated agreement reached with
the prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the agreement along with
the advantages, disadvantages and potential consequences of the agreement.
E. If a negotiated disposition would be in the best interest of the client, initial refusals by
the prosecutor to negotiate should not prevent counsel from making further efforts to
negotiate. Similarly, a client's initial opposition should not prevent counsel from
engaging in an ongoing effort to persuade the client to accept an offer of resolution
that is in the client's best interest.
F. Counsel should not accept any agreed-upon disposition without the client's express
authorization.
G. The existence of ongoing negotiations with the prosecution does not in any way
diminish the obligations of defense counsel respecting litigation.
History ofGuideline
Guideline 10.9.1 is based on aspects of Guidelines 11.6.1, 11.6.2, and 11.6.3 of the
original edition. New language has been added to clarify the importance ofpursuing an agreed-
upon disposition at every phase ofthe case, not just as a substitute for proceeding to trial initially.
This Guideline omits the requirement, which appeared in Guideline 11.6.1 ofthe original
edition, ofclient consent to initiate plea discussions, in recognition ofthe possible unintended
consequence of premature rejection of plea options by a suicidal or depressed client. However,
the Guideline does require counsel to obtain the client's consent before accepting any agreed-upon
disposition. Moreover, the Guideline requires that counsel enter into a continuing dialogue with
the client about the content of any such agreement, including advantages, disadvantages, and
potential consequences.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-6.1 ("Duty to
Explore Disposition without Trial") and Standard 4-6.2 ("Plea Discussions"), in ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2 (3d ed. 1999)
("Responsibilities ofdefense counsel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
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Commentary
Guidelines 10.9.1 2 both deal with the subject ofagreed-upon dispositions. They and their
associated commentaries should be read together.
"Death is different because avoiding execution is, in many capital cases, the best and only
realistic result possible"; as a result, plea bargains in capital cases are not usually
"offered" but instead must be "pursued and won.,,240 Agreements are often only possible after
many years ofeffort. Accordingly, this Guideline emphasizes that the obligation ofcounsel to
seek an agreed-upon disposition continues throughout all phases ofthe case. As in other sorts of
protracted litigation, circumstances change over time and as they do (e.g., through replacement of
a prosecutor, death ofa prosecution witness, alteration in viewpoint ofa key family member of the
client or the victim, favorable developments in the law or the litigation, reconsideration by the
client) new possibilities arise.241 Whenever they do, counsel must pursue them.
In many jurisdictions, the prosecution will consider waiving the death penalty after the
defense makes a proffer ofthe mitigating evidence that would be presented at the penalty phase
and explains why death would be legally and/or factually inappropriate. In some states and the
federal government, this process is formalized and occurs before a decision is made whether to
seek the death penalty.242 In other jurisdictions, the process is not formalized and may occur after
the prosecution has announced its intention to seek the death penalty. In either event, the
mitigation investigation is crucial to persuading the prosecution not to seek death.243
Kevin McNally, Death Is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case Must be Different,
Too, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 8,15; see also Doyle, supra note 178.
Examples ofagreed-upon dispositions after extended litigation include the cases of Lloyd
Schlup, see Tim O'Neil, Killer Who Escaped Execution Over New "Evidence" Pleads Guilty, ST.
LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15 (client pleads guilty to second-degree murder after
new evidence appeared) and Paris Carriger, see Samuel R. Gross, ABA's Proposed Moratorium:
Lost Lives: Miscarriages ofJustice in Capital Cases, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 139-40
(1998) (following affirmance of federal habeas corpus reliefby Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998), client pleaded guilty to lesser offense
and was released). Numerous other instances are reported in LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 27,
Apps. C, D.
See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 160, § 9-10.030. New York law
gives the District Attorney a l20-day "deliberative period" to decide whether to file a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(2) (McKinney 2002);
Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33, 37, 731 N.E.2d 614, 616, 709 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (2000).
During that time, with the assistance of the Capital Defender's Office, counsel is appointed and
may attempt to persuade the prosecutor not to file a notice. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b (McKinney
2001). The notice may also be withdrawn at any time. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(4)
(McKinney 2002). Between 1995 and mid-2002, District Attorneys in New York formally
investigated seeking the death penalty against 701 defendants, but only filed notice that they were
seeking the death penalty against 43 of these. See New York Capital Defender Office home page,
available at <http://www.nycdo.org>.
243 See Doyle, supra note 178; White, supra note 2, at 328-29.
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Before entering into plea discussions, counsel should have thoroughly examined the
quality ofthe prosecution's case and investigated possible first-phase defenses and mitigation, as
discussed in the Commentary to GuidelineI0.7. Counsel must also consider the collateral
consequences ofentering a plea. For example, when the resulting adjudication of guilt could be
used as an aggravating circumstance in another pending case, counsel should endeavor to structure
an agreement that would resolve both cases without imposition of the death penalty.
In some cases, where there is a viable first-phase defense, it may be possible to negotiate a
plea to a lesser charge. And if it is trial counsel's perception that the death penalty is being sought
primarily to allow selection ofa death-qualified (and therefore conviction-prone) jury, counsel
should seek to remedy the situation through litigation in accordance with Guideline 10.8 as well as
through negotiation. In many capital cases, however, the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong,
and there is little or no chance ofcharge bargaining. In these cases, a guilty plea in exchange for
life imprisonment is the best available outcome.
These considerations mean that in the area of plea negotiations, as in so many others, death
penalty cases are sui generis. Many bases for bargaining in non-capital cases are irrelevant or
have little practical significance in a capital case,244 and some uniquely restrictive legal principles
apply.245 Emotional and political pressures, including ones from the victim's family or the media,
are especially likely to limit the government's willingness to bargain. On the other hand, the
complexity, expense, legal risks, and length of the capital trial and appellate process may make an
agreement particularly desirable for the prosecution.246
A very difficult but important part of capital plea negotiation is often contact with the
family ofthe victim.247 In some states, the prosecution is required to notify and confer with the
victim's family prior to entering a plea agreement.248 Any approaches to the victim's family
should be undertaken carefully and with sensitivity. Counsel should be creative in proposing
resolutions that may satisfy the needs of the victim's family, including providing more immediate
closure by expressly foregoing appeals or arranging an apology or meeting between the victim's
A number ofconcessions that the parties might exchange in the capital context appear in
Subsection B.
See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (invalidating provision of federal
statute carrying capital punishment on basis that it coerced waivers or jury trial rights); Hynes v.
Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613,621, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1204,684 N.Y.S.2d 177, 180 (1998) (applying
Jackson to invalidate portion ofNew York death penalty statute), cert. denied 527 U.S. 1015
(1999); New York City Bar Committee on Capital Punishment, The Pataki Administration's
Proposals to Expand the Death Penalty 55 N.Y. CITY BARREc. 129, 141-43 (2000) (describing
mechanisms by which pleas in capital cases were being reached in light ofHynes).
As indicated in note 242 supra, plea offers are extended prior to trial in a significant




See Stetler, supra note 224, at 42.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-71 (1995).
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family and the client ifthe client is willing and able to do so. The defense team may consider
seeking the assistance ofclergy, a defense-victim liaison, or an organization ofmurder victims'
families in the outreach effort and in crafting possible resolutions.249 The victim's family can be
critical to achieving a settlement.250
Except in unusual circumstances, all agreements that are made should be formally
documented between the parties concerned (e.g., in a writing between the client and
representatives of the victim). In any event, counsel has an obligation under Guideline 10.13 to
maintain in his or her own files a complete written description ofany agreement.
Agreements for action or nonaction by government actors in exchange for a plea of guilty
are governed by Guideline 1O.9.2(B)(2) and, for the client's future benefit, should be set forth as
clearly as possible on the record?51
In addition to persuading the prosecution to negotiate a resolution to the case, counsel must
often persuade the client as well. As discussed in the Commentary to Guidelines 10.5 and 10.9.2,
a relationship oftrust with the client is essential to accomplishing this. The entire defense team
must work from the outset of the case with the client and others close to him to lay the
groundwork for acceptance ofa reasonable resolution.
If the possibility of a negotiated disposition is rejected by either the prosecution or the
client when a settlement appears to counsel to be in the client's best interest, counsel should
continue efforts at persuasion while also continuing to litigate the case vigorously (Subsection G).
249
250
See supra text accompanying note 224.
See McNally, supra note 240, at 15; White, supra note 2, at 368-69.
251 See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,5-6 (1987) (where defendant was deemed to have
breached terms ofplea agreement by refusing to testify against co-defendant at a retrial, double
jeopardy did not preclude state from vacating defendant's plea ofguilty to second degree murder,
trying him for capital murder and sentencing him to death).
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Guideline 10.9.2 Entry of a Plea of Guilty
A. The informed decision whether to enter a plea of guilty lies with the client.
B. In the event the client determines to enter a plea of guilty:
1. Prior to the entry of the plea, counsel should:
a. make certain that the client understands the rights to be waived by
entering the plea and that the client's decision to waive those rights is
knowing, voluntary and intelligent;
b. ensure that the client understands the conditions and limits of the plea
agreement and the maximum punishment, sanctions, and other
consequences to which he or she will be exposed by entering the plea;
c. explain to the client the nature of the plea hearing and prepare the
client for the role he or she will play in the hearing, including
answering questions in court and providing a statement concerning the
offense.
2. During entry of the plea, counsel should make sure that the full content and
conditions of any agreements with the government are placed on the record.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline amends Guideline 11.6.4 of the original edition to clarify that the decision
regarding whether to enter a plea ofguilty must be informed and counseled, yet ultimately lies
with the client.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-6.1 ("Duty to
Explore Disposition Without Trial") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-6.2 ("Plea
Discussions") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.4 (3d ed. 1999)
("Defendant to be Advised").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.7 (3d ed. 1999)
("Record ofProceedings").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2 (3d ed. 1999)
("Responsibilities ofDefense Counsel").
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NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 6.3 "The Decision to Enter a Plea ofGuilty."
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 6.4 "Entry ofthe Plea Before the Court."
Commentary
Ifno written guarantee can be obtained that death will not be imposed following a plea of
guilty, counsel should be extremely reluctant to participate in a waiver ofthe client's trial rights.
The relationship that the defense team has established with the client and his or her family
will often determine whether the client will accept counsel's advice regarding the advisability of a
plea. The case must therefore be diligently investigated so that the client will have as realistic a
view of the situation as possible. As the Commentary to Guidelinel0.5 describes, a client will,
quite reasonably, not acceRt counsel's advice about the case if the attorney has failed to conduct a
meaningful investigation. 52
A competent client is ultimately entitled to make his own choice. Counsel's role is to
ensure that the choice is as well considered as possible. This may require counsel to work
diligently over time to overcome the client's natural resistance to the idea of standing in open
court, admitting to guilt, and perhaps agreeing to permanent imprisonment. Or it may require
counsel to do everything possible to prevent a depressed or suicidal client from pleading guilty
where such a plea could result in an avoidable death sentence.253
Because of the factors described in the text accompanying notes 178-90 supra, it will often
require the combined and sustained efforts ofthe entire defense team to dissuade the client from
making a self-destructive decision. As noted there, the defense team may also need to call on




See supra text accompanying note 178.
See supra Commentary to Guideline 10.5.
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A. As the investigations mandated by Guideline 10.7 produce information, trial counsel
should formulate a defense theory. Counsel should seek a theory that will be effective
in connection with both guilt and penalty, and should seek to minimize any
inconsistencies.
History ofGuideline
The revisions to this Guideline, which was formerly Guideline 11.7.1, are stylistic.
Related Standards
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 4.3 "Theory ofthe Case."
Commentary
Formulation ofand adherence to a persuasive and understandable defense theory are vital
in any criminal case. In a capital trial, the task ofconstructing a viable strategy is complicated by
the fact that the proceedings are bifurcated. The client is entitled to have counsel insist that the
state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,254 At the same time, if counsel takes contradictory
positions at guilt/innocence and sentencing, credibility with the sentencer is lost and the
defendant's chances for a life verdict reduced. Accordingly, it is critical that, well before trial,
counsel formulate an integrated defense theory255 that will be reinforced by its presentation at both
the guilt and mitigation stages.256 Counsel should then advance that theory during all phases of
the trial, including jury selection, witness preparation, pretrial motions, opening statement,
presentation ofevidence, and closing argument,257
See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (ineffective assistance for counsel to
fail to obtain client's explicit prior consent to strategy ofconceding guilt to jury in opening
statement in effort to preserve credibility for sentencing), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 980 (2000).
See infra text accompanying notes 271-74; McNally, supra note 240, at 8-11; White, supra
note 2, at 356-58.
As the text accompanying notes 102-03 supra suggests, for counsel to gamble that there
never will be a mitigation phase because the client will not be convicted ofthe capital charge is to
render ineffective assistance.
257 See Bright, supra note 225, at 40.
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Guideline 10.10.2 Voir Dire and Jury Selection
A. Counsel should consider, along with potential legal challenges to the procedures for
selecting the jury that would be available in any criminal case (particularly those
relating to bias on the basis of race or gender), whether any procedures have been
instituted for selection of juries in capital cases that present particular legal bases for
challenge. Such challenges may include challenges to the selection of the grand jury
and grand jury forepersons as well as to the selection of the petit jury venire.
B. Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and
challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding "death
qualification" concerning any potential juror's beliefs about the death penalty.
Counsel should be familiar with techniques: (1) for exposing those prospective jurors
who would automatically impose the death penalty following a murder conviction or
finding that the defendant is death-eligible, regardless of the individual circumstances
of the case; (2) for uncovering those prospective jurors who are unable to give
meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence; and (3) for rehabilitating potential
jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make them possibly
excludable.
C. Counsel should consider seeking expert assistance in the jury selection process.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.7.2 of the original edition. Subsection A of the
Guideline has been amended to make clear that potential jury composition challenges should not
be limited to the petit jury, but should also include the selection ofthe grandjury and grand jury
forepersons. Subsection B has been amended to reflect recent scholarship demonstrating that the
starkest failures ofcapital voir dire are the failure to uncover jurors who will automatically impose
the death penalty following a conviction or finding ofthe circumstances which make the
defendant eligible for the death penalty, and the failure to uncover jurors who are unable to
consider particular mitigating circumstances. Subsection C is new. Its language is derived from
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION Guideline 7.2(a)(7) (1995) ("Voir Dire and Jury Selection"), and the
accompanying Commentary.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-7.2
("Selection of Jurors"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.1
("Selection of Prospective Jurors"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND
TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.2 ("Juror
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ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.3 ("Challenge to
the array"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed.
1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.4 ("Conduct of
Voir Dire Examination"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY
JURY (3d ed. 1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.5 ("Challenges
for Cause"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed.
1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.6 ("Peremptory
Challenges"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d
ed. 1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.7 ("Procedure for
Exercise ofChallenges; Swearing the Jury"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.8 ("Impermissible
Peremptory Challenges"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY
JURY (3d ed. 1996).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TRIAL BY JURY Standard 15-2.9 ("Alternate
Jurors"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed.
1996).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 7.2 (1995) ("Voir Dire and Jury Selection").
Commentary
Jury selection is important and complex in any criminal case.258 In capital cases, it is all
the more critical. Counsel should devote substantial time to determining the makeup ofthe venire,
preparing a case-specific set of voir dire questions, planning a strategy for voir dire, and choosing
a jury most favorable to the theories ofmitigation that will be presented. Given the intricacy of
the process, counsel should consider obtaining the assistance ofan expert jury consultant.259
See John H. Blume, et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1209 & n.1 (2001) ("The conventional wisdom is that most trials are won
or lost in jury selection."); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 7.2 cmt. (1995) ("Voir Dire and Jury Selection").
See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 7.2 cmt. (1995) ("Voir Dire and Jury Selection") (noting
that the need for jury selection experts is "most obvious in extraordinary cases such as death
101 000407
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Counsel's jury selection strategy should minimize the problem of"death qualified" juries
that result from exclusion ofpotential jurors whose opposition to capital punishment effectively
skews the jury pool not only as to imposition of the death penalty but as to conviction.260 Caselaw
stemming from Supreme Court decisions that address capital jury selection procedures261 has
resulted in a highly specialized and technical procedure. As a practical matter, the burden rests
with defense counsel to "life qualify" a jury. Counsel should conduct a voir dire that is broad
enough to expose those prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to follow the applicable
sentencing law because they will either automatically vote for death in certain circumstances, or
are unwilling to consider mitigating evidence.262 Counsel should also develop a strategy for
rehabilitating those prospective jurors who have indicated opposition to the death penalty.
Bearing in mind that the history ofcapital punishment in this country is intimately bound up with
its history of race relations,263 counsel should determine whether discrimination is involved in the
penalty cases").
See Blume et aI., supra note 258, at 1232 ("[E]xposure to the death qualification process
makes a juror more likely to assume the defendant will be convicted and sentenced to death; more
likely to assume that the law disapproves ofpersons who oppose the death penalty; more likely to
assume that the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney all believe the defendant is guilty and will
be sentenced to die; and more likely to believe that the defendant deserves the death penalty.").
See also Liebman, supra note 28, at 2097 & n.164 (discussing studies demonstrating that death
qualification process produces juries more likely to convict than non-death-qualified juries, and
that repeated discussion ofdeath penalty during voir dire in capital cases makes jurors
substantially more likely to vote for death).
Nonetheless, the current state of Supreme Court caselaw is that a jurisdiction does not
violate the federal Constitution by using the death qualification process. See Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 170 (1986).
See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding "juror[s] who will
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case" or are unwilling or unable to give
meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence must be disqualified from service); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 415-16 (1985) (holding that trial judges may exclude from a capital jury
persons with absolutist views on the death penalty, such that they are either in favor of, or opposed
to it in every case); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (invalidating statute disqualifying any
juror who would not swear "that the mandatory penalty ofdeath or imprisonment for life will not
affect his deliberations on any issue of fact"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513 (1968)
(holding that persons who have qualms about the death penalty in general, and who might be
inclined to oppose it as a matter ofpublic policy, but who can put aside those reservations in a
particular case, and in compliance with their oaths as jurors consider imposing the death penalty
according to the relevant state law, may not be precluded from serving as jurors in a death penalty
case).
262 See Blume et aI., supra note 258, at 1247-53.
263 See Stephen D. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance ofRacial
Discrimination in Infliction ofthe Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 433, 439 42 (1995)
(examining the historic relationship between racial violence and the death penalty, and describing
how racial prejudice continues to influence capital sentencing decisions); William S. Loquist,
102
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jury selection process. Counsel should investigate whether minorities or women are
underrepresented on the jury lists from which grand and2etit juries are drawn, or if race or gender
played a role in the selection of grand jury forepersons.2 The defense in a capital case is entitled
to voir dire to discover those potential jurors poisoned by racial bias,265 and should do so when
appropriate. Death qualification often results in the removal of more prospective jurors who are
members ofminority groups than those who are white, because minority jurors are more likely to
express reservations about the death penalty.166 Neither race nor gender may form a basis for
peremptory challenges,267 but a recent empirical analysis of capital murder cases supports the
conclusion that "discrimination in the use ofperemptory challenges on the basis of race and
gender ... is widespread.,,268 Counsel should listen closely to the prosecutor's voir dire,
challenges for cause and reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, make appropriate
objections, and ensure that all information critical to a discrimination claim is preserved on the
record?69
Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and Killing Them: An Analysis ofState-Level
Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1505, 1535 (2002) (presenting social
science data).
See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 395 (1998); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 216-
17 (1988); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 548 (1979).
265
266
See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,38 (1986).
See Bright, supra note 225, at 20.
267
268
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,83 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 128-29 (1994). See also Miller-el v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 431659 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2003).
David C. Baldus, et aI., The Use ofPeremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10 (2001). See also Jeffrey S. Brand, The
Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS.
L. REv. 511 (fmding persistent widespread discrimination in the use ofperemptory challenges and
attributing it to unwillingness or inability of the courts to scrutinize manifestly pretextual
nonracial justifications). These findings emphasize the duty ofcounsel to pursue this area
energetically, both factually and legally. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the
Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment As A Prohibition Against the Racial Use ofPeremptory
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1990) (proposing 13th Amendment theory entitling a minority
defendant to specific number ofminority jurors).
269 See supra Guideline 10.8(B)(2) and text accompanying note 238.
103
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Guideline 10.11 The Defense Case Concerning Penalty
A. As set out in Guideline lO.7(A), counsel at every stage of the case have a continuing
duty to investigate issues bearing upon penalty and to seek information that supports
mitigation or rebuts the prosecution's case in aggravation.
B. Trial counsel should discuss with the client early in the case the sentencing
alternatives available, and the relationship between the strategy for the sentencing
phase and for the guilt/innocence phase.
C. Prior to the sentencing phase, trial counsel should discuss with the client the specific
sentencing phase procedures of the jurisdiction and advise the client of steps being
taken in preparation for sentencing.
D. Counsel at every stage of the case should discuss with the client the content and
purpose of the information concerning penalty that they intend to present to the
sentencing or reviewing body or individual, means by which the mitigation
presentation might be strengthened, and the strategy for meeting the prosecution's
case in aggravation.
E. Counsel should consider, and discuss with the client, the possible consequences of
having the client testify or make a statement to the sentencing or reviewing body or
individual.
F. In deciding which witnesses and evidence to prepare concerning penalty, the areas
counsel should consider include the following:
1. Witnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the client's life and
development, from conception to the time of sentencing, that would be
explanatory of the offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced, would
rebut or explain evidence presented by the prosecutor, would present positive
aspects of the client's life, or would otherwise support a sentence less than
death;
2. Expert and lay witnesses along with supporting documentation (e.g. school
records, military records) to provide medical, psychological, sociological,
cultural or other insights into the client's mental and/or emotional state and
life history that may explain or lessen the client's culpability for the
underlying offense(s); to give a favorable opinion as to the client's capacity for
rehabilitation, or adaptation to prison; to explain possible treatment
programs; or otherwise support a sentence less than death; and/or to rebut or
explain evidence presented by the prosecutor;
3. Witnesses who can testify about the applicable alternative to a death sentence
and/or the conditions under which the alternative sentence would be served;
4. Witnesses who can testify about the adverse impact of the client's execution on
the client's family and loved ones;
104
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
5. Demonstrative evidence, such as photos, videos, and physical objects (e.g.,
trophies, artwork, military medals), and documents that humanize the client
or portray him positively, such as certificates of earned awards, favorable
press accounts, and letters of praise or reference.
G. In determining what presentation to make concerning penalty, counsel should
consider whether any portion of the defense case will open the door to the
prosecution's presentation of otherwise inadmissible aggravating evidence. Counsel
should pursue all appropriate means (e.g., motions in limine) to ensure that the
defense case concerning penalty is constricted as little as possible by this
consideration, and should make a full record in order to support any subsequent
challenges.
H. Trial counsel should determine at the earliest possible time what aggravating factors
the prosecution will rely upon in seeking the death penalty and what evidence will be
offered in support thereof. If the jurisdiction has rules regarding notification of these
factors, counsel at all stages of the case should object to any non-compliance, and if
such rules are inadequate, counsel at all stages of the case should challenge the
adequacy of the rules.
I. Counsel at all stages of the case should carefully consider whether all or part of the
aggravating evidence may appropriately be challenged as improper, inaccurate,
misleading or not legally admissible.
J. If the prosecution is granted leave at any stage of the case to have the client
interviewed by witnesses associated with the government, defense counsel should:
1. carefully consider
a. what legal challenges may appropriately be made to the interview or
the conditions surrounding it, and
b. the legal and strategic issues implicated by the client's co-operation or
non-cooperation;
2. insure that the client understands the significance of any statements made
during such an interview; and
3. attend the interview.
K. Trial counsel should request jury instructions and verdict forms that ensure that
jurors will be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence.
Trial counsel should object to instructions or verdict forms that are constitutionally
flawed, or are inaccurate, or confusing and should offer alternative instructions.
Post-conviction counsel should pursue these issues through factual investigation and
legal argument.
105 000411
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L. Counsel at every stage of the case should take advantage of all appropriate
opportunities to argue why death is not suitable punishment for their particular
client.
History ofGuideline
The substance of this Guideline is drawn from Guideline 11.8.3 of the original edition.
The principal changes are the expansion of coverage to counsel at all stages of the proceedings,
and language changes to underscore the range and importance ofexpert testimony in capital cases,
the breadth of mitigating evidence, and counsel's duty to present arguments in mitigation.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-8.1
("Sentencing"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.1 (1995) ("Obligations ofCounsel in Sentencing").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.2 (1995) ("Sentencing Options, Consequences and
Procedures").
Commentary
Capital sentencing is unique in a variety ofways, but only one ultimately matters: the
stakes are life and death.
This Commentary is written primarily from the perspective of trial counsel. But
corresponding obligations rest on successor counsel. This Guideline has been broadened to
include them because of the realities that in capital cases (a) more evidence tends to become
available to the defense as time passes,270 and (b) updated presentations ofthe defense case on
penalty in accordance with Guideline 10.15.1 (E) (3) may influence decisionmakers both on the
bench (e.g., an appellate court considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel) and off it
(e.g., the prosecutor, the Governor).
The Importance of an Integrated Defense
During the investigation of the case, counsel should begin to develop a theme that can be
presented consistently through both the first and second phases of the trial. Ideally, "the theory of
the trial must complement, support, and lay the groundwork for the theory ofmitigation.,,271
Consistency is crucial because, as discussed in the Commentary to Guideline 10.10.1, counsel
risks losing credibility by making an unconvincing argument in the first phase that the defendant
270
271
See supra text accompanying note 38.
Lyon, supra note 2, at 711.
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did not commit the crime, then attempting to show in the penalty phase why the client committed
the crime?72 First phase defenses that seek to reduce the client's culpability for the crime (e.g., by
negating intent) rather than to deny involvement altogether are more likely to be consistent with
mitigating evidence ofmental illness, retardation, domination by a co-defendant, substance abuse,
or trauma.273 But whether or not the guilt phase defense will be that the defendant did not commit
the crime, counsel must be prepared from the outset to make the transition to the penalty phase?74
The Defense Presentation at the Penalty Phase
As discussed in the Commentary to Guideline 10.7, areas ofmitigation are extremely
broad and encompass any evidence that tends to lessen the defendant's moral culpability for the
offense or otherwise supports a sentence less than death.275 In particular, a mitigation presentation




In fact, most statutory mitigating circumstances, which were typically adapted from the
Model Penal Code, are "imperfect" versions of first phase defenses such as insanity, diminished
capacity, duress, and self-defense. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them
Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE LJ. 835, 856-
57 (1992) (reviewing Beverly Lowry, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992». Of
course, the defendant's penalty phase presentation may not constitutionally be limited to statutory
mitigating circumstances and the jury must be allowed to give full consideration to any non-
statutory ones he advances. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978).
For an example ofan argument making an effective transition, see Edith Georgi Houlihan,
Defending the Accused Child Killer, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1998, at 23. Lingering doubt is a
permissible mitigating circumstance in some jurisdictions (e.g., California, see People v. Sanchez,
12 Cal. 4th 1, 77-78,906 P.2d 1129, 1178,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 892-93 (1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 835 (1996», but not in others (e.g., Florida, see Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 916-17 (Fla.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001».
Existing caselaw in the United States Supreme Court holds that a capital defendant has no
federal constitutional right to have lingering doubt considered as a mitigating circumstance at the
penalty phase. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1988). Given the significant number
ofdeath row exonerations, and the degree to which these have plainly troubled many Justices, see
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 n.25 (2002) ("Despite the heavy burden that the
prosecution must shoulder in capital cases, we cannot ignore the fact that in recent years a
disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated."), there is ample reason to
doubt the force ofthis precedent. See MANDATORY JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 40-41 (advocating
allowing lingering doubt to be considered as a mitigating circumstance); Christina S. Pignatelli,
Residual Doubt: It's a Lift Saver, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 307 (2001).
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989) ("[I]t is precisely because the
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability ofthe defendant that the jury
must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's
character or record or the circumstances of the offense."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,
4-5 (1986) (evidence ofdefendant's positive adaptation to prison is relevant and admissible
mitigating evidence even though it does "not relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the
crime he committed"). Similarly, counsel could appropriately argue to the jury that the death
107
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may be offered not to justify or excuse the crime "but to help explain it.,,276 Ifcounsel cannot
establish a direct cause and effect relationship between anyone mitigating factor and the
commission ofa capital offense, counsel should endeavor to show the combination of factors that
led the client to commit the crime.277 In any event, it is critically important to construct a
persuasive narrative, rather than to simply present a catalog ofseemingly unrelated mitigating
factors.278
Since an understanding ofthe client's extended, multigenerational history is often needed
for an understanding ofhis functioning, construction ofthe narrative normally requires evidence
that sets forth and explains the client's complete social history from before conception to the
present. Expert witnesses may be useful for this purpose and, in any event, are almost always
crucial to explain the significance ofthe observations.279 For example, expert testimony may
explain the permanent neurological damage caused by fetal alcohol syndrome or childhood abuse,
or the hereditary nature ofmental illness, and the effects ofthese impairments on the client's
judgment and impulse control.280 Counsel should choose experts who are tailored specifically to
the needs of the case, rather than relying on an "all-purpose" expert who may have insufficient
knowledge or experience to testify persuasively.281 In order to prepare effectively for trial, and to
choose the best experts, counsel should take advantage of training materials and seminars and
remain current on developments in fields such as neurology and psychology, which often have
important implications for understanding clients' behavior?82 Counsel should also seek advice
and assistance from colleagues and experts in the field ofcapital litigation.
sentence should not be imposed on a client because doing so would tend to incite the client's
political followers to avenge him by committing further crimes. See, e.g, Benjamin Weiser, Jury
Rejects Death Penaltyfor Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2001, at B1 (reporting successful use of
this argument at trial ofdefendant convicted of bombing American embassy).
276
277
See generally Haney, supra note 91, at 560.
Id at 600.
278 See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1140-41 (1997) (noting that jurors find
expert testimony unpersuasive if it is not tied into other evidence presented in the case).




See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) ("the introduction of
expert testimony would also have been important" to explain the effects that "serious physical and
psychological abuse and neglect as a child" had on the defendant).
See Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (although counsel consulted
four experts, including a medical doctor, a psychologist, and a psychiatrist, counsel failed to
consult neurologist or toxicologist who could have explained neurological effects ofdefendant's
extensive exposure to pesticides), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1049 (1999).
High quality continuing legal education programs on the death penalty, such as those noted
supra in the Commentary to Guideline 8.1, regularly present such information.
108
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Counsel should ordinarily use lay witnesses as much as possible to provide the factual
foundation for the expert's conclusions?83 Community members such as co-workers, prison
guards, teachers, military personnel, or clergy who interacted with the defendant or his family, or
have other relevant personal knowledge or experience often speak to the jury with particular
credibility.284
Family members and friends can provide vivid first-hand accounts of the poverty and
abuse that characterize the lives ofmany capital defendants. These witnesses can also humanize
the client by allowing the jury to see him in the context of his family, showing that they care about
him, and providing examples ofhis capacity to behave in a caring, positive way, such as
attempting to ~rotect other family members from domestic violence or trying to be a good parent
and provider.2 5 Similarly, acquaintances who can testify to the client's performance ofgood
works in the community may help the decisionmaker to have a more complete view ofhim. None
ofthis evidence should be offered as counterweight to the gravity of the crime, but rather to show
that the person who committed the crime is a flawed but real individual rather than a generic
evildoer, someone for whom one could reasonably see a constricted but worthwhile future.
In addition to humanizing the client, counsel should endeavor to show that the alternatives
to the death penalty would be adequate punishment. Studies show that "future dangerousness is
on the minds ofmost capital jurors, and is thus 'at issue' in virtually all capital trials," whether or
not it is argued by the prosecution or is a statutorily mandated sentencing consideration.286
Accordingly, counsel should make every effort to present information on this subject. Evidence
that the client has adapted well to prison and has had few disciplinary problems can allay jurors'
fears and reinforce other positive mitigating evidence?87 Counsel should therefore always
encourage the client not only to avoid any disciplinary infractions but also to participate in
treatment programs and/or educational, religious or other constructive activities.
Counsel should emphasize through evidence, argument, and/or instruction that the client
will either never be eligible for parole, will be required to serve a lengthy minimum mandatory
sentence before being considered for parole, or will be serving so many lengthy, consecutive
sentences that he has no realistic hope of release.288 In at least some jurisdictions, counsel may be
283
284
See Sundby, supra note 278, at 1163-84.




See id. at 1152-62; see also Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An
Argumentfor Execution Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 12-14
(1999).
286 See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue, " 86
CORNELL L. REv. 397, 398-99 (2001).
See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,8 (1986) Gury would "quite naturally" give
great weight to the testimony ofdisinterested witnesses, such as ''jailers who would have had no
particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their charges"); Sundby, supra note
278, at 1147 Guries tend to respond favorably to testimony ofprison employees).
The Supreme Court has held that "when 'a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at
issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment
109
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allowed to present evidence concerning the conditions under which such a sentence would be
served.289
Counsel should also consider, in consultation with the client, the possibility ofthe client
expressing remorse for the crime in testimony, in allocution, or in a post-trial statement. If
counsel decides that a trial presentation by the client is desirable, and the proposed testimony or
allocution is forestalled by evidentiary rulings ofthe court either disallowing it or conditioning it
on unacceptable cross-examination, counsel should take care to make a full record ofthe
circumstances, including the content ofthe proposed statement. In light ofthe strong common
law underpinnings ofallocution and the broad constitutional right to present mitigation that has
already been described, any such issue is likely to merit the careful examination of successor
counsel.
Finally, in preparing a defense presentation on mitigation counsel must try to anticipate the
evidence that may be admitted in response and to tailor the presentation to avoid opening the door
to damaging rebuttal evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible?90
without possibility ofparole, due process entitles the defendant "to inform the jury of [his] parole
ineligibility, either by ajury instruction or in arguments by counsel."'" Kelly v. South Carolina,
534 U.S. 246, 122 S. Ct. 726, 728 (2002) (quoting Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39
(2001) and Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)). The precise contours ofthis rule
remain in dispute, see Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940 (1997), and counsel may appropriately seek
to extend them (e.g., by applying the rule to other alternative sentences than life imprisonment
without parole or by requiring that the jury receive the information through instructions).
Some state courts have held that the trial court must resolve, before the capital sentencing
hearing, issues such as the length ofother sentences the defendant would serve and whether he
would be eligible for parole. See Clark v. Tansy, 118 N.M. 486, 493, 882 P.2d 527, 534 (N.M.
1994) (trial court must, upon defendant's request, impose sentence for noncapital convictions prior
to jury deliberations on death penalty); Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 674-75 (Miss. 1990) (trial
court should determine defendant's habitual offender status before capital sentencing hearing so
jury could be accurately informed ofdefendant's parole ineligibility), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910
(1991).
In other jurisdictions, the defense can at least argue that the defendant is likely to receive
lengthy, consecutive sentences. See Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234, 1239-40 (Fla. 1990) (length
of time a defendant would be "removed from society" if sentenced to life imprisonment is relevant
mitigating evidence that the jury must be permitted to consider), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 836
(1993); Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444, 448 (Fla. 1994) Oury could properly consider in
mitigation that alternative to death sentences would have been two life sentences with combined
minimum mandatory of 50 years).
In the federal capital sentencing ofa defendant convicted of bombing American embassies
overseas, the defense presented evidence about conditions at the federal "Super Max" prison in
Florence, Colorado, where the defendant would be incarcerated if sentenced to life without parole.
See Benjamin Weiser, Lawyersfor Embassy Bomber Push/or Prison Over Execution, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27,2001, at B4; see also infra note 310. The defendant was subsequently sentenced
to life without parole. See Weiser, supra note 275.
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The Defense Response to the Prosecution's Penalty Phase Presentation
Counsel should prepare for the prosecutor's case at the sentencing phase in much the same
way as for the prosecutor's case at the guilt/innocence phase.291 Counsel should use available
discovery mechanisms to ascertain the aggravating and rebuttal evidence the prosecution intends
to introduce, and then thoroughly investigate to determine whether this evidence can be excluded,
rebutted or undercut. As discussed in the Commentary to Guideline 10.2, jurisdictions vary in
whether the defense must be formally notified as to whether the prosecution will seek the death
penalty. If required notice has not been given, counsel should also prepare to challenge at the
sentencing phase any prosecution efforts that should be barred for failure to give notice?92
Counsel should carefully research applicable state and federal law governing the
admissibility ofevidence in aggravation. Where possible, counsel should move to exclude
aggravating evidence as inadmissible, and, if that fails, rebut the evidence or offer mitigating
evidence that will blunt its impact.293
If (but only iti94 the defense presents an expert who has examined the client, a prosecution
expert may be entitled to examine the client to prepare for rebuttal.295 Counsel should become
familiar with the governing law regarding limitations on the scope ofexpert evaluations conducted
by prosecution experts, and file appropriate motions to ensure that the scope ofthe examination is
no broader than legally permissible.29 If the examination is not limited as counsel deem
However, as Subsection G suggests, ifthere is uncertainty as to the scope ofhow wide this
opening would be or ifcounsel believes that excessive rebuttal is to be admitted, they should
object and make a full record on the issue.
291
292
See White, supra note 2, at 358.
See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
293 See Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding counsel was
ineffective in part for failing to challenge the state's use ofprior rape convictions in aggravation
as prior violent offenses where both of the convictions occurred when Arizona law did not include
violence as an element of rape), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 952 (2000); Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d
923,929-31 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
evidence to rebut the only aggravating circumstances), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038 (2000);
Summit v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 1237, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1986) (concluding trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue the lack ofcorroborating evidence of the sole aggravating factor
when under state law a defendant cannot be convicted based solely on uncorroborated confession
and the only evidence supporting the aggravating factor was defendant's confession).
294 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
295
296
As described infra in note 296, several states explicitly confine this right to the penalty
phase.
See, e.g. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) ("No statement made by the defendant in the course of
any [court-ordered psychiatric] examination ... shall be admitted in evidence against the
defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the
111
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases' February 2003
appropriate, Subsection J(I) requires them to give careful consideration to their response (e.g.,
refuse to participate on possible pain ofpreclusion, participate at the cost ofan irretrievable
surrender ofinfonnation, seek relief from a higher court). Counsel must discuss with the client in
advance any evaluation that is to take place and attend the examination in order to protect the
client's rights (Subsections J(2)-(3)). Counsel may also seek to have the evaluation observed by a
defense expert.
Counsel should integrate the defense response to the prosecution's evidence in aggravation
with the overall theory of the case. In some cases, counsel's response to aggravating evidence at
the penalty stage converges with the defense presentation at the guilt/innocence phase. The
prosecutor will offer no additional evidence at the penalty phase but will simply rely on
aggravating factors established by the evidence at the guilt/innocence phase, such as that the
murder was committed during the course ofa felony.297 In such cases, counsel's rebuttal
presentation should focus on the circumstances of the crime, and defendant's conduct as it relates
to the elements ofthe applicable aggravating circumstances.
In other cases, the prosecution will introduce additional aggravating evidence at the
penalty stage. If the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence of unadjudicated prior criminal
conduct as aggravating evidence, counsel should fully investigate the circumstances of the prior
conduct and determine whether it is properly admissible at the penalty stage.298
defendant has introduced testimony."); Abernathy v. State, 265 Ga. 754,462 S.E.2d 615 (1995) (if
defendant intends to present expert mental health testimony as mitigating evidence, he must
submit to a mental health examination by a State expert, but State expert may only testify in
rebuttal to the testimony ofa defense expert or ofthe defendant himself); State v. Reid, 981
S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1998) (once defendant files notice of intent to present expert testimony
regarding mitigating evidence, State expert may examine defendant, but State expert report will be
provided only to the defense until after conviction and after defendant confinns intent to rely on
expert testimony as part ofcase in mitigation); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(d); Dillbeck v. State, 643
So.2d 1027, 1030-31 (Fla. 1994) (where defendant plans to use in the penalty phase the testimony
of an expert who has interviewed him or her, the State is entitled to examine the defendant only
after conviction and after the State has certified that it will seek the death penalty), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1022 (1995). See also State v. Johnson, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 13,2003).
See, e.g., Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West
2001) (listing as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the crime was committed while the
defendant was engaged in, or an accomplice to, the commission or attempted commission or flight
after committing or attempting to commit anyone oftwelve enumerated felonies). In some states,
e.g., New York, the prosecution is essentially limited at the penalty phase to the evidence admitted
at the guilt phase. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002).
In some jurisdictions, only criminal conduct for which the client has been convicted is
admissible at the penalty stage. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West 2001) (listing as
aggravating circumstance the fact that the defendant was previously convicted ofcapital felony or
a felony involving violence). In others, no conviction is necessary, but the admissibility ofa prior
bad act may depend on other factors. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999) (allowing
admission ofevidence ofother criminal activity at penalty phase even though the defendant was
not convicted for it, unless the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted or it did not involve the
use or threat ofviolence); Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 842, 524 S.E.2d 490,505 (1999) (prior
112
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Ifthe prosecution relies upon a prior conviction (as opposed to conduct), counsel should
also determine whether it could be attacked as the product of invalid guilty plea,299 as obtained
when the client was unrepresented by counsel,3oo as a violation of double jeopardy,301 or on some
other basis. Counsel should determine whether a constitutional challenge to a prior conviction
must be litigated in the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred.302
In jurisdictions where victim-impact evidence is permitted, counsel, mindful that such
evidence is often very persuasive to the sentencer, should ascertain what, if any, victim-impact
evidence the prosecution intends to introduce at f<enalty phase, and evaluate all available strate§1es
for contesting the admissibility of such evidence 03 and minimizing its effect on the sentencer.3
In particular, in light ofthe instability ofthe caselaw,305 counsel should consider the federal
constitutionality of admitting such evidence to be an open field for legal advocacy.306
crime without conviction may be used in aggravation unless there is a previous acquittal), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 839 (2000). As a matter of constitutional law, the continuing validity ofthe
admission ofunadjudicated prior misconduct has been called into further question by Ring v.





See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-244 (1969).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1963).
See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 61-62 (1975).





Limitations on the admission ofsuch evidence exist in a number ofjurisdictions as a
matter ofstate law. See, e.g., Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1077 (1996); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787,832-36,819 P.2d 436,464-67, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
696 (1991), cert denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992).
See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements at
Capital Sentencing: Traditional and Nontraditional Perspectives, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 67 (2001);
Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence during the
Sentencing Phase ofCapital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 589, 612-15 (1992); Ellen Kreitzberg, How
Much Payne Will the Courts Allow?, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 31; Michael Ogul, Capital
Cases: Dealing with Victim Impact Evidence (pts. 1 & 2), THE CHAMPION, June 2000, at 43,
Aug.lSept. 2000, at 42.
Compare Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,501-03 (1987) (victim impact evidence
unconstitutional), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-12 (1989) (prosecutorial
argument for death based upon laudable characteristics of victim unconstitutional), with Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (overruling Booth and Gathers while noting that Due
Process clause is violated if such evidence is "unduly prejudicial").
For example, on the assumption that victim impact evidence in support of the death
penalty would be admissible, there is conflicting caselaw in various states on whether the defense
can call members ofthe victim's family to testify in opposition to the client's execution. Compare
Greene v. State, 343 Ark. 526, 531-36 (2001) (defendant not entitled to present testimony of
113
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Counsel should also evaluate how to blunt certain intangible factors that can be damaging
to a capital defendant at sentencing, including the heinous nature ofthe crime or the sentencer's
possible racial antagonism for the client.307 In jurisdictions where the alternative to a death
sentence is life without the possibility of parole, counsel should consider informing the jury ofthe
defendant's parole ineligibility in order to blunt the concern that the defendant may one day be
released from custody.308 Ifthey have not done so previously in building their affirmative case for
a penalty less than death,309 counsel should also consider putting on evidence describing the
conditions under which the client would serve a life sentence to rebut aggravating evidence of
future dangerousness.310
Jury Considerations
Personal argument by counsel in support of a sentence less than death is important.
Counsel who seeks to persuade a decisionmaker to empathize with the client must convey his or
her own empathy.311 While counsel may also stress the gravi~ ofthe sentencer's life and death
decision, the fact that the jury will have been death-qualified3 2 means that categorical arguments
against the death penalty are unlikely to be effective.
surviving spouse that she forgave him and opposed death sentence), Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650,
688 (2000) (victim's family member not allowed to give opinion on whether death penalty should
be invoked) and People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 70 (1994) (witness' opinion that defendant
should not be sentenced to death is inadmissible) with Murphy v. State, 47 P.3d 876 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2002) (victim's family allowed to make sentencing recommendation), and Tate v. Matteson,




See White, supra note 2, at 359-60.
See supra text accompanying notes 286-88.
See supra text accompanying note 289.
310
311
See United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing how, to rebut
government's assertion of future dangerousness, federal capital defendant put on evidence at
penalty phase regarding conditions at "Supermax" prison where defendant would be housed if
sentenced to life imprisonment), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 71 (2001); supra note 289.
See supra text accompanying note 183; White, supra note 2, at 374-75. An attorney whose
contempt for his client is palpable cannot provide effective representation. See, e.g., Rickman v.
Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (counsel's hostility to his own client was so patent that
defendant was "'functionally ... totally denied counsel"') (quoting Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F.
Supp. 686, 701 (1994», cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998»; Clark v. State, 690 So. 2d 1280,
1283 (Fla. 1997) ("Counsel completely abdicated his responsibility to Clark when he told the jury
that Clark's case presented his most difficult challenge ever in arguing against imposition ofthe
death penalty.").
312 See supra text accompanying note 260.
114
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases· February 2003
It is essential that counsel object to evidentiary rulings, instructions, or verdict forms that
improperly circumscribe the scope of the mitigating evidence that can be presented or the ability
of the jury to consider and give effect to such evidence.313 Counsel should also object to and be
prepared to rebut arguments that improperly minimize the significance of mitigating evidence314
or equate the standards for mitigation with those for a first-phase defense.315 At the same time,
counsel should request instructions that will ensure that the jury understands, considers, and gives
effect to all relevant mitigating evidence.J16 It is vital that the instructions clearly convey the
differing unanimity requirements applicable to aggravating and mitigating factors.317
If the jury instructions are insufficient to achieve the purposes described in the previous
paragraph or are otherwise confusing or misleading, counsel must object, even ifthe instructions
See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799-800 (2001) (instructions and verdict form
prevented jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence of defendant's mental retardation);
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 438-40 (1990) (verdict form and instructions suggesting
mitigating circumstances must be found unanimously improperly restricted jurors' ability to give
effect to mitigating evidence); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (same).
Prosecutors will frequently try to argue, for example, that "not everybody" who is abused
as a child grows up to commit capital murder or that mental illness did not "cause" the defendant
to commit the crime. See Haney, supra note 91, at 589-602. Both of these arguments are
objectionable on Eighth Amendment grounds because they nullify the effect of virtually all
mitigation. Id. In any event, counsel can seek to counter such arguments by emphasizing the
unique combination of factors at play in the client's life and demonstrating that there are causal
connections between, for example, childhood abuse, neurological damage, and violent behavior.
See, e.g., Phyllis Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications For, 77 N.C. L. REv.
1143, 1157-66 (1999) (reviewing scientific literature).
Arguments confusing the standards for a first phase defense and mitigation also violate the
Eighth Amendment. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (trial court
improperly rejected mitigating evidence ofdefendant's emotional disturbance on ground that
defendant "knew the difference between right and wrong"); Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of
Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty
Cases, 66 FORDHAML. REv. 21 (1997).
See Blume et aI., supra note 286, at 398-99. See also James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe,
Symposium: the Capital Jury Project, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or
Misguided?, 70 IND. L. REv. 1161 (1995) (results of study show that substantial percentage of
jurors do not understand instructions concerning aggravating and mitigating evidence, burdens of
proofand unanimity); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELLL. REv. 1 (1993) (results of study showing jury
confusion as to meaning of instructions, particularly about the mitigating circumstance burden of
proof).
See McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (instructions allowing jury to consider
only mitigating circumstances found unanimously violated Eighth Amendment); Mills v.
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases' February 2003
are the standard ones given in the jurisdiction. If the court does not instruct the jury on individual
mitigating circumstances, counsel should spell them out in closing argument.
Record Preservation
In some jurisdictions, counsel is required or allowed to either proffer to the court or
present to the sentencer mitigating evidence, regardless ofthe client's wishes.318 Even if such a
presentation is not mandatory, counsel should endeavor to put all available mitigating evidence
into the record because of its possible impact on subsequent decisionmakers in the case.
See, e.g., Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 1993) ("When a defendant, against
his counsel's advice, refuses to permit the presentation ofmitigating evidence in the penalty
phase, counsel must inform the court on the record ofthe defendant's decision. Counsel must
indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably believes there to be mitigating
evidence that could be presented and what that evidence would be."); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J.
225,329-33,548 A.2d 939, 993-95 (1988) (mitigating factors must be introduced regardless of the
defendant's position), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989).
116
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Guideline 10.12 The Official Presentence Report
A. If an official presentence report or similar document mayor will be presented to the
court at any time, counsel should become familiar with the procedures governing
preparation, submission, and verification of the report. In addition, counsel should:
1. where preparation ofthe report is optional, consider the strategic implications
of requesting that a report be prepared;
2. provide to the report preparer information favorable to the client. In this
regard, counsel should consider whether the client should speak with the
person preparing the report; if the determination is made to do so, counsel
should discuss the interview in advance with the client and attend it;
3. review the completed report;
4. take appropriate steps to ensure that improper, incorrect or misleading
information that may harm the client is deleted from the report;
5. take steps to preserve and protect the client's interests where the defense
considers information in the presentence report to be improper, inaccurate or
misleading.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.8.4 ofthe original edition. New requirements in
the Guideline include: (1) counsel's obligation to become familiar with the procedures governing
preparation, submission, and verification ofofficial presentence reports, where there is a chance
that such a report may be presented to the court at any time; (2) counsel's obligation to provide
information that is favorable to the client to the person who is preparing the report; (3) counsel's
obligation to prepare the client for and attend an interview with the person preparing the report,
provided counsel has first determined such an interview to be appropriate.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-8.1
("Sentencing") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.3 (1995) ("Preparation for Sentencing").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.4 (1995) ("The Official Presentence Report").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.5 (1995) ("The Prosecution's Sentencing Position").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.6 (1995) ("The Defense Sentencing Memorandum").
117
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Commentary
In many jurisdictions, an official presentence report may be prepared prior to the
imposition of sentence in a capital case.319 How such reports may be used in the sentencing
process differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and counsel should become familiar with the
statutes, court rules, caselaw, and local practice governing their use.320 There are also
constitutional limits on the use of presentence reports in capital sentencing.321
In some jurisdictions, a presentence report is not prepared unless requested by the defense.
Counsel should carefully consider the implications of such a request.322 In jurisdictions where a
presentence report is prepared regardless ofthe wishes ofthe defense, counsel should submit
information favorable to the client, including the client's social history and expert evaluations. If
the report preparer does not include the "defense materials, counsel should consider how they might
otherwise be made part ofthe client's official records. This information may not only affect the
sentencing decision, but also the client's classification, programming and treatment in the prison
system following imposition of sentence. In any event, counsel should make a clear record of any
inaccuracies they discern in the report.
See, e.g., Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363 n.lO (Fla. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 323 (2001); State v. Dunster, 262 Neb. 329, 362-65, 631 N.W.2d 879, 906-08 (2001), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 1210 (2002); Ex parte George, 717 So. 2d 858,859 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1024 (1998).
For example, in Florida, a presentence investigation report is required in every case where
the defendant is not challenging the imposition ofthe death penalty and refuses to present
mitigating evidence. Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363 (Fla. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 323 (2001). In California, although a probation report is prepared prior to the trial court's
ruling on a capital defendant's post-trial motion to modify the death verdict, it is error for the
judge, in ruling on that motion, to consider information contained in the probation report that was
not presented to the jury. See, e.g., People v. Kipp, 956 P.2d 1169, 1189-90, 18 Cal. 4th 349, 382-
83, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1152 (1999).
See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-62 (1977) (holding that if, in imposing a death
sentence, the trial judge relies in part on confidential information in a presentence investigation
report, the report must be disclosed to defense counselor due process is violated).
For example, in Ohio, a presentence report is prepared only at the request ofthe defense,
and ifthe defense requests the preparation ofa report, the prosecution is allowed to present
victim-impact evidence, other crimes evidence, and other information that is not otherwise
admissible at penalty phase to the jury. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Anderson
1999); State v. White, 85 Ohio St. 3d 433, 444-46, 709 N.E.2d 140, 153-55, cert. denied, 528 U.s.
938 (1999). Because Ohio provides capital defendants the right to reasonably necessary
investigation, experts, or other assistance for trial and penalty phases, see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2929.024 (Anderson 1999), capital counsel who request a presentence report instead may be
ineffective fordoing so. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 910 (1996).
118
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Guideline 10.13 The Duty to Facilitate the Work of Successor Counsel
323
In accordance with professional norms, all persons who are or have been members ofthe
defense team have a continuing duty to safeguard the interests of the client and should
cooperate fully with successor counsel. This duty includes, but is not limited to:
A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will inform successor counsel of
all significant developments relevant to the litigation;
B. providing the client's files, as well as information regarding all aspects of the
representation, to successor counsel;
C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with successor counsel;
and
D. cooperating with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may be chosen by
successor counsel.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is new.
Related Standards
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 9.2 (c) (1997) ("Right to Appeal").
Commentary
All members of the defense team must anticipate and facilitate the duty of successor
counsel, embodied in Guideline 7.1 (B) (1), to investigate the defense presentation at all prior
stages of the case. As set forth in Subsection A, this duty includes an affirmative obligation to
maintain contemporaneous records that will enable successor counsel to have a factual predicate
for the assertion ofwhatever legal claims may arise. For example, there may be issues as to
whether the government produced certain evidence or whether counsel knew of the existence ofa
particular witness or legal theory. Each counsel's files should be maintained in a manner
sufficient to enable successor counsel to answer questions of this sort through appropriate
documentation (e.g., notes ofclient interviews, telephone message slips, etc.).
Even after team members have been formally replaced, they must continue to safeguard
the interests ofthe client. Specifically, they must cooperate with the professionally appropriate
strategies of successor counsel (Subsection D). And this is true even when (as is commonly the
case) successor counsel are investigating or asserting a claim that prior counsel was ineffective.323
See David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical
Obligations ofCriminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85,
90-91 (1998/1999) ("While any criminal defense lawyer whose client is convicted is subject to
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As the California Bar has ruled in a formal opinion, "[T]he Rules ofProfessional Conduct impose
a duty upon trial counsel to fully and candidly discuss matters relating to the representation ofthe
client with appellate counsel and to respond to the questions ofappellate counsel, even ifto do so
would be to disclose that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. This
decision is in accord with the general rule that the attorney owes a duty of complete fidelity to the
client and to the interests ofthe client.,,324
The duties contained in this Guideline are ofenormous practical significance to the
vindication ofthe client's legal rights. "[T]he strategic thinking of the lawyer, and leaming this
strategic thinking[,] is absolutely critical to the thorough presentation of a post-conviction claim.
It should be routinely and openly presented to the post-conviction counsel.,,325 To do otherwise is
professionally unethical.326
State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
1992-127 (1992), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/html_unclassified/ca92-127.html.
325 Siegel, supra note 323, at 114.
326 See id ("[G]iven the peculiar aspects of the role of counsel whose former client brings a
post-conviction action, [it] violates counsel's ethical obligations" to fail to cooperate with
successor counsel in "the disclosure to the post-conviction counsel of files and notes from the
representation, the volunteering of absences in the record and the volunteering ofcounsel's
strategic thinking in the case.''); Mary B. Nelson, Note, When Clients Become "Ex-Clients": The
Duties OwedAfter Discharge, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 233, 241 (2002) ("Essentially, a failure to
cooperate with the client's new attorney can constitute the same violations as a failure to
cooperate with the actual client under Model Rule 1.16 ). See generally Ariz. Comm. on
Professional Conduct, Formal Op. 98-07 (1998); Returning Client Files After Termination,
Hawaii Bar 1., Sept. 1998.
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Guideline 10.14 Duties of Trial Counsel After Conviction
327
328
A. Trial counsel should be familiar with all state and federal post-conviction options
available to the client. Trial counsel should discuss with the client the post-conviction
procedures that will or may follow imposition of the death sentence.
B. Trial counsel should take whatever action(s), such as filing a notice of appeal, and/or
motion for a new trial, will maximize the client's ability to obtain post-conviction
relief.
c. Trial counsel should not cease acting on the client's behalf until successor counsel has
entered the case or trial counsel's representation has been formally terminated.
Until that time, Guideline 10.15 applies in its entirety.
D. Trial counsel should take all appropriate action to ensure that the client obtains
successor counsel as soon as possible.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.9.1 of the original edition. Subsection B has been
revised to require that trial counsel take whatever action(s) will maximize the client's ability to
obtain post-conviction relief. Additionally, Subsection D has been revised to require that counsel
take all appropriate action to ensure that the client obtains successor counsel as soon as possible.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-8.2 ("Appeal"),
in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
(3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 9.2 (1995) ("Right to Appeal").
Commentary
Post-conviction procedures, and therefore the duties ofcounsel, vary among
jurisdictions.327 Whatever the procedures, the client should be advised ofwhat will happen
following the imposition ofsentence and potential legal consequences of the client's anticipated
actions. For example, ifthe client will be given any psychological examination or will otherwise
be interviewed by prison personnel or others following the court's imposition ofsentence, the
client should be counseled regarding that interview and advised ofthe potential legal impact of
any statements the client might make there.J28
E.g., trial counsel in California is given, by statute, certain post-conviction duties and
must remain on the case until the record is certified. CAL. PENAL CODE §1239(b), 1240.1(e)(I)
(West 1982 & Supp. 2002).
See CAL. ATT'ys FOR CRIM. JUSTICE & CAL. DEFENDERS ASS'N, CALIFORNIA DEATH
PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 1-38 to 1-40 (1986).
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The client should also be advised ofall available avenues ofjudicial revie~29 and what
the client must do to secure review (e.g., sign a notice of appeal or affidavit of indigency). Trial
counsel should file the necessary documents and take whatever other steps are needed to preserve
the client's right to review, such as ordering transcripts of the trial proceedings and objecting to
any governmentally imposed barriers (e.g., failure to provide counsel) to obtaining such review. If
there are any further actions available that might expand the scope of review (e.g., filing a motion
for a new trial), trial counsel should take them.33o
In short, trial counsel is responsible for making sure that the client's legal position does not
suffer any harm during the period oftransition to successor counsel. To avoid prejudice to the
client, trial counsel should, in accordance with Subsection D, make every effort to ensure that this
period is as short as possible. But, in any event, trial counsel may not cease acting on the client's
behalf until successor counsel has entered the case. As Subsection C provides, until that time trial
counsel must discharge the duties common to all post-conviction counsel as set forth in Guideline
10.15 (including obtaining a stay ofexecution ifneeded).
Trial counsel must also monitor the client's personal condition as set out in Guideline
I0.15(E)(2). Ifthe client's mental status deteriorates under the impact of the conviction and death
sentence, the client may inappropriately decide to cease efforts to secure review, thereby creating
a series ofproblems for the defense team that might well have been avoided.
Once successor counsel are in place, trial counsel continue to be under the obligation,
imposed by Guideline 10.13, to recognize a continuing duty to safeguard the interests of the client
and to cooperate fully with successor counsel.
Some death penalty states provide for automatic appellate review, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ I239(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 4I4(a) (2002) (this section has
been repealed by 2002 Md. Laws 26, § 1, effective Oct. 1,2002; an analogous provision has been
enacted by 2002 Md. Laws 26, § 2, to be codified as MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-40I(a));
MD. R. 8-306(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § I5A-2000(d)(l) (2001).
This comports with the requirements for counsel in all criminal cases. See NAT'L LEGAL
AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTAnON
Guideline 9.2(a), (b) (1995). Cf Mayo v. Cockrell, 287 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying
federal habeas corpus relief where trial counsel was unaware that he remained on case until
replaced, appellate counsel was unaware ofhis appointment until after expiration of time for
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Guideline 10.15.1 Duties of Post-Conviction Counsel
A. Counsel representing a capital client at any point after conviction should be familiar
with the juriSdiction's procedures for setting execution dates and providing notice of
them. Post-conviction counsel should also be thoroughly familiar with all available
procedures for seeking a stay of execution.
B. If an execution date is set, post-conviction counsel should immediately take all
appropriate steps to secure a stay of execution and pursue those efforts through all
available fora.
C. Post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously
presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high
quality capital defense representation, including challenges to any overly restrictive
procedural rules. Counsel should make every professionally appropriate effort to
present issues in a manner that will preserve them for subsequent review.
D. The duties of the counsel representing the client on direct appeal should include filing
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. If appellate
counsel does not intend to file such a petition, he or she should immediately notify
successor counsel if known and the Responsible Agency.
E. Post-conviction counsel should fully discharge the ongoing obligations imposed by
these Guidelines, including the obligations to:
1. maintain close contact with the client regarding litigation developments; and
2. continually monitor the client's mental, physical and emotional condition for
effects on the client's legal position;
3. keep under continuing review the desirability of modifying prior counsel's
theory ofthe case in light of subsequent developments; and
4. continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.9.3 ofthe original edition. Subsections A, B, and
D are entirely new. Subsection C includes new language regarding the manner in which post-
conviction counsel must present all arguably meritorious issues. Subsection E includes new
language emphasizing the ongoing obligations imposed by these Guidelines upon post-conviction
counsel.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-8.5 ("Post-
Conviction Remedies") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
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Commentary
Almost all ofthe duties imposed by Guidelines 10.3 et seq. are applicable in the post-
conviction context. Subsection E notes this by way ofreminder. Post-conviction counsel should
consult those Guidelines and accompanying commentaries.
The Paramount Duty to Obtain a Stay
No matter how compelling the client's post-conviction case may be, he faces the risk that
his execution will moot it.33 ! This is a phenomenon unique to capital litigation and one that must
be uppermost in the mind ofpost-conviction counsel.
When states fail to provide post-conviction counsel entirely or in a timely manner,332 or
request the setting ofan execution date to advance the litigation,333 or impose short periods of time
for filing substantive post-judgment pleadings, the result is emergency requests for stays of
execution so that substantive pleadings will be considered.334 Although the ABA and other
See Brooks v. Estelle, 702 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1983) (dismissing appeal, which had received
certificate of probable cause from district court, as moot since petitioner had been executed
following the denial ofa stay by Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982)).
There is no right to state post-conviction counsel in Georgia. Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga.
855,513 S.E.2d 186, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999). In August 1996, Georgia Supreme Court
Justice Robert Benham noted that several persons under sentence ofdeath in Georgia were in
"immediate need oflegal representation," and asked area law firms to volunteer. One Atlanta
civil firm that volunteered was assigned the case of Marcus Wellons. Three days after the firm
received a copy ofthe trial transcript, the trial court set an execution date for two weeks later.
The firm rushed to the Georgia Supreme Court and asked for more time to submit a formal post-
conviction petition. Hours before Mr. Wellons's scheduled execution, the Court denied the
request by a 4-3 vote. As guards were about to shave Mr. Wellons's head for that evening's
electrocution, the federal district court granted a stay ofexecution. State counsel and the federal
defender were given ten months to prepare the federal petition. Bill Rankin, When Death Row
Inmates Go To Court Without Lawyers: In the Late Stages ofTheir Fight to Stay Alive, Some
Must Represent Themselves, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 29, 1996, at D5; Bill Rankin & Rhonda
Cook, Death Penalty: Sudden Speed, Then a Delay, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 1996, at AI.
For example, in Kentucky capital cases the Attorney General invariably requests an
execution date at the end ofdirect appeal, and the Governor invariably signs the death warrant.
No stay ofexecution may be granted until the state post-conviction petition is filed. As a result,
in order to obtain a stay, counsel must often file a state post-conviction petition well before the
time allowed under state law because there is an outstanding execution date. The practice is the
same in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Execution ofKiller Delayed, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, June 9, 2000, at DIB.
When a capital case enters a phase of being "under warrant" - i.e., when a death warrant
has been signed - time commitments for counsel increase, "due in large part to the necessary
duplication ofeffort in the preparation of several petitions which might have to be filed
simultaneously in different courts." Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defense, ABA
Bar Information Program, Time & Expense Analysis in Postconviction Death Penalty Cases, Feb.
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professional voices have repeatedly condemned this system,335 defense counsel must make the
best of it - by seeking stays or reprieves from any available source and challenging the unfairness
of any overly restrictive constraints on filing of substantive pleadings and/or stays.
And to the extent that counsel can responsibly reduce the stresses imposed upon the client
by this often-nightmarish system, counsel should of course do so (e.g., by reassuring the client of
the unlikelihood ofthe execution actually occurring on its nominal date, notwithstanding the
alarming preparations being made by the prison). 336
Keeping the Client Whole
Even iftheir executions have been safely stayed, however, the mental condition ofmany
capital clients will deteriorate the longer they remain on death row. This may result in suicidal
tendencies and/or impairments in realistic perception and rational decisionmaking.337 Counsel
should seek to minimize this risk by staying in close contact with the client.338
Counsel's ongoing monitoring of the client's status, required by Subsection E(2), also has
a strictly legal purpose. As described in the text accompanying notes 187-90 supra, a worsening
in the client's mental condition may directly affect the legal posture ofthe case and the lawyer
needs to be aware ofdevelopments. For example, the case establishing the proposition that insane
1987, at 10.
See, ABA House ofDelegates Res. 15, Rec. 11 (adopted Feb. 13, 1990) (calling for
automatic federal stays throughout post-conviction period) reprinted in Toward a More Just and
Effective System ofReview, supra note 84, at 38; Legislative Modification, supra note 11, at 855
("We agree with the Powell Committee [appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to study reform of
capital habeas corpus] that the current mechanisms for obtaining stays of execution are irrational
and indefensible. At best, they lead to an enormous waste of legal effort by all participants in the
system, and at worst they result in inconsistencies that have fatal consequences."); Eric M.
Freedman, Can Justice Be Served by Appeals ofthe Dead?, NATL. LJ., Oct. 19, 1992, at 13
(current situation respecting stays is "no way to run a judicial system").
See, e.g., Williams v. Missouri, 463 U.S. 1301 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in chambers)
(executions scheduled for prior to the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari on direct
appeal would be stayed "as a matter ofcourse"); McDonald v. Missouri, 464 U.S. 1306 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., in chambers) ("1 thought I had advised the Supreme Court ofMissouri once
before, in Williams, that ... I ... shall stay the execution ofany Missouri applicant whose direct
review ofhis conviction is being sought and has not been completed. I repeat the admonition to
the Supreme Court ofMissouri, and to any official within the State's chain of responsibility, that
I shall continue that practice. The stay, of course, ought to be granted by the state tribunal in the
first instance, but, if it fails to fulfill its responsibility, I shall fulfill mine.")
See C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics ofDeath
Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 850 (2000) (noting that between 1977 and
March 1998, 59 condemned inmates had volunteered for execution, compared to 382 executed
unwillingly).
338 See supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
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persons cannot be executed339 was heavily based on notes on the client's mental status that
counsel had kept over a period ofmonths.
The Labyrinth ofPost-conviction Litigation
A. The Direct Appeal
Practice varies among jurisdictions as to the limits ofthe appellate process and the
relationship between direct appeals and collateral post-conviction challenges to a conviction or
sentence.340 Issues that are only partially or minimally reflected by the record, or that are outside
the record, should be explored by appellate counsel as a predicate for informed decision making
about legal strategy.
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is ofcritical importance that counsel on direct appeal
proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a manner that maximizes the client's ultimate chances
of success. "Winnowing" issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues
abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another case and ultimately
successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later.341 When a client will be killed ifthe case is lost,
counsel should not let any possible ground for relief go unexplored or unexploited.342




In some states, there is a unitary appeal system in which direct appeal and collateral
challenges such as ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims are raised simultaneously. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie Supp. 2000). In other jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims generally may not be raised on direct appeal but are reserved for separate post-
conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 691 So.2d 1068, 1074 (Fla. 1997) (claims
of ineffective assistance ofcounsel not cognizable on direct appeal) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 880
(1997).
For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), appellate counsel failed to assert
on direct appeal that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by the testimony
ofa psychiatrist who had examined the defendant without warning him the interview could be
used against him. The Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims at the time of the
defendant's direct appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reached a contrary result, however, in Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In a Catch-22 for the client, the Court concluded appellate
counsel was not ineffective, because "'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing
on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of
effective appellate advocacy." Murray, 477 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted). At the same time, the
claim was not deemed sufficiently "'novel'" to constitute cause for the procedural default
because "forms ofthe claim he now advances had been percolating in the lower courts for years
at the time ofhis original appeal." Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted). Mr. Smith was therefore
barred from raising the issue in federal habeas proceedings and was subsequently executed.
It is for this reason that, consistent with the text supra accompanying note 27, Subsection
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Appellate counsel must be familiar with the deadlines for filing petitions for state and
federal post-conviction reliefand how they are affected by the direct appeal. If the conviction and
sentence are affirmed, appellate counsel should ordinarily file on the client's behalf a petition for
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Under the AEDPA, a client's one-year
statute of limitations for filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief generally begins to run
upon the denial ofcertiorari or when the 90 days for filing a petition has elapsed.343 Appellate
counsel should therefore immediately inform successor counsel ifhe or she does not intend to file
a petition for certiorari or when a petition for certiorari is denied; if successor counsel is not yet
appointed, counsel should promptly advise the Responsible Agency ofthe need to designate
successor counsel. (Subsection D)
Appellate counsel should also advise the client directly of all applicable deadlines for
seeking post-conviction relief and explain the tolling provisions of the AEDPA,344 emphasizing
that a state post-conviction motion should be filed sufficiently in advance ofthe one-year deadline
to allow adequate time to prepare a federal habeas corpus petition. In states in which the direct
appeal and state post-conviction review are conducted simultaneously,345 post-conviction
proceedings may be concluded at the same time as, or even before, the direct appeal, effectively
rendering the tolling provisions inapplicable.
In light of this mutual dependency among all the post-conviction legal procedures, it is of
the utmost importance that, in accordance with Guideline 10.13, appellate counsel cooperates fully
with successor counsel and tum over all relevant files promptly.
B. Collateral Relief-State and Federal
As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high quality legal
representation in collateral review proceedings in capital cases requires enormous amounts of
time, energy and knowledge. The field is increasingly complex and ever changing. As state and
federal collateral proceedings become ever-more intertwined, counsel representing a capital client
in state collateral proceedings must become intimately familiar with federal habeas corpus
procedures. As indicated above, for example, although the AEDPA deals strictly with cases being
litigated in federal court, its statute of limitations provision creates a de facto statute of limitations
for filing a collateral review petition in state court. Some state collateral counsel have failed to




28 U.S.c. § 2244(d)(l)(A); see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, note 27 supra § 5.1b.
28 U.s.C. § 2244(d)(2).
346
345 See, e.g., Policy 3, California Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From
Judgments ofDeath (2002) (petitions for writ ofhabeas corpus to be filed within 90 days offinal
due date for filing reply briefon direct appeal); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 22, § 1089(D)(l) (West
Supp. 2002) (motion for post-conviction relief must be filed within 90 days from filing of reply
briefon direct appeal).
See, e.g., Goodman v. Johnson, No. 99-20452 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 1999) (unpublished),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1091 (1999). Spencer Goodman was executed by Texas in January 2000, and
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Collateral counsel has the same obligation as trial and appellate counsel to establish a
relationship of trust with the client. But by the time a case reaches this stage, the client will have
put his life into the hands ofat least one other lawyer and found himselfon death row. Counsel
should not be surprised if the client initially exhibits some hostility and lack oftrust, and must
endeavor to overcome these barriers.
Ultimately, winning collateral reliefin capital cases will require changing the picture that
has previously been presented. The old facts and legal arguments - those which resulted in a
conviction and imposition ofthe ultimate punishment, both affirmed on appeal - are unlikely to
motivate a collateral court to make the effort required to stop the momentum the case has already
gained in rolling through the legal system.347 Because an appreciable portion ofthe task ofpost-
conviction counsel is to change the overall picture ofthe case, Subsection E(3) requires that they
keep under continuing review the desirability of amending the defense theory ofthe case, whether
one has been formulated by prior counsel in accordance with Guideline 10.10.1 or not.
For similar reasons, collateral counsel cannot rely on the previously compiled record but
must conduct a thorough, independent investigation in accordance with Guideline 10.7.
(Subsection E(4». As demonstrated by the high percentage of reversals and disturbingly large
number of innocent persons sentenced to death, the trial record is unlikely to provide either a
complete or accurate picture ofthe facts and issues in the case.J48 That may be because of
information concealed by the state, because ofwitnesses who did not appear at trial or who
testified falsely, because the trial attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation in the first
instance, because new developments show the inadequacies of prior forensic evidence, because of
juror misconduct, or for a variety ofother reasons.
Two parallel tracks ofpost-conviction investigation are required. One involves
reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client. Reinvestigating the case means
examining the facts underlying the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial
counsel's performance,judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating the client
means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than was known at the time oftrial, not
only to discover mitigation that was not presented previously, but also to identify mental-health
claims which potentially reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions ofcompetency
and mental-state defenses.
As with every other stage ofcapital proceedings, collateral counsel has a duty in
accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all arguably meritorious issues.349 These
include not only challenges to the conviction and sentence, but also issues which may arise
Andrew Cantu-Tzin was executed by Texas in January 1999.
See generally Russell Stetler, Post-Conviction Investigation in Death Penalty Cases, THE




See supra text accompanying note 38.
See supra Guideline 10.8 and accompanying Commentary.
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subsequently.350 Collateral counsel should assume that any meritorious issue not contained in the
initial application will be waived or procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, or barred by
strict rules governing subsequent applications.351 Counsel should also be aware that any change in
the availability of post-conviction relief may itselfprovide an issue for further litigation.352 This
is especially true ifthe change occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have
affected strategic decisions along the way.
For example, although the Justices disagree on the point, as shown most recently by their
varying opinions respecting the certiorari petition in Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470 (2002), it
may well be that after a certain length of time continued confinement on Death Row ripens into
an Eighth Amendment violation.
See Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that as a result of the
strict rules governing successive habeas corpus petitions enacted by the AEDPA and codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), "it is essential that habeas petitioners include in their first petition all
potential claims for which they might desire to seek review and relief').
See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (discussing the retroactive application of
various procedural provisions in the AEDPA to pending cases).
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Guideline 10.15.2 Duties of Clemency Counsel
A. Clemency counsel should be familiar with the procedures for and permissible
substantive content of a request for clemency.
B. Clemency counsel should conduct an investigation in accordance with Guideline 10.7.
C. Clemency counsel should ensure that clemency is sought in as timely and persuasive a
manner as possible, tailoring the presentation to the characteristics of the particular
client, case and jurisdiction.
D. Clemency counsel should ensure that the process governing consideration of the
client's application is substantively and procedurally just, and, if it is not, should seek
appropriate redress.
History ofGuideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.9.4 of the original edition. Subsection D of the
Guideline was added to reflect the effect of the decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v.




As discussed in the text accompanying notes 57-64 supra, a series ofdevelopments in law,
public opinion, and forensic science suggests that clemency petitions in capital cases will in the
future enjoy a greater success rate than they do now, which will place additional demands on
clemency counsel.
As Subsection B emphasizes, further investigation is critical at this phase. Beyond that,
the manner in which clemency is dispensed in the jurisdiction controls what clemency counsel
needs to do.353
Counsel should be familiar with the clemency-dispenser, and with the factors the
The states utilize 50 different clemency processes, which can be categorized in the
following manner: the Governor has sole authority over the clemency process; the Governor
cannot grant clemency without a recommendation from a board or advisory group to do so; the
Governor decides clemency after receiving a nonbinding recommendation from a board or
advisory group; a board or advisory group makes the clemency determination; or, the Governor
sits as a member ofthe board which makes the clemency determination. The Death Penalty
Information Group details the process by state, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency.htm/#process. For federal death row inmates, the
President alone has pardon power. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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clemency-dispenser has historically found persuasive. As possible innocence is the most
frequently cited reason for clemency,354 ifthere is a possibility that the client is innocent, counsel
should mobilize an especially detailed investigation to determine whether confidence in the
client's guilt can be undermined. If doubts about the fairness of the judicial proceedings that
produced the death sentence have led to clemency in other cases, counsel should consider whether
particular instances ofprocedural unfairness can be set out as to the client's case.355 Ifpersonal
characteristics of the condemned, such as youth, mental illness,356 spousal abuse, or cultural
barriers, have proven helpful in past clemency proceedings, then counsel should discover and
demonstrate examples ofthe client's similar characteristics to the extent possible.
In any event, the presentation should be as complete and persuasive as possible, utilizing
all appropriate resources in support (e.g. relevant outside organizations, the trial judge, prominent
citizens), and discussing explicitly why the clemency-dispenser should act favorably
notwithstanding the repeated reaffirmation of the client's conviction and sentence by the judicial
system. For example, counsel may be in a position to argue that the underlying claims were
powerful ones but procedural technicalities barred the courts from addressing their merits.
As discussed in the text accompanying notes 63-64 supra, due process protections apply to
clemency proceedings, and counsel should be alert to the possibility ofdeveloping the nascent
existing law in this area.
The Death Penalty Information Center reports that since 1976, ofthe 35 death row
inmates who have been granted clemency for reasons other than the personal convictions ofthe
governor in opposition to the death penalty, the possible innocence of the condemned inmate was
provided as the reason for granting clemency in 16 cases (46%). Available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency.html.
For example, in 1999 the Governor of Arkansas commuted the death sentence ofBobby
Ray Fretwell after receiving a letter from a juror at Fretwell's trial stating that he had been the
lone holdout against the death penalty, but had relented for fear that he would be an outcast in the
small community where the killing had occurred. See Arkansas Governor Spares Killer's Life
After Juror's Plea, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1999, at A19. In the case ofCharlie Brooks, who was
executed in Texas in 1982, counsel enlisted the trial prosecutor to argue before the Board of
Pardons and Paroles that it would be unfair to execute the client when his co-defendant was
serving a term ofyears and the state did not know who the triggerman had been. See Robert
Reinhold, Groups Race to Prevent Texas Execution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1982, at A16.
In 2002, the Georgia Board ofPardons commuted the death sentence ofAlexander
Williams to life in prison without parole in large part due to Williams's profound mental illness.
See Rhonda Cook, Death penalty reduced to lift, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 26, 2002, at Ai.
131
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. . . . STATE APPELLAT~
OLD JUROR. '. NEWJUROR ...:. . PlJBLlC DEFENDER'
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTHJUD~ DISTRICT OF . .


















YOU MUST READ THIS PAGE.
YOU ARE REQUIRED TO SIGN BELOW ACKNOWLEDGING THAT YOU HAVE READ AND
UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCnONS AND THAT YOU AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE COURT'S
ORDERS AS OUTUNED BELOW
This Questionnaire has been approved by the Court and is to be filled out by each prospective
juror in this case. The parties and the Court recognize that the infonnation you are being asked
to provide In this Questionnaire is personal and 'detailed and that it will take you some time to fill
out this Questionnaire. However. the questions asked In this Questionnaire could be asked in
open court and are important to ensure that this process is fair to both the State and the
Defendant This Questionnaire is designed to save time and assist the Court and the parties i~
selecting a fair and impartial jury fot this trial. You are also given more privacy by answering
these questions in this Questionnaire. When you come back to court for the jury selection
process. your answers may generate more questions.
YOU ARE UNDER OATH AND ARE REQUIRED TO ANSWER ALL OF THE QUESTIONS IN
THIS QUI:ST1ONNAIRE TRUTHFULLY. YOU MUST PRINT OR HANDWRITE YOUR
ANSWERS YOURSELF, WITHOUT CONSULTING ANY O,...ER PERSON. THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED IS EXCLUSNELY FOR THE SELECTION OF JURORS. YOUR
ANSWERS MUST BE COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY.
PLEASE ANSWER EACH AND EVERy QUESDON. We need your honest. accurate answers to
eac;h question. If you don' know the answer to a question, write. -I don' know: If you do not
understand a question. please ind"1C8te that In yow' response. If your response is incomplete.
please indicate that in your response. The information you give in this Questionnaire wit only be
used by the Court and the parties to select a qualfied jury. After a jury has been selected. ali
copies of your fesponses will be reUned to the Cold. The parties are under an order to maintain
the secrecy of any Information they ream in the course of reviewing these QuestIonnaIres.
YOU MAY NOT DISCUSS THIS CASE, ANt OF THE QUESTIONS OR YOUR ANSWERS IN
11IS. QUEST10NNAIRE WITH ANYONE ELSE, INCLUDING YOUR SPOUSE. MEMBERS OF
YOUR FAMILY, CD-WORKERS OR ANYONE ELSE. IF ANYONE APPROACHES YOU TO
DISCUSS THIS CASE OR THE QUEsnoNNAIRE, YOU MAY NOT DISCUSS ANYTHING
ABOUT nus CASE WITH THAT PERSON OR ANYONE ELSE. IF ANYONE PERSISTS.
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.RePoRT IT TO THl: COURT IMMEDlA1I:Ly. YOU°SHOOa.o°NoTDISCUSS nISCAseWItH
" ANYONE ELSE,~ OTHER POTENTIAL JURORS WHO ARE FLUNG ~
QUESlIONNAIRESWITH YOU.
IF AT MY TIME YOU RECALL HEARING oR SESNG ANYTHING ABOUT THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE OR ANYTIING ABOUT THIS DEFENDANT THAT YOU HAVE HEARD OR SEEN
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM AND NOT DURING THE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
TRIAl... DO NOT SPEAK WITH ANY OF THE OTHER JURORS OR ANYONE ELSE ABOUT
WHAT YOU RECALL, BUT BRING IT TO THE JUDGE'S ATTEN110N IMMEDIATELY.
FINALLY, DURING JURYSELECTION AND DURING THE ENnRE TRIAL:
(1) YOU MUST NOT WATCH ANY NEWS ON TELEVISION;
(2) YOU MUST NOT READ ANY NEWSPAPERS OR NEWS PERIODICALS;
(3) YOU MUST NOT USTEN TO ANY RADIO NEWS;
(4) YOU MUST NOT READ ANY INTERNET NEWS; AND.
(5) YOU MUST NOT DISCUSS THIS CASE OR WHAT YOU LEARN IN COURT WITH
ANYONE ELSE, INCLUDING OTHER JURORS. YOU WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO
DISCUSS THIS CASE wmt OTHER JURORS WHEN THE CASE IS SUBMtnED TO
THE JURy FOR DEUBERATIONS.
JUROR AFFIDAVIT
I. HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, DEPOSE AND SAY:
1. DlAT I HAVE READ THE INSTRUCTION PAGE;
2. DlAT I UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTION PAGE;
3. DlAT IWILL FOLLOW THECOURrS INSTRUCTIONS OUTlINED IN THE
INSTRUCTION PAGE;
4. DlAT I HEREBY AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE COURT'S ORDERS THAT I NOT WATCH
ANY"TELEVISION NEWS; THAT I NOT READ ANY NEWSPAPERS OR NEWS
PERIODICALS; THAT I NOT USTEN TO ANY RADIO NEWS; THAT I NOT READ ANY
INTERNET NEWS; AND THAT I NOT DISCUSS THIS CASE WITH ANYONE,
INCLUDING OTHER JURORS. t UNDERSTAND THAT WILL ONLY BE ALLOWED TO
DISCUSS THIS CASE WITH OTHER JURORS WHEN THE CASE IS SUBMrnED TO
THE JURY FOR DELIBERATIONS.




PLEASE PRINT DARK ENOUGH TO MAKE COPIES.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
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1. NAME: ~~....o--~~~~~~_:_:_--
last First Middle- Malden (IfApplIcable)
2. Ust any other names you've ewr been known by: _
3. Age Date of BirIh
4. sex__





6. City of residence: (NOTE: You doml[ need to provide your residence address.)
CityfTown state
7. How long have you lived where you now reside? _
8. Do you own your own home or rent? _
9. Where else have you lived? _
10. Are you a citizen of the United states? (Yes) [No)
11.Are you a resident of Gooding County? [Yes) [No) For how long? __
12. Are you able to read. speak. and understand the english language? [Yes) [No]
If 8 00.1t please explain.
13. Idaho law provides that nursing mothers can have their jury service postponed until they are
no longer nursing. Are you a nursing mother who would like to have your jury service
postponed? [Yes) [No)
14. Have you lost the right to vote because of a criminal conviction? (Yes] [No)
15. What is your current marital status? (circle one that applies)
Single Never married Divorced Separated Remarried WIdowed
Married __ years Living with someone years
16. If you are. or ever have been married. please state the name ofeach person to whom you
have been married: _
17. Has your marital status changed within the last 10 years? (Yes] [No]
18. If yes. what was the reason?
o Marriage 0 Re-marriage 0 Death 0 DIvorce 0 Other: _
19. Do you have any children or stepchildren or are you a guardian of any children? [Yes] [No)
JUROR Q1JESTIONNAIRE (BALL), Page 3
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.Ifyour anSwerwas -yes- pleaSe proWiG the following rntOrmadon:




20. Do you contriI:KJte service or·money to any charitable organization? (Yes) [No]
If "yes- Please describe which organIzations. _
21. Have YOU. your spouse. a relative or close friend ever sought assistance from. donated
money to. emptoyed by and/or otherwise associated with any of the following:
a. Any state. federal. or municipal law enforcement agency. for example. portee
department. FBI. DEA. INS. ATF. IRS. Parole and Probat!on Department. Sheriffs
Office. correctJona' facility. fire department or prosecutor's office? (Yes) [No] If
"yes.- please describe: _
b. Criminal defense attorneys or other criminal defense groups. prisoners rights. or
sentencing reform group. such 8S American CivIl Uberties Union (ACLU). Amnesty
International. or a similar organization? (Yes) [No] If '"yes,- please describe:__
c. Any group or association that favors jury nulHfication? [Yes] [No] If -yes: please
describe: _
d.Neighborhood crime watch program. NRA. Mothefs Against Drunk Drivers (MADD)
or simUar organizations? (Yes) [No) If -yes: please describe: _
e. Crime victim's rights organization? [Yes) (No) If "yes-. please describe: _
22. What type of books do you read? _
23. What is the last book you have read or are currently reading? _
24. Please state hobbies and major recreational activities. which are most Important to you?_
25. Do you have any health problems. such as vision problems. hearing problems. or any
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (HALL), Page 4
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.current~. or emotional~~Would make it ci.fflcuit f~· yOU' to s8rve as ~
juior? (Yesl (No) .
If you have such a probfem, please briefly state the nature of the problem: _
26. Do you have any Sf)8Cifif? problems~Dng with stress or pressure? (Yes] (No]
If"yes,- please explain. _
27. Are you presently taldng any form of medication? (Yesl [No)
If so, please list the medications you are taking, the reasons for taking them and how often
you take them.
Medicatfon Reason for Taking How long taking
Dr MENTAL HEALTH AND §UBSIANCE USE
28. Have you. any famHy member or close personal friend ever undergone counseling or
treatment for emotiona'. psychiatric, behavioral or substance abuse (alcohol or drug)
probtems? (Yes] [No] If -yes-, please give deteRs.
29. What are your feelings, either positive or negative, about psychiatrists. psychologists or
other mental health professlonals? _
30. How would you feel about a psychiatrist. psychologist, or other mental health professional
testifying in a capital murder case as an expert witness?
31. Please describe your opinions about the consumption of alcohol _
32. 00 you have strong feelings against the consumption of alcohol? (Yes) [No]
If-yes: please explain. _
33. If you hear evidenCe that the victim. the defendant, or both had consumed alcohol. would
that impact your ability to be a fair and impartial juror? [Yes] [No]
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·If·...- - ~e.aexplaln·• ~~ _
~~~ \ .
.34. Do you believe alcohol consumption excuses someone from beJng responsible for criminal
conduct? [Yes) [No) If -yes: please expfaln. _
'35. Do you believe that i1 someone consumes alcohol. that person cannot be the victim of a
crime? [Yes] [No] If "yes: please explain._- _
nt. LOGISTICS OF THIS CASE
36. The Court and counsel anticipate that jury selection In this case wiD take approximately two
weeks. during which time Jurors will be asked to retum to the Gooding County Courthouse
for indMdual juror questioning. After the jury is seated to try this case. rather than requiring
the jury to move to Boise for the entire length of the trial. the Court has decided to bus the
jurors back and forth from Gooding County to BoIse In order to minimize the disruption In
the jurors· dally lives. The Court anticipates that the schedule wiD be as follows: the jurors
win meet at a predetermined location in Gooding County at approximately 7:00 or 7:30 a.m.
and board a chartered bus that win travel to Boise. The jury will arrive at the Ada County
Courthouse at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. The trial win begin at 9:00 a.m. and
continue until 2:00 p.m. with two 15-mlnute breaks during the day. The jury win again board
the bus shortly after 2:00 p.m. and retum to the predetermined location in Gooding County.
It Is the Courts plan that the jury wll be back to Gooding before 5:00 p.m. each day. Before
the jury Is sequestered for deliberations. the Court wiU hold the trial on Tuesdays through
Fridays. giving the jury three-day weekends. There will be security personnel riding on the
bus with the Jury. In addition. the Jury will be provided with snacks. The bus seats win have
high backs and will be upholstered. The bus will be equipped with monitors for videos and
restroom facilities.
a. If you are selected as a juror in this case. would you be able to handle this
arrangement? (Yes] [No] If -no.- please explain. _
37. Court and counsel understand ,that this arrangement will create some disruption In your life.
but we need to know if this arrangement wHI be such a burden that you could not fulfill your
duties in this case. Do you feel that this arrangement would create such a heavy burden that it
would beim~for you to serve 8$ a juror In this case? (Yes] [No] If -yes,- please explain.
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38. Would the arrangement described above prevent you from being a fair and impartial juror to
either the State or the Defendant? [Yes) [No) If )tes,. please explain. _
39. After the evidence has been presented to the Jury and each side has made closing
arguments, the Jury begins its deliberations. DurIng the deliberations, Idaho law requires that
the jury be sequestered. sequestration Is the separation of a Jury from society and particularly
sources of news during the course of deliberations, which may take hours, days, or longer. The
jurors will be provided with meals and lodging at an undisclosed hotel in Ada County.
a. What are your feelings with regard to being separated from your family for whatever
period of time the jury needs to.make Its decision? _
b. If you are selected as a juror in this case. would it be impossible for you to fulfiU your
duties as a juror if you have to be sequestered for the time necessary to reach a
verdict? (Yes] (No) If "yes: please explain. _
40. If the jury finds the Defendant guilty of Rrst Degree Murder, a sentencing hearing witt begin
immediatelY. The jury will continue to be kept together In BoIse during the sentencing hearing
and through deliberations on what the sentence should be. If you are selected as a Juror In this
case. Is there anything in your job or personal life that would make it impossible for you to fulfill
your duties as a juror for the required time? (Yes] [No) If"yes,. please explain. _
41. Do you think that concern about your children, personal life. job or other 1hIngs might
distract your concentration if you served as a juror in this case for three weeks or more? [Yes)
[No] If-yes.- please explain _
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (BALL), Page 7
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IV.' DuitES IN Tia CASE
. . .
42. If yoU. are selected as a juror in 1hi$~. you will. at the end of~ case; be called upon to
judge whether the Defendant Is guilty or not guilty. Is there any reason why you cannot do
this? (Yes) (No)
.f-yes: what Is the reasOn?__~ _
43. If you are selected as a juror In this case. you may be required to view photographs of the
body of the victim. The court recognizes that this ls not pleasant for anyone. The Issue In
this case, however, Is whether the State can prove the charges it has brought related to this
death beyond a reasonable doubt. WiD viewing such photographs affect your ability to
consider this case objectively? [Yes) (No] Please explain. _
Will viewing such photographs affect your ablity to follow the instructions of the court?
[Yes] (No] Please explain. _
44. The Jury win decide whether the defendant is guilty or not gUilty. The Judge wiD instruct the
Jury on the law applicable to this case and It Is the Jury's duty to follow the law as given by
the Judge. Will you follow the Judge's instructions upon the law even if you believed the
law was different? (Yes] [No] If no, please explain. --:... _
45. Will you follow the Judge's instructions upon the law even if you disagree with the law as
instructed by the Judge? (Yes) [No] If -no: please explain. _
46. Do you hold anybeliefs, religious, moral, political, or otherwise, that would prevent you from
following the law, as the judge wUl instruct you? [Yes) (No) If "yes: please explain.__
v. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS CASE
47. Although neither side is permitted to ten you their version of the facts in this case, both sides
have agreed to summarize the allegations as follows in order to detennine whether you
know anything about this case:
Cheryl Hanlon's body was found on March 1, 2003. at approximately 10:30 in the morning at
the edge of the Boise foothills, near the intersection of 5'" and Alturas. Erick VtrgU Hall was
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (HALL), Page 8
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charged with rape and~mui'der ofCheryl Hanlon il March, 2003. There has been
news media ooverage regarding this case. If you are choSen as a juror, you wlR take an oath
that requires. you to return a verdict. whatever that verdict Is, only on the basis of the
. evidence 1hat you hear In the courtroom and not from~ outside SOlI'C8. WI you be able
to do that? [Yes) [No) If-no,- please explain. _
48. Have you heard anything about this case from any source? (Yes] [No]
a. If-yes,- what have you heard? _
b. If "yes: what was the source of that Information? _
49. Have you ever participated In or overheard discussions about this case? [Yes] [No] If
"yes,- who was involved in that discussion and what was the nature of the ~versation? _
50. Have you formed an opinion about whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of these
charges? (Yes) [No]
a. If "yes,- what is your opinion? _
b. If"yes: what is the basis is for your opinion. _
51. Has anyone talked with you about your possible involvement as a juror in this~? (Yes)
[No] If "yes,- please describe the nature of the conversation. _
52. The Court has ordered you and win continue to order you not to read, listen to, or watch any
news accounts of this case in the news media, including but not limited to. newspapers,
periodicals, television, radio, Internet or any other source. The Court will further instruct you
not to discuss this case with anyone, not even one another, unbl the jury retires to deliberate
upon the verdict. Would you find it difficult to follow such an instruction for any reason?
[Yes] (No) If -yes: please explain. _
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (HALL), Page 9
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53. Do you know any of the people on the 1st below who may be frwolved or who may tesWy In
" this trial? If you know any of these p&q)Ie, please circle the names of the people you know




RIck Allen. Garden City PoUce
Department
BrIan Ames









Steve Bartlett, Ada County SherIfI's
Offtce, formerly employed at Garden
City Police









SCott Birch. Attorney General's Office
Marcus A. Bonilla
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Megan Clement. Lab Corp"














Rachel Cutler. Idaho State Forensic Lab




Rigo Delgadillo, Boise Police
Department
Dennis Dean, State of Idaho
Michelle Deen


















Carta Finis. ldentigenetix, Inc.
Sasha Fletcher
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. ': :' Rob Gallas, BoIse PoIce Department
": ChristIna GarrIson. Canyon County





DennIs Graybll, eoase Police
DeparIment
Rex Green, Idaho Department of
. Transportation
Brian GriffIn. Boise Police DeparIment






Cynthia Hall, Idaho State Police,
Forensic ServIces


















Department. formerly employed at




Tom '(Randy) Holst, Boise Police
DeparIment (retired)












Andy Johnson. BoIse Police Depaa1ment
BeInda Johnson
BrIan Johnson, BoIse Police Department
KIrk Johnson
Mindy Jorgenson .
Robert KarInen, Ada Co. Coroner's
omce
Eric KJehI, State of Idaho
JenyKlng
Trisha KIng
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, Thomas Miotke. BoIs8 'P0uc8
Department.. .
U. MIke Monroe. BoIse Police
Department ,
RyIene Moore (NoWlin), Idaho State
CrIme Lab
Ed Moreno. Boise PolIce Department
ChIp Morgan. BoIse Police Department
, (retired)
, Greg Morgan. Boise Police Department
Josh-Nelson
.Edward Nice
soott Nicholls, Boise Police Department














Dr. Roderick W. Pettis
Jason Pietrzak. formerly Garden City
PorIC8 Department
StevePilIott
Brett Powell. Boise porlC8 Department
RayPrasa
Brett Quilter. Boise Police Department
Cookie Quirk
Glenda Rabbe. formerly State of Idaho
Dawn Richards
Gary'Ripley
Dale Rogers. BoIse PoUce Department
Sue Rogers
Randy Roper. Boise Police Department








Tom Shuler. Boise Police Department
Dave Smith. Boise Police Department
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (HALL), Page 12
(retired)
.MIchael B. Smith. FBI
BrIan Soba (aka Eddie)
Pam Somen. State of Idaho
Janet Sparks, Ada Cot.mty DisPatch
CorY S1ambaugh. Garden CIly Police
Department































Mark Vucinich. Boise Police Department
Jeny Walbey. Garden City Police
Department
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:. ,,:' .~DwaYne Wtnston..Lab Corp . ' L,· .
. . .-Jen8 Wydra . ...... '.
. . 0_....._. Wydra '.. ~~.' .
. .~IVI .. ' .:.. l'~'" "
Juanita Yfibar
RandyZook
54. Do you know either of the prosecutors in this case. Jan M. Bennetts or Doug Varie? [Yes]
(No]
If "yes.- please explain•. _
55. Are you friends or associates with any other members of the Ada County Prosecutor's
Office staff? [Yes] [No]
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (BALL), Page 13
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56. Do you knOw anyone from the Gooding County Prosecuto(s Office? (Yea) [No)
tf-yes.- pleaseexplain•. _
57. Do you have any plans to move out of Gooding County wfthin the next two (2) months?
(Yes) [No] If "yes.- please give detaUs. _
58. Do you have any pending business with either Ada CoUnty or Gooding County, including
criminal cases. zoning matters. licensing matters or any other matters? [Yes) (No)
If "yes,. please explain. _
59. Do you know either of the defense attorneys in this case, Robert Chastain or Deborah
Kristal? [Yes) [No)
If-yes: please explain. _
60. Are you friends or associates with any other criminal defense attorneys?
[Yes) [No]
If "yes," please explain who you know and how you know them.
61. Do you know, or think you might know. the defendant, Erick Virgil HaD, or any of his family
or friends? (Yes) [No)
If "yes.. please expfain.who you know and how you know them.
62. Do you ever recall hearing the Defendanfs name in any other context other than this case?
[Yes] (No]
a. If "yes,. please explain. _
b. What was the source of this information? _
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63. When the Def~ntw8s arrested and charged with rape and~ In ,this case. do you
.. .. . .~ "
know If he was suspected of being InwIved In any other crfn:NnaI activity? [Yesl (No)
a. If-yes,- please explain. -:-- _
b. Wlvit was the source of this informatfon? _
64. Do you recan hearing about any previous murder cases in Ada COunty within the last seven
(7)years? [Yes] [No)
a. If "yes•• please list those cases you know about and describe what you remember
about each case?' _
b. If you answered -yes•• what was the source of that information? _
c. If you answered "yes•• do you think that the conviction(s) and sentence(s) were fair?
[Yes] [No] Please explain your answer. _
d. If you answered "yes•• did you discuss any of these cases with anyone? [Yes] [No)
If "yes; with whom did you discuss these cases and what was the nature of the
dlscusslon? _
VI. DEATH PENALTY
One of the crimes the Defendant is charged with is First Degree Murder. If the jury finds the
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of First Degree Murder. it is possible that the death
penalty could be imposed. Under Idaho law. not aU defendants convicted of murder are eligible
for the death penalty. Rather. under Idaho law. only offenders who have been convicted of Rrst
Degree Murder are eligible for the death penalty. In 1hose rot Degree Murder cases where a
defendant is eligible for the death penalty and the jury has found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of First Degree Murder. the jury has to decide whether to impose the death
penalty. Persons convicted of FIfSt Degree Murder cannot automatically be given the death
penalty. Before the jury could impose the death penalty, there would have to be a special
sentencing proceeding on the appropriate penalty and the jury would have to find that the death
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. be presented re9ardin9 the~ penalty. .The evidence that may be presented ~ the
. . .
sentencing hearing woutd Include what Is Called -aggravation evidence- and -mitigation
~: -~vation evidence- Is evidence that the state would present In support of~
death penalty. -Mitigation evfdence- is evidence that does not constitute a justiftcatfon or
excuse for the offense in question, but which, In fairness and mercy, may be considered as
extenuating or reducing the degree of moral cufpabIIity.
65. What are your opinions, beliefs or views regarding the death penalty? _
66. Are you in favor of the death penalty? [Yes] [No) Please explain your answer. _
67. Do you oppose the death penalty [Yes) [No] Please explain your answer.
68. Have you ever held a different view on the death penalty? (Yes] [No) If "yes,. what was
your prior view and why did you change it? _
69. There have been several recent cases discussed In the news media concerning the death
penalty, and executions. Have you foUowed any of these stories? (Yes) [No] If "yes: which
stories did youfoUow? _
70. If "yes: what, if any, effect did these stories or news articles have on your opinion about the
death penalty? Please explain. _
71. Do you feel that your views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair your
abHily to view the facts impartially? (Yes) [No] Please explain. _
72. Do you feel that your views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair your
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proved its case beyOnd a reasonabIe'dOubt? [Yes) [NO] ~~In. _
73. With regard to the death penalty. which of the following statements YJDufd best represent
ytU' feelings: (CIrcle only one)
a. I~ that the death penalty is appropriate in aU first degree murder cases
regardless of the evidence presented at sentencing.
b. Although I believe that the death penalty Is appropriate In aI first degree mll'der
cases. as long as the law provides that the death penalty Is not automatlcaDy
Imposed. I could assess a penalty other than the death penalty under the proper set
of circumstances.
c. I believe that the death penalty Is appropriate In some first degree murder cases and
• could retum a death penalty verdict in a proper case.
d. Although I do not believe that the death penalty ever ought to be Invoked. as long as
the law provides for the death penalty. I could assess it under the proper set of
circumstances.
e. I believe that the death penalty Is appropriate In some first degree murder cases. but
I could never retum a verdict which assessed the death penalty.
f. I believe that the death penalty should never be imposed and I could never. under
any circumstances. return a verdict which assessed the death penalty.
74. Do you belong to any group that favors abolishing the death penalty? [Yes] (No] Please
explain your answer.
75. If you are selected as a juror in this case and the jury finds the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. dO you befl8ve that the death penalty should be
automatically Imposed regardless of the circumstances? [Yes] [No) Please explain your
answer. _
76. If you are selected as a juror in this case and the juryfinds the defendant guilty of murder In
the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. do you believe that the death penalty should JlIl!![
be imposed regardless of the evidence presented In aggravation and the specifIC circumstances
of the case? [Yes] [No) Please explain your answer. _
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'77. HaS'theie been any partk:uI8~ event In your ire thai 'haS~ the way you feel &bout
the death penalty? [Yes] [No] If-yes.- please~I.-'_' ,.--__
78. The best ergwnent In favor of the death penally is?
79. The best argument against the death penalty is? _
SO. If you are in favor of the death penalty in some cases. do you agree that 8 life~
without the possibility of parole. rather than the death penalty, would be appropriate lIfldM' the
proper circumstances In some cases? [Yes) [No] Please explain. _
81. Do you hold any beliefs, moral, religious. political, personal or otherwise that would prevent
you from applying the death penalty? [Yes] (No] If "yes,- please explain. _
82. For what crimes do you think the death penalty should be available in Idaho? _
83. Do you agree with the law in the State ofkfaho that states a murder committed during the
commission of certain felonies. including rape. may be charged as a capital offense for which
the death penalty may be imposed under certain circumstances? [Yes] [No] Please explain. _
84. 00 you think there should be some crimes under certain circumstances which can for the
death penalty solely because of their severe facts and circumstances. regardless of whether or
not the guilty person has committed prior violent acts?
(Yes] [No] Please explain., _
85. If you believe in the application of the death penalty. how strongly. on a scale of 1 to 10, do
JUROR QUJ'SI10NNAIRE (BALL)J Page 18
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86. If you are opposed to the death pena~, how strongly, ~ a scale of l' to 10, do~ hofd
that belief? (1 being the weakest belief, 10 being the strongest.)
81. Do )4OU think the deaI1 penalty Is a deterrent to othercriniinaIs? [Yes] [No) Please explain.
88. Do you think the death penalty Is ever misapplied? (Yes] [No] Please e~....-- _
89. Do you beDew In aan eye for an eye-? (Yes) [No] Please explain. _
90. 00 you think that a life sentence Is worse than the death penalty? [Yes] INo] Please
explain. _
91. What would be important to you In deciding whether a person received a death or life
sentence in a first degree murder case? _
92. If you are selected as a juror in this case, you may be reqUired to determine and weigh
whether mitigating factors presented to you are sufficiently compellng to make the imposition of
,the death penalty unjust. Mitigating circumstances are those that do not constitute a
justification or excuse for the offense in question, but Which, in fairness and mercy, may be
considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpabUity. If mitigation evidence Is
presented, the jury would be reqUired to consider such evidence and determine what weight. If
any, to give to the mitigaUonevidence.
a. Would you be able first, to consider aD of the mitigation evidence presented In this
case and second, to determine What weight to give such evidence? (Yes] (No] If
·no," please explain. _
93. What factors would you conslder mitigating. making life in prison without the possibility of
parole a just sentence for a person convicted of first degree murder? _
a. In determining whether mitigating circumstances exist. would you consider Erick
Virgil Hall's character and record? (Yes] (No) Please eXplain. _
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·b. Inde~ whether mitigating circu~ ~'~"~'~'eiidc
. VIrgil HalrsfamUy history? [Yes] [No] Please explain. --:-- _
Co ,n determining whether mitigating circumstances exist. would you consider Erick
\IIrgI1 HaIrs behavior In jail? [Yesl [No) Please explain. _
d. In cletermfnlng whether mitigating circumstances exist, would you consider Erick
Vlfgl HaIrs mental health? [Yes) [No] Please explain. _
e•. In determining whether mitigating circumstances exist, would you consider Erick
VirgY Halfs learning difficulties? (Yes] [No] Please explain. _
f. In determining whether mitigating circumstances exist. would you consider evidence
that Erick Virgil HaH had been physicaHy and sexually abused as a child? (Yes] (No]
Please explain. _
94. What general factors would you consfder to be aggravating. making the death penalty a just
sentence for a person convicted of first degree murder? _
95. Would a person·s use of drugs automatically prevent you from assessing the death penalty
if you found him guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt? [Yes] [No] If "yes.-
pleaseexplaJn _
96. Would a person's use .of alcohol automatically prevent you from assessing the death
penalty if you found him gUilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt? (Yes] [No]
If "yes.- please explain. _
97. tfthe State meets its burden of proof as to the Defendanfs guDt beyond a reasonable doubt
and the State similarly meets its tuden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more
aggravating circumstances. and. after having considered and weighed mitigating factors. you
do not find that the mitigating factors are sufficiently compeIing to make the imposition of the
death penalty unjust. is there any reason. religious. moral. political, personal or otherwise that
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (HALL), Page 20
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you coUld not'slgri the c:i8ath. p&naIiy verdict fOrm? [Yes] [No) If "y8s.- please expiaIn.__
98. If the State meets Its burden of proof as to the Defendants guHt beyond a reasonable doubt
and the State similarly meets its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more
aggravating circumstances, but. after having considered and weighed mitigating factors, you
find that the mitigating factors are sufftcIentIy compelling to make the imposition of the death
penalty unjust. is there any reason, religious. moral. political. personal or otherwise that you
could not sign a verdict Imposing life In prison? (Yes] [No] If -yes: please explain.
99. If the State meets its burden of proof as to the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
is there any reason why you would find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense in order to avoid
the death penalty question? [Yes] [No] If "yes: please explain. _
100. . Are your views on the death penalty different from your spouse or a close family
member's views [Yes] (No] Please explain your answer. _
101. Have you or your spouse's or close famDy member's views on the death penalty
changed in the past five years? [Yes) [No] If)tes,It please explain what caused that change: _
102. Would your feelings about the monetary costs to the state of life Imprisonment as
opposed to the monetary costs to the State of the death penalty in any way affect your decision
as to whether to impose the death penally or life imprisonment if the Defendant is convicted in
this case? [Yes] [No] Please explain. _
103. Do you believe that an Idaho inmate sentenced to life Imprisonment without parole could
eYer be released from prison? [Yes] [No] If ayes: please explain. _
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104. '. 'WOuld your belief re9anDno 'paFoieor eligibility for reIeaSe'hav& 'an affect on your
C:fecision as'to whether to Impose the death penalty or life imprisonment if the Defendant is
, . .
convicted In this case? (Yes) (No) If-yes: please explain. ~ _
105. Do you believe that a death sentence Is the only just atonement for a person corMcted
of Intentlonaly killing another person? (Yes) (No) If -yes: please explain. _
VII. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
106.What are your feelings In general about the criminal justice system? _
107.00 you have any special training or knowledge In the field of genetics or DNA t8$tlng? [Yes]
[No] If"yes.- please describe., "'- _
108.00 you have any opinion about the reliability of DNA testing results? [Yes} [No] If -yes:
please give detaits., _
109. Have YOU. any member of your famity, or close friends. ever been involved in a civil
lawsuit? [Yes] [No]
If -Yes,- please check where appropriate: _Plaintiff_Defendant__Witness
Please also state the nature of the lawsuit and its outcome. _
110. ,Have you, any member of your family, or close friends. ever been involved in a criminal
lawsuit? [Yes) [No]
If "Yes,- please check where appropriate: Witness _ Defendant
Please also state the nature of the lawsuit and its outcome. _
111. Have you, a member of your family, or a close friend ever been the victim of a violent or
otherwise serious crime (reported or unreported)? (Yes] [No] If your answer is -yes-.
please answer the following:
a. Briefly explain the circumstances _
b. What was theoutcome? _
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:, Co waS anyone arrested'or prosecuted?
d. Do you feel that justice was served? (Yesl (No) _
~. What do you think could or should have been done? _
112. Have you, your spouse, a relative. or close friend ever had an unpleasant experience
InvoMng law enforcement? (Yes) [No)
If-yea,- please describe., o:--- _
113. Have you ever had a positive experience with a law enforcement officer?
(Yes) [No)
If''yes.- please describe... -------
114. Do you have any opinions ~bout law enforcement officers that might affect your ability to
Impartially evaluate the testimony of an officer dUring this trial? (Yes] [No]
If "yes: please describe. _
115. Which best describes how you behave when you believe that you are correct about
something?
(Check 0 ...).
_ftJways hold my ground
__Generally hold my ground
_Generallyhold my ground. but can be swayed by forceful arguments
_--cGeneraUy am swayed by others
_~AImost always am swayed by others
a. When you feel you are correct. win you stillisten to the arguments of others who do
not agree with you? [Yes) (No] If -yes: are you sometimes persuaded to change
your positions? [Yes) {No) _
116. Have you ever served as a juror before today? (Yes] [No] If -yes::
a. When? _
b. Which Court caned you for jury duty? _
c. Was it a civil or criminal case? _
d. Describe the case briefly., _
e. Was the case submitted to the jury? [Yes] (No)
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,f. pies'you~ In the deIiber8uons? riesj (No]
, g. Did the JurY reach a \ierdicrt [Yes) lNO)
h. Whatwastheverdict?__~ _
~ Were you theF~? [Yes] (Not
,117. W. there anylhfng In your prior jury experience that upset you to the extent that jury
service was an unsatisfactory experience? [Yes) [No)
If"yes: please describe. _
118. Do you ICnow any of the other members of this IllY panel In ~ay'8 case? (Yes) [No)
If "yes,-:
a. Who do you know? _
b. How do you know this person? _
119. Have you ever observed any of the following?
(CHECK THE ANSWER THAT APPLIES)
Human corpse? Yes No__
A medical operation? Yes No__
An autopsy? Yes _ No__
VICtims of a violent accident? Yes No__
120. Please check the statement which best reflects your personal belief regarding the
following five (5) statements:
8. -Most criminals are actuaRy victims of societYs problems.-
I) Strongly Agree (J Agree [) Uncertain [) Disagree [ ) Strongly Disagree
b. "The criminal justice system fairly protects the rights of persons accused of
committing a crime.-
[JStrongly Agree () Agree [) Uncertain [I Disagree [] Strongly Disagree
Co "The criminal justice system fairly protects the rights of victim's of crime.-
( ) Strongly Agree [ ) Agree I) Uncertain (J Disagree () Strongly DIsagree
d. "Criminal laws treat criminal defendants too harshly.-
, [) Strongly Agree [] Agree [) Uncertain () Disagree () Strongly Disagree
e. Where would you place our criminal justice system on a scale of 1 to 10 with respect
to punishment of aimlnal offenders, with ·1- being the most lenient and ·10'"' being
the most severe? (Circfe a number)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
121. Have you, your spouse, any family members. close personal friends or anyone you
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (BALL), Page 24
000462
    
. 
. f  .      f i  
.       i t? ( e   
    _____________  
     (y   
·  as                
     (y   
    _________________  
 00                 
  
     _________________  
       ________________  
         
     
     
      
      
        
             
    
       y'  
I             
             
  
             
            
       [    I     
 · l l      " 
.             
       Ju t            
      ·      ' ·  
      
   56     
       ,       
     
· . . .
:.:;' :·:·..:~..,:·.:i· , ..:.... .
-. '0 ••
0;. ':,..; •• :;.0. '.
:... :.:: ..~. ".
:.: . :.:." .
123. Have you, your spouse, any family members or dose personal friends ever used the
services of an attorney because of being involved in litigation? (Yes] [No] If "yes: please give
details. _
124. Have you been interested in the outcome of a criminal case either personally or through
the 'media? (Yes) [No] If "yes: please give details•. _
125. Did you form any opinion about the criminal justice system as a result of this interest?
{Yes] [No] Please give details.
126. Have you ever watched anyTV shows, movies or read any books or articles dealing with
the death penalty or life on death row? [Yes] [No) If yes. which ones? _
121. How did those shows, movies, books or articles Influence your opinion about the death
penalty?-------------------------
128. Do you watch any TV programs involving law enforcement. prosecutors, defense
attorneys or the crimiflal justice system; for example, Law & Older, CS/, Sharf(, Court~ and
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Penon Charged Relation to you Type of CrIme Date Outcome of Charge 
1 .. __ --------------------------------------------------
~.----------------------------------------------------3. __________________________________________________ __ 
4. _______________________________ _ 
5.""--_______________________________ _ 
122. 00 you think that the person, who was charged as described above, was treated fairly 
by "the system-Le. police. attorneys. judges etc.? Please describe:, _______ _ 
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"-. . . you watch them on are9utar basis. _
129. Have )'OU ever~ the services of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office or any other
Prosecutfng.AttomeYsofllce (bad checks. child support. protective order. etc.)? [Yes] [No]
If"yes: pleasegivedetalls., --:-- _
130. Have you ever been to the Ada County Courthouse before? [yes]' [No]
If "yes," please give details., _
131. Have you ever known anyone that was killed by criminal means? [Yes) [No)
If -yes," please explain:
132. Do you, or someone in your OOme. own a ftreann? [Yes) [No] If "yes; please describe
the type. for example. rifle, shotgun. handgun. and th8 purpose of ownership. for example,
hunting, personal protection. target shooting etc. _
133. Have you taken any extra precautions to protect yourself. your family or your home from
crime? [Yes] [No] If "yes," please describe. _
134. Rank the following objectives of punishment in order of their importance to you:
(1st, 2nd. or 3rd)
__ Rehabilitate those convicted
_ Deter others from similar crimes
_ Punish those convicted
Please explain your above answer:
135. What do you think causes a person to be dangerous?
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~. ,', ': ',;,'. 136. ReligiOus Preference: Church denominatioli, if~, _
'., . .
137. Name and loCation of church or synagogtI8:, _
~38. How often do you attend? _
139. Ifyour church has a position on capital Plmlshment, please state 1: _
140. Do you agree with the position of your church on capital punishment? _
141. Other than attendance, what other activities are you involved In at )'OUr' church or
synagogue?_-----------------------
142. Were you raised in some other denomination? [Yes] [No)
If yes, which one? _
143. Are you registered to vote? [Yes] [No]
144. Do you consider yourself politically liberal, conservative, or moderate?__-.,... _
145. Do you consider yourself a Democrat. Republican, or Independent? _
146. Have you or any member of your family ever been active in a political campaign as a
volunteer, fundralser, paid campaign worker, etc.? [Yes) [No] If yes, please expIain.,__
147. Have you ever been elected or appointed to serve on a government or regulatory board
(for examPle: school board, citizen's task force, etc.) [Yes] [No] If "yes,- please explain.
148. Do you hold (or have you held) an office or leadership position of any kind? [Yes] [No]
If "yas,- please explain.
149. Are you a member of, or do volunteer work for, any civic clubs, societies, unions,
professional associations or other organizations? [Yes] [No] If so, please give details,
including any offices held in any of these organizations: _
150. Have you ever written a Letter to the Editor? [Yes] (No] If yes, on what~__
151. What newspapers or magazines do you routinely read?
152. How often do you read the following newspapers:
a. Ggoding County Leader: DaHy Once a Week Never
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. . c. Idaho Statesman: Dally
153. . What are your favorite movies?
164. What are your- fawrIte TV shows?
onceaWeek
Once a Week
155. What is your fawrlte radio station? _
156. What books about murder cases have you read?
IX. EMPLOYMENT BACI(GROJIjD
. 157. Have you or your significant other ever served in the armed forces? (Yes] [No)
a. Branch of service and highest rank. _
b. Dates and places of service. _
c. Are you a Combat veteran? [Yes] [No]
158. What is your occupational status? (Mark X next to those that apply)
_Work fuR-time outside the home
_Work part-time outside the home
_Full-time homemaker
_Homemaker with part-time employment
_Volunteer full-time with charitable organization






"unemployed. for how long? _
159. What Is your current occupatlonljob title? _
160. Who is your employer? _
161. What are your regular duties with that emPloyer? _
162. How long have you been employedthere? _
163. UstaH prior occupations: _
164. What is your significant other's occupational status?
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (BALL), Page28
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165. What Is your significant other's occupatlonljob tftfe? _
166. Who is your significant other's employer? _
167. Have you. any relatives. or close friends had .any experience, training. or any
involvement in the following areas. including employment in any of the fields listed below?











Psychology or ComseIing field
Sociology
&f -yes-. please expJain the experience or Involvement In that area. _
X. EDUCADON
168. What is the highest level of education completed by each of the following people? If
not completed. 6st the years attended.
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE (BALL), Page 29
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Trade:- -Vo-tech AssocIate- Post-grad
169. If you attended high schOol, where did you attend? _
170. If you have any education beyond high school, Identify the school(s) you attended.
when, the areas of study and any degree(s) you received: _
171. Area(s)ofconcentration: _
172. Are you a student now? (Yes] [No]
a. Name of SChool: _
b. Grade or level: _
c. Major Field of Study or Area ofeoncentration: _
173. Is there anything else that the Court or Counsel should know about you that might
influence their decision about you as a potential juror? [Yes] [No] If "yes," please explain.
I declare under penalty ·ofperJury that the foregoing answers to each question are
true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Printed Name
Signature
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ASSIGNMENT: Saturday, 03/01/03, 1240 hrs. I was contacted and directed to respond and
assist in the investigation of,what was believed to be a homicide. I was directed to respond to the
area of5th and Alturas where the victim's body had been discovered.
Upon arriving at the scene I was briefed as to what was known to this time. The body was that of
a W/F/A. She had been discovered in an abandoned open lot. The body was covered with brush
and debris. Clothing appeared to have been removed from the body. A.belt was found around the
victim's neck. The belt was secured to a small tree. The body showed evidence ofphysical
trauma.
On the ground near the body officers had discovered an Idaho Drivers License along with other
person effects. The licence was in the name of Cheryl Ann Hanlon WIF, 0__
The address listed on the licence was
The description on the licence fit the general description ofthe victim (body).
I was assigned to respond to the listed address to confirm that the victim lives at this address and
to gather background information on Ms. Hanlon.
1400 hrs. I arrived at the address where I met Jeffory A Carlson,WIMl~
,phone __ \nd William Thomas Williams, WlM.a-, __ . ...
Both report living at this address with Ms. Hanlon. Mr. Williams is at this time in the process of
moving. He will be living at . "
I explained the discovery ofthe body and both appeared to be shocked and disturbed.
Mr. Carlson explained that Ms. Hanlon is his girlfriend. They have been together for about
sixteen years. Mr. Williams indicated he has been living at this address with Carlson and Hanlon
for several months. After the death ofhis wife he was unable to stay in his own home and had
been allowed or invited to live with Jeffand Cheryl.
They indicated that Cheryl worked at the Owyhee Plaza and the Center on the Grove in the
Banquet areas.
~Officer I Serial I DatdI'imc
.~MAYOTIE . 348
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Both indicated they had not seen the victim today.. She had left home late last night and had not
returned. This was not unco~onand both believed that she would return. They indicated that
she has left in the past to visit family in Salmon Idaho or California without notice so they were
not really concerned.
Jeffexplained that he and Cheryl had been together last night. They had gone to McCleary's Pub
on W State street. Then had gone on to Gil's K-9 bar before coming home.
Jeff indicated that he does not nonnally stay out late, but Cheryl has been staying out after she
gets off work., going to bars that he has not visited before. He says for the most part he goes to
the neighborhood bars. Mostly to Terry's at State and Collister.
He indicated that both he and Cheryl had been regulars at Teny's for some time. But that Cheryl
had been asked not to drink in the bar. She had caused some problem after drinking in the bar
and had been told she was no longer allowed service, but was welcome in the bar.
He says he had not been to Gil's before but Cheryl had wanted him. to get out to new places and
meet new people. So he had gone to the bar with her last night.
He says at Gil's he played pool while she played shuffle board with some other people. When
he noticed that it had begun to snow he suggested they should go home before the weather got
too bad. She did not want to leave.
Jeff says that he left the bar and went out to his PIU to warm it up and wait for her. A short time
later she came out and got into the PIU.
Jeff says that as he drove home Cheryl expressed how displeased she was with him. How she
had not wanted to leave, and how he never wanted to meet new people or be out with her.
He says that when he arrived home he let her out ofthe vehicle. He says he knew ifhe went into
the house he was in for a night ofbeing told offby her.
He says that she got out of the PIU and was going to the door when he last saw her. He
explained that rather then listen to her complain all night he had intended to go see ifhe could
find somewhere else to stay for the night.
ISupavisor Approving I Serial I DatelT"IIIIe. .
003·203
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At this time Both Jeff and Bill explained that they feared Cheryl had been having some type of
mental problem. That' for some time she has seemed depressed, or delusional.
She has talked nonsense. Complaining about people following her, getting into the house. But
both say they never saw any evidence ofanyone following her or being in the house. Jeff
indicated he had talked with her about seeing adoctor but she has refused.
They both indicated that it was becoming more common for her to get offwork late, come in and
wake one or both ofthem wanting to talk all night.
Lately she had begun talking about-how the people who had stolen a lottery ticket from her years
ago in California were after her now. Jeff says she has no idea what she was talking about, he
knew nothing about any lottery ticket. .
Jeff indicated that both he and Cheryl had been involved with drugs when they were younger
living in California. He was fearful her condition had something to do with the drug usage. But
. she refused to admit any problem or to seek help ofany type.
Jeffcontinued to explain when he had last seen Cheryl. He says that he had not wanted to listen
to a night ofher being angry with him for wanting to come home. So he let her out ofthe PIU
and drove away. He says he drove to Terry's to see ifhe could find a friend to stay with. He had
been unable to find anyone so he gave up and drove home.
Vlhen he arrived home, he saw that Cheryl's prlJ was gone. He said he knew she was upset and
felt it was possible she had gone to Salmon to see her parents or to California to see her daughter
and grandchild.
He indicated he couldn't be sme ofthe time but believed he had let her offat the house sometime




I talked with Bill also. He explained that he too last saw Cheryl as JefIlet her out ofthe PIU in
front of the house. He was not sme ofthe time.
He explained that he had been driving home and found himselfon Collister NIB behind Jeff's
PIU. .
. ;eportiDa Ofticer! Serial!Date/Time ISuperYisor Approving! SeriBl.' ! DatelTime
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As they came to the house, he saw Jeffpull in. He (Bill) went past so as to turn around and park
in front of the residence facing the correct way on the street He says this is habit for him so he is
parked facing the right way on the street.
After he turned around and pulled in front ofthe house he saw Cheryl get out and walk to the
house. He also saw that Jeffwas backing out. He knew that ifJeff didn't want to be in the house
that he didn't want to go in. He took Jeffpulling away as a sign that Cheryl was upset and he
didn't want any part ofit so he followed Jeff to Terry's.
He stopped and asked Jeff ifeverything was ok and Jeff indicated that she was upset with him.
Bill says that with that he knew he didn't want to go home yet. He says that he went out to
McCleary's where he played a song that has meaning to him after the death ofhis wife.
Bill says that after a short time he returned to the house. When he arrived, he saw that Cheryl's
PIU was gone, and Jeff's was parked out front. He went in and saw that Jeffwas in bed. So he
went to bed and didn't see Jeff until the follow morning.
He too was not sure ofthe times, he believes he was home in bed by 0030/0045 hrs. He thinks it
was about a halfhour before that he had seen Jeff leave Cheryloffat the house.
Bill says that he left the light on in the front room, having been informed by Cheryl that she
wanted it on when she comes home. Some time about 0600 hrs. He got up to use the bathroom
and saw that the light was still on so he believed she had not come home. He said it was not was
not unusual for Cheryl to ieave unannounced -and he wasn't too concerned:-
Bill says that he got up early because he was going to move today. He saw Jeff about 0815 hrs.
And commented that Cheryl was not home. Jeff confirmed she had·not come home but was not
concerned. Bill says he began moving and saw Jeff again about 10:30. Cheryl still had not come
home. They commented to one another that she should be home soon or call because they
believed she had to work tonight.
I talked with Jeff and Bill about what vehilce Cheryl would be driving. They described it as a
two-tone brown 1987 Ford Ranger with a cab high shell. The vehicle should have Idaho plates.
Jeff indicated the vehilce should be registered in the name ofCheryl and her father Gary. The
plate should be 2IL unk#.
t}03205
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I talked with Jeff about what clothing Cheryl had on last night He indicated that he believes the
coat she bad on when he l~t saw her is in the bathroom. He thinks she may have bad on a green
sweat shirt and dark pants buthe isn't sure. She should have on a pair ofbrown shoes.
I asked about jewelry and be indicated that she always had on a silver ring. The ring is made up
ofthree rings that are connected together.
He knows that when they left home together last night she should have bad about $80.00. He
had no idea what she may have spent while they were together.
,
Jeff knows that Cheryl normally carried her Id and cash in a small pocket purse when she was in
bars. Her larger purse may be in her vehicle. She should have a bank. ofAmerica visa card.. A .
BofA savings card, and another checking/savings card combo.
I asked Jeff when the last time he and Cheryl had sex was. He indicated it bad been a couple of
weeks.
I asked about other identifying information. Jeff indicated that she should have bad extensive
dental work. He knows she has a plate and may have both upper and lower plates. She also was
involved in an accident years ago and suffered injury to both legs. She may have some scars on
both knees.
Jeff indicated that Cheryl has family in Idaho, California and Washington. Her parents Joyce
and Gary live neal Her daughter is in the USAF and stationed at
She has .brothers and a sister in Washington. And an eX-husband in Washington.
I again talked with Bill apart from JefT. He confirmed that Cheryl bad been refused service at
Terry's in part because she had bothered others in the bar with her odd stories about people being
after her.
Bill says that she had begun to run around with different people after not being allowed to drink
at Terry's. He knew that she bas gone to other bars without Jeff.
I asked ifbe knew ofany reason why we should be looking at Jeff as a suspect He didn't believe
Jeffwould ever hurt her. He knew ofno reason to think Jeffwould do her any harm.
003206
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I informed both that the body had not yet been identified and I was not sure it was Cheryl, I asked
that they allow me to confirm the identity before they inform any ofthe family. They agreed.
1700 hrs. After being informed by Det. Smith that the identity of the victim had been confirmed
I called and talked with Joyce Hanlon. She and her husband Gary live a .
II)
I explained the discovery of the victim's body and the fact she appeared to be the victim of a
homicide.
Joyce indicated to me that she knows the victim and Jeffhave been having some problems, but
she believes they are all verbal and knows ofno physical conflicts between the two ofthem. She·
has no reason to suspect that Jeffwould harm Cheryl. Cheryl had visited them in January for a
few days and never indicated Jeffhas harmed her in any way.
Cheryl's complaint was that Jeffwas not yet working and that Jeff would not communicate with
. her, he would simply walk away and go to bed to avoid an argument. Joyce knows that Cheryl
was happy when Jeffwent to work.
She confirmed that Jeff and the victim had been together for several years. They had moved to
Idaho from California living in Salmon before moving to Boise.
Joyce indicated that all ofher children were at one time involved with drug usage. Shebelieves
however'that Cheryl is no longer using andhas not for some time. " .
Joyce also indicated" that she is aware Cheryl has been talking ofodd happenings. People
following her or after her. Joyce indicated she believed Cheryl had some mental health issues.
.She had tried to convince CherYl to seek some help but Cheryl refused.
Joyce told me about the family. She indicate that Cheryl's younger brother David was the victim
of a murder in 1977 when they lived in Woodvill Washington. He was found murdered in the
family home.
Chexyl's other brother PhD Hanlon lives in '\
c"'""',.....,-;roM AYOITE 348'
JD'D.OO2a-ADP 1994
His cell number j
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Another brother Walter Hanlon 8J.so lives in _ His number j - Joyce
indicated she believes that ~e may still be involved in drug usage, and suggested that he would be
oflittle assistance.
Cheryl has a sister Renae but Joyce has no idea where she is or how to reach her.
Cheryl's daughter Erin Kessler in the USAF and lives
number is --- .
Joyce believes her cell "
1725 hrs. I called the cell number provided to me for Erin. It is in fact the correct number.
I eXplained the discovery of the victim and the fact that she appears to be the victim ofa murder.
Joyce knew that Cheryl had stopped going to the neighborhood bar (Terry's) because of some
falling out she had with the owners. She knew little ofCheryl's other activities.
, I spoke with Erin Kessler who lives at .:nd hercet a' . Her home phone is
Erin indicated to me that her mother has never been a totally well person. She has heard her
mother talk about people following her. And how people she and Jeff knew in California (drug
related people) may be after her because ofdrugs or money.
Erin says she told her mother she didn't want to hear about these things. She says she never
believed what her IJl,other was saying. She described her mother as a pathological liar. She feels
that Cheryl believed what she was saying, but that it was not based in reality. Erin too believes
her mother had some mental health issues.
Erin says that she last talked with her mother (the victim) last Wednesday. They normally talked
once a week.
Erin indicated that she knows Jeff and her mother have been together for some time. She knows
that Jeff stayed with her during the drug times. And she believes they both are no longer
involved in drug usage.
-
DISTRIBUTION: Original- Records, Yellow - Follow-up, Pink - Crime A@)alJPd@) .13000477
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BOISE POLICE OEPAR JENT/ADA COUNTY SHERI. 'S DEPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
. 03/01/03
Another brother Walter Hanlon 8J.so lives in _ His number j - Joyce
indicated she believes that~ may still be involved in drug usage, and suggested that he would be
oflittle assistance.
Cheryl has a sister Renae but Joyce has no idea where she is or how to reach her.
.'
Cheryl's daughter Erin Kessler in the USAF and lives
number is --- .
"Joyce believes her cell
1725 hrs. I called the cell number provided to me for Erin. It is in fact the correct number.
Joyce knew that Cheryl had stopped going to the neighborhood bar (ferry's) because of some
falling out she had with the owners. She knew little ofCheryl's other activities.
I eXplained the discovery ofthe victim and the fact ~t she appears to be the victim ofa murder.
Erin indicated to me that her mother has ·never been a totally well person. She bas heard her
mother talk about people following her. And how people she and Jeff knew in California (drug
related people) may be after her because ofdrogs or money.
Erin says she told her mother she didn't want to hear about these things. She says she never
believed what her JIl,other was saying. She described her mother as a pathological liar. She feels
that Cheryl believed what she was saying, but that it was not based in reality. Erin too believes
her mother had some mental health issues.
, I spoke with Erin Kessler who lives at .:nd hercet a' . Her home phone is
Erin says that she last talked with her mother (the victim) last Wednesday. They normally talked
once a week. .
. ..
Erin indicated that she knows Jeffand her mother have been together for some time. She knows
that Jeff stayed with her during the drug times. And she believes they both are no longer
involved in drug usage.
Cj-,......,-
. • M AYOTI'E 348
JJPD.GQ2a-ADP 19M
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But she knows that her mother had' abused alcohol for most ofher life. And she feared that after
moving to Boise she is drinkjng more.
;
Erin indicated she knows her mother complained about Jeffnot working. But knew ofno real
problems between them. Erin didn't believe that Jeff is a violent person. She described him as a
fifty-year-old hippy, who would put up with her mother because he cared for her. ,,
Erin indicated that she and her mother were separated when she (Erin) was very young because
ofCheryl's involvement in diug usage. They had limited contact until Erin became an adult and
Cheryl seemed to have gotten her life in order.
Erin described Cheryl as a very open outgoing person. She was quick to make friends, not
frightened ofanyone and always willing to meet or talk with people. She enjoyed people.. Erin .
did not feel that her mother would have gone out and picked up another man off the street. She
knew she and Jeffwere having problems but nothing out of the ordinary. And she didn't know
her mother to be involved in a romantic way with any other man.
1817 hrs. I called and talked with Oscar Guttormsen at: He is Erin's father
and Cheryl's ex-husband. He is also a retired Redmond Washington Police Officer.
.Oscar indicated that he and Cheryl divorced in 1981 after three years ofmarriage. He indicated
that after the divorce his contact with Cheryl has been limited. Most ofWhat he knew about her
life now came through Erin. He had met Jeffone time but knew little about him other then what
he had been told by others.
He did say that it was common for Cheryl to tell stories that had no basis in reality. She was
known to talk about gangs and the mob. He described her as a pathological liar when she was
using drugs.
1910 hrs. I called and talked with Phil Hanlon. I explained the discover of the victim and that
she appears to have been the victim ofa homicide.
Phil told me that at one time both Cheryl and Jeff and been involved in drugs. As had he
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BOISE POLICE DEPAR' lENT/ADA COUNTY SHERI: 'S DEPARTMENT
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'03/01/03
But she knows that her mother had" abused alcohol for most ofher life. And she feared that after
moving to Boise she is drink,ing more.
Erin indicated she knows her mother complained about Jeffnot working. But knew ofno real
problems between them. Erin didn't believe that Jeff is a violent person. She described him as a
fifty-year-old hippy, who would put up with her mother because he cared for her. ,.
Erin indicated that she and her mother were separated when she (Erin) was very young because
ofCheryl's involvement in drug usage. They had limited contact until Erin became an adult and
·Cheryl seemed to have gotten her life in order.
Erin described Cheryl as a very open outgoing person. She was quick to make friends, not
frightened ofanyone and always willing to meet or talk with people. She enjoyed people., Erin .
did not feel that her mother would have gone out and picked up another man oifthe street. She
knew she and Jeffwere having problems but nothing out of the ordinary. And she didn't know
her mother to be involved in a romantic way with any other man.
f817 hrs. I called and talked with Oscar Guttormsen at: He is Erin's father
and Cheryl's. ex-husband. He is also a retired Redmond Washington Police Officer.
.Oscar indicated that he and Cheryl divorced in 1981 after three years ofmarriage. He indicated
that after the divorce his contact with Cheryl has been limited. Most ofWbat he knew abouther
. life now came through Erin. He had met Jeffone time but knew little about him other then what
he bad been told by others.
He did say that it was common for Cheryl to tell stories that had no basis in reality. She was
known to talk about gangs and the mob. He described her as a pathological liar when she was
using drugs.
1910 hrs. I called and talked with Phil Hanlon. I explained the discover ofthe victim and that
she appears to have been the victim ofa homicide.
Phil told me that at one time both Cheiyl and Jeffand been involved in drugs. As bad he
himself. He indicated that he has been clean for thirteen years.
..,....... .,'
1)03209 'I
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Phil believed that Cheryl and Jeffhad both gotten clean. And knows that Cheryl had told him
she was not going back into that lifestyle.
I
Phil knew that Cheryl was working and seemed to like what she was doing.
He knows Jeff and has no reason to suspect Jeff has ever abused Cheryl.
Phil indicated that he knoWs Cheryl often talked of odd things hap~g. One of the last
strange stories he knew ofhad something to do with diamonds. He didn't know what she was '
talking about. But indicated she talked crazy all the time. She had indicated to him at she felt
.California was going to catch up with her.
He knows Jeff was concerned about Cheryl. He says he received an E-mail from Jeff about a
month ago expressing concern and saying he (left) didn't know how much more he could take.
Phil also indicated he knew Bill (roommate) but not well. He indicated he felt it somewhat odd
that Bill was living with them. But he had no reason to suspect any problems.
After a briefing where we learned what had been located at the crime scene, and autopsy Det.
Iverson and I returned to the victim's residence where we met with both Jeff and Bill.
I explained that the identity had been confirmed and that Cheryl was in fact the victim of a
homicide. Both appeared shaken and upset by the news. Jeffbroke down crying.
I explained to both the need to exclude them as suspects and both indicated they would do
anything we requested. Both expressed they wanted the person responsible found and would do
anything needed to see that they were caught.
I explained that it may be that evidence had been located on the body, and that I would need a
sample ofDNA from each to exclude them. Each agreed to provide a sample. I showed both a
consent form, both read and signed the form. Then both provided oral swabs for DNA sample.
These were later tumed over to the lab.
As I collected the oral swabs, Det Iverson with consent ofboth Jeff and Bill looked at all the
shoes in the residence. None match the foot print found at the scene. Jeff's shoes are size 8-9.
1&:==''-'--:' 1--'.....'- 003210
BPD-002a-ADf 1994 ..
DISTRIBUTION: Original- Records, Yellow - Follow-up, Pink - Crime AJO.I~O ·15000483
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A short time later we received word from Det Smith that Ward had been cleared and the lead is
closed.
At about 1810 hrs. We met with Rhoda Sherman at
She and her husbando~ 'Terry's bar.
Rhoda described herself as one of the victim's best friends. Others had also described her as
such.
Rhoda indicated that she has known the victim and Jeff for about four years. They met after Jeff




Rhoda indicated that Cheryl was friends with everyone. She was open and outgoing. But added
when she drank you didn't want to be around her. She confirmed that because ofhow she was
when she drank she had been refused service in the bar.
She'also indicated that Cheryl liked to stay out later then Jeff. Cheryl wanted to be among
people. And Jeff wanted to be home in bed early. It Was common for him to leave the bar in the
early evening. He very seldom was out as late as 2200 hrs.
Rhoda recalled that they had all gone out on her (Rhoda's) daughters twenty-first birthday. She
ond Jeff left early~ go home leaving her daughters and Cheryl downtown. Later that night the
girls called and said they couldn't fmd Cheryl, she had taken offand they didn't know where she
was. Rhoda told th~ to go home and not to worry.
The following morning Cheryl showed up at her house ready to set up a yard sale.
Rhoda indicated that Cheryl loved to talk, and told all kinds ofstories. That was in part what
caused some ofthe problems in the bar. People didn't want to listen to her and she continued to
bother them.
She talked about the dopers in California and her fear they may be after her.
e7VC:;;'''"''''':. .1--'.....'''''''''- 003215
ID'D-CJ02a.ADP 1994 .
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03/01/03 FILE
Rhoda indicated she was concenied that Cheryl may have some mental health issues and knows
·the family has talked about it She feels the problem began after Cheryl lost her job at Home
Depot '
Rhoda said that Jeffhad talked with her about Cheryl. He had told her that after Cheryl had not
been allowed service in Terry's she had developed a new life with new friends he didn't know.
She is. a different person.
Rhoda indicated that she knew ofno real problems between Jeff and Cheryl. And none between
Bill and Cheryl.
Rhoda·was able to provide me with some newer photographs ofCheryl. Jeffhad none that were
new. But Rhoda had some and agreed to let us have some.
0311 0103 0830 hrs. Briefing. I learned ofa new lead that appeared to·have some substance. A
suspect had been identified as Eric Hall and RSO who is. now in the Ada County jail on
· outstanding warrants.
. .
1600 hrs. Det Morgan and I interview James Tackett AKA Venom. Patrol units had located
and 1ransported him to CID. The interview was recorded. See Del Morgan's report for details
ofthe interview.
Tackett did put the victim and suspect Hall togetheron the night in question. He also described .
for us the boots that Hall should have had on. He looked at a phQto ofthe footprint found at the. .
scene and indicated it looks like the shoe pattern on the boots Hall bad. Tackett also indicated
that suspect Hall smokes USA Golds for the most part.
· 1805 hrs. Det Morgan and I met with Darrell Lady at his home. He was shown a photo line up
with Hall's booking photo in it Mr. Lady was unable to identify anyone in the lineup as the
. subject he had. seen with the victim on the night in question. He indicated he felt in order to
make an identification he would have to see the subject in person. He was not sure he Would be
able to make an identification from a photograph.
· 03/11103 0900 Briefuig.
t0flicer/Saill/Darll'ime
• MAY01TB .. 348
.: tl03216
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Lead Synopsis: Left voice mail. Said he was friend of . tims.
o~t dancing together. Said he now un;c They would go
hIDl up (or the last date. Said h erstood why she stood
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Lead Recleved From:· WaRDer, Laura,
Return'Telephone: (208) 426-0482
Suspect Name:
Lead Location: GUs K-9
Date ofCompletion:
Lead Synopsis: Saw Cheryl and Jeff at GUs K-9. Cheryl and-Jeff left around.
10:45. ·Laura said Iter and a group offiiends were talldng to Jeff
and Cheryl came up and started talking to them. Said Cheryl
was IIpset and was crying.
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He iildicated on the night in question he had.been Ollt bu{ WaSi:iQri1e,iri~&'alOne oY
betWeen OlOO/013() MS. Heawokeabout1l00irts,. on 0310l!<tt:AritfJeatned ofthe
inciclent later in the day. Upon learning ofthe incidenth~went to:Visit:~d;offetsupport
tobis friend Jeff. . . ; .
He indicated he knew both Jeffand the victim fromTerry's Bar.
Heindi~that the victinlhadbeen liavihg some problems (ni.entato.~drinking) for
some time. He was not sure about drug usage.
, I expi~ed the lead and he indicated he understood and w~u1~ihelp'ni:ari.y'w~y~sslbi~;
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Patrick says the last time he saw the victim was about two weeks ~o, .'~e was walking
when be saw her.. ' ..,-- ....
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Rhoda indicated she was concerned that Cheryl may have some mental health issues and knows
the family has talked about it. She feels the problem began after Cheryl lost her job at Home
Depot.
Rhoda said that Jeffhad talked with her about Cheryl. He had told her that after Cheryl had not
been allowed service in Terry's she had developed a new life with new friends he didn't know.
She is a different person.
Rhoda indicated that she knew ofno real problems between Jeff and Cheryl. And none between
Bill and Cheryl.
Rhoda was able to provide me with some newer photographs of Cheryl. Jeffhad none that were
new. But Rhoda had some and agreed to let us have some.
0311 0/03 0830 hrs. Briefing. I learned ofa new lead that appeared to have some substance. A
suspect had been identified as Eric Hall and RSO who is, now in the Ada County jail on
outstanding warrants.
1600 hrs. Det Morgan and I interview James Tackett AKA Venom. Patrol units had located
and transported him to CID. The interview was recorded. See Det. Morgan's report for details
of the interview.
Tackett did put the victim. and suspect Hall together on the night in question. He also described
for us the boots that Hall should have had on. He looked at a photo ofthe footprint found at the
scene and indicated it looks like the shoe pattern on the boots Hall had. Tackett also indicated
that suspect Hall smokes USA Golds for the most part.
1805 hrs. Det Morgan and I met with Darrell Lady at his home. He was shown a photo line up
with Hall's booking photo in it. Mr. Lady was unable to identify anyone in the line up as the
subject he had seen with the victim on the night in question. He indicated he felt in order to
make an identification he would have to see the subject in person. He was not sure he would be
able to make an identification from a photograph.
03111103 0900 Briefing.
" =PJdiuI Officer! Serial!DmITime
DET. M AYOITE . ,348
BPD-002a-ADP 1994
ISupervisor Approving ! Serial! DatrII'ime 003216
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MORGAN: What do you do for a living?
JAMES:
INTERVIEW WITH JAMES TACKETI, GREG MORGAN AND MARK AYOITE
JAMES: OffofHill Road and Collister.
JAMES: Yes, G-R-E-E-R.
MORGAN: Oh, okay. Do YO\l have a home phone?
MORGAN: I'm sorry.
MORGAN: 0751?
MORGAN: Where do you live at James?
JAMES: 4665 Greer Court.
JAMES: 4665 Greer Court.
MORGAN: T-A-C-K
JAMES:
MORGAN: My name is Greg Morgan. This is Mark Ayotte.
MORGAN: Hi there, you must be James.
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2 MORGAN: Perfect. How did you get that job?
3 JAMES: JUst dropped out ofschool.
4 MORGAN: Cool. How old are you James?
5 JAMES: Nineteen.
6 MORGAN: Your date ofbirth?
7 JAMES: Januaiy
8 MORGAN: Height and weight?
9 JAMES: My height is like 5'10" and my weight, I don't mow.
10 MORGAN: About 210 or so?
11 JAMES: About that.
( 2 MORGAN: Have you ever (inaudible)?
\.
13 JAMES: No.
14 MORGAN: Your social security.
15 JAMES:
16 MORGAN: Okay. Do you know why you are here today?
17 JAMES: About Amanda.
18 MORGAN: Do you know where she's at?
19 JAMES: Maybe. But, the guy that she's with, they keep on changing and their last campout
20 she was at was behind a church, and um,the (inaudible) building, I can't remember
21 the name of it and there's a church right next to"with bushes behind it.
22 MORGAN: How do you know these people?
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(0 1 MORGAN: And how do you do that?
2 JAMES: She fixed me a meal.
3 MORGAN: And his name is Erick?
4 JAMES: Yeah/Erick. He goes by Erick and that's all I know. I don't know his last name.
S MORGAN: When was the last time that you saw him?
6 JAMES: Last Friday, yeah last Friday afternoon, about 3:00 p.m.
7 MORGAN: Both of them?
8 JAMES: Yeah.
9 AYOTTE:: What time was that?
10 JAMES: Like, around 10:00 or 11:00, (inaudible).




13 MORGAN: What all happened that night?
14 . JAMES: . I was just talking and went to Ray's, Willie Dog, to buy a hot dog and then went to
15 Bogie's and then went home.
16 MORGAN: Did anything else happen?
17 JAMES: Not that I knowof.
18 MORGAN: And she was with him downtown?
19 JAMES: Yeah. She is always with him wherever she goes.
20 MORGAN: Any drinking that night?
21 JAMES: Yeah.
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MORGAN: What size ofshoes are those?
I think that they are size 12 or 12 ~, 12.
I will get in trouble for saying.
Downtown..
Urn, 10:30 or 11 :00.
Urn, a beer.
JAl\fES:
MORGAN: Where did you get that?
AYOTTE: Do you know who this homeless guy was?
JAMES: Urn, this one homeless guy who (inaudible) will I buy him one ifI let him buy me
one.
MORGAN: That's (inaudible).
AYOTTE~ Where did you get the beer on Friday night?
MORGAN: Where did you drink then?
JAMES: Urn. Do you know where (inaudible) is, a nightclub, there islike a park right next




MORGAN: Were you drunk?
AYOTTE: Did you drink it with them or .did you drink it by yourself? '
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What do you mean?
JAMES: Okay.
MORGAN: Well, we'll get to that. It doesn't make any difference. For example, if somebody is
going to do a burglary and you are either the lookout or after the fact you know that
this person committed a burglary and seen some stolen pro~ or if you have
knowledge ofthe crime and you don't take the next logical step which is to call the
police and report the' crime. Then it makes you just as guilty as the person who
actually did the crime. It is an obstruction ofjustice. Under the law, when someone,
you are considered to be a good citizen you are expected to cooperate with the police
and report crimes. And ifyou have knowledge ofa crime and you withhold that, then
- .. _.. -you are"an -accessory-after-the-fact, or if you were involved in "the crime yourself,
took part in it, then it is a little bit different. This is just that knowledge. Okay?
MORGAN: Being an accessory-after-the-fact means thatyou have knowledge a crime potentially
and ifyou're withholding that infonnation. That's a felony in and ofitself, which
you can do the exact same amount of time that the persons responsible doing the
crime will get.
MORGAN: We talked to the (inaudible) abOut charging you with an accessory-after-the-fact.
Have you he~dofthat before?
MORGAN: .You were downtown with Erick that night and encountered some gal at that time?
MORGAN: But you are (inaudible) part ofyou lying.
. .
MORGAN: What ~o I mean? JUst that, what you just told me was not completely truthful.
JAMES: It is.
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1 MORGAN: We have been told that last Friday night, the fact that you were downtown with Erick 
(' 
2 with some o~der lady. And him, and you and that he sent you back to camp. 
tl't 
3 JAMES: Last Friday night? 
4 MORGAN: Last Friday night 
I 
5 JAMES: No. Two Friday's ago, I waS downtown with Erick. But the old lady told me that she 
6 had to go home and I went back to camp. But not last Friday. 
7 MORGAN: What did this old lady look like? 
8 JAMES: Shellad like curly hair. She looked like she was in her thirties, wearing all black. 
9 She lives by a hot dog stand. 
10 MORGAN: Were you following what has been going on the news? 
11 JAMES: No, I don't watch the news. 
12 MORGAN: See the newspaper? 
13 JAMES: No. I (inaudible) I really can't-read .. 
.,,: 
\. 14 AYOTTE: So last Friday night woUld have been like the 7th, you are talking about the ~8tb? 
15 JAMES: Yeah. 
16 AYOTIE: Okay. What time? 
17 JAMES: You mean what time, did I go by there, when did 1 see him, how long did 1 stay 
18 downtown? 
.19 AYOTIE: This probably would have ~n a little bit later than that, wouldn't it? 
20 JAMES: I'm not sure, I don't really keep track of time. Last Friday, not the last Friday but the 
21 Friday before that I did stay at the camp, the Friday before that I went home. 
22 AYOTTE:-- He-toki-you-to:-go'-back-to-camp and he was gone alltiight? .- .-~ --._- .-~. . . 
23 JAMES~ Yeah. 
24 AYOTTE: So, you and he are downtown,. where at? 




I JAMES: Fifth and Main, down that street, down by a hot dog vendor.
2 AYOTTE: Down by one ofthe bars in particUlar?
..
3 JAMES: Urn, I am trying to think ofwhat bars, (inaudible) the Bistro.
4 AYOTTE: The Bistro, what else is along there?
5 JAMES: Urn, there's urn (inaudible), that new (inaudible) there is another bar down there, but
6 I don't remember the name of it, it's with that big old opening.
7 AYOTTE: Did the lady say anything?
8 JAMES: All she said was, she talked to Erick, she said what's going on, and Erick said he was
9 cold and tired. She said, well I am going to take you home with me. Then Erick said
10 that he would'meet me at the camp and he would be there later.
11 MORGAN: This is the night in (inaudible) that not last Friday night. This is the lady that
12 smoked. Right?
13 JAMES: I'm n?t sure, by the time that I woke up Erick was gone.
t'," 14 AYOTTE: What time was it, when Erick was gone all night?
I .
......."..
15 JAMES: It was a little after ten. (Inaudible).
16 AYOTTE: Would you recognize the woman ifyou saw her again?
17 JAMES: Probably.
18 AYOTTE: Is that her?
19 JAMES: I think so, but she had like curly hair though.
20 AYOTTE: Does that look like her?
21 JAMES: Yeah.
22 AYOTTE: Whatw~ she wearing?
23 . JAMES: All black.
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JAMES: She had a black shirt and a palits or dress, and I am not sure about shoes. She was
real drunk.-.
AVOTIE: Real drunk, do you remember her name?
,..---
JAMES: No.
AYOTIE: Did you ever hear her name?
JAMES: No.
AYOTTE: Did you think that's her?
JAMES: . It looks like her.
AYOTTE: Was she wearing a coat?
JAMES: Yes, a black shirt.
AYOTTE: A black shirt or a coat?
12
f. .:,
JAMES: It was like down to here and down to right here. ....
'<.;.- ·13 AYOTTE: sh it was a fairly long coat you think?
14 JAMES: Yes.
15 AYOTTE: Did you see anything underneath the coat?
16 JAMES: No.
17 AYOTTE: Do you remember if she had a shirt on underneath the coat, or could you tell?
18 JAMES: I wasn't really looking.
19 AYOTTE: You wasn't looking?
20- .- -- MORGAN:-¥ou--seen-that-picture·he-has,-1>n-a-scale··of-l-H),how sure are you, 10 being the
21 . highest? _.
22 JAMES: Ifshe bad curly hair, it would look exactly like her.
23 MORGAN: Ifshe had curly hair, it would look exactly like her?
Page -8- 000954
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i 1 AYO'ITE: Her hairstyle is different, but the other, is her?
i
2 JAMES: Yeah.
3 MORGAN: When you say curly, how curly are you talking about?
4 JAMES: Urn, like natural, like big and it was like to here. .
5 MORGAN: Like a windblown kind ofstuff.
6 JAMES: YealL
7 MORGAN: Okay~ so it could have beenstraighter hair,just blown by the wind?
8 JAMES: Yes. A little curlier though.
9 MORGAN: flow far did you walk with them?
10 JAMES: I'm not sure ifwe walked too long. This man picked them up. They walked away
11 andJ sat there talked to Ray for a little bit and then I went back to camp. Talked to
12 my friends about (inaudible), which he's injail now. Then we went over to the other
13 side of (inaudible).
, .,.....,. 14 MORGAN: So you were with them for just a short time then?
15 JAMES: Yes.
16 MORGAN: Do you remember her saying anything to anybody else?
17 JAMES: No.
18 AYOTTE: Were you on foot?
19 JAMES: What do you mean?
20 AYOTTE: Were you walking or did you have a bicycle?
21 JAMES: No, I don't have a bike. I was walking.
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1 AYOTTE: Do you rememberher talking to anybody else, oranybody asking her what was going
2 on or herm~ any statements? .
;, I
3 JAMES: No. When I fowid him, she was talking with him and she says that she would take
4 them back to the house and they walked offand then I stood there and talked to Ray
5 and then went back to camp. .
6 AYOTTE: Do you rememberher saying anything aboutgoingto walk with myhomeless friend?
1 JAMES: No.
8 AYOTTE: You don't remember hearing that?
9 JAMES: No, all I heard was that she was taking him to the house.
10 AYOTTE: Why was she doing that?
11 JAMES: I guess he knew her.
12 AYOTTE: Do you remeinber ifthe things she had on had any other color to it?
13 JAMES: Not that I know of. ; ..








AYOTTE: You don't think so?
JAMES: I don't think. so.
AYOTTE: The jacket?
JAMES: The jacket was black.
AYOTTE: Okay well that's
21 .. -···-·MORGAN: ----Dark-blue;-- _ .. ---.._-_.- .__.__..__.
22 AYOTTE: That's about midnight blue, that's just short ofbeing black.
23 JAMES: No it was black I am. pretty sure.
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MORGAN: None at that time.
JAMES: None.
No. Hers was like different, I could tell.
She like slwring on her words when she was talking to Erick she looked at me but
I don't know. She said lived offoflike 36th or somethirig, and I told her that's where
I lived too and she's all like you know where I live, I'm like no, then they walked off.
JAMES: None.
MORGAN: Okay. Now, I asked you ifyou had been drinking last Friday night and you said that
you had a little beer. Now going back to that night, how much had you bad to drink?
MORGAN: But she had the sleeves pushed up and you think instead ofbeing blue, it was black?
MORGAN: Aside from that (inaudible) coat?
MORGAN: And underneath her coat, you said her coat sleeves were pushed up, what kind of
material or fabric did she have?
JAMES:
MORGAN: Aside from the color, is that cmit similar to what you remember her wearing?
MORGAN: So it could have been that same coat, just with arms pushed up?
JAMES: No. Her coat waS like halfway on her arm, it was like pulled up.
JAMES: Yeah, and I said I lived by there too, and she's like I know where you live. Do you
know·where I live; I said told her no I don't and she said yeah you do, then she got
Erick and walked away.
MORGAN: .She said she lived off3~?
JAMES:
MORGAN: How drunk would you say she was?
AYOTTE: You are pretty sure. Okay. In the light down there it might have looked like that.
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1 JAMES: None..
2 MORGAN: Just bare. arms?
3 JAMES: Yeah.
4 MORGAN: Was she carrying anything?
5 JAMES: Her purse.
6 . MORGAN: What did it look like?




JAMES: Like' about that big and about that tall, kind ofshort and kind ofwent down to right
here.




MORGAN: And the long strap was over her shoulder or something like that?
: ..
14 JAMES: Yeah.
15 MORGAN: Ifyou saw the purse again, would you re~ognize it?
16 JAMES: No. I didn't really get a good look at the purse alII knew was that it was black.
17 MORGAN: Did Erick ever give you anything later on?
.18 .JAMES: . No, I was asleep by the time he got back.
19 AYOTTE: Did you talk to him?
20 .. .--JAMES:--Huh.· ._.
21 AYOTTE: Did you talk to him?
Page -12- 1)00958
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1 JAMES: When he came back, he just said he would be back shortly there and just go back to
2 camp and watch out for Amanda. And there waS like a homeless guy there.
3 (Inaudible) and he was worried about her bein8 left with him. (Inaudible) 'and my
4 friends when he carrie back when Erick went downtown to make sure that guy didn't
5 do nothing to Amanda and when'I came back, me and him (inau~ble) and I fell
6, asleep.
7 MORGAN: When he did get back, were you still asleep or did you talk to him in the morning?
8 JAMES: Yeah I talked to him in the morning. I asked him, did you go to her house, he said
9 no. Amanda was all mad because he went with her.
10 MORGAN: Whaidid he say to her?
11 JAMES: That was about it.
12 MORGAN: Did you ever ask him anymore about it?
13 JAMES: No.
14 MORGAN: When was the last time you seen him?
.. 15 JAMES: The last time that I seen him was last Friday.,',
\ :'.........
16 MORGAN: Okay. Did yo.u talk to him about it then?
17 JAMES: No.
18 MORGAN: You kindoflet it g01
19 JAMES: Mm-huh (8ffirmative).
20 AYOTTE: How was he dressed that night?
21 JAMES: He usually wears like this grayish black coat, black shirt and a beanie.
22 AYOTTE: Did he have anything else on?
23 JAMES: And blue jeans.
24 AYOTTE: What kind ofbeanie?
25 JAMES: It had black and it had two stripes with a Nike emblem.
~
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1 MORGAN: And he was ~earing that when you were downtown?
., ,
2 JAMES: Yeah.
3 MORGAN: What about his beard or faciQl- hair?
I
4 JAMES: His hair comes like down and he's got like a mustache to match it.
S AYOTTE: Was it long then?
/'
",6 JAMES: -No, it was about that short.
(7 MORGAN: So, it was like he was just starting to grow it?---
8 JAMES: Yeah.
9 MORGAN: That riight. Friday night, two weeks ago.
10 JAMES: No, he's had it for like a while.
11 MORGAN: How long have you known him? : .. :
(
JAMES: About a year, or a year and a half.'..;.'-~ 12
13 MORGAN: Aside from what I have seen now do you know where they used to camp?
14 JAMES: I am trying to think ofa place. Do you know it place called (inaudible)? Alright.
15 MORGAN: Over by the carwash?
16 JAMES: I'm not sure, you know as you drive down State Street, you've got the gas station and
17 then you've got the urn, that Moneytree, behind there is a pond. -On the other side of
.18 23M, there's a bunch oftrees, we camp there. -
19 AYOTTE: When was that?







AYOTTE: What about last summer or this summer?
JAMES: Right. It's also a place right outside ofthe river, there's a dentist office over there
with bushes behind there. Spent the night in there. Then they got in trouble for
camping there, then I went back to my house and moved back out, then I went to my 0
friend Jack's house, got kicked out. Then me and him were staying with a bunch of t\J
mends. Then one ofmy mends were camping in Sherwood Forest. t) 00£t60 ./
Page~l4- 000527
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1 AYOTTE: Where?
2 JAMES: It's behind (inaudible).
3 AYOTTE: What's it called again?
4 JAMES: It's called Sherwood Forest.
5 AYOTTE: .Sherwood Forest?
6 JAMES: Yeah. We were camping in there, then we moved from there up to 8th Street in a Cul-
7 de saC, then I moved back in my mom's house..
8 MORGAN: That's you and a friend?
9 JAMES: Yeah.
10 MORGAN: What about Amanda?
11 JAMES: Last time I heard that. Before he got out ofjail. He got arrested and then they moved
12 back to her house. Then Erick got-out and then her parents kicked her out and then
.. ,13 she was staying with Erick.
t'< .:
14 MORGAN: Do you know where they are camping last summer aside from that (inaudible) place?
15 JAMES: Behind that dentist's office. I don't know, its about, that is all I know.
16 AYOTTE: How about in the foothills anyplace?
17 JAMES: Urn. She liked to stay downtown, close to downtown.
18 AYOTTE: So if they are camping somewhere other than those places you know where to go?
19 JAMES: There is one other camp that I know about, butevery time he moves from a camp she
20 usually tells me. Last Friday I thought that he was moving his camp, but hedidn't
21 tell me where. He usually tells me where to find it. I don't think he's moved from
22 that spot yet.
23 MORGAN: Did he ever tell you up about any camp up around Fifth and Alturus?
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1 AYOTTE: The neighborhood is the old, east ofthe foothills kind of(inaudible).
2 JAMES: . He never-told me about that.
3 MORGAN: He never mentioned that?
,
4 AYOtTE:. Near Hyde Park.
~ JAMES: .No. How far from downtoWn is it?
6 . AYOTTE: I don't know, maybe a mile if that.
7 JAMES: He never told me about that then, he usually likes to stay within a half a mile from
8 downtown.
9 MORGAN: You said something about (inaudible).
10 JAMES: (Inaudible).
11 AYOTTE: That Saturdaymorning, you woke up and you said that she was mad at him for being
12 with this gal that night.
: ,
( '3 JAMES: Yes.\
14 AYOTTE: What was that?
15 JAMES: Not much,. she just mad thai he was sleeping with her. Then I told him 'that I was
16 going to go home and I asked him ifhe wanted to come get something to eat. He said
]7 no and started walking off. Amanda came up, J told her goodbye and I headed
18 downtown to catch the bus.
19 AYOTTE: What did he look like? Was he clean, dirty?
20 JAMES: . Dirty.
21 AYOTTE: He was dirty. Did Amanda say anything about him being dirty?
22 ·_---JAMES: --No~ He was aIwa:ys-dirty~_ .... -.. -.
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, 1 AYOTT.E; Did he stink?
2 JAMES: No.
3 AYOTTE: Did he stink different than normal?
4 JAMES: No.
'5 AYOTTE: Amanda didn't say anything about him stinking different?
6 . JAMES: Mm-rom (negative).
7 AYOTTE: No perfume. No other odor?
8 JAMES: No.
9 AYOTTE: Nothing about maybe he craped his pants or anything?
10 JAMES: No.
11 AYOTTE: You d,idn't hear anything like that?
I,: '2 JAMES: No.
13 AYOTTE: Did he have anything?
14 JAMES: No.
15 AYOTTE: That the lady gave him~
16 JAMES: No. All he had was his backpack that he carries with him every where he goes.
17 AYOTTE: Did he have anything the lady gave him?
18 JAMES: No.
19 AYOTTE: Did he tell you about the lady?
20 JAMES: No.
21 AYOTTE: Did he say he spent the night with her?
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1 AYOTTE: What did he say?
2 JAMES: . Well, when I asked him ifhe like did you go her house, he said no, just don't worry
3 about it. I was like alright and left.
4 AYOTtE: He told you not to worry about it. What time was that?
5 JAMES: Probably around like 5:00 or 6:00 in: the morning?
6 AYOTTE: 5:00 or 6:09 in the morning?
7 JAMES: Yeah.
8 AYOTTE: This when he comeS back?
9 JAMES: Yeah.
10 AYOTIE: Around 5:00 or 6:00?
11 JAMES: Yeah.
12 AYOTTE: It was still dark? : I .. •
I
\. . 13 JAMES: Kind of light.
14 AYOTTE: Starting to (inaudible)?
15 JAMES: Yeah.
16 MORGAN: What about, this lady, tell me more about her.
17 JAMES: I don't know much, except for what I told you what she was wearing, that she was
18 drunk. (Inaudible). She looked at me and told me, I asked her where she lived. She
19 said up by 36th, then I told her that's by where llive up. Then she told me, you know
20 where I live the I told her, no I didn't Then she got up with Erick and walked away,
21 and that's all I remember about her.
--22 ----MORGAN:--When·they-walked away, how did they do that?
23 JAMES: She was mostly grabbing Erick and dragging him.
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I JAMES: Most ofthe time I see him (inaudible) with this other lady, when Amanda was like,-
2 living with her parents.
3 AYOTTE: When~that?
4 JAMES: All I know is the last time when Erick got arrested and got with another girl
5 (inaudible).
'6 AYOTTE: Where did he meet her?
7 JAMES: He said downtown.
8 AYOTTE: Whafdid she look like?
9 JAMES: I never saw her.
10 AYOTfE: You just seen the other woman?
11 JAMES: Yeah.
12 AYOTfE: Give ~e a time frame. A month ago, six months ago, two years ago.
t
13 JAMES: I would say about six months ago.
\.
14 MORGAN: Does he have a gun or a knife?
15 JAMES: He always carries a pocket knife, a Swiss army knife. But, he doesn't carry a gun.
16 MORGAN: Did he give him some tools or something to sell?
17 JAMES: No.
18 MORGAN: Did Spider?
19 JAMES: . No. I gave him a cd player (inaudible).
20 AYOTfE: Okay, teil me about your life.
21 JAMES: He usually goes (inaudible) goes in the garbage cans, dumpsters, trying to find fresh
22 food usually.
23 MORGAN: What about the money?
Page -19- 000965 /1_/Jl0
000532
1                  
     
   
                  
  
       
     
       
      
        
   
                
 
 
         
          
                  
            
   
    
           
        
                
   
      
  )  
1 JAMES: I'm not sure about money. Ifhe has something to sell, he sells it
2 MORGAN: Where would be get something to sell ifhe doesn't have any money?
3 JAMES: I'm not sure.
4 MORGAN: Does he burglarize (inaudible)?
5 JAMES: I don't know.
6 MORGAN: Have you been with him when he's done it? .
7 JAMES: No.
8 MORGAN: Are you sure?
9 JAMES: Yeah.
10 MORGAN: What's Spider in for?
11 JAMES: Burglary and petit theft.
: 4.:
(. -~2 MORGAN: Have you (inaudible)?
\.
13 JAMES: I don't know, by the time I saw him. I was over in Garden City with one ofmy
14 friends. Then I went home because I had to give my mom her money. Then the next
15 day he went over to the house and found out they were selling a bunch ofdrugs and
16 . stuff. The cops had already got (inaudible). After the cops left, he ran off and got
17 arrested.
18 AYOTTE: (Inaudible)?
19 JAMES: Lee, I always call him (inaudible).
20 AYOTTE: Lee?
·21 JAMES: I don't know his last name.
22 AYOTTE: Who did he get arrested with exactly?
23 JAMES: Spider, a guy named Tim or Todd, lived up underneath him, and Lee's brother.
When you saw him, not last Friday, but two Friday's ago.You said he had on a Nike
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1 JAMES: Yeah, he always wears that. And he had a black shirfunderneath it.
2 AYOTI'E: And.what e.lsc:? .'
3 JAMES: Blue jeans and brown shoes, they look like hiking boots.




JAMES: No they are like, have you ever seen like what all of the gangsters are wearing
(inaudible). They are brown leatlterish on the soles right here, they are like tan. He .
was wearing those kind of shoes, a sort of like awork. boot
8 MORGAN: IfI took you to a store could you pick those out?
9 JAMES: Ifthey had them.
10 MORGAN: What kind ofstore would sell them?
11 JAMES: I am not sure.
12 AYOTTE: Have'you seen them lately?
\.,' 13 JAMES: Last Friday.
14 AYOTTE: Last Friday?
15 JAMES: Yeah.
16 AYOTTE: Where did you see them?
17 JAMES: At his camp.
18 AYOTTE:·' Were they low cut or high cut His were kind ofahigh cut, yours are low cut?
19 JAMES: Low cut.
20 AYOTI'E:' About to the ankle.
21 JAMES: Yeah.
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1 JAMES: (Inaudible) the soles are like all tan no, no designs right there, all tan. The bottoms
are like hiking,boots, but they are work boots.
h· I
• ! •
3 MORGAN:. Have-you ever seen the sole print Has he stepped indirt, would you know what they
4 look?" .. ,.,. '. . .' '., '.
5
6
JAMES: Yeah. On the bottom they are cut kind of like that, like a little halfcircle coming
down.
7 . MORGAN: On the sides?
8
9
JAMES: On the front Have you ever seen a pair ofmilitary boots? On the bottom they are
.kind oflike that.
10 MORGAN: Let me show you a picture. Do they look a little bit like that?
1 JAMES: Yeah.
2 . MORGAN: You say yeah, are you positive?
13 JAMES: Yeah.
..". AYOTI'E: The last time that you saw him, he was wearing those shoes?r •.
\.;.,
5 JAMES: Yeah.
16 AYOTTE: And who w~ars those kinds ofshoes, you said some gangsters?
17 JAMES: Yeah. Gangsters. All these like wanna-be gangsters (inaudible) My brother used to
. 8 wear those kind of shoe.
19 AYOTTE: Where did he get them at?
o JAMES: I'm not exactly sure. I really don't pay attention to my brother that much because I
21 kind oflike (inaudible).
:2 AYOTTE: So ifyou called your brother, could he tell you where he bought them?
:3 JAMES: I don't know where to call him, he's down in Florida.
24 AYOTTE: What do you think ofhim?
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I am not exactly sure. (Inaudible).JAMES:
l\tIORGAN: When you last saw him walking off. Where were they, how far did you see him
'walking offbefore you lost sight ofthem?
JAMES: Yeah.




MORGAN: What's your mom's name, James?
AYOTTE: Oh, come on, guys always talk about women. You see a good looking girl walking
down the street and he doesn't say anything?
JAMES: No.
AYOTTE: He doesn't ~e women walking down the street and say anything about them?
AYOTTE: Doesn't he talk abOut ex-girlfriends?
AYOTTE: He never talked about other women?
AYOTTE: How does he treat her?
AYOTTE: Did he ever talk about women?
JAMES: All he talks about is (inaudible).
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1 JAMES: Erick and Amanda, or the other lady?
2 MORGAN: Erick and the other lady.
3 JAMES: Not too long, they walked to 8th and that other streetright there by the, uh, city hall.
4 MORGAN: Capital?
! -
'5 JAMES: Yeah. They walked there and that was about it.
6 MORGAN: You just went back to camp?







The Willie guy, you know the hot dog vendor. Willie's Dog (Inaudible) His name
is Ray. I sat there and talked to him for a minute and then went back to camp.
I talked to him for a minute and then went back to camp.
12 MORGAN: Would Ray have seen thein, James, Erick and the lady talking together?
t-· -
''''~3 JAMES: Um, probably. I'm not exactly sure.
14 MORGAN: Was he real busy right then?
15 JAMES: Yeah.





JAMES: If I did, I really wouldn't know their name. There was a woman named Jill, she
probably would have seen them. I am not sure ifthere was anybody else there. But
mostly Jill that would have seen them talk.
.- '21-- -----MORGAN: -- -Who-is Jill?
22 JAMES: Ray's girlfriend.
23 MORGAN: Okay. And they run the Willie Dog stand at Sixth and Main
Page -24- 000970
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1 JAMES: Yeah, she's like a (inaudible).
/.,:
2 MORGAN: You wouldn't have one ofRay's business cards, do you?
3 JAMES: No.
4 MORGAN: It's called Willie Dog?
5 JAMES: Yeah.
6 MORGAN: Is he just down here on Main?
7 JAMES: Yeah:He works uh, Wednesdays and he keeps going down there on Alive After Five
8 has been opening. He usually gets there on Friday or Saturday and I think Sundays,
9 he usually gets there around 8:00 or 9:00.
10 MORGAN: When we asked you ifyou had seen James, you said that the last time that you saw
11 him was downtown Friday night. That was the night they got arrested, right?
12 JAMES: You mean (inaudible).
13 MORGAN: That was the night they got arrested.'
t, A JAMES: Yeah.
15 MORGAN: Were you with him when that happened.
16 JAMES: No.
17 MORGAN: Do you know if they got arrested?
18 JAMES: No. Erick, I'm pretty sure he did. He usually doesn't like to tell me stuff like that.
19 MORGAN: So you must have been with them earlier then?
20 JAMES: Yeah. '
21 MORGAN: What time was the last time you saw him last Friday?
22 JAMES: Last Friday. Around 10:00 or 11:00. Almost 11 :00.
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2 AYOTTE: The Friday before, you are not clear on the time.
3 JAMES: I'm not sure.
4 MORGAN: Did you think it was later was there a lot ofpeople on the street when this woman
.5 approached like bars were just getting out?
6 JAMES: There was a lot ofpeople on the street, but lam nofsure what you are talking about
7 because there are always people coming around.
8 AYOTTE: What,"where did he actually leave her, do you know?
9 JAMES: There is a hotdog stand right next to the flowerpot and (inaudi1l1e) right next to it.
10 He was sitting on the flowerpot and I was sitting there talking to him and she came
11 up like she knew him and started asking him what was going on.
12 AYOTTE: What did she say exactly?
13 JAMES: . She said asked him what was wrong and he said that he was tired and cold. She was
. 14 all she wanted him to come home with me. He's alllike no. She kept on buggin
. 15 him.
\-
16 AYOTTE: When you say kept on buggin, what exactly did she say?
17 JAMES: She kept on saying, why don't you come home with me tomorrow, like that stuffand .
18 then she walked away and said Erick and then Erick looked up and I headed back to
19 camp.
20 AYOTTE: Did she offer her name ever?
21 JAMES: I actually, I never got her name, but Erick probably knew.
22 AYOTTE: Okay. Did you hear her say her name or did you hear Erick call her by name?
23 JAMES: No.
..~. _._-. ---_ .. ~ .
24 AYOITE: Ifyou heard her name would it mean anything to you then?
25 JAMES: It wouldn't.
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1 JAMES: I live by 3&\offthe road from Collister.
" ,
2 AY6'FfE: Offtheyoad from Collister where?
3 JAMES: Do you know where John Lane is, the street before it, Castleblock, you tum down
4 there ib. that neighborhood.
5 AYOTTE: Did she anything about living offofCollister?
6 JAMES: No~
7 AYOTTE: Did you tell her where you lived?
8 JAMES: No she was all like I live by 3&Jt, and I said I lived by there too, she's like you know
9 where I live and I'm like, no I don't, then she got up with Erick and left.
10 AYOTTE: Have you ever seen this woman before?









AYOTTE: Did she say anything about driving?
JAMES: No.
AYOTTE: She didn't say my car's over her, or pickup or truck or anything?
JAMES: No.
AYOTTE: She didn't say I got a ride over' here?
JAMES: She probably took a taxi because I watched the comer, turned around and talked to
Ray and looked bac~ and they were gone. .
AYOTTE: So you took a cab down there hub, by the church you said?
JAMES: Yeah.
: 0.'
21 AYOTTE: And he was going to move?
22 JAMES: Yeah.




           
  
    YO     
      Ob            
  :b    
          
   
         
                       
                  
         
    
        
~ .- -,_ .. _.3   
               
   
           
 
 
                
         
         h       
   
        
   
   I)(y-y          
 
  
MORGAN: Where would Erick have gotten those shoes that you were talking about?
MORGAN: When I asked you about the tread (inaudible) what you told me. How do you know
that?
JAMES: Because, when I was sitting down there, I went outside, put my on it (inaudible), if
put my hand on the dirt it would get all dirty so sit down when I sat down and they




That night, that Friday night that he eventually meets the one, had he been drinking
at all that night? ~
1j'\
Not the same night that she came over.
I'm not sure. Probably the Salvation Army or somewhere.
No. He usually doesn't tell me until he finds a spot
No. They were kind of, they looked old and they are all wet.
MORGAN:
MORGAN: Just this last Friday. Okay~
MORGAN: They weren't tennis shoes. They weren'tlike these?
AYOTTE: How long ago was that?
MORGAN: They weren't in very good shape.
MORGAN: They didn't look new either?
JAMES:
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MORGAN: What kind do you smoke?
JAMES:. Camel filter.
MORGAN: What does he smoke?
JAMES: I'm not sure, but I am pretty sure he was.
AYOTIE: And h~ smokes right?
JAMES: Yeah.
MORGAN: Do you smoke?
JAMES: Yeah.
. MORGAN: Did he give you a cigarette after he got back that night?
MORGAN: Whatever he can buy?
JAMES: Yeah ~ost1y (inaudible).
MORGAN: Have you ever seen him smoke Marlboro's?
JAMES: No.
MORGAN: Marlboro lights?
. JAMES: (Inaudible) It doesn't matter which kind it is.
MORGAN: A cigarette is a cigarette.
JAMES: Yeah.
MORGAN: Have you ever seen hiril drink anything other th3n Steel Reserve.
JAMES: No.
MORGAN: That's his beer ofchoice, huh.
tl00975Page -29-
Whatever he can buy.
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21 -. - ---MORGAN: ---You-stay down there longer on weekends?
22 JAMES: Well sometimes I don't go home. It depends on what is going on.
23 MORGAN: How do you get home, when the buSes aren't running?
Page -30- 000976
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I JAMES: Yeah. He said doesn't like to drink straight alcohol because it makes him violent. 
I 
2 MORGAN: Have 'you ever seen him do anythfug other ~ just open a tab wh~ he is poppiIig 
3 .... " .. abeeroan.· 
4 JAMES: No. 
5 MO;RGAN: Does he ever put any more holes in it? Have you seen him ever do that?· 
6 JAMES: : No. 
7 . MORGAN: Do you plan to see him? 
8 JAMES: I might see him next Friday .. 
9 MORGAN: So typically, you see him just on the weekends then. 
10 JAMES: Yeah, whenever he's downtown during the weekday. The last few times on the 
11 weekends. 
12 MORGAN: So do you go downtown every night. 
. ~3 JAMES: Not every night, just everyday. 
14 . MORGAN: Everyday? 
15 JAMES: I go home just before seven. 
16 MORGAN: You go home? 
17 JAMES: I get downtown usually around 1:30 to like 2:30, see all my friends then around like 
18 6:15 or 6:45 I catch the bus and come home. 
19 MORGAN: Except for weekends then. You stay down there longer on weekends? 
20 JAMES: Huh? 
1. .  -- .       
               
            
  
I JAMES: I walk.
{.'
2 MORGAN: You don~tpave a car?
3 JAMES: No, I can't I got my license suspended~
4 AYOTTE: Well. Twould like to know where he got those shoes, where do you buy them?
5 JAMES: Actually I don't know what kind they are.
6 MORGAN: Would your mom know where.your brother got them?
7 JAMES: No..
8 MORGAN: How expensive are they?
9 JAMES: I'm riot exactly sure.
10 MORGAN: More expensive, over $100 or $200?
11 JAMES: Probably cheaper than that.
""2 AYOTTE: He wouldn't have bought them new though.
\. ;'.
13 JAMES: Probably not.
14 AYOTTE: He would have gotten them at a thrift store.
15 JAMES: Or like Salvation Army.
16 AYOTTE: Salvation Anny.
17 MORGAN: And how long had you seen him wear those particular shoes?
18 JAMES: Last Saturday.
19 MORGAN: And prior to that?
20 JAMES: That was the only time.
21 MORGAN: Just that one night?
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1 AYOTTE: So what did he had on the night that, two Friday's ago?
,,'"
2 JAMES: I'm not sure, I didn't see his shoes~
3 AYOTTE: Then you saw him with them last Friday and th3.t is when you ac~yplayed with
4 them.
S JAMES: Yeah.
6. AYOTTE: Did you see them before that ever?
7 JAMES: No.
8 AYOTTE: Not that you remember, or.
9 JAMES: I've never seen them.
10 MORGAN: So was he wearing them downtown last Friday?
11 JAMES: .Yeah.




15 AYOTTE: Now, wait a minute. You saw them when you were in camp?
16 JAMES: The night that he met that woman.








Okay. I got confused because I was thinking that you hadn't seen them. Two weeks
ago, but you saw them.--· - -_. .
I see him ·every Friday.
Okay. No I mean those shoes. You saw those shoes two Friday's before because you
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1 JAMES: No, last wee~end. 
.. , 
2 AY6TTE: But)1OU weren't -at camp with him last Friday. 
3 JAMES: During the day. 
0 
4 AYOTTE: Oh, during the day? 
5 JAMES: . Yeah. 
6 AYOTTE: So it had been during the day? 
7 JAMES: Yeah. 
8 AYOTTE: Okay. 
9 JAMES: Nonnally, I don't see the shoes that he wears before, except for when I went to camp 
10 I woke him up and he doesn't wear shoes when he sleeps. 
11 AYOTTE: So you woke him up last Friday, what time? 
12 JAMES: Urn. I got downtown like around 2:30, I walked over there probably around 2:40. 
... 
13 AYOTTE: And he was asleep and to keep from putting your hand on the ground, you put your 
14 hand on the shoes and tipped it over and then ended up looking at them and played 
15 with them a little bit. 
16 JAMES: Yeah. 
17 AYOTTE: Okay. And you left camp before him, or did you guys leave camp together? 
18 JAMES: We left camp together. -We were looking for a new spot 
19 AYOTTE: Okay. Were you with him all the time up until you went home about 10:30 or 11 :OO? 
.20 JAMES: No, I went to Bogie's. 
21 AYOTTE: You went to Bogie's.-Okay. Okay. 
22 MORGAN: Do you know where Fifth and Alturus is? 







MIn-huh. Yeah, she's great (inaudible).
That morning were he and Amanda arguing about that woman, didn't that make D
Amanda mad? . 1;1
Page -34- 000980
That's a good point..
Home.
No. (Inaudible).
How mu~h longer do I have to wait to take a smoke break?
Do yo~ have a bathroom I could~?
MORGAN: Have you ever been up there? Okay, why don't you give us a couple ofminutes and
we'll come back in, we'll shut the door. Give us five minutes will be fine.
MORGAN: How can you stand to be around him?
JAMES:
AYOTTE:
MORGAN: It's about five after five do you need to be anywhere right away?
MORGAN: Well. Ifhe's down there Friday night, if he's downtown Friday night The main
thing is I'mjust concerned about is Amanda You know her mom hasn't seen her or
heard from her and so she's a little concerned about her. But you saw her last Friday
.ght?m .
MORGAN: Yeah.
MORGAN: Okay and that's up on Greer.
MORGAN: And she seemed to be okay?
JAMES:




MORGAN:- - Um.-And through· the week from that Friday of the woman downtown and then the
next Friday when you saw him on Friday night. You don't see him at all, or go over
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AYOTTE: He told you that you didn't need to worry about it?
AYOTTE: Did he have a talk with her, did he go home with her, or what?
'! I
No. Because I walked (inaudible) and called Tom and told her I'm leaving and told
her to come with me and he's all like no, I want to stay here .and then I started
walking home. I saw Amanda downstairs and told her goodbye and went home.
She's, theY'Yere arguing that night.
JAMES:
MORGAN: When they were arguing that morning, did you hear him explain any ofwhat he did
with her? .
AYOTTE: Like none ofyour business.
JAMES: (Inaudible) He didn't like talking about it in front ofAmanda, 80 I just left it at that.
JAMES: When I talked to him, I'm like, did you go to her at her house, he'8 all like he no just .
don't worry about it.
AYOTTE: Then whatdid he say?
JAMES: Pretty much nothing he just told her to shut up.
JAMES: Shejust said, I'm not like did you sleep with her, he liked sayno, she's like yeah, you
did, I don't believe you. And then she's like saying why don't you live her and not
with me and all ofa sudden she's crying.
. .
AYOTTE: Tha~ night,_~1?Ptit the woman. It didn't inake her mad that he had gone home with
th1s woman. What did she say? . _. .
AYOTTE: .Did she~ to him about it, rant and rave and yell at him?
JAMES: Well, when I saw her she was already mad, she's all did he try to sleep with her,
that's aboUt it.
JAMES:
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Okay, well ifI see Amanda should I call anybody?
End of tape.
MORGAN: Alright, well I guess that we will get you out ofhere then.
AYOTI'E: You have a bus pass?
AYOITE: Do you a ride home, downtown, how will you get home from there? Bus.
MORGAN: Okay and ifthey're okay, they are just concerned about her. Ifshe's okay and ifyou
"see her in person know she's okay, that's all I am concerned with. "
MORGAN: Just gct a hold ofOffi~er -S~huIer. -You know him pretty" gOOd don't you?
JAMES:































 ..  
              
           
      m~e  ·     -g    
  
                  
.              . 
.   
                 
  
                
  
       








SUPPLEMENTAL PRESENTENCE REPORT DELIVERED:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff
vs.
ERICK VIRGLE HALL, Defendant
DEFENDANT: Erick VirgIe Hall
AKA: None Known







PHONE: None 23 YEARS IN IDAHO DATE OF OFFENSE: 9-17-94 ARRESTED:9-18-94

















EYES: Hazel GLASSES: No PRIOR RECORD: FBI#310890KA6 CIB#ID165828
WA 133 843 82
RACE/ETHNIC:Caucasian CITIZEN:USA FELONIES (3)
PERSONAL INFORMATION: MISDEMEANORS (6)
GED YEARS EDUCATION DISMISSED (9)
MARITAL STATUS: Married CHILDREN: 1 PROBATIONS (3)










DEFENSE COUNSEL: Ami I Myshin SENTENCING JUDGE:
The Honorable Deborah A. Bail
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Connie Dietz Judge, Fourth Judicial District
Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho
?RESENTENCE PREPARED BY:Linda Burns
~resentence Investigator DATE OF DISPOSITION: 1-23-95
Fourth Judicial District DISPOSITION




    
         
            
    
 
    
    
   




      
           
          
    
    














        
    
    
     ) 
     
       





    
      
   
  il    
     
      U i   
     
    
ence     -95. 
    
     
(
ERICK VIRGLE HALL





That the defendant, ERICK VIRGLE HALL, on or about the 17th day of
September, 1994, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did, while
convicted of a felony, and while at work in the dairy of the South Idaho
Correctional Institution outside the walls of the Idaho State
Penitentiary, escape from the dairy at the Idaho State Penitentiary.
Police Reports
The police reports are appended.
Defendant's Version
The following statement is verbatim as written by the defendant: "It
all ocured on september sixteenth, it was about two A.M., I was on the
phone talking with my wife and she told me that the people she was
living with were dealing drugs, so I told her to get out of there and to
go to her mothers, then she told me that my son kevin was acting strang,
so I asked her in what way, she told me that he would not eat, and that
he would start to scream when she would try to chang his diapers, then I
got angrey and asked to talk to the guy she was living with, she got him
on the phone and I asked him what he was doing, he told me that he was
going to sell my car and that it was his house and if I didn't like what
was going on to get my wife out of there. So I called my sister and she
told me that this guy Johnny came over and was stealing my car. my
sister called the police and they came to her house where the car was
and let him take my car, so I called my wife back and asked her what was
going on and she told me she cut her wrist, that is when I decided to go
out there to try and stop all this from going on, when I called the next
day this guy Johnny was gone to Wilder with my car, then I asked where
my wife was, they didn't know, so I went to work. I left, that is when
I left the prison, I can't stand to hear about children being abused and
the law was called once and nothing was done, so I tried to do some
thing, and now I am here for it, I am sorry, I just can't sit around
while my son is being abused, it makes me sick with anger to think about
itl
that is what happened, I'm sorry for none of it, I love my sonlll! If I
spend my life here for my son then its worth it and more, he is my life!
Amongst other things that have went on, I now have bills that I don't
know of, all I know is that some body got my sociale security card
number and used it to get gas and electricity hooked up to their home, I
now owe around ten thousand in smalle amounts.
You tell me, if you were in prison and some one was doing things to yor
child would you let it keep happening? we tryed to tell the law, all
Page 1 000552
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they would say is we need solid prof of the crime, what kind of prof do
they need? photos of the person motes ling my son? I am sick of Garden
City Cops, they never do a dam thing to help.
so What do you do if the law will not help? I did what I had to, I was
protecting my family, if thats a crime then give me death, for I can't
handle this any more.
I commited a crime to stop a crime and now the ofender goes free, and is
now threatening my wife, give me the chance and he will be very, very
hurtl-
Why is it that he should get away with these crimes and I should be
sentenced to a five year term for trying to stop him? I don't
understand this law!
I am sorry but it makes me sick! For these are the cause and reason of
my crime, I do not remorse for protecting my loved ones, for that in its































4-28-88 28 wks, 7
Manifest Injustice
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1) Burglary I (F)
2) Grand Theft (F)
3) Burglary I (F)
4) Grand Theft (F)
Case No. 18094
Grand Theft by POSSe
of Stolen Property
(F) Case No. 17804
1) Carrying Concealed
Weapon (M)
2) POSSe of Burglary
Tools (M)
3) Dis. Conduct (M)
Case No. M9008725
3 yrs (1 fixed, 2 ind)
concurrent
1) 5yrs - 1 fixed 4ind




1) J/C: $42.50 f&c;
$1,865.57 for rest-
itution; 3 yr susp.
sentence; 5 yrs
prob.; 250 ds jail





J/C; 3 yrs ISCI with a
120 day retained
jurisdiction credit




on a 3 yr probation.
1) J/C; 5 dys jail
2) J/C; $32.50 f&c; 60
dys jail w/credit
for 60 dys served
3) J/C; .2 dys jail
Garden City, ID 9-19-90 Disturbing the Peace Dismissed
(M) Case No. M900687l
1) Petit Theft (M) 1)







5 dys jail with
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1) J/C; $82.50 f&c
2) J/C; $57.50 f&c
Defendant's Probation Plan
The following statement is verbatim as written by the defendant: "I
don't think any of this matters now! I wish it did, but it is not
important, but if you want to know, then I will tell you!
My plans are as follows. I was going to go to work for my wifes father,
he owns a planning business, I was going to go to some counseling groups
with my wife, so we could both learn to deal with our problems together,
she has a place for us to live down in Burley if I ever get out of
prison.
I was going to get my drivers license, and go to c01leg to learn the
journeyman trade of pluming, and work for her father to get my hours as
an aprenticship license, then go on to the buisness course do I could
learn how to run a good buisness.
I also was going to go to group meetings for A.A, to keep my sobriety,
and to seek suport from others to stay clean."
PART II - SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Appended the Court will find a prior presentence report which was
prepared for the Honorable Alan M. Schwartzman on May 1, 1991 for the
offense of Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property. The defendant
received a three year sentence (1 fixed, 2 indeterminant) with credit
for 77 days served and the Court retaining jurisdiction for 120 days.
At the time the defendant was sentenced on that case he had numerous
felony offenses pending. A Burglary and Grand Theft charge were
dismissed and the defendant was sentenced by the Honorable D. Duff McKee
to the custody of the State Board of Corrections for a term of not less
than one year nor more than three years to run concurrent with the
sentence imposed by the Honorable Alan M. Schwartzman. The Court
suspended execution of that sentence and placed the defendant on
probation for five years. On December 3, 1991 the defendant was
arrested for Rape and Infamous Crime Against Nature. An updated
presentence report was completed at that time. As a result of this
arrest the defendant was violated on probation in front of Judge
Schwartzman and Judge McKee. On April 23, 1992 the defendant entered a
plea of guilty to an Amended Information in Case No. 18591 which charged
the defendant with Rape. He received a five year sentence (one fixed,
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Correctional Institute on June 12, 1992. On September 17, 1994 while
working at the Southern Idaho Correctional Institution's farm/dairy the
defendant escaped. He was last seen at 5:45. He was arrested at
approximately 8:30 PM the next day. He is now being housed at ISCI
Maximum Security.
The defendant said there are have been few changes since his last
presentence report was completed. He said he married Ms. Hannah
Catmull-Hall on October 10, 1993 while he was in custody. She has a
three year old son, Kevin. In the defendant's version of the instant
offense, the defendant states that he was concerned about his wife and
son's safety and escaped to try to protect him. The defendant states "I
committed a crime to stop a crime and now the offender goes free and is
now threatening my wife, give me the chance and he will be very very
hurt! Why is it that he should get away with these crimes and I should
be sentenced to a five year term for trying to stop him I don't
understand this law!"
This investigator spoke with the defendant's wife, Hannah Catmull-Hall.
She said her husband is really nice and she wants him home with her and
her son. She said she has not seen him in "a year or two" because she
is on probation for Grand Theft and therefore cannot visit him at the
penitentiary. She said she was not with him at the time he escaped,
however, in the appended police reports it indicates that she was with
him and was transported by Deputy Thompson to Five Mile and Overland so
she could make arrangements for a ride home. Ms. Catmull-Hall said she
keeps in contact with her husband by mail. She said she cannot accept
collect phone calls and so is unable to talk to him by phone. She said
she is unemployed right now and lives in the Burley-Rupert area. She
said she is looking for work but has not had any luck. She and her son
are living on her son's social security. Ms. Catmull-Hall thinks it's
unfair that her husband is being charged with this crime.
The defendant appears before the Court with three prior felony offenses.
He was serving a five year sentence when he escaped on September 17,
1994. He was arrested the next day at approximately 8:30 PM. Since
that time he has been in maximum security at ISCI. This investigator
has no specific recommendations for sentencing and will concur with any





223 N. 6th, Suite 303
Boise, Idaho 83702
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Criminal Identification Bureau
National Crime Information Center
Drivers Services
Prosecuting Attorney, file material
Hannah Catmull-Hall, defendant's wife
Page 6 000557
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PRESENTENCE REPORT DELIVEr· ;":':
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH J~·>:·C~J.L DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR niL - ;..... ~. TY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff
\'S.
ERICK VIRGIL ~~LL, Defendant
DEFENDAhl: Hall, Erick Virgil
AKA: Erick McCracken







PHONE: 377-6500 20 YEARS IN IDAHO DATE OF OFFENSE: 2-20-91 ARRESTED: 2-10-~
DATE OF BIRTH: AGE: 20 DAYS SERVED PRIOR SENTENCING: 69
PLACE OF BIRTH:
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
PWiSICAL DESCRIPTION: SEX: Male
C~~GES PENDING: See Prior Record Section


















PRIOR RECORD: FBII310890KA6 CIB#ID165B28
FELONIIRNfNG: PU'M~t to R.de 32 (h) (1): Neither
e de~~ndZ!nt. his counsel, the prosecuting
MI sDEMHbos:sr'iJr atop :ps:~G:I aut~criled by the
senten~'~" ·..~·rt .. .'.or'" ....:.. 1.. ." rL>·":>",,:: a cONI n' t~'" .r.... ":"","It ';"'} ",," ;le
DISMIS:PJiP.mte'i~.cr."(.Q.l'.A" " . I' '.
.... ~ :. ";0;.:-.+ re·~.·_:· -..~ ~'V c~[...cr
"rs", or~: ',""1; r / .... • .. _. . . .
PROBATin~ ~. "- 'OJ) ll.: IC •• ;';" :~;;~.: C ,-;'fy
~l""at!on CGjlI~;r::;d :"(;il';U:.I.;" r;~;it;~i1 Qf
PAROLE~IS rUI~ St!;i:! ~emed contempt of court
Ind subject to appropriate sanctions.






MARITAL STATUS: Single CHILDREN: 0
rELIGIOUS AFFILIATIO~: None
)ROSECUTING ATTORNEY: George Gunn
SENTE..~CING JUDGE:
The Honorable Alan M. Schwartzman
Judge, Fourth Judicial District
Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho
Sweeney
DATE OF DISPOSITION: 5-1-91
DISPOSITION
~EFENSE COUNSEL: Ed Odessey
PRESENTENCE PREPARED BY: Mary
resentence Investigator
ourth Judicial District
223 N. 6th, Suite 303
ODE: (V) Verified (U) Unverified
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PART 1 - OFFICIAL INFORMATIO~
CRI 17804
Official Version - Mr. Hall pled guilty to the following:
That the defendants, HE.l.ffiY WILLIAM GUNTRUH, Jr., and ERICK VIRGIL
HALL, on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess stolen property, to-wit: a
1974 Toyota station wagon, of a value in excess of One Hundred Fifty
Dollars, lawful money of the United States, knowing the said property
to have been stolen by another or under circumstances as would reason-
able induce them to believe the property was stolen and intending to
deprive the owner, B.P. Auto Sales, of the use or benefit of the proper-
ty.
In exchange for Hr. Hall's plea, the State has agreed to recommend a
five-year term at the Idaho State Correctional Institution with one
year fixed. The Court would then retain jurisdiction. Also as part of
the plea bargain in this case, Mr. Hall is to plead guilty to a charge
stemming from a Burglary at Whittier School (M9102818). However, at
this writing, Prosecutor George Gunn indicates the defendant has not
pled guilty to a specific charge in that case.
Police Reports - Please see attached.
Defendant's Version
No comment on preveous charges.
Victim's Statement
The victim in this case is B.P. Auto Sales, located at 505 N. Orchard
Street. According to manager Rod Kelley, one morning in late Novem-
ber, he and other staff members came into the store to find that a 1974
Toyota station wagon had been stolen. Mr. Kelley est~ates the
value of the car at $400. B.P. Auto Sales subsequently filed a report
with police, and retrieved their car approxtmately three months later.
Mr. Kelley says that nothing was damaged, except for the steering
column and ignition, where the car had been hot-wired. He says the
cost of repair was approximately $60. Although the company has not
been reimbursed for its costs, Mr. Kelley says he doesn't particular-
ly care whether he is, because he has already sold the vehicle. He had
no thoughts on sentencing.
Restitution - Prosecuting Attorney to provide.
Prior Record
Juvenile
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Donna Leonard, a clerk typist at the Mission Creek Youth Camp in
Belfair, Washington. says that the defendant was first received at
Mission Creek on May 10, 1988. Then on February 28, 1989, he was trans-
ferred to the Twin Rivers Group Home. He escaped from Twin Rivers on
March 19, 1989, and was apprehended four days later. In an attached
Record of Official Actions, it is noted that after he was apprehended,
he was transferred to the Benton County ,(Washington) Jail on March
24, 1989. He was sentenced to 120 days in jail for the Escape, and his
calculated release date was July 2, 1989. However, he was transferred
back to Mission Creek on JUne 28, 1989. He was paroled from that insti-
tution on April 25, 1990.
Mr. Hall's former probation officer, Cookie Quirk. no longer works at
the Clark County (Washington) Juvenile Court. However, in the attachec
Record of Official Action/completed by the Division of Juvenile Rehabil-
itation in Clark County, on May 6, 1988, diagnostic case planner'
Claude Blair offers the following insights on Mr. Hall:
Erick's criminal history can partially be explained by his rather
disruptive and unstructured lifestyle. He has been involved in a
home situation that, at best, has been chaotic and unstable. Erick
has had periods of extensive runaways where he has left the home of
his parent or foster parent and has been on the street for long
periods of time. Also, on other occasions, he has been abandoned
by his mother or has been asked to leave the family home by a boy-
friend of the mother. In each case, he has been left to fend for
himself with absolutely no adult supervision. In this setting, he
has learned the criminal lifestyle and, when structure has been
applied, he has rebelled and continued to act out in a criminal
manner. Erick has little remorse for his actions and continues
to display a fairly passive attitude towards life and his control
of it. Future counseling programs should stress that Erick needs
n ... 000561
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to take control of his life and be aware that he can affect the
decisions that are significant for him. To this point, Erick has
not been in control of his life and he has taken little comfort
in knowing that he is wandering aimlessly.
In a later section of Mr. Blair's report, he notes, "In some instanc-
es, Erick's offense behavior has been a result of his transient life-
style and his need to obtain food and shelter for survival. In other
cases. his offense behavior has revolved around hedonistic attitudes
and an inability to think through his behavior and realize consequenc-
es. The most recent criminal referrals involve the thefts of several
vehicles for joyriding purposes. Items were generally not stolen out
of these vehicles and they were driven until they broke down or the
youths had no more need for them. During these periods of runaway.
Erick's behavior has generally been out of control and he has sho~~
no ability to help himself. Erick's alcohol use has been fairly
constant during this period of time and he generally used on a regular
basis while on runaway status. Erick is experiencing a fairly con-
stant level of stress and crisis at the moment and could be amenable to
therapeutic intervention if this crisis period continues."
Mr. Blair goes on to say, "Erick's natural mother has made it clear
that she does not want him in the family home. She is more concerned
with her own relationship with her boyfriend and is willing to give up
her children to maintain that relationship. With this in mind, a re-
turn to the home of the natural mother is probably not warranted.
Further complicating the issue is Erick's circle of friends in the
community he has come from and his ability to live on the streets and
engage in a criminal lifestyle in that coonnunity. Future planning for
Erick should revolve around an alternative placement in a structured,.
group setting that will allow him to stabilize his behavior and begin
to complete his education program and receive prevocational train-
ing. Erick has been enrolled in the Job Corps program while a resi-
dent of Oregon and wishes to finish up that program in the future. As
Erick completes his Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation sentence,
this writer would recommend that planning be started for placement in
the Job Corps program or in the alternative, .a program like Toutle
River Ranch. Erick seems motivated to begin working with a secondary
goal of completing his education if it is convenient. Again. the
D.C.F.S. case worker should be involved in his planning and could facil-
itate a placement at Toutle River Ranch or an alternative."
After Mr. Blair's report was written, the defendant was sentenced to
the Mission Creek Youth Camp. After having spent approximately two
years in juvenile incarceration. he was paroled on April 25, 1990.
Pat Zock, a juvenile parole counselor for the Washington Division of
Juvenile Rehabilitation, was Mr. Hall's parole officer in Bremerton.
Mr. Zock says that he began supervising him in May 1990, and that he
could not remember when the defendant was released from parole. He
does note that juvenile parole typically lasts four to six months. Mr.
Zock believes that the defendant's biggest problem was that he was
"basically left dangling by his parents." He says that he grew into
the assumption that most adults were going to abandon him. Mr. Zock
believes that that assumption interfered with his ability to trust
000562
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r.l;lCK VIRGIL HALL
those around him. Noting that the defendant was conscientious in re-
porting. Mr. Zock says he does not believe he was a threat to the
community in a physical sense. Hr. Zock believes that the defendant
has a low level of both social and vocational skills. Consequently, he
fears that he could grow comfortable in a prison setting. Regarding
sentencing in the instant offense. he thinks that the plea bargain,
calling for a retained jurisdiction would be an appropriate sentence.
"He needs to be stung. If he's continuing to steal cars, obviously








































1) $182.50 fine and




1) 5 days jail
2) $32.50 fine and
costs; 60 days jail,
60 days credit
3) 2 days jail
1) $57.50 fine and
costs









Driver's Services - Record not located per Driver's Services.
PART II - SOCIAL HISTORY
Early Life
Erick Hall was born 20 years ago in Long Beach, California. His
father, Frank McCracken, was an alcoholic and a drug addict; his
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When Mr. Hall was three, the family moved to Camas, Washin-. J:.. A
cuuple of years later, his parents divorced, primarily bec,_ ~~ ~f his
father's brutal temper, which was exacerbated by alcohol a~:~ ':1" Llg
abuse. Mr. Hall says that Frank t-1cCracken claimed neither .. ::::: nor
his brother, alleging that they had been fathered by someon~ else.
Frank McCracken eventually returned to California, and the defendant
remained with his mother in Camas. When Mr. Hall was seven, he went
to live with his grandmother, Jean Seivers, because his mother had
moved to a small town in Washington, and could not afford to take all
of her children with her. The defendant lived with his grandmother for
four months, and then moved with his mother to Newburg, Oregon. The
family remained there for less than a year, at which time the defendant
went to a group home, and his two younger brothers went to foster
homes. Mr. Hall believes his mother farmed the children out, primarily
because her boyfriend,.Jeff Conners, did not want them around.
When Mr. Hall was 13, he went to live with his father in Buena Park,
California. By that time, the father had remarried a woman named
Tina. Shortly after the defendant's arrival, he and his father began
clashing. Consequently, Mr. Hall ran away several times, and subse-
quently went back to Camas to live with his mother.
Several months later, the mother moved to McMinnville, Oregon, and
left the defendant and his brother in Camas without supervision. Mr.
Hall says that when he was 15, he was placed in a group home in Vancou-
ver. because no one could find his mother. He was subsequently placed
in a couple of foster homes. but ran away, and lived on the streets of
Vancouver for approximately nine months. During that time. Mr. Hall
stole a number of motor vehicles, and at age 17, he was sent to the
Mission Creek Youth Camp near Belfair, Washington. During his stay
at Mission Creek, he escaped once and spent four months in the Benton
County (Washington) Jail. Upon his release. he was returned to Mission
Creek. He was not paroled from that facility until April 25. 1990.
Shortly after Mr. Hall was released, he says he came to Boise and
stayed with a friend. who was living on welfare. He says he supported
himself primarily by doing yard work. The defendant has never served














Noting that he last saw his father 10 years ago, Mr. Hall says that he
does not know where he currently lives. He says he has poor memories
of Frank McCracken, primarily because he often beat the defendant.
Mother:
Date of Birth:
Jean Hall, age unknown
Unknown
000564
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Mr. Hall says he last saw his mother five years ago when she abandoned
him in Camas, Washington. Mrs. Hall's behavior has been discussed in
the juvenile section of this report, and further information is con-
tained in the attached Record of Official Actions, dated May 6, 1988.
Siblings - The defendant failed to provide any information regarding
his brothers and sisters.
Comments on Relationship With Siblings as a Child:
"Not very good because I am black sheep of family. And I never had a
chance to get to make a relationship with any of them."
Most Important Events During Childhood, Both Good and Bad:
"When dad disowned me at age 14. Good when I got girlfriend that
really cared enough to help me with my problems."
Marital - Mr. Hall has never been married, and is currently dating no
one.
Military - The defendant has never served in the military.
Education
Mr. Hall dropped out of school in Camas, Washington, when he was in
the eighth grade.
Employment
Noting that he has supported himself primarily by doing yard work and
odd jobs, the defendant was unable to provide any employment references.
Health
Physical: Describing his health as fair, Mr. Hall says he suffers
from "bad body functions." When asked to elaborate on his condition,
he indicated that he suffers from pains in his side, that his shoulder
and elbow joints pop out, and that he sweats too much when he moves
around. He suspects his former drug use may have affected his health.
Mental: Prior to Mr. Hall's incarceration at the Mission Creek
Youth Camp in. 1988, he received a psychological evaluation from psychol-
ogist Kirk Johnson in Vancouver, Washington. In the attached report,
dated April 18, 1988, Mr. Johnson indicates the defendant submitted to
the following psychological tests: The Minnesota Multiphasic Person-
ality Inventory, the Jesness Inventory, the Mooney Problem Check
List, and the Sentence Completion Test. Mr. Johnson reports his find-
ings as follows:
D_ .... _ t:.
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This 17-year-old api .. r~. to have achieved a valid profile on the
M.M.P.I. Similarly ,-. J illg adolescents are often referred for
treatment as they a~" ~-:t'j jant, tense,' disobedient and restless.
At least half of sue referrals are received from the court system.
A very common proble~ ~ith similarly scoring adolescents is nega-
tive relationships ~ith parenting figures. They tend to denigrate
and rebel against such authority. There is often parental involve-
ment in alcohol abuse. Mothers of similarly scoring adolescents
are often seen as dependent personalities with fathers seen as in-
consistent and uncaring. Similarly scoring adolescents do not per-
form well in school, often feeling that othe~ students are too
bright to keep up with. Limited intellectual ability is associated
with the achieved profile. Similarly scoring adolescents are impul-
sive and demanding. Delay of gratification is very difficult.
Excitement is often sought out and ends with rather dangerous or
criminal behavior.
On the Jesness Inventory this subject appears to be generally
socially maladjusted with a distrust of any authority figure. This
subject is likely to be quite skeptical and critical of others. It
would be very difficult for this subject to accept help. Others
will likely be blamed for any problems. The profile is also asso-
ciated with a subject who is admitting many family problems and
serious conflict. This subject does not see his family as a source
of support or nurturence.
On the Mooney Problem Check List numerous problem areas are en
dorsed. Subject indicates concern over family, school achievement,
personal relationships, and future orientation. Although many con-
cerns were endorsed it is of interest to note that subject also in-
dicated on this instrument that he does not want to talk with any-
one about or get specific help for these expressed concerns.
Conclusions and Recommendations: This subject has been highly de-
linquent for quite some time with a chaotic family history. Neither
parent appears to be an adequate resource, with a long history of
alcohol abuse and apparent inability to provide any real limits or
structure. Subjectts lack of involvement in any school program for
the past three years, probably limited intellectual ability, and
current alcohol abuse almost seems to ensure further delinquent
acting out. This examiner would make the following specific recom-
mendations:
1. Subject to be considered for placement in a State facility where
behavior can be controlled.
2. Educational assessment be completed with an individualized pro-
gram designed to address academic needs.
3. Vocational training be provided to assist subject in obtaining
work following release and emancipation.
4. Alcohol and drug treatment be provided during institutionaliza-
tion.
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g\.,u~ral it is felt that this subject should not under any circum-
·.~IC\."'S return home and must at the same time be given specific
~~ III training to allow for non-criminal survival after leaving the
i.lenile system.
Substance Abuse
Mr. Hall says he began drinking a couple of nights a week at age 15.
Several months later, he says he began drinking three nights a week.
He estimates he drank approximately six beers at a sitting. He report-
edly continued at that rate of consumption until he was incarcerated at
the Mission Creek Youth Camp at age 17. When he was released two years
later, he began drinking approximately four nights a week, usually
consuming about 12 beers at a sitting. Records reflect no alcohol-re-
lated arrests.
Mr. Hall says he began smoking marIjUana with his father when he was
seven years old. He estimates he used the drug once or twice a week.
Later, Mr. Hall says that when he had money, he bought marijuana, using
it as often as he could. He says he began using cocaine and
methamphetamine when he was 19. During his heaviest period of consump-
tion, he estimates he was using four times a week. He was using at
that rate of consumption just prior to his arrest on the instant of-




Mr. Hall says he enjoys reading and building cars from extra parts.
The defendant says he relaxes by smoking marijuana, adding that, "It
makes me feel alone and secure."
Economic Status
Mr. Hall reports no income, no expenses, no assets and no long-term
debts.
PART III - PRESCRIPTION PROBATION PROGRAM
Vocational/Academic Training: RECOMMENDED.
Rationale - Mr. Hall has never obtained his G.E.D., and he has no mar-
ketable skills. Based on his current legal and financial situation, he
is probably eligible for assistance through the Department of Vocation-
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Rationale - Although records reflect no drug or alcohol-related offens-
es, Mr. Hall says he has been addicted to alcohol and drugs for the
past eight years. As part of any probation the Court might grant, it
is felt that the defendant should be required to submit to a substance
abuse evaluation, and follo~ the recommendations contained therein.
Structured Counseling: RECO~~ED.
Rationale - Based on Mr. Hall's significant juvenile history, coupled
with his apparent inability to function in society, a retained jurisdic-
tion appears appropriate. If Mr. Hall went on a rider, corrections
personnel could evaluate him prior to final disposition. Moreover, the
defendant might be able to gain some valuable living skills in the
rider program.
Family Counseling: NOT RECOMMENDED.
Rationale - Mr. Hall is a single adult living on his own.
Defendant's Probation Plan:
I plan to seek help with my drug problems. With the suport of my
friends that care. Seek employment any where I can find that needs
help with bissness. Living arrangments I have 3 posible places
that I can stay for a few months untile I get on my feet again. I




PART IV - SUMMARY/EVALUATION/RECOMMENDATION
Having pled guilty to Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property,
Erick Hall faces sentencing in this court. The instant offense is
his first adult felony. Pursuant to plea negotiations, the State will
recommend a five-year term at the Idaho State Correctional lnstitutior.
with one year fixed. The Court would then retain jurisdiction. Also,
as part of the plea bargain in this case, Mr. Hall is to plead guilty
to a charge stemming from a burglary at Whittier School (M9102818).
However, at this writing, Prosecutor George Gunn indicates the defen-
dant has not pled guilty to any specific charge in that case.
Erick Hall was born 20 years ago in Long Beach, California. His
father was an alcoholic and a drug addict, and his mother was a homemak-
er. Mr. Hall had four brothers and three sisters. When the defendant
was three years old, the family moved to Camas, Washington. A couple
of years later, his parents divorced, and his father moved back to
California. Although the defendant remained with his mother, she led a
rather nomadic lifestyle, and eventually abandoned him when he was 15.
Mr. Hall says he has not seen his father for the past 10 years, and
that he has not seen his mother for the past five years. He does not
000568
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know the whereabouts of either of them. He spent much of his teen
years in group homes, foster homes, detention centers, and in the
streets. After having amassed a rather significant juvenile record,
went to Mission Creek Youth Camp near Belfair, Washington, for approx
imately two years. He was paroled last spring. Several months later.
he moved to Boise, where he lived with a friend and did odd jobs to
support himself. At the time of his arrest, he was living by htmself.
The defendant has never been married, and is currently dating no one.
Mr. Hall has been both polite and cooperative throughout this investig~­
tion. He appears to have had an extremely chaotic and unstable child-
hood, void of parental affection or direction. Because he has lived o~
his own for so long, he appears to have few social or vocational
skills. With this in mind, it is felt that he would benefit from a
retained jurisdiction. If he went on a rider. Corrections personnel
would have additional time to evaluate him, and he might be able to






223 N. 6th, Suite 303
Boise, Idaho 83702
Collateral Contacts
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Criminal Identification Bureau
National Crime Information Center
Drivers Services
Prosecuting Attorney, File Material
Paul Kuter, Clark County (Washington) Juvenile Court
Clark County Juvenile Court Records
Pat Zock, Washington Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation
Rod Kelley, Victim
Donna Leonard, Mission Creek Youth Camp
D 1 n.
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14:39:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court admits State's 150
14:40:06 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin did cross examination
14:49:19 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did redirect examination
14:53:02 - Other: Witness
Excused
14:53:06 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower called JAY ROSENTHAL /SWORN and direct examined
14:57:09 - Other: Witness
Excused
14:57:41 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Prepared to rest aggravation case, request leave to put on v
ictim impact
14:58:03 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
statement
14:58:09 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower called Mr. Mark Huisenga for victim impact stateme
nt
14:59:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court instructs on victim impact statement
15:00:40 - Other: MARK HUISENGA
victim impact statement
15:11:40 - Other: LAURA PETTET
victim impact statement
15:21:13 - Operator











15:22:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court makes record of another jury note
15:23:09 - Other: Counsel
have no objection
15:23:14 - Operator









     
    
      
     
      
     
   
 
      
         
   
 
      
           
  
      
 
      
          
 
     
      
    
   
    
   
  




   
  




   
     
       
   
   
  






S-~sion: ~eville102304 ) Page 9
Hall, Erick Virgil
15:46:16 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court made record of response to jury
15:48:25 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.







16:57:22 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower did cross examination
16:58:09 - Other: Witness
excused
16:58:31 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court admonished jury and excused them until Monday @ 1:
30 p.m.
17:00:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquires of schedule for Monday afternoon
17:00:46 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin responded
17:01:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
17:01:54 - Operator
Stop recording: (On Recess)
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S 3sion Date: 2004/10/25
















Defendant: Hall, Erick Virgil
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg












13:34:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court calls the case outside the jury.
13:37:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Made record of jury questions
13:38:05 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
00593
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5l :sion: Neville102504pm
Mr. Bourne tendered to the Court copy of power point present
ation of defense
13:38:49 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
wh Dr. Cunningham tomorrow and Dr. Pettis. Mr. Bourne respo
nded regarding
13:39:33 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
issue with women the defendant could come in contact with in
the penitentary.
13:43:22 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
state's depending on how defense experts answer questions co
uld open the door
13:46:47 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
n the Hanlon matter. Don't want it to be a surprise to coun
sel and the court
13:47:40 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
when State does cross examination on propoensity. Mr. Bourn
e stated one
13:48:05 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
doctor spent 12 hours with defendant and the other doctor sp
ent 5 hours with
13:48:28 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
defendant as well as countless hours with defendant's family
. Do not see how
13:49:09 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
to get this tomorrow without the jury knowing about the Hanl
on case
13:49:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Courat inquires who first witness would be tomorrow
13:49:30 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr stated Dr. Pettis first then Dr. Cunningham.
13:49:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
State has alleged 4 aggravators. State focusing now on 4th
aggravator the
13:50:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
propensity to commit murder. If State were to ask Dr. Petti
s and Dr.
13:50:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Cunningham's view of what defendant's propopensity to commit
murder and it is
13:50:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
answered that there is a low risk
13:51:07 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin stated sounds like state saying no matter what an
swer is it opens
13:51:31 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
door
13:51:34 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne responded, doctor's have to admit he is a signifi
Page 2
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13:52:37 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
re-offend
13:52:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquired of Mr. Myshin
13:52:49 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin stated will probably say he does not know.
13:53:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
13:53:38 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin stated presenting mitigation, information about M
r. Hall, not
13:53:55 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
about the crime, was going to illiminate risk assessment to
avoid opening the
13:54:17 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
door, sounds like State is going ask that question. If ther
e is no opinion,
13:54:43 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
should not open the door
13:54:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Issues framed by the charges.
13:55:00 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mitigation does not rebutt aggravators. Trying hard to foIl
ow Court's
13:55:21 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
ruling. State shouldn't be allowed to open that door.
13:55:48 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne question is where is he, what is he, what conclus
ion is State to
13:56:30 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
draw, is he a risk to the community. Question is what does
this all mean and
13:57:24 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
that question is unavoidable
13:57:32 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin indicated State trying to turn defense witnesses
into State
13:57:54 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
witnesses by getting risk assessment.
13:58:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Both sides entitled to cross examination. Mitigation is the
body of evidence
13:58:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
the jury has to weigh. Court has not illirnnated how Mr. Hal
I is today, just
13:59:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.





   
   
      
 
     
     
      
          
     
      
        
   
      
          
   
      
           
    
      
     
     
     
      
         
  
      
         
      
            
    
      
            
    
      
    
      
         
  
      
     
     
         
   
     
        m     
    
     





14:00:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
consider further, if Dr. Pettis and Dr. Cunningham say he is
a risk to
14:01:00 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
society, could cause problems. Court will take up later.
14:02:06 - Other: JURy PRESENT
. & seated
14:04:02 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin called BETTY JANE KIRK/SWORN and direct examined
14:17:45 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne asked question in aid of objection. Request only
contact that
14:18:15 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
involved the defendant.
14:18:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court requested foundation and things that ocurred with the
defendant.
14:18:55 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin cont'd
14:32:01 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did cross examination
14:33:02 - Other: Witness
excused
14:33:07 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin called DEANNA HORMANN/SWORN and direct examined
14:42:59 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne asked question in aid of objection
14:43:34 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
object to anything defendant did not view
14:43:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court sustains objection
14:44:01 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin cont'd
14:'50:53 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne objects unless relates to Mr. Hall
14:51:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court concurs
14:51:15 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin
14:51:23 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne objected
14:51:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court sustains unless in presence of Mr. Hall
14:51:55 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin cont'd
15·: 00: 55 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did cross examination
15:01:37 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Page 4
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Mr. Myshin did redirect examination
15:03:02 - Other: Witness
Excused
15:03:08 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin requested short recess
15:03:34 - Other: Jury Excused
15:03:47 - Operator





15:32:20 - Other: Jury Present
& seated
15:32:44 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin called SHANDRA HAMMING/SWORN and direct examined
16:16:19 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne cross examination
16:16:41 - Other: Witness
excused
16:16:44 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin called COOKIE QUIRK/SWORN and direct examined
16:21:27 - Other: Witness
Identified the defendant
16:23:37 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin marked defense exhibits F, G & H
16:26:39 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg







16:46:42 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne requested to read these exhibits before cross exa
mination of this
16:46:58 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
witness
16:47:24 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Dr. Estess will sit in on examination of experts tomorrow.
Will not be
16:47:44 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
using Dr. Engle
16:47:51 - Operator
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17:06:16 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne stated he would have no questions for this witnes
s
17:06:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will bring the jury back in and advise
17:08:04 - Other: Jury Present
& seated
17:08:10 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne indicated he has no cross examination for this wi
tness
17:08:23 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin stated defense will rest for the day.
17:08:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court excused the jury for the day
17:09:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court inquired about post-proof instructions
17:10:46 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin had no objection and no add'l instructions
17:10:58 - State Attorney; Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne had no objection, may want to view further regard
ing the
17:11:49 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
governor's pardon power, and may want an instruction on that
and what the
17:12:55 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
sentence could be
17:13:00 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquires if counsel would like court to fashion one
17:13:17 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne stated he will work on one tonight
17:13:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded regarding witnesses for tomorrow
17:16:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court cont'd possible questions State make ask Dr. Cunni
ngham and Dr.
17:16:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Pettis. Defense will not go near risk assessment or propens
ity to commit
17:16:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
murder with these witnesses. When Court looked through powe
r point slides.
17:17:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
State not to go to 2nd charge of murder and believe should s
tay away from
17:18:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
this. If defense witness does not opine to future propensit
Page 6
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y, State will not
17:19:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
be allowed to ask. Court's intention is if defense does not
open door in
17:19:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
mitigation there is nothing to rebutt. State has proof on t
hree aggravators,
1 :20:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
and working on the fourth aggravator. State has shown evide
nce back to 1992
1 :20:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
and this pattern started back to 1992. Court does not want
either side to go
1 :21:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
to Hanlon. Court concedes it is totally relevent, but too p
rejudicial
1 :21:55 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Is Court restricting argument
1 : 22: 23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F·.
Can argue that as State feels fit, just not asking about Han
lon.
1 :23:31 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne responded, drug offense, faulty wiring, bad paren
ting causing the
1 :24:02 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
capital offense
1 :24:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court not sure how will come out in power point. The Co
urt will consider
1 :25:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
further, but it is the hope of the Court that Hanlon is not
talked about on
1 :25:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
this issue
1 :26:05 - Operator
Stop recording:
00599000579
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ldge: Neville, Thomas F.
__ ~porter: Gambee, John
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Plaintiff: IDAHO, STATE OF
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg




09:06:54 - New case
HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
09:07:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Defendant present in custody
09:08:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court notes statesman article that Mr. Us is aware that
when he makes
09:08:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
impact statement he does not make an opinion about what sent
ence should be or
09:10:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
in any of the victim impact statements






   
    
    
    
  
  
·l     
  
    
   
  
   
   
    
  




     




   
   
     
    
     
           
   
     
           
    
     
       




Court in receipt of proposed instruction 49 from the State w
hich the State
09:11:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.







09:12:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court inquired if any objection
09:12:52 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin would like to consider further
09:13:10 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court inquired if State had any further instructions
09:13:29 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne stated both subjects covered in this instruction
09:13:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has considered further overnight re: Dr. Cunningha
mls powerpoint
09:14:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
presentation and whether defendant would be dangerous. Cour
t believes that
09:14:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
that is still opening the door and the Court will not allow.
There should
09:14:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
not be questions on dangerousness even in the penitentary.
The defense is
09:15:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
not going to go there
09:15:22 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin stated it is not his intension to go there
09:15:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquires of State's intention with Dr. Estess
09:18:35 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne stated hard to know without hearing the defendant
's evidence
09:20:17 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower inquired about defense arguing he is not a danger
in prison
09:20:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
No basis for arguing if defense does not have Dr. Pettis or
Cunningham have
09:21:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
presented it
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Mr. Carr stated have had two exhibits marked I & J, as well
as a couple of
09:21:51 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
blow ups of a few pages out of those exhibits
09:22:27 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne had no objection .
09:22:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court admits I & J
09:24:38 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Car has had L, M, N & 0 marked for illustrative purposes
09:24:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.







09:41:12 - Other: Jury Present
09:41:19 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr called Dr. ROBERT PETTIS/SWORN and direct examined
09:58:17 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
cont'd to exhibits I & J
09:59:03 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr cont'd to K, L, M & N, illust exhibits from pages i
n I & J
11:11:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.







11:35:10 - Other: Jury Present
& seated .
11:35:14 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr cont'd direct examination
11:49:34 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did cross examination
11:59:40 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr did redirect examination
12:01:59 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did recross
12:02:16 - Other: Witness excused
12:02:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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12:03:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.







13:24:31 - Other: JURy PRESENT
13:24:36 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.








14:55:13 - Other: JURY PRESENT
15:49:34 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did cross examination
15:51:25 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr did recross examination
15:53:27 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bourne did recross examination








15:54:44 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Carr moved K, L, M & N
15:55:11 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
No objection
15:55:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court admits K. L, M & N
15:55:28 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
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16:41:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court inquires of the defendant regarding his right to a
llocute
16:42:07 - Defendant: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Understands that right and has taken advice of counsel serio
usly
16:42:58 - Defendant: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
& will not allocute
16:43:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will have defense rest mitigation before jury
16:44:20 - Other: Jury present
16:44:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court advised jury that K, L, M & N have been admitted
16:45:13 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin rested defendant's mitigation case
16:45:25 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower called WALTER US for victim impact statement
16:45:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court instructed jury on impact statement
16:46:47 - Other: WALTER US
17:00:03 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower called RONALD HuISENGA/Victim impact statement
17:01:55 - State Attorney: Bower, Roger Bourne/Greg
Mr. Bower called MIRIAM HISENGA/Victim impact statement
17:16:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court excuses the jury until tomorrow morning for final
instructions and
17:16:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
closing arguments
17:17:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has made a revised instruction 49
17:20:07 - Public Defender: Carr, Amil Myshin/D.C.
Mr. Myshin accepts instruction as amended








17:29:51 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court cont'd to post proof instructions
Page 5
00604000584





   
     
           
 
     
          
 
     
    
     
        
    
     
            
      
      
      
         
     
      
    
      
       
      
       
     
          
  
     
  
     
        
      
      







   
     







State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF




THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
















Shannon Michael Pambrun, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge unless otherwise
noted.
2. I was not contacted by anyone on the defense team or prosecution nor any experts from
their offices. I was not asked to testify but had I been asked to testify, I would have
testified to the below.
3. I am Erick's older brother. I was three and half years old when Erick was born. Erick
and I have the same mother, Jean Hall, but not the same father, Frank McCracken.
Although I did not know until I was in high school but I refer to Frank as my father.
4. My biological father is Roy Pambrun. Roy is listed as Erick's biological father on his
birth certificate. I do not know the reason for this.
5. I remember Erick was different from my other siblings. He would be a happy baby one
moment and for no apparent reason, he would throw a tantrum. He would cry
uncontrollably as ifhe was in a rage. Most ofthe time, I did not know why he was upset.
AFFIDAVIT OF SHANNON MICHAEL PAMBRUN 1
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6. My brothers, sisters, and I were told that we needed to be careful not to touch Erick's
head by my mother. For some unknown reason to me, Erick's head was not to be
touched. If his head or the back of his neck were touched, it was like pushing a button.
Erick would quickly lose his temper and get angry with everyone. Sometimes his anger
was expressed with violence. Then just as quickly as his anger had come, it would
disappear.
7. When Erick, my brothers and I were younger, we used to play around the house. For fun,
we used to throw rocks at each other. Erick would be playing along with us and get
accidentally hit in the head and he would lose his temper. Erick would quickly get
violent with everyone that was playing with him. Sometimes we would pick on Erick
just for the fun of it. We were little and knew that Erick would easily be angered so we
would tease him.
8. When Erick was about eight years old, I noticed that he started hearing voices. Erick
would act different and odd. I would notice his odd behavior and knew to leave him
alone. Most of the time, Erick would be playing in the field by himself. Erick was very
good with animals. He was very patient with them. He would always catch rabbits or
snakes and take them home.
9. When Mt. St. Helen's blew up, we lived nearby and saw it blow. Ashes landed on the
roof ofour house. When it stopped, Erick went up to the roof and collected all the ashes.
He then took some glue and glued them into a little mountain. Erick molded it so it
looked like Mt. St. Helen's. Then he went down to the four comers and sold them to cars
that were passing by. Erick would also go into our neighbor's blueberry bushes and steal
the blueberries. He would put them in little bags and go down to the four comers and sell
them. The four comers was an intersection where all four comers had stop signs. It was
usually busy with cars.
10. When we moved from California to Washington, we lived with my grandmother Sievers.
Then my parents got a holise for our family. My father worked and provided for our
family. Although my dad was always fmancially responsible for us, he was not
emotionally present. Many times, my father would come home drunk and angry. He
would beat on us kids for no apparent reason. There were several times when Erick was
singled out and beaten.
11. We never had any family support. Although my grandmother was someone that was very
loving with us kids, she was more concerned with my dead Aunt Janine's children, Betty
and Kenny. Specifically, my grandmother favored Kenny.
12. Although my mother did not drink in front of the children, I know that she was a heavy
alcohol drinker. I called her a closet drinker. She would hide to drink. She even did this
during her pregnancies. To the day my mom died, she drank: in secrecy. My mom had
very low self-esteem and this was her way ofdealing with it.
AFFIDAVIT OF SHANNON MICHAEL PAMBRUN 2
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13. There was a time when mom left Erick and me alone in an apartment. I had no control
over Erick. Erick would disappear days at a time. There were times when he would hide
in the basement of his girlfriend's house. Until her mother found him one day and called
the police. At other times, Erick would disappear and I did not know where he went.
Unfortunately, I too was trying to survive so Erick was largely on his own.
14. My mother was always leaving us boys alone. Other times, she was quick to drop us off
with social services. My mother went as far as having Steven and Johnny adopted by
another family. It was only through deception that she was able to get them back into her
custody.
15. Many times Erick and I were also fighting with each other for various reasons. Erick did
not have any external triggers. It was like his adrenaline would kick in and he would go
into some type of protection mode. When this happened, I knew that he was not Erick
but someone else.
16. We had parents that did not know how to be parents. My parents were constantly
verbally and physically abusive toward each other. My father on many occasions would
punch my mother. There were even times when he would choke her. Several times my
mom would end up bleeding and had to be taken to the hospital. This always happened
in front of the children including Erick.
17. Whenever my father got angry and decided to beat us, my mother never tried to stop him.
She never once tried to protect us from my father's behavior by standing up to my father.
Nor did she try to console us afterwards. It seemed that Erick was always getting singled
out because ofhow odd he was in relation to the other siblings.
18. Many times their fights were started because of us kids. My father would "protect" his
kids: Tamara, Frankie, and Shawnra, against my mother by not allowing my mother to
yell or hit "his" children. My mother would then "protect" me, although I was not aware
ofwhy my father was so critical of me until high school. Other times, my parents would
fight because of my father's drinking. There were several times that my father would
come home drunk and pick fights with the kids and/or my mother. I remember one
occasion where my father beat my mother while she was pregnant. Although there was a
lot of fighting and abuse, I believed, at that time, it was normal. I saw my parent's acts as
acceptable behavior.
19. I remember one Easter morning when I was young. My mother made plans to take us
kids to an Easter outing. When we were getting ready to leave, my father asked me to go
upstairs. I did and he followed. My father noticed that my drawer was unorganized and
hit me hard on my head. He told me that I could not go downstairs and would not be able
to go. When my brothers and sisters started calling out to me so we could leave, I did not
answer. I was afraid that if I answered, my father would severely beat me. They left
without me. Later, he lied to my mom saying that he was not aware that I was upstairs
and had not gone to the Easter outing. I wanted to go to the Easter outing very much but
I was so afraid ofgetting beat, that I did not make any noises.
AFFIDAVIT OF SHANNON MICHAEL PAMBRUN 3
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20. Although there was a lot of abuse within our family, my father always provided for us.
My father had a well paying job and made sure that our needs were met. It was not until
my parents divorced that we started really feeling neglected.
21. After my father moved away, my mother started dating other men. My mom had several
boyfriends. She would always put their needs ahead ofour needs. The children were left
to fend for ourselves. Several of these men physically, emotionally, and sexually abused
us. Still my mother did nothing to protect us.
22. About the time my mother and father divorced, my mother stopped meeting our needs.
Many times we were left to find our own food. We would wear the same clothing for
several days at a time. My mother did not have a job so we depended on others for our
support. If she did not receive assistance, she did nothing to improve our living
conditions. Ifshe had money, she would spend it on herselfor her current boyfriend.
23. One of my mother's boyfriends, Jeff Conners, would constantly beat and harass us
children. After Jeff was convicted of molesting Deanna and released, my mother took
him back into the home and blamed the sexual abuse on Deanna's behavior. Although
never convicted, I know that Jeff was also sexually abusing Tiffany. Tiffany exhibited
many of the characteristics of sexually abused children by playing with her dolls and
others.
24. We had no structure in our home. We were never encouraged or helped with our
homework. If we got bad grades, my parents would beat us. Then we would go to
school and get paddled. Either way, we were always being physically abused for one
reason or another. My mother never was involved with us in school. Unless she was
required, she had nothing to do with us in school.
25. I am aware ofmy maternal uncle Allen molesting my mother. On several occasions, my
Uncle Allen would try and molest me and my brothers including Erick. Excuses were
always being made by my grandmother for my Uncle Allen's behavior. My grandmother
was always protecting my uncle. Although it is not discussed, I believe that my Uncle
Mark was also molesting us kids.
26. As we were growing up, we also dealt with my mom's inappropriate kissing and hugging.
Even as an adult, I was not comfortable with my mother kissing me on the cheek or
hugging me. I am aware of incidents where my mother instigated inappropriate kissing
between herself and my brother, Frankie. As I look back, I realize that there were many
hints as to my mother's inappropriate sexual behavior towards Erick too. She would hug
him a lot but not how a mother should hug her son. There was also sexual activity
between Shawnra, Tamara, Kenny, Betty and myself
27. On many occasions, Erick asked for help by drawing attention to himself with outbursts
but neither my father nor mother did anything to help him. My father returned to
California and remarried. His new wife, Tina McCracken did not want to have Erick as
AFFIDAVIT OF SHANNON MICHAEL PAMBRUN 4
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part of the family and ran him off. My mother was too busy with different men and she
too ignored Erick's pleas for help.
28. On several occasions, the Vancouver police were involved because ofErick's acting out.
One time the police had to be called to our home because Erick was swinging a tire iron
at people. Several times, the police told my mother that Erick had emotional problems
and that he needed help. The police never offered any type of assistance or help that
Erick needed. Instead they would put him into juvenile homes or foster homes without
paying attention to his emotional needs.
29. I am not sure what medical condition Erick had that possessed him to act in this manner.
There was a lot going on in our home as we were growing up. Erick was always odd and
seemed to have even more difficulties with dealing with the problems. It was a lot to
absorb for a child, especially one like Erick. I know that we all had choices but Erick
was little and there were too many negative things happening around him. I believe that
Erick did not have a choice as a child.
30. As soon as I was able to, I left the home. Steven and Johnny were adopted out. Erick
was caught in the middle. He had no one to help him out. He was being rejected from
both my parent's homes. He had no one to care about him. It seemed that he continued
to live in the cyclewhere no one cared about the McCracken children.
31. The last time that I saw Erick was in 1987 while living in Washington. I love my brother
very much. I will always regret that I was not a better brother for him. I know that Erick
is not the evil person everyone thinks. Erick needs help. He should have gotten
counseling a long time ago. It is too bad that we do not fully understand all the damage
that was done to Erick. For these reasons, I do not believe that Erick deserves the death
penalty.
tJ ;:;:epT
DATED this -.:L day of.Jwte, 2007.
SRpt-
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1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT





THE STATE OF IDAHO,
BEFORE
HON. THOMAS F. NEVILLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
vs.






















15 BE IT REMEMBERED, That the above-entitled
16 matter came on for hearings before the Honorable




21 GREG H. BOWER, ESQ. And ROGER BOURNE, ESQ.
Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys, 200 West Front





AMIL MYSHIN, ESQ. And D. C. CARR, ESQ., Ada
County Public Defenders, 200 West Front Street,
Suite 1107, Boise, Idaho, appearing for and on
behalf of the Defendant.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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11 RECEIVED from John W. Gambee, Certified
12 Shorthand Reporter of the above-entitled court, and
13 lodged with me this 26th day of September, 2005,
14 original plus three (3) copies of the Court
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STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528r--------------------,r------------------,
Q. And then only recently have you seen
Erick again?
A. Correct.
Q. Is that right? Okay.
MR. MYSHIN: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Cross examination, Mr. Bourne.
1 to California.
2 Q. Okay. And that's where your dad had
3 lived?
4 A. Right.
S Q. Now, did you see Erick after that?
6 A. He didn't come to live with us after
7 that. There was a long time when we didn't see him
8 and to the best of my knowledge again he was either
9 living in California or in juvenile hall. And later
10 I learned that he wasn't in juvenile hall the whole
11 time but he did spend some time in foster care.
12 Q. So he was up -- but after that you don't
13 ever remember Erick living --
14 A.He did come back and visit the last time
15 that I saw him. It was later, acouple years later.
16 It was just ashort time we were shopping and I saw
17 Erick and I -'- we were in the parking lot and we
18 went up and confronted him to see what he was doing
19 and he came and visited us for ashort time and then
20 he left again.
21 Q. Now what statewould that have been?
22 A. That was Washington.












9 BY MR. BOURNE:
10 Q. What do you do for the insurance company,
11 ma'am?
12 A. I'm asales agent.
13 Q. Do you have to have special school or
14 training for that?
15 A. You go through government testing and
16 licensing.
17 Q. And I think you said children?
18 A. I have children.
19 Q. You are raising them and working, both?
20 A. Right.
21 Q. And 1--
22 MR. BOURNE: That's all. Thank you, ma'am.
23 THE COURT: Redirect?
24 MR. MYSHIN: No, not on that, thank you.
25 THE COURT: May this witness be excused?
5097
MR. MYSHIN: Oh, I guess I did have acouple
more questions I forgot to ask. I'm sorry.
1 Q. Do you remember any of the other
2 circumstance around that?
3 A. He had not been living with us at that
4 time.
5 Q. Urn-hum. And how old would you have been?
6 A. It would have been about '88, '89 I'm not
7 very good with time frames.
8 Q. But some years later?
9 A. Right.
10 Q. Now, did -- well, you just didn't see
11 Erick after. that? .
12 A. After that! didn't see Erick.
13 Q. Okay. Do you work now?
14 A. Yean.
15 Q. Where do you work?
16 A. I work at Maine Insurance Company.
17 Q. Okay. And how long have you done that?
18 A. I've been there for fIVe years. '
19 Q. And you live in what town now?
20 A. Vancouver, Washington.
21 Q. Vancouver? Okay. And is it fair to say
22 that there was a break in time when you didn't see
23 Erick for quite a long time?






5 BY MR. MYSHIN:
6 Q. Did you have drug and alcohol problems at
7 one point?
8 A. Yeah. I had, at ayoung age, at about
9 12, 13 was drinking and I had used speed at that
10 time.
11 Q. Urn-hum. And was that the time that you
12 were living with Betty?
13 A. No. That was before living with Betty.
14 Q. Okay. And then did you continue to have
15 those kinds of problems for awhile?
16 A. I only used speed for about three or four
17 months. It was during the summer. Yeah, wasn't
18 very long:
19 Q. Okay. And did you have alcohol problems
20 for a longer period of time?
21 A. I -- yeah. It was kind of a weekend
22 thing for me. I would drink every weekend that was
23 my highlight. SChool was out, I'd go out drinking
24 with whoever I could. It was acouple times that I
25 just took off and left home and went drinking with
5096 5098===-=.. =-.=.-~=====.""...~_..,..~.. ~- <.....- --1
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5101
SHAWNDRA HEMMING,
awitness called on behalf of the Defendant, haVing
been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified
5099
1 strangers and go to the local hang-out where I knew
2 everybody would be that were partiers.
3 MR. MYSHIN: All right. Thank you.
4 THE COURT: Recross?
5 MR. BOURNE: Nothing on that.
6 THE COURT: May this witness be excused?
7 MR. MYSHIN: Please.
8 THE COURT: You're free to go, ma'am. Thank
9 you. You may call your next witness.
10 MR. MYSHIN: May we take ashort recess,
11 Judge?
12 THE COURT: Sure, take ten minutes, Ladies
13 and Gentlemen.
14 (Recess taken.)
15 THE COURT: Ready for the next witness?
16 MR. MYSHIN: Yes.
17 THE COURT: Let's bring them in, please.
18 (Brief delay. Jury present.)
19 THE COURT: You may call your next Witness,
20 Mr. Myshin.





STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528r-----------------.,
1 Q. Okay. And so you share the same father
2 but not the --
3 A. same father, different mothers.
4 Q. Okay. How old are you?
5 A.35.
6 Q. In terms of Erick and you, are you older
7 than Erick or younger?
8 A. I'm older.
9 Q. By how many?
10 A. Three years.
11 Q. Three years?
12 A. Urn-hum.
13 Q. Okay. Were you in the home when Erick
14 and Frank and Jean lived in camas?
1~ A. I was.
16 Q. Okay. And prior to that you lived with
17 whom? Prior to Jean coming who did you live with?
18 A. It would be my mom.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. And my dad.
21 Q. And your dad?
22 A. My brother and my sister.
23 Q. Okay. And where was that?





4 BY MR. MYSHIN:
5 Q. Good afternoon.
6 A. Hi.
7 Q. Would you please state your name, spell
8 your last name for the reporter.
9 A. Shawndra Hemming, H-e-m-m-i-n-g.
10 Q. And Shawndra what city and state do you
11 live in?
12 A. Anaheim, california.
13 Q. And are you related to Tam~ra?
14 A. Yes, I am.
15 Q. How are you related to Tamara?
16 A. We're sisters.
17 Q. Okay. Do you share the same mother and
18 father?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And Frank MCCracken is your father?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Okay. And do you know Erick Hall?
23 A. I do.
24 Q. And how do you know Erick?
25 A. He's my half brother.
5100
1 Q. Okay. And then your mother we heard she I
2 had died?
3 A. Right.
4 Q. But for some period she was simply gone?
5 A. Right. We were told she just had left
6 and never came back. She used to do drugs and party I
7 alot and so leave us kids at home unattended and
8 one day she just never came back we were told.
9 Q. Okay. Now, in terms of the time when
10 your mother disappeared. When did Jean arrive?
11 A. I was only 11 months old so ;rd have to
12 say she was there shortly before my first
13 birthday --
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. And she stayed in my life for too many
16 years, but probably 15 years.
17 Q.For 15 years. So how old would you have
18 been when you left the home?
19 A. When I left Jeanie's house I was 12, I
20 believe.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. And I went to live with my father but she
23 was still intermittently in the picture.
24 Q. Okay. Now, at whatpoint did Erick come
25 into the home? Was Erick born while you were with
5102 I
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STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528...--------------------,..--------------------,
1 Frank and Jean?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. And in terms of the hierarchy,
4 were there brothers that were older than you as
5 well?
6 A. There was two.
7 Q. And who were they?
8 A. Franky and Shannon and then it went to
9 Erick.
10 Q. Yeah. So is -- you and Tamara, Franky
11 and Shannon?
12 A. Right.
13 Q. Were all just full brothers and sisters?
14 A. No, just Tammy, Franky and me are full
15 brothers and sisters. Everybody else that came
16 after me are half sisters and brothers and step.
17 Q. Okay. I have it straight now. Do you
18 remember living with Erick?
19 A. I do.
20 Q. What are your first memories? Where
21 would you have been liVing then?
22 A. I believe it would be our home in
23 Vancouver.
24 Q. Vancouver, Washington?
25 A. Right.
5103
1 Q. And you would have been pretty small
2 then?
3 A. When we moved back to Washington, when we
4 left California and went to Washington, I was
5 probably about four or five. We moved to Vancouver
6 at that time, too.
7 Q. Okay. And Erick would have been three or
8 four, I suppose? .
9 A. He would have been just about three.
10 Q. Okay. And as a three-year-old what was
11 Erick like, if you can remember?
12 A. Even at that age he -- he was a good kid.
13 He had emotional problems even atthat age and he
14 could lose his temper. He had very vivid
15 imaginations, you know, so much so it would scare us
16 to Where we wouldn't want to go into our rooms
17 because he would talk of King Kong and Godzilla were
18 under his bed and in his closet and it would scare
19 the crap out of me and I wouldn't want to go in my
20 own room.
21 Q. Urn-hum.
22 A. He was very good with animals. He loved
23 animals.
24 Q. Urn-hum.
25 A. He could takea cat and give it a bath
5104
1 and he'd like to clean its nose and clean its ears
2 and he was very loving on some points and very angry
3 at other points.
4 Q. Was he always angry? I mean as long as
5 you can remember?
6 A. I would say, yes.
7 Q.Okay.
8 A. At one point to another.
9 Q. Would any particular thing cause that?
10 A. He was picked on a lot. We were all kind
11 of -- we all kind of had our own cliques, it was the
12 older children and us middle kids stuck together.
13 And before the rest of them came Erick really had
14 nobody.
15 Q. The time that -- well, when did you move
16 from Vancouver to Camas? Do you remember. How old
17 would you have been?
18 A. Probably about six. It had to be because
19 I went the kindergarten in Camas.
20 Q. Urn-hum. And Erick would have been about
21 four?
22 A. Right.
23 Q. Or three or four?
24 A. I think just about four.
25 Q. About four? Okay. And what was the
5105
1 house in Camas like? What was the place in Camas
2 like?
3 A. Very volatile. A lot of fighting. A lot
4 of violence.
5 Q.Um-hum.
6 A. It wasn't really a -- it wasn't a home or
7 a family.
8 Q. Was it a house that you lived in or a
9 trailer? '
10 A. It was a home.
11 Q. It was a home? And was it avery big
12 house?
13 A. It was a small house. I don't think we
14 were there very long and we moved in with our -
15 Jean's mother. She had a farmhouse and then it was
16 our familyand then from time to time it would be my
17 aunfs family, Betty and Kenny would be there and my
18 aunt would be there also. So we lived in the attic.
19 We lived in whatever rooms there was room for
20 everybody.
21 Q. Was it always crowded?
22 A. It was very crowded.
23 Q. Were you supervised by Jean or Frank?
24 A. We were unsupervised a lot of the time.
25 It was pretty much kids raising kids.
5106
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STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528
1 Q. Okay. Most of the household chores were 1 by them. Or sometimes you'd walk in on it and I
2 done by whom? 2 you're so scared you can't move.
3 A. They were divided up by the kids. Mainly 3 Q. Was there a lot of fear in the house?
4 the older ones did the most strenuous ones and the 4 A. Alot of fear. I
5 little ones had jobs to do that, you know. 5 Q. How did Jean treat Erick?
6 Q. And what did Jean do? 6 A. Probably as unattachful as she treated
7 A. sat around really. 7 the rest of us. I
8 Q. Did she do any of the chores? 8 Q. Urn-hum.
9 A. No. 9 A. If you weren't agirl and couldn't give
10 Q. Did she have ajob? 10 her children or be her meal ticket later on in her I
11 A. No. 11 life she really had no use for you.
12 Q. How did she treat you? 12 Q. And what do you mean by "meal ticket"?
I13 A. She had to treat me better than everybody 13 A. Because after my dad left her she used
14 else because my dad wouldn't allow her not to treat 14 the system and the state and used all of us kids for
15 me good. I was the last gift from my mother that my 15 her monthly income. And the girls she knew could I16 dad had. I was actually two hours late in being 16 give her more children and therefore be more of a
17 born on his birthday. So he made sure that 17 dependent for her.
18 everybody, you know, treated me right. If they 18 Q. Did she therefore treatthe boys worse? I19 didn't they got beaten -- they got beat up or they 19 A. She treated the boys much worse.
20 went through hell basically. 20 Q. And was Erick singled out in any way by
21 Q. Now, while Erick was in the home do you 21 her? I
22 recall how Frank and Jean interacted? 22 A. Being her only son, I would say at times,
23 A. Alot of furniture went flying, people 23 yes.
24 went flying. I remember one time he threw ahammer 24 Q. Urn-hum. Was Jean the kind of person that I
25 at. her across the room and it barely missed her and 25 would give affection towards Erick, like hugs and
5107 5109
1 hit the wall. Alot of fighting, a lot of yelling. 1 kisses that sort of stuff? I
2 Q. Was -- when Erick was there was Frank 2 A. None of us got them really, no.
3 physically violent with Jean? 3 Q. Including Erick? I
4 A. Yes. 4 A. Including Erick.
5 Q. And talked about throWing things? 5 Q. Okay. Was there any sort of that
6 A. Yes, it didn't matter -- at the point he 6 nurturing or loving in the family? I
7 lost his temper it didn't matter who was there or 7 A. No.
8 who was around. 8 Q. No? Okay. Now, while you were in camas
9 Q. Would he strike her? 9 wouldall-- whatwas the living arrangemen~ I I
10 A. Yes. 10 guess, the physical arrangement in the house? How
11 Q. In front of the kids? 11 would that work out?
12 A. Yes. 12 A. The girls, me and Tammy and Betty shared I
13 Q. Would he choke her? 13 a room and the boys were divided up, mainly Franky,
14 A. Urn-hum. 14 Shannon and I believe Erick slept in one room and
I15 Q. Yes? 15 Johnny and Steven slept in the other room.
16 A. Yes. 16 Sometimes Kenny would be there.
17 Q. We have a reporter so we have to say yes 17 Q. Okay. So was it cl'QWded? I18 or no. 18 A. It was very crowded. One of the rooms
19 And would Erick have seen these things? 19 was just an alcove. There was really no walls or no
20 ' A. We all seen i~ yes. 20 privacy or anything. I21 Q. And how would that happen in ageneral 21 Q. And what was the rest of the situation in
22 sense? 22 the house? Did you have enough food to eat?
23 A. Generally? You would half the time be 23 A. Sometimes in the beginning of the month I
24 caugh~ I mean YOU'd be caught in the corner and 24 there would be food. Towards the end of the month
2S they're in the middle of the room you couldn't get 2S there wouldn't be a lot of food.
5108 5110 I,---
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STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528
1 Q. Urn-hum. Okay. And so what kinds of 1 then he would show us how to do it. Uke the
2 things would you be fed? . 2 clothing, he would just wear baggier clothing and
3 A. We would feed ourselves at that point, 3 put clothes on and put your clothes on that you had
4 and mostly it was bread with butter and sugar on it. 4 over it. And we would walk out of the store that
5 That would be what we would eat. 5 way. That's how we get our school clothes, didn't
6 Q. Okay. That's all you would get all day 6 have money for school clothes. If we didn't get
7 long? 7 them that way it was hand-me-downs, salvation Army
8 A. That's all we would get. 8 or wherever we could get them from.
9 Q. Now, did Jean eat the same things that 9 Q. Urn-hum. And so the same thing would
10 you would eat? 10 happen to Erick?
11 A. She would wait until we went to bed and 11 A. Right.
12 then she would cook herself different things. I 12 Q. As he grew up, you know, let's say about
13 remember waking up one night with Shannon because we 13 the time that, perhaps he would have been oh, 6or 7
14 smelled this, you know, aroma that we hadn't smelled 14 years old, 5, 6, 7in that range. Was he having any
15 and we walked in on her in the living room eating 15 particular kinds of problems?
16 steak. 16 A. He had alot of anger problems at that
17 Q. Was that an unusual occurrence? 17 point and maybe wet the bed at this point At that
18 A. That was the first night that we had woke 18 point that's when our mom's mom and dad came to
19 up to it, but it wasn't the last night that that had 19 visit us and they brought us gifts and things and
20 happened. 20 they didn't bring them fOr the other kids. So alot
21 Q. SO she would have different foods? 21 of jealously came from that. And I remember adoll
22 A. Different, much better food than what we 22 that I had that he had taken and burnt the hair off
23 were eating. 23 the doll and Wiped his feces all over it so that I
24 Q. Well, you know, when Erick is there and 24 couldn't have the doll.
25 you're all there, are you guys hungry a,lot of the 25 Q. Okay. When you say "our parents" what do
5111 5113
1 time? 1 you mean by that?
2 A. Urn-hum. 2 A. My mom, Victoria.
3 Q. Yes? 3 Q. Okay. This was before she passed, of
4 A. Yes. 4 course?
5 Q. And what would you do to feed yourselves? 5 A. It was after she passed.
6 A. We would steal food. 6 Q. After she passed?
7 Q. Where would you steal food? 7 A. After she passed my·· her mom and dad
8 A. The grocery stores. There was afew 8 came to visit us.
9 times we broke into neighbor's homes to get food. 9 Q. I see. So your grandparents?
10 Q. And Erick would participate in this? 10 A. Right
11 A. I think on one of the times we broke into 11 Q. That weren't Erick's grandparents?
12 one of the homes he did, and going to the stores. 12 A. Right.
13 We were all taught how to self-defend -- or 13 Q. And they would come to the house and not
14 self-support ourselves. So we were all taught the 14 give all the kids gifts? .
15 art of shoplifting. 15 A. Right
16 Q. Including Erick? 16 Q. And would that kindof thing make Erick
17 A. Including Erick. 17 angry?
18 Q. And who would teach you such things? 18 A. Yeah.
19 A. Our dad. 19 Q. When he would get angry what - how would
20 Q. And that's Frank? 20 he act? Would you know when he was going to get
21 A. Frank. 21 angry?
22 Q. How would that have happened? How did 22 A. He would get very distant, very quiet
23 that occur? Did he specifically instruct as to how 23 And sometimes he'd go off on his own and be alone.
24 to do these kinds of things? 24 You could just tell that something was bugging him.
25 A. At first we would watch him do it. And 25 Other times he would lash out, and didn' matter who
.. ,~".- 5112 5114
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STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528
I
1-
1 had made him angry or if you were in the way, you 1 should have been punished for. I
2 know, if you tried to comfort him or find out what 2 Q. But he was punished?
3 was wrong. 3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Was Erick singled out by anybody, for 4 Q. Did Jean punish Erick for wetting the bed I
5 worse treatment let's say, by any of the kids? 5 other than sticking the sheets out and everyone -.,.
6 A. I think we all did it at different 6 A. She would stick the sheets out and it
7 moments. 7 depends on my dad's mood or how much Jeanie would I
8 Q. Okay. What kinds of things would be done 8 nag him as to whether they got the shit beat out of
9 to Erick? 9 them or not.
10 A. We'd go to the rock quarry and we would 10 Q. Now, did you observe times when Erick I
11 run home before he knew we had left him. And we 11 would have been able to see Jean and Frank fighting?
12 would leave him there by himself. We'd throw rocks 12 A. Yes.
I13 at him or tease him. 13 Q. And what kind of affect did that seem to
14 Q. Was there any particular reason Erick 14 have on Erick?
15 would be the recipient of that kind of behavior? 15 A. I think it scared him like it scared the I16 A. Mainly because it was done to us and it 16 rest of us.
17 was just the sibling down the line effect. 17 Q. Um-hum. Was there choking?
18 Q. So older kids would do it to you? 18 A. There was choking, yes. There would be I19 A. Right. 19 punching, there would be bashing her head into the
20 Q. And then you would do it to younger kids? 20 wall or if he found something to throw at her he
21 A. Right. 21 would throw it at her. I
22 Q. Did your parents - or did Frank ever 22 Q. And that would all be done in front of
23 intervene in any of that kind ofstuff? 23 Erick?
24 A. No. 24 A. Right. I
25 Q. Did Jean ever intervene? 25 Q. As well as the other kids? Yes?
Sl1S S117
1 A. No. 1 A. Yes. I
2 Q. Okay. Did she ever -- oh, I don't know. 2 Q. Did -- are you okay? You can get some
3 Punish people for it, for hurting each other? 3 water there if you want. Did there come a time when I
4 A. No. 4 Erick lived in a house that -- and he would have
5 Q. Now, the bed wetting thing. Did that 5 known that there was improper touching done between
6 continue for some period of time with Erick? 6 the children? I
7 A. It continued until I left the home in 7 A. Yes.
8 1982, I believe. 8 Q. If you can put us in a time frame, or
9 Q.Okay. 9 place or anything like that help us get an idea? I
10 A. We lived on Prune Hill and the bus would 10 A. It would have been in our grandma's home
11 come in the morning to pick us up, and if the boys 11 down in the tree fort. She had acouple of acres of
12 had peed, she'd stick their peed sheets out the 12 land and we had a tree fort down there. And it was
13 window so everybody in the school bus would know 13 Shannon, me, Betty and Kenny. And there was Shannon
14 they'd been peed. 14 and Betty and me and Kenney because we weren't
15 Q. And then what would happen to them? 15 related by blood. We assumed it was okay, or it
16 A. They'd get ridiculed. All of us would, 16 wasn't improper. Nobody had ever said anything or
17 even the girls. It was embarrassing. 17 made us feel that it was. And Erick and Johnny and
18 Q. So were you embarrassed for, let's say, 18 Steven had came down, and the two older boys had
19 Erick's behavior? 19 tried getting them to participate and Erick got very
20 A. I was embarrassed for Erick. it was, you 20 angry and was one of the only ones that said no,
21 know, traumatic life for us, you know, it was very 21 that it was wrong.
22 dysfunctional and children peed the bed. Now that 22 Q. What would Erick have seen? What kind of
23 I'm older and can look back on it, it's because 23 behavior?
24 there's problems in the home, not something that he 24 A. Us touching and kissing and almost having
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STATE VS. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528
1 Q. How old would you have been? 1 us.
2 A. We were young, six or seven. 2 Q. Urn-hum. And then would your dad
3 Q. But Erick wouldn't participate? 3 physically harm you?
4 A. No. 4 A. He would spank me, but he -- for the boys
5 Q. It would make<him angry? 5 he got very physical, almost on the same way he did
6 A. He got very angry that we even -- it was 6 to their mother.
7 mainly the boys that kept trying to encourage and 7 Q. SO how would Frank have treated Erick?
8 coax him into doing it. He got very angry. And 8 A. About the same as the boys.
9 ended up running away from the scene. 9 Q. And how was that?
10 Q. Urn-hum. And even when Erick wasn't there 10 A. Well, it was awful. There was a time
11 was he told about these kinds of things? 11 when -- we had afire in the house and he tried
12 A. I think there was a few times that he 12 literally throwing them into the fire. He would
13 probably overheard -- 13 beat them, he would take the belt and just hit them
14 Q.Um-hum. 14 with it over and over. Sometimes they'd have blood
15 A. -- the conversations. 15 sometimes they wouldn't, you know. And when it got
16 Q. Because he would have been' -- 16 too serious would Jeanie step in. And then we would
17 A. He was in the room. He heard 'us 17 be oh so grateful because she'd step in and try to
18 complaining about the neighbor, John McGuire. He 18 stop it. But she would be the one that got it
19 was mentally retarded. He who also -- would offer 19 started.
20 us candy or popcorn or whatever, because, you knew, 20 Q. She would provoke it?
21 at the time we were so young and so naive and 21 A. She would provoke it and then try to come
22 deprived. We would, you know, take whatever he gave 22 in and be the savior.
23 us to do certain things that he wanted. 23 Q. Urn-hum. Now, did -- was Erick treated
24 Q. And would those be inappropriate sexual 24 any different than the other boys were treated?
25 things? 25 A. No, he got the same.
5119 5121
1 A. Right. 1 Q. Was there any question about whether
2 Q. And Erick would have been around when 2 Frank was Erick's father?
3 that happened? 3 A. None at that point, no.
4 A. Yes. 4 Q. Okay. Was there ever a point when that
5 Q. In fact, he would have known about it 5 happened?
6 then? 6 A. When we found his birth certificate and
7 A. Yes. 7 found it wasn't my dad's name, but even then there's
8 Q. Did Jean know about this kind of stuff? 8 -- our family genes are in him. There's no denying
9 A. Jean knew about it. 9 this.
10 Q. And how do you know that? 10 Q. Yeah. Now when would that have happened
11 A. Because we told her. She walked in on us 11 that you found the --
12 sometimes. She used to threaten us to tell my 12 A. We just found out 2003.
13 father about it. She knew we were scared of my dad 13 Q.Oh, okay. I'm talking - you're not
14 and his temper. She knew I was afraid to lose my 14 talking about when you were kids?
15 dad's love seeing how I didn't have my mom and he is A. No. When we were kids he was our
16 was the last.parent figure that! had and I had a 16 brother, he was my dad's son.
17 very good bond with him. 17 Q. Urn-hum. Okay. Does Erick look like your
18 Q. Did Jean use your father - did Jean use 18 dad?
19 your father against you? 19 A. Yes.
20 A. She would - she would discuss with him. 20 Q. Okay. Did he then?
21 If we didn't do what she wanted us to do she was 21 A. No, he didn't.
22 going to tell our dad. If we did anything wrong 22 Q. Okay. Tell me Why. Tell me what?
23 she'd make us sit on the couch for hours until he 23 A. The rest of us have curly hair, we're
24 came home and just sit there all day and make us 24 white. Erick was very tan and olive skinned and had
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I
1
1 He just -- he looked different than the rest of us. 1 32 cavities. So we had no hygiene, no doctor I
2 Q. Than anyone else in the family? 2 visits, no nothing the normal family would do to
3 A. Right. 3 their children.
4 Q. Did that cause Erick to be, oh, put away, 4 Q. Did you -- did the parents, that is Erick I
5 pushed away or anything like that? 5 -- I mean Frank and Jean, did they, you know, set
6 A. I think Erick was just pushed away 6 boundaries for you and supervise you?
7 because he didn't really fit in, but not because we 7 A. We had no supervision. There was really I
8 didn't think he was our brother or anything. 8 no boundaries. I sit here now, you know, and I do
9 Q. How did Erick not fit in? can you tell 9 three and a half hours of homework with my son at
I10 us a little bit about that? 10 night. I can not even remember a time that she sat
11 A. He was -- he was a loner, he ~as very 11 down and did homework with us. I don't even know
12 much stayed by himself a lot, had a lot of 12 how we got through school.
I13 imagination and a lot of fake, made-up friends, I 13 Q. Well, most of the time in camas then was
14 think because me, Shannon, Betty, Kenny were all 14 it like that?
15 similar in age. The four of us stuck together and 15 A. My whole life was like that until I moved I16 we didn't have room for another one, or didn't want 16 our of her home, yes.
17 another one in our group, so therefore Erick was 17 Q. And where would you all have been living
18 left to himself. 18 when you moved out of the home? I
19 Q. Now, would Erick -- while Erick was still 19 A. It was in -- we had gone back to
20 in the home did there come a time when you would say 20 Vancouver and when the -- we finally found out that
21 work outside the home such as baby-sitting or 21 my mom was dead, us three children were shipped off I
22 anything like that? 22 to california to live with her parents. And I was
23 A. I used to pick blueberries. I picked 23 there for probably about a year and I returned back
24 blueberries, I think, two summers in a row and saved 24 to Washington in '79, at which point they were I
25 all my money from it so that finally I could buy 25 living on Prune Hill, which is the home I returned
5123 5125
1 school clothes and at least try and fit in With how 1 back to.
I
2 everybody else was looking in the school. 2 Q. Urn-hum. And Erick would have stayed in
3 Q.Um-hum. 3 the home on Prune Hill? I
4 A. And Jeanie took the money and used it. 4 A. Yes. Erick was there.
5 So when it came time for me to go buy my school 5 Q. So you were back in the home then?
6 clothes, which I remember was $325, which to me at 6 A. I was back in the home then. I
7 that time was a lot of money, and the money was 7 Q. Were things any better?
8 gone. 8 A. Things were worse then. My dad had, for
9 Q. And Erick would have known about that? 9 some reason married her. He -- their marriage only I
10 A. Yes. 10 lasted about - I think it lasted ayear,if that
11 Q. Were arrangements made for Erick's 11 long, which they were together for 12:years, married
12 clothes as far as you know? 12 ayear and then divorced. I remember trying to go I
13 A. We were lucky to get school supplies. 13 to school in the mornings and she would tell me by
14 There was no arrangements. The neighbors would give 14 the time I got home that she was going to divorce my
15 us things. Most of the boys got hand-me-downs from 15 dad. She was going to call the lawyers that
16 the older boys. By the time they got them, you 16 morning.
17 know, you can imagine, they were ragged, old, 17 Q. Would Erick have been exposed to that?
18 stained. Nobody took care of things, nobody made 18 A. She said that mainly to me and Shannon;
19 the children take care of things. 19 but Erick and Johnny and Steven were in the living
20 Q. Was Erick a cared for child? You know 20 room. I mean I know they had to· have overheard it.
21 what I mean by that, well groomed? 21 But she mainly was doing it to me, to intimidate me
22 A. No, we weren't. > 22 and scare me. She would tell me my dad - if I left
23 Q. Okay. None of you were? 23 and went to live with my dad, my dad·would beat the
24 A. None of us were. I know personally 24 crap out of me. She wouldn't be there to protect
25 myself I had - when I went to my foster home I had 25 me. My brothers' friends would rape me. And so she
5124 5126
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STATE V5. HALL SUPREME COURT NO. 31528
1 pretty much scared me, intimidated me to stay with 1 A. There came atime Erick moved in with us.
2 her for about ayear and then finally I couldn't 2 When we moved down to california. In 182 my aunt at
3 take it any more and I went and lived with my dad. 3 the time had just lost her husband. She had been
4 Q.And that was where? 4 married to my dad's brother and she had inherited a
5 A. He lived in camas still, down in the city 5 lot of money. And at the time my dad was really
6 steps in aduplex. 6 poor and broke and she dangled all this money in
7 Q. Would Erick have stayed with Jean then? 7 front his face and had us come down there to live
8 A. Erick stayed with Jeanie, yes. 8 with her. We were there for probably about four
9 Q. And was life any better for him? 9 years, and then Erick came to live with us and it
10 A. I think it got a lot worse for Erick and 10 lasted about probably about six months.
11 all the kids. 11 Q. Okay. Now how old would Erick have been
12 Q. Okay. can you tell us about that -- or 12 there -- or how old would you have been?
13 explain that a little bit? 13 A. I was probably about 15 or 16.
14 A. She no longer had my dad's money to live 14 Q. And Erick would have been probably 13 or
15 off of. She then went on to Welfare, lived off the 15 14?
16 system. She still tried to get money out of my dad, 16 A. 13, 14, I believe.
17 but I know when my dad left that it got a lot worse. 17 Q. Okay. And he stayed with you for about
18 Q. And then -- well, you would have been 18 six months you say?
19 with your dad and then you came back when they were 19 A. Right.
20 married, and then divorced you would have all 20 Q. In california?
21 separated again, is that right? 21 A. In California.
22 A. Right. I stayed with Jeanie for ayear 22 Q. And what was life like then?
23 after they divorced. 23 A. It was like jumping out of frying pan
24 Q. I see. Okay. 24 into the fire. The household was a much more -- it
25 A. And then I got the courage up to tell her 25 wasn't as violent a household, but it was a lot more
5127 5129
1 that she was lying, I didn't believe her any more 1 emotional. I had two cousins who then became my
2 and that I wanted to go live with my dad. 2 stepbrothers because they had married each other.
3 Q. And when you say "lying" you mean about 3 And the violence more came from them and the abuse
4 your dad being mean to you and stuff like that? 4 . and the -- when I first moved in there I'd be
5 A. About my dad beating me or about what 5 getting undressed and one of them would be hiding in
6 would happen, you know, my dad at the time partied 6 the closet watching, or I'd be getting ready to come
7 with my brother. It was a party house, but I would 7 out of my bedroom door and the one would be there
8 take that any day. than living in Jeanie's house. 8 and his pants pulled down. And I would go to Tina
9 Q. And when you say "a party house" what do 9 and she would just tell me boys would be boys, you
10 you mean? 10 know, and deal with it.
11 A. All the high school boys would come down 11 Q. Now, who's Tina?
12 and they would party with my dad and my brother. 12 A. The stepmother.
13 Q.Um-hum. 13 Q. After Jean?
14 A. I remember there would be a party and my 14 A. Right.
15 dad would take an M-80 and threw it in the middle of 15 Q. Okay. So Frank married Tina after the
16 the crowd in the living room just to see everybody 16 divorce from Jean?
17 scatter and see what they would do. 17 A. Right.
18 Q. That's some kind of a firework thing? 18 Q. And Erick would have moved down and been
19 A. It's avery high explosive firework. 19 involved in that then?
20 Q. Now, after you moved in with your dad, 20 A. Erick moved down, and Tina hated Jeanie.
21 that would have been in california? 21 She hated any of the kids that came from Jeanie.
22 A. That was still in camas. 22 She didn't aUowmy dad to have contact with them.
23 Q. Still in camas? Okay. Did there come a 23 So when Erick came down it was really against her
24 time when Erick had moved in with your father and 24 will. She didn't want him in the home. She barely
25 you? 25 allowed me in the home let alone wanting Erick to
5128 5130
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1 come down and give him a loving home to come to. 1 And then there was -- after that acouple I
2 Q. Okay. And how was -- what was Erick's 2 weeks Erick and Tony had gotten into a fight about
3 life like at the home there with Frank and Tina and 3 something and his mother got involved and when my
4 you and -- 4 dad got home he came in on the tail end of it. I
5 A. My dad worked a lot of the time. 5 Before my dad could. even find out Erick's point of
6 Q. Urn-hum. 6 view, because you could just tellliooking at my
7 A. He worked 18, 19 hours aday to stay away 7 dad's face and his eyes that he was ready to I
8 from the home so he didn't have to hear the 8 explode, or the anger was going to come, and Erick
9 complaints and the arguing. And he would tell us 9 didn't wait. He just ran.
I10 life's agame. Play the game, you know. 10 Q. Didn't wait for Frank to come home?
11 So unfortunately me and Erick were 11 A. He didn't want for my dad to tum on him
12 subjected to Tina's children, Mark and Tony, and it 12 and --
I13 would be very violent. You know, before Erick came 13 Q.Oh?
14 it was me and then when Erick came they took the 14 A. -- find out his side of what had
15 violence out on him. 15 happened. I16 Q. And can you describe the violence? What 16 Q. He just took off?
17 kind of violence are we talking about? 17 A. Took off running.
18 A. Pushing, hitting, you -- you know, the 18 Q. Did you know where he went? I
19 hallway would be big enough for two people to go 19 A. I found him probably acouple days later
20 down. They would walk, you know, bump right into 20 behind adumpster behind aThrifty store.
21 you on purpose, knock you into the wall. 21 Q. Still in the same place in California? I
22 There was once or twice where Erick I 22 A. Still in the same area. It was like
23 know, got in fist fights with Tony. Not very -- you 23 maybe three or four blocks away from where we had
24 know, Erick didn't provoke them but Tony would keep 24 lived. He had acouch there and he was supporting I
25 getting in his face and keep teasing him, because 25 himself from stealing from the grocery store. He
5131 5133
1 even at this point Erick would wet the bed and he 1 had acat that he had there in the dumpster with him
I
2 would hide the sheets in the drawers or in the 2 that he took care of and there was another little
3 closet. And when Tony would find them he would call 3 boy that was there with him. I
4 him names and hit him or punch him and things. 4 Q. Now, you're talking about a regular
5 Q. So Erick is 13 or 14 and he's still 5 garbage dumpster?
6 wetting the sheets then? 6 A. Aregular dumpster, yes. I
7 A. Yes. 7 Q. And it was .in a parking lot downtown?
8 Q. Did that violence continue the whole time 8 A. It was behind the store. It was like a
9 that he lived there? 9 little three cement walls and a regular door that I
10 A. It did. 10 came down. He was staying in there. It was dirty,
11 Q. But apparently there was some time when 11 disgusting, it smelled. And I remember talking to
12 Erick left? 12 him and telling him that I was sorry that I couldn't I
13 A. It was. It was -- we had Mother's Day at 13 protect him. I was barely able to protect myself.
14 the park, Eldorado Park and they had bought 14 It was awful. I15 champagne and they had told each of us kids that 15 Q. How did you know where to find him?
16 whoever caught the cork screw first would get 16 A. I had been riding my bike and just
17 $50.00. So, of course, you have Erick, me, Mark and 17 happened upon him. And he was scared that I was I18 Tony and we're running after the cork screw. And I 18 going to tell my dad where he was at.
19 believe Erick caught it first. And Mark being a lot 19 Q. What -- I mean what was the problem with
20 bigger than we were, like three times our size, 20 your dad finding out about it? I
21 tried overpowering Erick to get the cork screw so he 21 A. You didn't -- at that time in our lives
22 could get the money. It turned into abig fight. 22 we still didn't trust our dad. We still feared him.
23 We ended up leaving. And from that -- tha~s 23 Q. Trust in terms of him being violent or -- I
24 probably the first time Yihen it started going really 24 A. In terms of him being violent or even
25 bad. 25 standing up for you. When Iwas 13 he allowed Tina,
5132 5134 I--
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1 my second stepmother, to kick me out of the home. I 1 Q. Now, the -- I guess the -- you haven't
2 lived with different people. One person was a 2 seen Erick until just recently?
3 boyfriend who was 28. It's not asituation for a 3 A. Right.
4 13-year-old to be in. He -- you know, he didn't 4 Q. So there was a long period of time when
5 stand up for us and I think Erick knew he wouldn't 5 you had no contact with Erick?
6 be there for him. 6 A. Right. And when I would have contact
7 Q. Now after you saw Erick there at the 7 with the people in Washington I would ask them,
8 dumpster and you visited with him, did you see Erick 8 "Have you heard from him? Have you seen him?" I
9 after that? 9 mean every phone call, I didn't care if I hadn't
10 A. I didn't see him again after that, 10 talked to them in five years I would ask them -- my
11 because then he got picked up for breaking into 11 first questions would always be about Erick. Nobody
12 semi trucks. 12 ever knew. And I really got the feeling that they
13 Q. Urn-hum. 13 really didn't care. We always wondered. We didn't
14 A. And then he was shipped off to live with 14 know if he was alive, if he was dead, was in jail,
15 Jeanie again. 15 if he was safe finally, that he finally had found
16 Q. And when you say "picked up" arrested 16 love. We never knew.
17 is -- 17 Q. So -- just so everybody understands.
,
i
18 A. Right. 18 Part of your -- part of the family lives in
19 Q. -- what you're talking about? 19 California now and part of the family lives up in
20 A.' Right. 20 Washington?
21 Q. And then somehow he got sent off to live 21 A. Right.
22 With Jean again? 22 Q. And up until this incident brought you
23 A. Right. And that was the last time I seen 23 together, there wasn't much contact?
24 him until now. 24 A. There has been no contact. Once in a
25 Q. Okay. This kind of childhood and home 25 while there would be aphone call but that was it.
5135 5137
1 life. Did it have a permanent affect on you? 1 Q. Thank you. Go ahead.
2 A. I know it always scarred all of us. 2 A. The boys, Johnny and Steven did come down
3 There's a lot of things that we feel we've dealt 3 to California for a little while. I believe it was
4 with and have gotten over, but really you don't. 4 like in '96 or '97. They come down at different
5 Q. Urn-hum. 5 times and stayed for a little while, but it was too
6 A. I'm amom and I have a little boy, and 6 much pressure, too much work for them to stay there.
7 not aday that goes by I don't tell him -- in fact 7 They were used to liVing in Washington and living
8 this morning he told me "You always tell me you love 8 where things came freer or easier. They lived off
9 me, mom. I love you." I love you. That's the most 9 the state and in California, you know, you have to
10 important thing, that he knows that he's loved 10 work to get what you want. To live the life you
11 there's security in his home. I don't move him 11 want you have to work for it.
12 around, because as kids we moved around too many 12 Q. Um-hum.
13 times. We had no foundation, no roots, no friends. 13 A. I keep working.
14 I have an anger problem that comes out once in a 14 Q. Now did -- who was Franky?
15 while, but it's not _:.. I say I'm probably 96 percent 15 A. Franky was my brother from my real mom.
16 better than -- amother than what I grew up with. 16 Q. So he's afull brother?
17 I'm not perfect. 17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, is it fair to say that you hate 18 Q. And did Frank end up in prison at some
19 Jean? 19 point?
20 A. In order to survive and keep surviving I 20 A. Franky ended up in prison three months
21 have no feelings for that woman. I can't afford to 21 before he graduated high school.
22 have feelings for her. Hate or otherwise, I feel 22 Q. And do you remember what the
23 nothing for her. 23 circumstances of that were?
24 Q. And that hasn't changed? 24 A. My dad was -- I believe it was August
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Shawora is 2 years older than Erick. She first recalls him when he was 4 or 5 very
imaginative, loved animals, he was kinda yo]atile, be would just blo:q- you knew how far to .
· push hitn- if he blew you knew to run, he was a loner.. No one ill the family clicked rc:ally
well, but Erick less than others in the family. Into animals and Wltllre.. he would give his cats
baths- clean their noses and eyes- he cuddled them and fathered them- they always had dogs
and cats
Unusually into fantasies- King Kong, GodZilla- the things he saw he would scare other kids
with. He was doing that even when Shawnra left in 1978. We all felt strange in our affect
we never fit in .
He was maybe a little bitmore fidge!y than the other kids, all the boys were fidgety. Erick
would jump up from one table to the next. Erick was worse than the children I know as an
adult who are ADHD. Erick was more hyper
It was real fo~ bim':' the fantasies- he was terrorized. He could tell you in detail what the
monsters looked like to him
Erick was sOU wetting his bed by the· time Shawiua left. Jeannie would put the boys wet
· sheets Qut of thei£ bedta6JR v;;'dows~when the school bus came everybody ~~_~at?ad..n'
J1agRen.~2. . .. i - '-.. . .
One time Shawnra remembered the boys burned the dolls hair off and Erick had rubbed
feces all over the dolli? head and face. Maybe this was an act of jealousy on the part of the
boys. They were all living at Grandma Savers, plus Betty and Kenny (Jeannie's kids) were
· liVing there also. .
What was Jean like: Jeannie depended upon who was around for the way you were treated-
if dad was there Shawma was treated well and if·her mom was there ]eanwas more herself.
She was lazy, ha4 the kids doing the chores. Jean was lazy beCause shewould sit on the
couch, ea~ and we would be cleaning. 'We would be starv§g and she WOuld eat steak in
front of them QJ: sneak §teaks at night. S,he would feed the kids shit Qn·a §hing1e, rice with
-;ugar and. CUlaamea, lett ofoauneab-IfJean ha<:l n:t0ney ShaWnra would have.no idea.
· When .dadwas there he handed all the money to Jean and she ~ouldbuy clothes for ~e
kids'- but after dad left we got clo~es from the Salvation Army and stuff that was ~en to
us.
A~they grew oWl;! the kids got smut; ~aough to SBOp lift clothes for themselv~ Shavznm
·t:hlltks Frank would shopJift clothes for bi5 kids· The parents had no idea or didn't care .
Where""l1ie domes came from- .Jean was not ashoplifter. Jean once made Shawxu:a ~ at age,
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Shawnra remembers her dad as always working: construction worker, crane operator-
Shawnra remembers him drinking at that time.
Frankwas providing support for the whole family- Jean never worked- Shawnra had no idea
as to what their family financial situation was
, Ifyou were sick Jean would be nurturing- but otherwise no hugs, kisses or I love you~.0
' don't remember knowing that Jean or Frank ever loved us. She never cleaned the house- .
you were embarrassed to admit we ~ved there. Only friends were siblings and step siblings
and % of them weren't even your friends. '
.YiQ!ent relationship between Jean and FragJ{-lots of arguments- furniture thrown, hammers
thrown- he would hit her- she would keep pushing him. She would talk in tongues to him
and took on the role of the righteous one-
.--.
Fights would be over money, punishing the kids for something they had done earlier in the
day- these arguments were at least a few times a week- sometimes they would argue for
hours just depending on Jeanilie's response- black eye's, busted lips_but she did not back
down .
)!lhen dad was angry he would c:a)) you a slut and a whon: to the girls as they grew older., _
Did the abuse ofJean ever take on a sexual thing- not that Shawma knows Qr is aware of.
Mom and Dad never fooled around or showed us any sexual activity,. One time after Frank
and Jean had separated- this was in 1981 or 82- Shawnra was living with her Dad- Jean came
over to visit and stayed the night. peanna wet the bed and Jean came into Shawnra's room'





















Shawma lived with Jean for one year after they separated because told her that her Dad'
would beat her and the brother's friends would rape her so Shawnra stayed withJean for
that year. 'Then she went to live with her Dad
There waQoing ouin the family.
- ... - - -
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Sometimes older boys, -umen they li"lTedjo Vancouver, would give you things so they could
;;tchyo~ve interactions-sexual with family. She was probably 6 or 7 when this first
startedhappening. The stuff with John McGuire started at this rime also- he would take
~ but also do touching.
First time- down in the orchards in the tree hous~- Shannon, Kenny, Shawnra and Betty-
like agroup show and tell- does not remember when Frankie got involved. Shannon is 1
year older than Shawnra, Kenny, Betty all around the same age
This continued on until Shawnrawasj4 Frankie was really depres!>ed and Shawnra felt if she
of~edher~him that would help him, but it did not follow thtough all the way arid it
.didn't help Frankie. .
The intercourse began when Shawnra was 7 or8 years old- all girls had intercourse with 2U-,
·~the guys.
We just acted on it: we had nothing else to do
'X
There were no boundaries
. Kids were starved for attention
'. . There was no support from parents
Erick did observe their interactions- he even got mad if they were juSt kissing- this is the
second time the C fanply' group got together:-
Erick saw kissing and fondling- she only remembers him seeing once
Non of us were c1ose- so it was not unusual for Erick to be offmhis room'
Shannon- I justknow that Shannon and Kenny would kiss- show each other penises and
Shannon. may have had oral ex with Kenny . .
Shawnra says Jean knew what was going on but.did nothing Until Shailnon sta,rted in on
Deanna ..
SJ:1awnra stopped with. Shannon because she sta.rted feeling dirty, plus Shannon seemed to
moving on to Deanna. . .
Then the relationship was'no longer a special thiitg
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Shawnra thinks there was something that happened between she and Frankie and some
older boys up the road "
Shawnra thinks Jean knew about the incest, the older boys, and she never did anygung- "
Erick would have heard the threats Jean made
She would make us sit on the couch for hours waiting for out: dad to come home to punish
us
Jean woUld discipline you by pulling your hair, grabbing your ear, slap your face, but not
Shawnra's, she beat Shawnra once with the hose of the vacuum "
She would call Shawnra stupid and witch- she would tell the boys they were stupid
I thinks<: aU felt unwanteQ.in every aspect- Jean, Dad
A lot of competition growing up
Ecick neyet honded with any Ofj!]S- he was a little more different than we"were. "You did not
know what would trigger Erick and we all mew what my dad was like "
Erick:
Some story about monkeys
" He was quiet as a child
feels that Jeannie and het mom chased Erick awa then Frank. and Tina chased









             
     . 
               
. 
. ' There were a few times she walked in and found us, Shannon, Shawnra, Kenny and Betty. 
'. Shawnra also told Jean about John McGuire having Deanna set on his lap and Shawnra 
confronted him and he threatened her with a knife and Shawnra told Jean and nothing 
. happened 
-.lean walked in,on Shawnra, Shannon, Kenny and Betty and they were having ~ex- Jean t~ 
them to stop and went back to bed. She would use the information she had against the J 
. children- she would threaten to tell their dad 
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him away' in CA- en e chased him away in WA and finally Erick was gone. 








Frank. would drink with his friend Noon on the weekends- when living in Camas arid
Vancouver. When married to Tina he drank less but smoked pot more
. ,
Frankie and Frank. smoked pot together in Camas and Vancouver
Frankie in the burglary- Frankie was holding the knife that cut the woman's wrist
GET FRANKIE'S RECORDS FROM WASHINGTON
Frankie went in a young man and came out hard and bitter
,Shannon:
Last saw him 6 years ago- con artist





. Beer and drugs
Happy go lucky
Deanna:
I have no idea
Frankie:
Off and on since he has been out- marijuana
Tamara:
Nothing after early childhood
Shawnra:
Had to see 2 psychologist one time. SEe was in"foster care in 1984-1985- she was having
, problems with Tina- she was jealous- so she was in foster care- she was in juVenile hall tor,
being a runaway and cltose to go into foster care ' . ,
Shawnra had been living with an alcoholic friend of her fathers who had a girlfriend with ,
two cl:i.iJ.dJ;en. 'Shawnra was in high school- and Frank. chose to live with his wife and not to '
have Shawnra in the family
000611
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MEMO TO THE FILE
CONFIDENTIAL WORK PRODUCT ONLY
THIS IS NOT AN INTERVIEW SUMMARY BUT ONLY A








This typescript of notes contains thoughts and impressions of my
meeting with Betty Douglas on 2/8/07. It is not an actual verbatim
transcription of our conversation. Ms. Douglas has not reviewed this
document.
Dr. Craig Beaver and I arrived at Betty Douglas' residence at around
8:00 a.m. Betty explained that Jean McCracken's memorial service had
been held on the previous Saturday, February 3. At the service, Betty spoke
with many of her extended family members, some ofwhom she had not seen
for many years. Through conversations with other members of the family,
Betty discovered that Jean had been molested as a young woman by her
father, John Hall. Apparently, Jean's mother came home early from work
one day and found John and Jean in bed together. Jean's mother
iImnediately kicked John Hall out of the residence and they were eventually
divorced. Betty believes this experience had a profoundly negative affect on
Jean's parenting skills and helps to explain why Jean did not intervene when
she discovered that the children were having sex with one another.
Betty then told Dr. Beaver and I many of the same facts that can be
found in the August 15, ~006 interview that I had with her. The following is
a summary of what Betty told Dr. Beaver and I:
Jean and Frank fought very often. Betty remembers that they were
always arguing with one another. Sometimes the arguments became
physical but Betty cannot recall if the police ever intervened.
Jean drank blackberry brandy on occasion and Frank also drank - not
as much in the beginning but Betty remembers that Frank's alcohol intake
increased near the end of his marriage to Jean.
Betty Douglas Interview 2/8/07 page 1 of 2.
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Jean McCracken's un~le, Allen, is mentally retarded and had to be
institutionalized at age 14. He may also be a molester of young boys.
Frank beat Shannon on many occasions. Shannon was the main focus
of Frank's aggression but the other children were beaten with a belt also.
Betty cannot remember ever being disciplined by Frank but saw Erick being
beaten on several occasions.
Erick tried to protect the girls of the family from Shannon's sexual
aggression. Erick knew that the behavior was wrong and always tried to
stop it. Betty now believes that Shannon's sexual aggression was a direct
result ofFrank's abuse.
Erick and Shannon had frequent fist fights and one occasion, Shannon
knocked Erick unconscious with a closed fist punch to the back of the head-
right behind the ear.
Betty noticed, when Erick fought with his siblings, that on some
occasions he would "black out" and not remember any details about the fight
or even himself. She describes the look in his eyes as; "He just wasn't
there."
Betty remembers that Erick was very hyper-active as a child and had
lots of imaginary friends. She could not recall Erick ever having any real
close friends, and never had a "best buddy," that he always hung around
with as most children do.
Betty cannot recall ever hearing Jean or Frank encouraging the
children and they would usually talk down to them, "like they were all
stupid." Jean and Frank did not give love and affection to the children or
one another.
Betty believes that Jean cared more about the girls in the family than
she did the boys. Jean was very protective of the girls but was willing to
abandon the boys - as she did on several occasions. Betty does recall that
on once instance, Shannon and Erick were left in an apartment with no food
or electricity while Jean and her boyfriend Jeff Conner moved to Oregon
with Deanna.
Betty heard from family members that Wesley Dodd once lived with
Shannon and Erick but she never met Dodd personally.
Betty described her Grandmother Siever's house as the children's
"Safe Zone," where food and real adult supervision was the norm.
THIS CONCLUDES MY IMPRESSIONS OF MY MEETING WITH
BETTY DOUGLAS ON 2/8/07.
f)00187
Betty Douglas Interview 2/8/07 page 2 of 2. 000614
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State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT




















STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
County ofAda )
COMES NOW, Jean Hall McCracken, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I am Erick Virgil Hall's mother.
3. I was born on . My father, John Hall, was nineteen years old when I
was born. My mother, Jean Marie Seivers, was twenty-two years old.
4. My grandparents raised thirteen children. My mother, Jean Marie Seivers, was one of
thirteen children. Only nine ofthe children survived.
Affidavit ofJean Hall McCracken 1
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5. My mother and father were physically and verbally abusive with one another in front of
me, and I assimilated a lot ofthis violence and felt as though I were responsible because I
was the subject of some of the disputes. My mother was very rarely physically
affectionate with me. I recall her hugging me on only a few occasions.
6. Beginning when I was about five years old, I was sexually molested by my mentally
retarded uncle Allen, who is nine years older than I am. The molestation included
fondling and intercourse and happened until I was approximately seven years old, when I
stopped him. When I was 37 years old and told my mother about this, she called me a
liar.
7. My mother was very strong willed, competitive, and had a difficult time showing
emotion. I was subjected to mental abuse as a child in my home by my mother and by
my aunt Betty. They would scream at me, tell me I was stupid, and call me names. My
mother also used to punish me excessively, and this punishment was physical.
8. My parents divorced when I was approximately nine or ten years old. I believed they
divorced because my father was unfaithful and my mother was domineering and a poor
money manager.
9. I became sexually active as a pre~teen. I was in a sexual relationship with a man named
Vernon Peck when I was a senior in high school, and became pregnant. I gave the baby
up for adoption at my mother's insistence.
10. I graduated from high school in 1966. I met Roy Pambrun, became pregnant, and gave
birth to a son, Shannon, on . I lived with Roy for two and a half
years. Roy tried to prostitute me in Long Beach, California
Affidavit of Jean Hall McCracken 2
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11. Roy and I broke up in Long Beach, where I met Frank McCracken. Frank had three
children: Tamara, age seven; Frankie, age five; and an infant, Shawnra Frank needed a
babysitter to care for the children, and I did so. Within a month, Frank and I became
sexually active.
12. Frank had been abused by his father as a child and was sent to live with his grandparents.
Then he was removed from his grandparents' home and placed again with his parents.
He was insecure, paranoid, full ofguilt, emotionally withdrawn, and had a difficult time
in social situations.
13. I took speed (amphetamines) for a few weeks during my pregnancy with Erick. Erick
was born a few weeks premature, on . He was born in Long Beach
Hospital. The doctors checked his weight, and he gained a pound and grew an inch in the
first two weeks. I spent one day in the hospital.
14. I placed Roy Pambrun's name on Erick's birth certificate because the real father, Frank.
McCracken, threatened to destroy Erick and me ifhis name was on the birth certificate.
Frank. told me the reason was he didn't want to have health and welfare following him
around, but once Frank and I had a few more children together, he was more comfortable
with the idea of being Erick's father.
15. I gave birth to John McCracken on . I gave birth to Steven McCracken
on . I gave birth to Deanna McCracken on .
16. I recall a number of stories about Erick's childhood. When Erick was cutting teeth, I
used to give him hamburger so that he could chew it. On one occasion, he threw the
hamburger on the floor because everyone else was eating steak and he wanted steak too.
-
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17. On one occasion, Erick was probably about two years old. Erick was obsessed with
'Monkers' (Monsters). One time the family was in the car and they were driving up
north from Southern California Erick saw the shadows on the hillside, and he started
yelling, 'Monkers Mom! Monkers' I told him, "Erick, the monkers are asleep." Erick
reached around the car seat, grabbed his father's head, and turned his head to see the
Monkers while he was driving. Frank said, "Yes Erick, I see them."
18. Erick and I also played a lot of games together. We played one game with a mirror. We
would see a mirror, and I would say 'Look at the monkey.' Erick would then make up
lists of rhymes with the word monkey, and finish with a dinosaur or zoo animal. He
would say things like 'Monkey, Donkey, Rhinoceros.'
19. Erick defecated in his pants one time when he was about 1.5 or 2. He was walking by
that time. He used his feces and painted on the wall. Said, "Very nice honey, but you
shouldn't write with poop." I didn't know what to say to him.
20. Just after Erick learned to walk, he used to wait by the door for his older sister Tamara
when she would come home from school. She would pick him up and play with him and
cuddle with him, and he loved it. One day I told Tamara that she would want to go play
with her friends and not play with Erick, and he would become very upset. Soon after
that it happened. Tamara came home one day in a big hurry and left without playing with
Erick. He went ballistic. His screaming was extremely loud and reverberated throughout
the entire neighborhood.
21. When Erick was about two and a half, we went to a drive-in movie theater. Erick was
very impulsive, very impatient, and he said he was hungry. For Erick, that meant he
wanted to eat 'right now,' and so we took him to the concession stand to get something
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for him to eat. A heavy-set woman turned around in line and gave Frank a dirty look. I
realized that Erick had been pushing the woman in the buttocks and backside in order to
get her to hurry up.
22. Erick has always been an escape artist. On one occasion as a toddler, he watched Frank
with a combination padlock on the back gate, the next day he opened it and got out.
23. Erick was not stupid. He was emotionally volatile and high strung, but very intelligent.
Erick couldn't sit still and play with blocks the way a psychologist might expect him to
when giving him a test, he would throw them. However, if a person would give Erick
something like clay and let him make something, he would totally amaze you.
24. Erick is like me that way, I learn everything with my hands and am very tactile. Erick
made clay dinosaurs from a picture in his book one time and took them to school. He
was in first grade. The clay dinosaurs looked exactly like the pictures in the book, and
you could identify which dinosaur was which very easily. He paid amazing attention to
detail. On the other hand, it was very difficult to get Erick to sit down and read, and he
had a very hard time with math. Erick's activities had to be extremely tactile.
25. Erick was extremely creative. On one occasion, Erick wanted to play with some
aluminum foil, so I gave him some. He used it all up and made a canoe. Then he had to
make an Indian, who would sit in the canoe. So he made one, squatting on his knees,
with an oar in his hands. Erick was only eight years old at the time.
26. Erick's favorite books were dinosaur books and Bible stories. Those were the only books
I could get him to read. He could pronounce those dinosaur names better than I could.
27. Erick was constantly living in an imaginary world with imaginary friends and make-
believe characters. He was always talking about Godzilla and King Kong fighting and
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how it kept him awake at night and how he just couldn't go to sleep. He'd use it as an
excuse to get to stay up extra time.
28. On one occasion when we lived in Minnehaha, Erick fell offhis bicycle and hit the back
ofhis head. He was out for either a few seconds or minutes. Frank took Erick to
Memorial Hospital in Vancouver, WA. Over a period of time following that event and
for several years afterward, Erick complained about severe headaches and neck pain. He
also occasionally complained about his eyes hurting.
29. On another occasion, Erick ran into the goalpoast at John David Zellerback school in
Camas and split his tongue. It required stitches, and he went to an old Kaiser Permanente
facility.
30. On one occasion, Erick gashed his wrist and severed the tendons in two of his fmgers
when he fell on broken glass in the garage. He was taken to Memorial Hospital and
received multiple stitches.
31. On another occasion Erick fell out ofa swing and injured his back.
32. On one occasion, my mother, Jean Seivers, yelled to Erick: 'Bring the laundry
downstairs.' Erick called back from upstairs, '1 can't.' Grandma Jean complained to me
and said, 'Jean, Erick won't bring the laundry.' So 1 intervened, and said, "Erick, do as
Grandma asks and bring down the laundry." Erick replied, 'The ghost won't let me.' So
1told him, "Erick, the ghosts are only out at night when it's dark. Erick replied, 'This
ghost is black and goes around during the day!'
33. On another occasion, Erick came running into the kitchen from outside, yelling "Mom,
mom, look! Look!" Erick was proudly holding up the rubber sole ofa tennis shoe. He
proclaimed, "Steve Austin was here!" Steve Austin was the Six Million Dollar Man.
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34. One night, everyone had gone to bed. Erick was in his room, quietly saying "I smell a
mouse. I smell a mouse." Pretty soon the kids started complaining about Erick. So I
told the kids, "Ignore him. If you don't give him attention, he'll be quiet." "Erick," I
said, "Shut up and go to sleep!" Erick kept saying in a tiny, funny voice, 'I smell a
mouse. I smell a mouse.' So I brought Erick to our bedroom. I specifically told Frank
not to interact with him so Erick would be quiet andjust go to sleep. Frank, ofcourse,
could not resist and has to ask the question: "What do they smell like?" Erick said,
"Cheese."
35. My daughter Deanna had some Barbie dolls she liked to play with, but none of them had
a fur coat. So Erick decided he was going to make a fur coat for one of her Barbies.
Erick caught a mouse, skinned it, and gave it to Deanna. He wrapped the mouse fur
around the Barbie. When he skinned the mouse, he left its tail on.
36. Erick could really communicate with animals, but he could not really communicate very
well with people. Erick loved animals. Erick had a cat named Tigger, and on one
occasion it had a runny nose. Erick cornered the cat with a tissue and wiped its nose. On
another occasion, Erick was walking around with a toothbrush. I asked him, "Erick, what
are you doing?" He said, "I'm going to brush the eat's teeth."
37. Our family also had a baby duckling we took as a pet. The duckling had a bum leg and
walked with a gimp. I brought him home to the children, and they named him Maynard
Peepers. Maynard would sit and watch TV with all the kids on the couch. Maynard
would follow them out into the yard, running around with them and following them as
they chased each other from place to place.
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38. Erick was very willing to please people, and he was a follower as opposed to being a
leader. On one occasion, Erick got a shovel, dug up a bunch of weeds (greasewood,
which grows really rapidly in the Northwest), dug a hole in the lawn and started planting
it. He told me he was planting trees for me. I had earlier been talking about planting
things, so he was helping me out.
39. Erick has large ear openings, and high pitched machine sounds hurt his ears. When he
was young he was afraid of the table saw because of its noise.
40. My relationship with Frank was full ofemotional outbursts. I can be loud and emotional,
and Frank did not like crying. Frank was verbally and physically violent with me, gave
me bloody noses and black eyes, and would throw me into walls. The children, including
Erick, witnessed this behavior.
41. Frank was also verbally and physically abusive with Erick and the other children. Frank
called Erick names such as 'dumb,' 'dummy,' 'stupid,' and 'ignorant little shit.' When
Frank could not cope with a situation, he would become angry, he would throw things,
and he would hit the children.
42. I made mistakes raising the children, and at times I said things that I probably should not
have said and did things I probably should not have done. There were times I pushed the
limits and spanked my kids too hard, then picked them up and held them and cried.
43. I have learned that some early testing suggested Erick was mildly mentally retarded, but I
do not believe Erick was mentally retarded. Nobody at Erick's schools informed me of
this. He was a very intelligent and sensitive child, prone to explosive anger and
emotional outbursts. I now believe Erick has Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder
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(ADHD) because behaviors I witnessed in Erick are the same as behaviors I see in my
grandchildren who have this diagnosis.
44. I have talked with others who are Bi-Polar and believe Erick was Bi-Polar as well, based
on some ofhis behaviors like volatility, extreme highs and lows, and sudden inexplicable
mood changes.
45. Frank McCracken and I were married on August 10, 1979. We divorced on January 26,
1981. Frank lived in Camas for approximately a year or slightly longer, and moved back
to California. Once there he did not visit the children. He corresponded for a few weeks,
then married his former sister-in-law Tina, and stopped contact with the children.
46. My mother, Jean Seivers, was really hard on Erick when he was growing up. She was
verbally and physically abusive with all ofmy children with the exception ofa couple
children, who she treated as favorites. My nephew Kenneth was one ofher favorites.
47. Erick developed an explosive temper. When Erick lost control ofa situation, he would
get so worked up that he would almost black out in terms of being conscious ofwhat he
was doing, saying, or engaged in. It was a little bit like memory loss, in that Erick would
remember that he had an episode ofanger, but he wouldn't remember what the memory
was about or how he had behaved. With Erick, it was like a switch, when he'd calm
down, his attention could be diverted.
48. Similar explosions with this blackout-type memory loss have happened three times in my
life. One time was extreme anger with my sister, Jannine. I just boiled over, and
exploded on her. I grabbed her by the back of the neck and shoved her head into the
carpet. All of a sudden I came to my senses, was looking at the situation, and said, "Dh
my God, What have I done? What am I doing?" It only lasted for a few minutes. It
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scared me, and I'm sure it scared my mother. When it happened I just shut everything
out, but after a short time I was able to get back to reality and get away from the anger.
49. The second occasion I experienced this explosive anger was with Frank. He wouldn't get
out ofmy face, and was nagging me and being verbally abusive. I was fed up, had been
passive for too long, and had had enough. I reared way back and slugged him in the
shoulder.
50. The third explosion was toward the boyfriend of my daughter, Deanna. I was intensely
angry at him because he thought he could tell Tiffany what to do. Betty Kirk witnessed it
- told her not to let him come around that comer. I was shaking. If he'd come around
that comer, I would have knocked his socks off. Betty didn't know what to do.
51. These days when I'm going to go off, I get very quiet. It's a danger sign. If I'm
screaming and yelling, things are probably okay. If I'm quiet, watch out.
52. I believe Erick has relayed information to his sisters that some ofhis uncontrolled and
explosive behavior is due to drugs he used.
53. There was drug use happening in our house. Frank was involved in excessive alcohol use
and pot. I took speed for a while. I was very overweight, and took it to elevate my
metabolism.
54. In his teens, Erick's anger and impulsivity continued. Erick was out ofcontrol. He
would leave the house after he was supposed to have gone to bed, get picked up by
police, and brought home. He would not attend school. I asked Frank for help, and he
refused communication with me. Through police intervention and juvenile crime, it was
decided that Erick needed to go to a group home. He was out of control, and I agreed
that he could go there for a while and then try living with his father in California.
-
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55. In 1986 Orange county brought Erick back to me in Washington, and dropped him off at
my home. I tried getting him into job corps, education, and he was rebellious. He
became violent with a tire iron on one occasion, and the police were contacted. Erick did
not stay with me for very long.
56. My father, John Hall, was murdered in or around 1998. Two people were charged with
his murder. I did not want to be involved, and I did not want the murderers to receive the
death penalty. I held them responsible for what they did, but did not wish them ill will.
God will judge them.
57. Erick is an incredibly talented artist. He has always been creative, and to this day he
continues to send me beautiful pictures and drawings in pen and ink.
58. I spoke with the defense team on January 18,2004, March 19,2004, and August 7, 2004.
59. I was not called to testify at Erick's trial, although I wanted to do so and wanted to see
my son. Defense counsel told me they would fly me to Boise to see Erick. I was
ultimately never asked to go.
60. I was contacted on September 27,2004 by a male with the prosecution. He told me that
the defense team was going to say at trial that Frank and I had raised Erick to be a killer
and that we were responsible for what Erick had become. My response was that we did
not raise our child to be a killer. The prosecution also asked me ifI thought Erick's drug
use excused his behavior. I told him that it was not an excuse, but drug use did influence
Erick's behavior.
61. I have strong feelings of love for Erick and I do not believe he should get the death
penalty.
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COMES NOW, Frank Owen McCracken, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I live at 212 North Dale in Anaheim, California. I deliver auto parts as my current
employment.
3. Although not listed as the biological father on his birth certificate, I know that I am
Erick Virgil Hall's father.
4. I was not interviewed by the prosecution for Erick's trial.
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5. I was previously interviewed by the defense team on January 24, 2004, and on August
8,2004. I was not called to testify.
6. Had I been asked to testifY, I would have testified about the following events:
7. I had three children, Tammy, Frank Alvin Charles, and Shawnra with a woman who
was not Erick's mother. Then the mother died and I was on my own as a father with
three children.
8. I went through a couple of babysitters. One woman was named Ima, and things did
not work out with her. Ima was friends with a woman named Jean. Jean told me she
wished she had a babysitting job like that, so we made an arrangement that Jean
would watch the children. Jean was seeing a man named Roy. I later learned that
Jean and Roy had a child named Shannon with Roy. Roy broke up with Jean and left
her.
9. Jean and I became romantically involved. It made practical sense for us to live
together and raise the children together. After several months, Jean told me she was
pregnant, and Erick was born in Long Beach, CA in 1971.
10. After my children John and Steven were born, we moved to Washington because it
was a more family-oriented place. After Deanna was born, I had a vasectomy.
11. I worked graveyard shifts and was not home a lot at night. During the day, Jean
would watch the children.
12. Jean and I had verbal and physical fights in which I used to hit her in front of the
children.
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13. I left Jean and came back to California in 1982 with my daughter Shawnra, when the
Washington shipyard closed and the economy declined. My son Frank Alvin Charles
committed a crime and went to prison at that time.
14. I married a woman named Tina after returning to California
15. I am not aware of a lot of things that happened with members of the family who
remained behind in Washington at that time, but know there were problems and
allegations of child abuse which were evaluated by Children's Services in Oregon and
Washington. I believe that Jean may have moved the children from place to place to
stay one step ahead of them.
16. Jean abandoned the children who remained with her in Washington. Erick went to a
youth home and John and Steven went to a foster home. I wanted to bring my sons
down to California, but Tina did not want me to bring them to California.
17. When Erick came back to California from the boys home in 1986-87 he had markings
on his back from having an iron pressed into his body. He wouldn't say who had
done it.
18. Erick did not stay for very long in California and did not get along too well with his
cousins. The Buena Park police picked him up after he ran away, and he said he
didn't want to stay in California He went back to be with Jean and we lost all
contact with him.
19. Erick was a quiet boy with a big imagination. He lived in his own world. When
Godzilla first came out, Erick was very interested in it and made up stories about him.
Erick loved animals. He had a cat, called Tigger, and had a close bond with the cat.
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20. Erick is a talented and creative artist, intelligent, and handsome. I love Erick. He is
my son, he's always been my son, and he will always be my son. I believe at times I
was not a great father, but I did the best I could. I don't want him to get the death
penalty.
DATED this _:1 day ofApril, 2006.
I, m;l.~'-~!!1: S~ , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this .:;~y
of April, 2006, personally' before me [wIL OwtJJ me.-(~ , who, being
by me first duly swo Ii. e is the above mentioned person and that (s)he signed the
foregoing document ts therein contained are true..
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COMES NOW, Frank Alvin Charles McCracken, being ftrst duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1. All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I live at 7440 EI Camino Circle, Buena Park. I am the second child born to Frank and
Victoria McCracken, and was born on .
3. I believe that Erick Virgil Hall and I share the same father, Frank McCracken Sr.;
therefore, I am Erick's older half-brother by approximately six years.
4. I was not interviewed by the Prosecution.
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5. I was interviewed by the defense team on January 24,2004 and August 8, 2004. I was
not called to testify by the defense team. I would have been willing to testify.
6. If I had been called to testify, I would have testified about the following:
7. There was physical violence and verbal abuse in the family. My stepmother Jean
McCracken was physically abusive to me and used a dog leash to beat me. My father
threw a shoe which hit me in the head and caused a cut requiring a hospital visit and
stitches. I was beaten on report card day for having D's and F's, but nobody asked if I
had homework or offered to help me with my homework between report card days.
8. Erick exhibited rage as a young boy. It appeared to be a defense mechanism, and just
about anything could cause him to express anger.
9. Erick had a number of make believe friends - ghosts, Godzilla, King Kong, bigfoot,
monsters, Erick was in his own world at times.
10. My last contact with Erick occurred when he was approximately II years old in 1981.
11. I went to prison in 1982 for eight years.
12. I do not want my brother to get the death penalty.
DATEDthis 2'" day ofApril, 2006. ~.._
~4""77::~~
R:iiiK'ALVIN CHARLES MC~RACKEN
.I, ~':fic d,g1j lUJll€..- .All..~ notary public, do hereb~ certify that on this qt£'- ~ay
of ApnI, 2006, personally appeareJ before me t\]J'JL lAc(r<.LClGLj"- , who, bemg
by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the above mentioned person and that (s)he signed the
foregoing document and that the statements th in cont . ed e.
~,,,~;~U~ll..
,,~,. 1-.,
~ C:J oT '<': ~ .t.}- '7:. .: * -.- :. • * •
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COMES NOW, Tiffaney LeAndrea Conner, being first dilly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I live at 904 N.E. 106th Ave. in Vancouver, Washington. Erick and I share the
same mother, Jean Hall McCracken; therefore, I am Erick's youngest half-sister
by 13 years.
3. I was not contacted by the Prosecution about Erick's case.
4. I was previously interviewed by the defense team in 2004 but was not asked to
testify.
5. I was very young when Erick left the home and do not have memories of him. I
love my brother. I have one picture of Erick. In this picture, Erick is holding me
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when I was arOlmd 1 year old. I hold onto this picture because it is something that
connects me to my brother.
6. My letters are my most prized possession of my brother because that's all I have
to remember him.
7. I have a son, Dakota, who is two and a half. Dakota's father, Randall Bunch, has
been in jail on several occasions. I understand how difficult it is to maintain a
relationship with an incarcerated person, and wish to do so with Erick. Our
connection is very important to me. In a choice of incarceration versus death, I
will always choose incarceration. Although Erick is incarcerated, I want the
opportunity to get to know my brother better and maintain a relationship with
him.
8. I have a brother named John. John's son, Tyler, who is my nephew, has been
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD). My mother has
learned more about how to deal with and understand ADHD through new medical
research and medicine to treat the disorder. I believe Erick has ADHD too, and
my mother did not have the benefits of this new information when Erick was
younger. My mother sees similarities between Tyler and Erick as well.
9. My nephew Devon, John's oldest son, has been diagnosed with ADD and takes
special education classes. Again, I believe the similarities between Devon and
Erick exist. Assistance is available for Devon that was not available for Erick.
10. I live with my mother. I have seen my mom suffer because of her lack of
education. I've also seen her not obtain assistance when she sought help. The
state of Oregon mislead her and tried to terminate her rights to her sons John and
Steven, my brothers. The State of Oregon mislead her by saying that this was
helping her, when what it really did was tear apart the family structure and hurt
our family.
11. This misrepresentation of "help" continues to tear at the relationship between my
brothers, Steven and John, and my mother.
12. My family is very important to me. I would like to have an opportunity to get in
touch with my niece, Amanda Stroud's daughter, through Amanda's mother
Kathy Stroud. Although I've never met her, I want my niece to know that she has
a family here in Washington who loves her and cares about her.
13. I love my brother and do not want him to get the death penalty.
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DATED this 8th day ofApril, 2006.
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STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
County ofAda )
COMES NOW, Kenneth Douglas, being first dilly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I am Erick Virgil Hall's cousin.
3. I Was born on . My mother, Jannine Hall Baker, is Erick Virgil Hall's
aunt. I grew up in Camas, Washington. I currently reside at ,
Avenue, Vancouver, WA 98664.
Affidavit ofKenneth S. Douglas 1
000641
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4. I was never contacted by the prosecution or defense in this case. If! had been contacted I
would have testified about the following:
5. I lived with Erick and his family in the early 1970s when my mother was using and
running drugs. I have a drug conviction from 1997 and recently voluntarily completed a
28-day drug rehabilitation program. I currently have a sponsor and attend Narcotics
Anonymous classes.
6. When I was growing up, I spent a lot oftime with Erick's family when we lived together
on Prune Hill. The acreage was an old homestead and we went everywhere together. I
taught Erick how to explore the woods and read tracks. We would follow the deer tracks
until we would find the deer and where they bedded down. Erick and his brothers
Johnny, Steven, and I would explore together for hours in the woods. There were close
to 3,000 acres for us to explore, and we were always out there in the summertime. We
traveled miles every day. We would leave in the morning and come back at night. We
found some old trapper cabins out in the woods, picked blueberries, and made forts in the
sticker bushes.
7. We would also go for day-long bicycle rides together around the area.
8. There were rival families on the hill, and we ran the hill. When there was a fight with
anyone outside the family, the whole family would come together in their defense.
9. There was a lot of teasing and fighting that occurred among the children, and of course
there were ongoing sibling rivalries. Sometimes things were more friendly, such as
roughhousing and wrestling. We'd convince Erick to climb up in a tree fort, then light
the tree on fire. We taught Erick how to start fires inside hollow trees.
-
Affidavit ofKenneth S. Douglas 2
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10. We would walk in the fields together and pick on the bulls, teasing them. We'd see how
close we could get to them and squirt them with water.
11. Other times the fighting was serious. The boys had BB gun wars and would shoot at each
other. We would give Erick a BB gun that had no BBs in it. We did a lot of rock
throwing at each other down by the quarry. We would scale the sides of the quarry and
drop rocks on each other.
12. I have memories of holding Erick down and just beating the tar out of him. An hour
later, we would be playing. It was not in Erick to hold a grudge.
13. On one occasion I shot a bee's nest in a barn with a BB gun when Erick and his brother
Shannon were in the hayloft. They were stung numerous times.
14. On a couple of occasions, Erick's brother Shannon and I tied Erick up and dragged him
around the property with a lawn tractor.
15. Erick behaved in a way that I would today characterize as manic depressive, Bi-Polar,
and schizophrenic. He was extremely hyper. He was very impulsive and did not
premeditate anything. He was not a leader, he was a follower. When he was pushed over
the edge, he would just react before thinking.
16. On one occasion, someone threw a pair of underwear up on Grandma Jean Seiver's
house. We told Erick to go up and get them down. He climbed up onto the second story,
and he slid down off the roof and fell into the rose garden bed. When his feet hit, he fell
forward and smacked his head onto the rock sidewalk.. He was down for a few seconds.
17. On a couple of occasions, Erick fell out of the back of a pickup truck. Another time, he
fell offthe hay trailer.
Mfidavit of Kenneth S. Douglas 3
000643
                  
           
                  
                    
                 
     
                  
              
                     
          
                 
       
               
             
                
        
               
                  
                    
        lk         
                   
     
      
18. On another occasion, Erick fell out of a tree and injured his arm. It was in a cast for a
while.
19. Erick loved animals more than he did people. Ifhe had his choice between spending time
with people and spending time with animals, he would choose animals every time. He
brought pockets full of snakes home. He also came home with possums, a raccoon, an
owl, and he would hold bees in his hands. He would take care of the animals. I used to
tease him for cleaning a cat's nose and buttocks. Erick also collected wood scorpions
when he lived in Skamania.
20. Frank could give out extremely harsh discipline for his boys, often bordering on abuse.
He liked to discipline and seemed to take pleasure in it. He was looking for terror and
fear in the boys when he disciplined them. If he didn't see it, it made him more angry.
He lined all of us against the wall in the kitchen, and he would make us stand there for
long periods of time until someone confessed to whatever he decided we had done was
wrong. When Frankie was caught smoking, Frank took him into the basement and made
him smoke an entire pack of cigars. On another occasion, Frank slammed Shannon's
head in a drawer.
21. On one occasion, the boys were wrestling. Frank came up and challenged us. I decided
to respond to the challenge and I hit Frank in the back with a wiftle ball bat, made out of
solid plastic. Frank became enraged and began chasing us. He got into his car and
chased Shannon, Erick, and I up the road. We ran into a hay field, and we went to
Grandma Jean Seiver's house.
22. I was one ofGrandma Seiver's favorites, and was able to escape much ofFrank's abusive
behavior.
Affidavit of Kenneth S. Douglas 4
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23. Erick, Shannon, and I got caught breaking into someone's house. The police were called,
and we had to apologize for what we had done.
I, m;ClH~ l 1"1~ , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this 9r.!:tday
of April, 2006, personally appeared before me JC.~.ut..Tt\- Do'>Je, lAS , who, being
by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the above mentioned person and that (s)he signed the
foregoing document and that the statements therein contained are true.
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24. I do not believe Erick should get the death penalty. 
DATED this L day of April, 2006. f¥ 
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COMES NOW, John August Thompson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I live at in Vancouver, Washington. I believe that Erick and I
share the same father, Frank Owen McCracken. Our mother is Jean Hall
McCracken. I am Erick's younger brother by 18 months. My date of birth is
.
•
Affidavit of John August Thompson 1
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3. I was contacted by the Prosecution but refused to speak with them.
4. I was previously interviewed by the defense team but did not testify.
5. If I had been called, I would have testified about the following:
6. Erick and I spent time hiking together, building forts in the hay fields and in the
barn.
7. As a member of our family, there were a lot of sibling rivalries. It was part of
living in a large family. Erick was targeted by our older brothers. I was Erick's
target from our early years on.
8. I was the quiet one. I didn't receive much punishment from my father Frank. I
was spanked with a belt on one occasion. My brother Shannon was choked and
beaten by Frank.
9. Erick was like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, with a split personality. He was totally
nice one minute and crazed the next. It was very unpredictable, and there didn't
seem to be a reason for his behavioral changes.
10. When Erick became angry, his eyes looked dead. Erick was scary as a little kid.
His anger episodes lasted about 20 minutes. Erick didn't fit in. His skin was
darker.
11. I lived with Erick in Newburg, Oregon in a house that a man rented to my mother.
I was around eleven years old, and I got along great with Erick during that time.
12. Erick moved in with Penny Armstrong while we were in Newburg. On one
occasion, they bought Erick some colored underwear, and he wore it to the
grocery store like a bathing suit.
Affidavit of John August Thompson 2
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13. My brother Steven told me on one occasion that he hated Shannon, because
Shannon had engaged in some sexually inappropriate behavior. I recall on one
occasion, Shannon had his girlfriend over and took his penis out ofhis pants.
14. Shannon was physically abusive to Erick and was a lot bigger than him. Shannon
would be babysitting, and Erick would not do what he said. Erick would stand up
to him.
15. My mother made arrangements with the Department of Children's Services for
foster placements for Steven and me. This incident did not upset me because I
just assumed that my mom was just going to be absent from the home again and
that the placement was temporary. I would have been around 12 or 13 years old.
I was placed with the Ritter family in Newburg, Oregon. While there, I was
pushed down the stairs for accidentally bumping into Mr. Ritter. I ran away.
16. The same day that I ran away, the police picked me up and placed me with the
Smith family in Sheridan, Oregon. It was during this stay that I was adopted by
the Thompson family.
17. Dan, a case worker, told me that my mom was not following through with the
requirements of the State. I was lead to believe that no matter what the
circumstances were, I was not going to be returned to my mother. My choices
were either to continue in foster care or explore adoption. I chose adoption. I was
adopted by the Thompson family in Oregon. Later I ran away from the
Thompson home and returned to Washington.
18. The last time I saw my brother Erick, he was about sixteen years old. We were
living in Camas, Washington in an apartment behind the paper mill. Someone
•
Affidavit ofJohn August Thompson 3
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accused Erick ofdrinking all the chocolate milk, and he went crazy. He screamed
and yelled, grabbed a tire iron, and someone called the police.
19. I do not want him to get the death penalty.
DATED this 9th day ofApril, 2006.
I, mo'C"'4eL J"~ S~ , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this q rtaay
of April, 2006, personal y appeared before me :to~ A~-;vsr· T~DSo--.J ,who, being
by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the above men%oned personkd that (s)he signed the
foregoing document and that the statements therein contained are true.
4
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COMES NOW, Kimberly A. Bacon, being fIrst duly sworn, deposes and says:
All matters set forth are based on personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
1. I was not contacted by the Prosecution about Erick Virgil Hall's case.
2. I was not contacted by the defense team and did not testify.
3. If I had been contacted, I would have testifIed to the following:
4. I live at 12214 NE 72nd Street in Vancouver, Washington.
Affidavit ofKimberly A. Bacon 1
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5. I was raised by my grandmother, Wynn Randall.
6. My biological mother, Jeannette, and Erick's Aunt Jannine looked alike. When
Erick's Aunt Jannine was in a car accident and died, my family was contacted by
mistake and gave the hospital permission to do emergency surgery. We thought
my mother Jeannette had died, and my grandmother Wynn went to the hospital.
Wynn was with Erick's Aunt Jannine when she died. Years later, I became best
friends with Betty Douglas Kirk, Erick's cousin. Later we figured out that it was
Betty's mom who died when our family was called.
7. I was married to Erick's older brother, Shannon Pambrun. I met Shannon when I
was fourteen years old. Up until I was 19, I had never met Erick. I do not have
any memory of Erick until I met him when he was a teenager, approximately
fifteen years old. Shannon would speak about Erick but I had yet to meet him.
8. I had my own apartment and Shannon would spend time there. After I got
pregnant, I was told by my grandmother that I had to be married. Shannon and I
married January 12, 1987. I tried to annul the marriage on January 19, 1987. I
was told that I had to divorce him. I did not have the money for a divorce. Then
on , our son Shaun was born. Although married, we never
lived together. Shannon would always come back and use me but he never lived
there. I did not see much of Shannon after 1988, and we were officially divorced
in 1993.
9. Shannon was very violent. He was physically abusive. He was not verbally
abusive. Shannon would explode with anger, become physical, hit me and then
leave. He would never communicate with me.
Affidavit ofKimberly A. Bacon 2
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10. I feel that Shannon had a huge impact on Erick's development. Shannon was
constantly filling Erick's mind with negative ideas, such as how to steal, how to
hot wire a car, and how to raid a newspaper and cardboard drop box to take it for
recycling money.
11. Shannon's abusive behavior toward me was not "classic," in the sense that it was
preceded by verbal abuse or specific indicators, it was random. For example,
Shannon would sit on top ofme, slap me in the face with a comb and there did not
appear to be any reason for it. He did not speak when it was happening.
12. On one occasion, Erick was with Shannon and I in the car when Shannon punched
me in the face and gave me a black eye. Erick tried to comfort me and told me
that it would be alright.
13. Erick engaged in unusual behaviors that no one could understand. He was always
like a little kid who needed to be heard. He had periods where he was completely
quiet and calm. He would be in a room and not communicate with anyone and
then he would have "boom" time, when he would become extremely active and
hyper. He had extreme mood swings, which today I would call Bi-Polar.
14. Erick could be very sweet. He could be "normal." There were times when he was
so willing to do anything for me and then he would become violent without any
provocation.
15. Erick was a "right now" child and very impulsive. For example, Shannon and I
took the kids to see Rambling Rod who was a local child TV character. We took
all the kids to meet him. Erick, without provocation, started swearing and
-
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refusing to meet with Rambling Rod. Erick was around 15 years old. He kept
calling Rambling Rod a "dick head" and shouting other profanities. Erick's sister
Tiffany and my daughter Vanessa were only 2 years old. My son Shaun was only
2 weeks old. We had to leave the mall because I was so embarrassed about
Erick's behavior. Then Erick was quiet and acted like nothing had occurred. But
just as quickly, Erick then went out of control and started complaining and
rambling. We dropped him off at home.
16. Erick was close to Shannon but there was something different about their
relationship. It was an odd relationship and difficult to describe. Shannon kept
Erick around so he could have a scapegoat. Shannnon was a leader, and Erick was
a follower.
17. I heard stories from Shannon that his father Frank would line up the kids against
the wall and whip them with a strap.
18. Shannon never showed me any physical love. There were no hugs or kisses from
him. He seemed to view his son Shaun as a "possession."
19. Grandma Seivers had the attitude that no one was ever good enough for her. She
was very harsh on all the children. She was verbally abusive and harsh with me
as well. She had expectations that no one could ever meet.
20. Shannon has never maintained a relationship with his son Shaun. When Shaun
was 5 years old, Shannon's mother Jean called me and expressed a desire to form
a relationship with Shaun. I initially refused because of all the bad stories that
Shannon had told me about Jean.
Affidavit ofKimberly A. Bacon 4
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21. As a result of Jean's insistence, I allowed the relationship to fonn between Jean
and Shaun. 'This lead to a better relationship between Jean and myself. We still
have a good bond to this day, and I now believe that the stories Shannon told me
about his mother are not true.
22. I believe that Erick is mentally ill, incompetent, and has developmental delays.
Erick was very unusual in his behaviors. He was in his own world. For example
one morning, Erick showed up at my house at 2 am. when he was 15 years old
because he needed to someone to speak to. I got up, and Erick told me he came to
my house by taking his mother's car and rolling it down the driveway.
23. I worked in a mental facility at Columbia River Mental Health for almost two
years as a specialist and worked with over a hundred and twenty clients with all
types of disorders. Through my work, I saw many children who exhibited the
same symptoms as I observed in Erick.
24. Back when Erick was young, they did not diagnose kids the way they do today.
Erick had symptoms and behaviors that are treated today as Bi-Polar disorder,
ADHD, and attachment disorder. I believe that Erick suffers from a severe
attachment disorder.
25. Erick is a warm person, not a cold person. Erick has major mental instability
issues, and needs help. I believe that in a controlled environment and with
structure and assistance he could function properly.
Affidavit ofKimberly A. Bacon 5
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DATED this 9th day ofApril, 2006.
I, e .1U c .. ).0-- , a no~ public, do hereby certify that on thii1~ay
of April, 2006, perso ly appeared before me kIIy\OCdy t~( ()Y).. , who, being
by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the above mentioned person and that (s)he signed the
foregoing document and that the statements the in contained e true.
Affidavit of Kimberly A. Bacon 6
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Wendy Levy, being ftrst duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge unless
otherwise noted.
2. I was interviewed by the Prosecution and Defense prior to Erick Virgil Hall's
conviction and sentencing. I was concerned following these interviews because I
have had very positive experiences with Erick, but was only asked about negative
experiences by the Prosecution and was not called to testify by the Defense. I
would have testifted about the following events at Erick Hall's trial if I had been
asked to do so:
-
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3. I met Erick Virgil Hall in or around 1990. Erick and I initially became close
friends because we were both from Washington State and have experienced
sexual abuse in our families. Erick told me he has great resentment toward his
real family because of how he was raised, considered his real family 'dead,' and
commonly refers to me as his ·Sister.' Erick frequently stayed in my home at
3905 Alpine Street, Apartment 84, in Boise.
4. Erick had limited job skills, limited social skills, limited education, and low self
esteem. However he was a talented artist, playful, a good worker, and was
protective of my children and me. Erick commonly acted like a child himself
when playing with my children, laughing, swinging on swings, jumping around,
and generally acting silly. Erick often acted like a little boy who had never had a
chance to grow up. He helped around the house with cooking, cleaning, taking
clothes to the laundromat, and was very good with all of my children, including
my special-needs daughter. Erick has never behaved in a violent manner with any
members ofmy family. My children refer to Erick as 'Uncle Erick.'
5. I believe that Erick had moments in which he experienced lapses in memory or
brief losses of memory. Erick would pause and have a blank look in his eyes.
When he re-oriented, he would play it off and act like he had understood the
conversation or passage of time, but it did not appear to me that he did in fact
understand.
6. On one occasion, Erick provided food for my family when we were hungry by
stealing meat and delivering it to my house. On other occasions, Erick gave me
money, although I later learned he had stolen this money by breaking into vending
AFFIDAVIT OF WENDY LEVY 2
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machines. Through these misguided but well-intentioned acts, it was clear to me
that Erick desired to provide for my family although he lacked the skills and
understanding about how to appropriately do so.
7. Erick was uncomfortable in crowds. but functioned and communicated well in
small groups and one-to-one settings. He would stay in my home for a period of
time. then he became uncomfortable with the family environment and would
leave for a period of time. He acted more grounded with the family. then seemed
to need to take a break from it. always returning after a period of time.
8. When I moved to 4304 Adams Street in Garden City in 1991, Erick came to stay
with my family and slept in a camp trailer we parked in our driveway.
9. One night in early December 1991, a woman named Norma Jean Oliver was
dropped off at my home by a person driving a white car. Norma Jean Oliver
behaved in a disrespectful and socially incapable manner: She came into the
house without knocking on the door or asking permission, used the bathroom, and
looked in the refrigerator. She was withdrawn and non-communicative while
there. She spent approximately 24 hours on my property.
10. Erick Hall told me Ms. Oliver had bought him drinks at Mountain Billiards. and
that they had had consensual sex in the camp trailer. I believe Ms. Oliver
followed Erick to my home from Mountain Billiards and was interested in him.
11. The following morning, Ms. Oliver used the shower and I saw her come out of the
bathroom. She was wearing a tank top and jeans, and I saw no marks. scratches,
bruises. or injuries of any kind on her face. neck, shoulders. arms. or hands.
While she was on my property, I did not see Ms. Oliver carrying a duffel bag,
AFFIDAVIT OF WENDY LEVY 3
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backpack, or extra clothing of any kind. I told Erick I believed there was
something wrong with Ms. Oliver and asked him to ask Ms. Oliver to leave my
property.
12. Within a few days, the police came to my home and arrested Erick Hall for raping
Ms. Oliver. Erick told me he had thought Ms. Oliver was old enough to engage in
consensual sex because he met her in a bar and she bought beer for him. I believe
the reason Ms. Oliver reported Erick for rape was because he rejected her interest
in him and told Ms. Oliver to leave the premises at my request.
13. I tried to explain to Erick that he should fight the rape charges, but he did not
seem to understand what the State was going to do to him and said that he was
giving up and would not fight the charges because he slept with Ms. Oliver.
14.
WL
When I went to see Erick t••J_..ltrtin prison, he acted like a completely different
person. He had a wild look in his eyes that reminded me ofa caged animal. Erick
was constantly in motion, pacing back and forth, looking trapped. Erick's
behavior seemed completely different from my earlier memories and experiences
of him, like Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Hyde. Erick wrote me letters from jail which
expressed his feelings of confusion and disorganization. He also talked about
committing suicide.
15. When Erick came out of prison after serving his sentence for rape, his level of
agitation and need to be in constant motion increased. Erick had typically
struggled to sit still in the past, but this was far worse. Erick was extremely
flighty. He had a few temporary jobs and did some babysitting, but could not
keep a job, could not sit still, and appeared completely unfocused and lost in
AFFIDAVIT OF WENDY LEVY 4
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tenns ofdetennining a future course ofaction. Erick was a good worker when he
worked, but something negative would happen and Erick would not know how to
take the next step to resolve the negative issue. He lacked the skills to organize
himself, structure events in his life, or plan into the future. He just acted on
impulse and in the moment. On several occasions he told me he ate out of the
garbage can at a McDonald's restaurant.
16. On another occasion when I lived at 3115 Turning Leaf Street in Caldwell in or
around 2000, Erick brought a woman to my house named Karen. Erick was
trying to help her avoid her abusive husband.
17. I was interviewed by the Defense on February 26,2004. I gave them much ofthe
same infonnation as reported in this affidavit, but was never called to testify at
Erick's trial or sentencing.
18. During Erick's murder trial, I was contacted by the Prosecution and asked to
come to the Ada County Courthouse. I was interviewed by a person who I
believe was Roger Bourne, and who only asked me for negative information
about Erick Hall such as incidents in which he was violent with me or my family.
I told them I had nothing but good things to say about Erick.
19. I also told this gentleman that Erick had had a girlfriend named Amber Peterson at
one time. I told this gentleman I had asked Ms. Peterson whether Erick had ever
choked her or engaged in violent behavior with her, and how Ms. Peterson told
me Erick had never done so.
-
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DATED this !5 day ofApril, 2006.
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State Appellate Public Defender
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Timothy N. Turley, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge unless
otherwise noted.
2. I was never contacted or interviewed by the police or Prosecution pertaining to
Erick Virgil Hall or this case.
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3. I was interviewed by a female member of Erick's defense team, Roseanne, in
August 2004 and again in September 2004. During those interviews, I shared
much of the information with Roseanne that is contained within this affidavit.
4. Roseanne told me that I would testify on Erick's behalf during his trial. She went
over the testimony with me that I planned to give. I was transported to the Ada
County Courthouse, but was not called to testify. I was never given a reason why
I did not testify. To this day, I continue to feel very bitter about not being called
by Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr, because I believe my testimony about Erick's
character and how he saved my life could have made a difference in the jury's
verdict.
5. Had I been called to testify, I would have stated the following:
6. I have known Erick Virgil Hall for nearly twenty years. I met him around 1987 or
1988. Erick had moved to Idaho from Washington, and he needed a place to live.
He moved in with my cousin, Rick Giambo.
7. In 1989, I was arrested for burglary. Erick helped me at that time by attending all
ofmy hearings, and selling my van so that I could post bail.
Affidavit ofTimothy N. Turley 2
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8. Erick and I became good friends. As our friendship progressed Erick came to be
accepted and loved by all of my family members. My daughters still talk about
their Uncle Erick. I consider him to be my brother; a member of my family. On
numerous occasions when I've been in jailor prisOI4 Erick has checked on my
mother, sister, and children to ensure they were safe and give them any assistance
they needed.
9. Erick and I each had a difficult childhood, but we didn't dwell on it. We decided
that nobody around us was going to go hungry. When you grow up hungry, it
makes you want to make sure that nobody around you has an empty belly.
10. One one occasion when we were staying with Rick Giambo and Wendy Levy,
Erick woke me up at 3am and asked me to help him deliver something. He said,
"Santa Claus is here." When I went downstairs, I saw three crates full of frozen
meat: I helped him deliver the meat to several homes and stock their refrigerators
and freezers. Erick said he didn't care if he got caught, because what mattered
was that the children were taken care of, and there was food on the table.
11. On August 9, 1990, my wife Antoinette was pregnant and her water broke. Erick
was staying with us at the time, and he drove my wife and I to the hospital. He
stayed in the delivery room with Antoinette for the birth, while I was taken to a
detox center at Port of Hope. Erick is the godfather of one of my children, and
one ofthe few men I considered worthy to hold her when she was a baby.
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12. In the summer of 2000, Erick happened to show up at my house. I had been out
of prison for a few months, and was having a very difficult time. I had been
planning to kill myself that day, and had a gun. I was in the process ofputting the
gun up to my head and in my mouth. Erick ran over to me and knocked the gun
out ofmy mouth. He picked me up, took me out to his car, and drove around with
me for several hours. He gave me food, cigarettes, and talked to me until I got to
the point where I could think again and figure out what to do. A week or two
after that I left Idaho and moved to a different state to try to put my life back
together.
13. Those of us who know Erick well and care about him see what an advocate he is
for the underdog. Erick had a trailer and would let anyone stay there who needed
a helping hand. He made sure they were fed and had a roofover their head.
14. I never feared Erick or saw him behave in a violent manner. I was always the
hothead in a given situation and charged in headfirst. Erick was always the one to
pull me back and calm me down. Erick never raged.
15. Erick knew that I was heavy into drugs, and lowe part ofmy sobriety to him. He
has held me in his arms while I came down from a heroin binge. There aren't
many people who will sit with you when you're drug-sick, but Erick did that for
Affidavit ofTimothy N. Turley 4
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me. He frequently gave me a hard time for getting high and told me that drugs
were killing me. I wish I had listened to him sooner.
16. If I could take Erick's place on the lethal injection table and spare his life, I
would. It's not right for the state to take his life. Erick's execution would have a
profoundly negative emotional impact on me and many members of my family.
To lose my brother would be like losing part ofmyself.




I, n'l1UJ1.el It:k S;.N-v..J , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this 30aay
of Novem r, 2006, personally appeared before me
IlMVfi;t tJ. Tvttl~ , who, being by me first duly sworn, declared that
he is the a ve mention person and that he SIgned the foregomg document and that the
statements therein contained are true.
My commission expires IDJ't Ito 1\
•
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State of Idaho
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Laura Turley, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge unless
otherwise noted.
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2. I was not contacted or interviewed by the Prosecution or the defense pertaining to
this case.
3. Had I been called to do so, I would have testified about the following:
4. 1 met Erick Virgil Hall approximately sixteen years ago, in or around 1990.
Erick came to my house with my ex-husband's cousin, Tim Turley, for a few
hours. Erick and Tim drove to the house in a van, and the van wouldn't start, so
Erick was working on it out in the driveway. Erick was using a wrench on the
battery, and the electricity was making his hair frizz out and stand on end. Erick
jokingly told me, 'I get a charge out of it,' and we stood out there laughing for
about an hour. Erick has always had the ability to make me laugh.
5. I lost contact with Erick not long after that, and was re-introduced to him through
Tim Turley's ex-wife Antoinette in 1993. Erick was in prison at the time, and we
became pen pals. After writing for a short time, we began speaking on the
telephone. For a period of about four months, Erick and I spoke on the telephone
two or three times a day.
6. During this time in 1993, Erick was my Rock of Gibraltar. He was an always
steady, always positive, and really important part of my life. I was going through
a divorce at the time, and I was also pregnant. I talked with Erick about all of the
challenges I was facing in my life, vented my frustrations with him, and he was a
compassionate, supportive, and sympathetic ear.
7. I did notice, however, that when I tried to engage Erick in conversations about his
life growing up, he didn't want to talk about those aspects ofhis past.
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8. When I was in labor in the hospital in November 1993, I received a telephone call
from Erick. He had called my roommate from prison, found out I was in the
hospital having the baby, and called the hospital to speak with and encourage me.
Erick made me laugh, although the labor made me feel like I was being tom to
pieces. Erick became the godfather of my youngest daughter, Kryshauna, who
was born that day.
9. I lost contact with Erick not long after that, and did not see him again until we met
coincidentally at a community event after Erick was released from prison.
10. In the late 1990s, I took Kryshauna to a barbeque at Julia Davis park. The
barbeque was a regularly occurring event, perhaps weekly, and was sponsored by
a local church. I saw Erick there on several occasions, usually with his girlfriend,
whose name I do not recall. Erick was always friendly, approachable, and he
played with Kryshauna. Erick and I spoke on those occasions, but not in-depth.
11. Erick is a very giving person. Some of my acquaintances told me they ran into
Erick from time to time, and I am aware that Erick was letting people stay with
him in his mobile home at the Flying H Trailer Park.
12. Erick is a very caring person. He has always had something positive to say about
people. All of my memories of Erick are positive, and I have never seen him
engage in any sort of frightening or violent behavior.
13. I left Boise and went back east for several years. In February 2005, I returned to
Boise to visit family and saw a story on the news regarding Erick's conviction.
The crimes Erick was convicted for are totally out of character based on my
experiences and interactions with Erick.
AFFIDAVIT OF LAURA TURLEY 3
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14. I have feelings of care and concern for Erick and his execution would cause a
devastating negative impact on my life. I do not want Erick to get the death
penalty.
day ofJuly, 2006.DATED this
~l ~ ~~ £. <LI....t:fi- ( ,j.,..A........ )
~ley ~ ~.
I, IYkM\Ct... JAJ 5/t1l <,J , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this "5dday
of July, 2006, pe onally appeared before me LAv£..f.\ TUR..L6eti '
who, being by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the above m tioned person and
that he signed the foregoing document and that the statements therein contained are true.
Residing in O¥-ie
My commission expires IDhf/W II,
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Jennifer Demunbrun, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge unless
otherwise noted.
2. I went with my mother, Wendy Levy when she was interviewed by the
Prosecution prior to Erick Virgil Hall's conviction and sentencing. There was a
female and two males who were asking questions. They asked my mother if
Erick ever hit anyone or brought any strange women to the house. My mother
said Erick never raised a hand to anyone in the house and had brought girlfriends
to the house. The prosecution didn't ask me any questions, but told me I would
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be interviewed to confinn what my mother said, and that I would probably receive
a subpoena. I was never contacted by the prosecution, and I did not receive a
subpoena.
3. I was interviewed multiple times by the defense team. A woman named
Roseanne came to my house at in Boise, and
interviewed me. I believe I spoke with her alone. One interview occurred on
September 22,2004, and {told Roseanne I wanted to testify on Erick's behalf. I
believe Roseanne told me I could testify, but I never received a subpoena or was
called to testify. I would have testified about the following events at Erick Hall's
trial if! had been asked to do so:
4. I was born on . I met Erick Virgil Hall when I was approximately
12 years old. At that time, I lived at in a Boise apartment
complex called Alpine Manor. Erick came to live with us, and he took care ofmy
brother Sean, my sisters Corrie and Christina, and me when my mother was
working and my stepfather, Rick Giambo, was away from the house stealing
money and doing drugs.
5. I began referring to Erick as my 'Uncle,' because he is about seven years older
than me, and I believe Erick may be related to our family through his grandfather,
Virgil Hall.
6. Erick was a great babysitter. He was gentle, he never raised his voice toward us,
he never hit us, and he did not neglect us or leave us alone. Erick treated us as
though we were his children. He took us to the park to feed the ducks, cooked
meals for us, and if we were sick he would encourage us to eat or take our
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medicine. Erick never behaved in a violent manner with any members of my
family.
7. On one occasion when my stepfather stole money the family had set aside for
food, my cousin Carl and Erick stole meat from a freezer for the family to be able
to eat. On other occasions, Erick stole money by breaking into vending machines.
Through these misguided but apparently well-intentioned acts, it was clear to me
that Erick wanted to provide for my family although he lacked the skills and
understanding about how to do so. Erick was shy, never stood up for himself and
lacked confidence in himself.
8. Our family moved to Garden City around 1991, and we were living at 4304
Adams Street. Erick came to live with us and slept in a camp trailer on our
property. One night in December 1991, Erick brought Norma Jean Oliver to my
mother's house, and introduced us to her. Norma Jean was wearing a jean jacket,
white shirt, and blue jeans. She had blonde hair. Erick was drunk, and told us he
had just come from Mountain Billiards, and that Norma Jean Oliver had been
buying him beers. Norma Jean was hanging onto Erick's arm, and Erick told us
Norma Jean had nowhere to go. He had never brought a woman into our home
prior to this incident.
9. Norma Jean was carrying a duffel bag, which made me suspicious. I believed that
there was something wrong with her based on how she was acting, and told her to
leave. I told Erick I thought Norma Jean Oliver was an underage runaway who
would steal from us. Erick told me she was 21, and that she had been buying him
drinks.
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10. I assumed Norma Jean had left the property. The next morning around 11 :OOam,
Norma Jean knocked on the door of the mobile horne, and I answered the door.
She appeared to have the same clothing on as she was wearing from the day
before, and I saw no cuts, scratches, markings, bruises, or injuries of any kind on
her body. Norma Jean said she needed to get her things out of the camper where
she had apparently spent the night. I walked with her to the trailer, and she went
inside for a few minutes, retrieved her duffel bag, and left immediately. She did
not act upset or concerned, but she did appear to be in a hurry.
11. Within a day, the police came to the property. The fIrst time the police came,
Erick was not there. The police searched the trailer, and allegedly found Norma
Jean's bra, rippedjeans, and other items.
12. The property also had a shed, which was where Rick Giambo kept his drugs and
tools. I believe the shed was locked. The police did not search the shed.
13. When Erick came home, he was arrested by the police and went to jail. I was not
interviewed by the police about Norma Jean Oliver. If there had been a trial, I
would have testifIed that I saw Norma Jean Oliver without any injuries the
morning after she was alleged to have been raped by Erick. I would also have
testifIed that I believe Norma Jean Oliver planted the evidence that the police
found in the camp trailer.
14. I knew the bartender at Mountain Billiards, Bobby Scott Warner, and think he is
my stepfather's cousin. I believe that ifErick had had a trial, Bobby Scott Warner
would have testifIed that Norma Jean Oliver had fake identifIcation and bought
Erick beer.
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15. Erick was very mechanically talented with his hands. He rebuilt bicycles for our
family, and he drew pictures for us. I completely trust Erick. In 1993, when I
became pregnant, Erick was the first person I told about the pregnancy. My
daughter, Syringa Lizama, loves Winnie the Pooh and Tigger so Erick would
draw pictures of them for her. She loved the pictures and slept with them under
her pillow. The pictures were high enough quality to have been framed, but
unfortunately they were lost when we moved to Garden Valley.
16. Around the year 2000, I gave my mother custody of my daughter and sent my son
William Tran to be with his father. I was out ofcontrol on drugs and did not want
any responsibilities. It was Erick who convinced me to stop using drugs and turn
my life around. Erick made sure I didn't go anywhere without him, checked that I
had receipts for things I purchased so I wasn't spending money on drugs, made
my drug-using friends leave when they came around the house, made me throw
away their telephone numbers, and kept me clean. Ultimately, I moved back in
with my husband.
17. I have a medical condition that causes ulcers on my tonsils, and sometimes they
become inflamed and I cannot eat or drink. When this happens I have become
hospitalized on several occasions. I had a similar episode sometime in 2000 or
2001, and Erick spent time with me and took care of me. Erick woke me up to
eat, to drink water, to take medicine, and he watched my children for me.
18. When Erick first got out of prison in November 1999, I took him to register as a
sex offender at the Boise Police Station on Barrister. Erick was homeless, and he
used our address. I did this on two or three occasions. I also paid the $10 fee for
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the registrations. On one occasion when I took Erick to register, the police told
him that he could not register because he did not have an address. Erick was
unable to use my address at that time because I had moved back in with my
husband, and he did not want Erick to use that address.
19. After Erick's arrest in 2003, Garden City Police officer Rick Allen came to my
house with a number of police officers. They asked me if Erick had ever been
violent with me or with my children. I told them Erick had never been physically
violent, and had been verbal on one occasion. The police told me Erick had raped
and killed two women, that there was DNA, and that there was a 40 billion to one
chance that it was not Erick.
20. My best friend, Amber, dated Erick and was intimate with him. I asked Amber if
Erick had ever forced her to have sex or choked her during sex and she said no,
Erick was very gentle.
21. When I went to see Erick in jail and in prison, he acted like a completely different
person. He had a wild look in his eyes that reminded me ofa caged animal. Erick
wrote me letters talking about committing suicide.
22. Erick tried really hard to improve his life, but he lacked the skills to organize
himself, structure events in his life, or plan into the future. He just acted on
impulse and in the moment. On several occasions he told me he ate out of the
garbage can at a McDonald's restaurant.
23. I was interviewed by the defense on September 22,2004. I gave Roseanne much
of the same information as reported in this affidavit, but was never called to
testify at Erick's trial or sentencing.
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24. I love Erick and I do not want him to get the death penalty.
25. Erick's death would devastate my family, especially my children and I. Erick was
a big part of my children's lives, and they talk about him all the time and how
much they miss him.
Residing i l?o7~ IJ;u--o
/
My commission expires IDJ4 JZb II
~iftiore me this '1= day ofSeptember, 2006.
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Amber Fox, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. I was never contacted or interviewed by the prosecution or the defense in this
matter. Had I been contacted and asked to testify, I would have stated the
following:
2. Until I married in May 2004, my name was Amber Lynn Peterson.
3. I first met Erick Virgil Hall when he got out ofprison in or around December
1999. I finished work for the day and my friend and roommate at the time,
Jennifer Demunbrun, told me she wanted to introduce me to her Uncle Erick who
was going to be staying with us for a while.
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4. Jennifer and I went to our residence at the time, 3824 Pershing Drive in Boise,
where I met Erick. He was very nice, and we became friends.
5. I was going through a difficult time in my life, because I had been using
methamphetamine. When I moved in with Jennifer, her children were present and
I did not use around them. Erick told me he did not like meth, was highly against
using it, and if he ever saw me using he would make sure I got in trouble for it.
6. Erick's mood and affect always appeared to me to be very nice, polite, cordial,
and soft spoken. Erick never became angry around me, and he did not seem to
have a temper.
7. Erick made numerous efforts to help people out with their problems and
concerns. On one occasion, someone needed some gas for their car, so Erick gave
them some gasoline. Erick was mechanically minded, and I believe he worked on
Jennifer's vehicle for her a few times.
8. My friendship with Erick evolved into a physical relationship. We both slept
downstairs in the house, and one night we decided to start having consensual sex.
We had sex a few times over the course of about a month. Erick was always
gentle with me, and never engaged in any kind ofrough or abusive behavior,
choking, or any other violent or bizarre behavior.
9. In late 1999 or early 2000, Erick began dating another woman. Erick and I
stopped our physical relationship, but remained friends.
10. In early 2000, I lost contact with Erick when I moved out and Erick spent less
time at Jennifer's house.
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11. I have feelings of care and concern for Erick, and I do not want him to get the
death penalty. Erick's death would cause me emotional trauma and have a
negative impact on my life.
DATED this -=l day ofJune, 2006.
---+-c.....L.:..:J!Z.!~:...::.-f--J..~OC":::...-__' a notary public, do hereby certify that on this
ersonally appeared before
-
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Jeff Langston, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I was never contacted by anyone on the defense team either on the trial team or
their experts
3. Had I been contacted, I would have testified to the below information:
4. In 1988, I was living in Toutle Rivers Boys Ranch in Vancouver, Washington
when I was told that in one week I would be leaving the ranch to live with a foster
family.
5. I was told that I would stay for one weekend with the foster family to make sure
that the foster family could meet my needs. But on the day I was to leave for the
weekend, I was told to pack all my items and that I would be staying permanently
with my foster family.
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6. Instead of a couple, I just got a foster mother, Linda McQuery. She was between
40 and 45 years old. She was divorced and had one biological son, Travis
McQuery.
7. Travis was 23 years old and did not live in the home. Travis lived with his
fiancee in a separate house. Linda and Travis had a strenuous relationship. Linda
and Travis' fiancee did not get along for some unknown reason.
8. Linda was working at Hewlett Packard between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday thru
Friday.
9. When I arrived at Linda's house. I was told that also living in the home was Erick
Hall. Erick had arrived 3 weeks prior to my arrival and left the home about one
week before I left. I was Erick's foster brother for two months.
10. The house was a three bedroom, two bathrooms home. Erick and I shared one
bathroom and Linda had another bathroom in her room. Erick and I each had our
own bedroom. In our bedroom, we each had our own waterbed. The rooms were
simply furnished with a bed and closet.
11. The bedrooms were divided with 2 bedrooms on one side and the master bedroom
across the hallway. Erick and I were next two each other with Erick's room being
directly across from Linda's.
12. The house was simply furnished. The house was always kept clean with no
clutter. The living room was simple with just a couch, piano and television.
13. Erick and I were her only foster children. I was 17 years old and Erick was 16
years old.
14. I had dropped out of school in the eighth grade but Erick was still attending high
school. Erick would walk to and from school.
15. Erick and I never developed a close relationship. I found Erick to be ignorant.
Although Erick was always trying to follow me around. He was always telling
me stories as ifhe was trying to impress me so I would like him.
16. Erick always seemed to act as if he was this big tough guy but in reality Erick was
not. At one time, I even thought Erick was gay because he always wanted to
hover over me and because he always wanted to be around guy friends. He was
always seeking there approval. Erick was very needs. Erick was always trying to
fmd friends. He was always trying to please everyone that would pay any
attention to him. He was more a follower than a leader. The kids he chose to
follow where kids who had problems with the law.
AFFIDAVIr OF JEFF LANGSTON 2
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17. Erick and I never hung around. There were times when we were both in the home
but I would try to ignore Erick. Erick had a huge problem with his outward
appearance and hygiene which I found to be disgusting. Linda always had to
remind Erick to brush his teeth, change his underwear, and use deodorant. She
also had to remind him to change his bed sheets. Any new clothes that Erick had
were folded and kept in the closet. It seemed to me that Erick was storing his
clothes. One time, I did discuss with Erick his poor hygiene. Erick said that he
had lived off and on the streets for so long that he preferred to save his clothes in
case he had to live on the streets again. He would use the same clothes until they
were no good from so much wearing and lack of washing. This was about the
extent that Erick talked about his life before he was placed with Linda.
18. Another reason I chose not to hang out with Erick was because I found him odd
and weird. On several occasions, Erick would say off the wall comments having
to do with elf demons. I would ask him where he would come up with these
things and he would say that he would hear them. Erick was always stating how
voices would say certain things to him or that he was hearing certain things.
Sometimes we would be discussing something like religion and Erick would
comment something odd and say that he just heard someone tell him that. But
there would not be anyone else in the room.
19. Erick suffered from lots of headaches. Linda always kept extra strength Tylenol
stocked up for him. He had headaches it seemed about 4 or 5 times a week. At
one time, Erick mentioned to me that he should be taking medication but did not.
I do not know ifthis was true or not. I believed it was true because ofhis constant
head aches and mood swings. Sometimes we would be talking and all of a sudden
Erick would get upset and start raving and ranting. Erick's voice would get loud
and he would start pacing and waving his arms around. There was no apparent
reason or rhyme for his behavior.
20. About a week and half after I arrived, Linda got home about 1 in the morning.
She had been drinking. Although, I had never seen Linda with a man, when she
arrived, she had a man with her. Erick was asleep in his room but I was awake
watching television. Linda saw that I was awake and asked the man to leave. She
told me that I was sweet for waiting up for her. She sat down on the couch next to
me and laid my head in her lap. She started petting my head as if I was a dog.
When I turned my head, her breast brushed against my face. Before I knew it, we
were making out. Then suddenly Linda got up from the sofa and turned off the
television. I thought that was her way ofsending me to bed. As we were walking
down the hall, Linda asked if I would tuck her into bed. When I went into her
bedroom, she started undressing and began to kiss me again. I got undressed and
got into bed with her and we had sex. I got up and tip toed down the hallway and
took a shower. I then went and slept in my own bed. The following morning,
Linda tried to act as if she was too drunk to remember. But I approached her and
started to kiss her again. From then on we developed a sexual relationship. Linda
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF LANGSTON 3
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always insisted that Erick not know. She would not allow me to get intimate
when Erick was around.
21. Linda had more a motherly attitude towards Erick. She did not want him to be
aware of our relationship. I never discussed my relationship with Linda with
Erick. Erick may have guessed it but we never talked about it.
22. Another reason I left was because of my relationship with Linda. I was interested
in dating other girls my own age. I felt that I was somehow betraying my
relationship with Linda. The relationship was getting stressful for both of us.
23. Once I left the home, I never saw Linda again. I did see Erick one time at the
Vancouver Mall. Erick approached me. Again, it seemed that he was eager to
talk to me but again, I ignored him. About a week later, I left to Oklahoma. I
never had contact with Erick Hall again.
~---
My commission expires 4- 1\.-;).()\ d-..
24. Remembering Erick back then, although he was odd, and definitely had problems
fitting in, Erick did not seem to be the type of person that would hurt someone
else. He seemed like a nice but troubled kid carrying a lot of baggage and maybe
suffering from some mental problems. I didn't know about his background then,
but learning about his childhood now, a lot of things kind of fall into place. Erick
was always trying to please people so that they would like him. It seemed that
Erick was always trying to get approval or acceptance from others; approval or
acceptance he never was given.
DATED this.liday of March, 2007.
r.m'·....::"..SUBS~.~,;:,~WORN
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STATE OF IDAHO. )
) S5
County ofAda. )
Sophronia Selby. being first duly afftrmed. deposes and says:
1. All matters set forth are based on personal knowledge unless otherwise noted.
2. I was never contacted by anyone on the defense team either on the trial team or
their experts
3. Had I been contacted. I would have testified to the below information:
4. My husband and I began doing foster care in 1976. We would only foster one
child at a time.
5. In 1979. my husband and I got licensed through Idaho to provide foster care.
AFFIDAVIr OF SOPHRONIA SELBY
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6. In late 1979 or 1980, we began our services through Youth for Christ in Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho. Youth for Christ had a family intervention program that provided
assistance with foster care for the State. The courts needed a place for foster kids
and Youth for Christ stepped in and provided that care by providing licensed care
takers.
7. The court used Youth for Christ to assist as a mediation home. Children would be
removed from the home while Youth for Christ worked with the parents and
children. The objective was to repair any damage to the parent-child relationship
and reunite the family. The children would only be placed with the foster parents
on a temporary basis lasting no longer then 2 weeks. Youth for Christ would
continue to work with the family once the child was returned to the home. The
program was trying to avoid long term foster care for these children.
8. Not long after the birth ofour first child in 1980, we quit providing foster care. In
1981, we had a second child.
9. In 1981, we moved to Newberg, Oregon. We lived there for four years.
10. In 1983, we were licensed for foster care in Oregon. We had been asked to
provide care for one girl and so we got licensed. We also had one other private
placement with us. A family friend asked that we take their son into our home
and provide foster care until he was eighteen years old which we did.
11. In 1985, we moved to Tillamook, Oregon. We were hired by Friends for Families
to open and operate a shelter care home. We were to take placements from the
State ofOregon and provide temporary shelter home.
12. We opened the home in November 1, 1985 and worked full-time. We lived in the
home with our children. The shelter home was referred to as the Selby house.
The children were placed in the Selby home until the State was able to figure out
the child's next foster placement.
13. The court would place children with us to provide an evaluation. We would be
required to go to court and provide a recommendation to the court by testifying.
We also had to submit a written report to Children Services. Our testimony and
report would either recommend that the children be returned to the home, go to a
group home or institutional care home or go into a foster care. We had to justify
our recommendation with behavior descriptions of the children.
14. Selby home consisted of 6 bedrooms. It was a two-story home with a basement.
The basement had a couch and TV. The main floor had the family living areas. It
had kitchen, dining room, living room, laundry room, three bedrooms and one
bathroom. These three bedrooms were divided: one for me and my husband, one
for my daughter and one for my son. The second floor had two bedrooms, one
office, and two bathrooms. One bedroom was for the boys and one bedroom was
AFFIDAVIT OF SOPHRONIA SELBY 2
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for the girls. One bathroom was designated for the boys and the other for the
girls. Each bedroom had 3 beds in it. The rooms were large dormitory style
bedrooms.
15. In late fall of 1985, Erick Hall was placed in our home. We were Erick's foster
parents for about five and half months.
16. During this time, we had various kids come and go through our home. Usually
we had no more then five at a time, not including our own.
17. Erick Hall was one of two children that were placed in our shelter home through
private placement. Erick was placed in our care under private placement by
David Gray.
18. At the time, David lived on College Street in Newberg, Oregon which was about
three houses down from Erick's home. Newberg was about 100 miles from
Tillamook. David Gray attended the same denominational church that we did.
The shelter home was a ministry through our denominational church. The Church
provided information on the Selby home to its congregations.
19. David and my husband, Harry, made the arrangements. I do not recall the details
of those arrangements.
20. David dropped Erick off at the Selby home. Erick did not have any personal
belonging with him. He only had the clothes he was wearing. The clothes that
Erick was wearing were very dirty and smelled. It was obvious from the smell
that the clothes had not been washed in a long time. They also smelled like
cigarette smoke.
21. Erick stayed in the clothes he arrived in for almost a week. We were finally able
to convince him to shower and change. We had a closet filled with clothes that
various people donated. Erick chose clothes from that closet. We were lucky if
we could get Erick to shower a couple of times a week.
22. Erick was a very quiet, very insecure person. All the children in our care seemed
to have this deer in the head lights look about them but Erick seemed to have it
even more so. Erick was overly scared and insecure. He was extra cautious in
everything he did in the home. It seemed that he went out of his way not to be
noticed.
23. Within the first few weeks of Erick's placement, we had a respite care person stay
in our home while my husband and I went to Newberg to visit my sister-n-Iaw. I
do not recall if we planned it but once there we decided to go to Erick's home to
see if we could get some clothes and personal belongings for Erick. We knew
where Erick lived because of the information given to us by David Gray.
-
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24. We drove to Erick's house sometime in the middle afternoon. The house had a
wrap around porch. The outside was unkempt. The paint was cracking and
peeling. The porch was very saggy and the foundation was cracking. There was
garbage all along the porch.
25. My husband is the one that got out of the car to go knock. I noticed that the door
to the house was open. I saw that my husband did not enter the house but was
speaking to someone. I watched as my husband returned to the car. My husband
looked very upset and was shaking his head. He expressed how angry he was at
the filth the house was in. He was also dismayed that there were two little girls in
the house but no adults.
26. While Erick was with us, he always stayed very close to my husband, Harry.
Only very rarely would Erick venture outside the home without him. Erick would
go outside to go to school but as soon as he was home from school, he was back
in the house. It was about four months before Erick went outside without Harry.
27. Usually, Erick would stay in the house close to my husband, Harry, or with the
other foster kids. Although he did not actively participate with the kids, he rarely
wondered on his own.
28. Erick related to the other kids in the same quiet manner. Erick did not make any
efforts to make friends. Erick got along with everyone but he was just present and
not an active participant. Erick was more ofa follower than a leader.
29. The only major issue we had with Erick were his constant dealings with
headaches. He dealt with headaches on a weekly basis. Usually we would give
him some Tylenol and have him lie down for a while. We did not take him to the
hospital or doctor. I do not know how severe the headaches were only that he had
them. Erick was not a complainer but I could see that he was in pain.
30. We did not have any problems with Erick except one time. Early spring, all the
kids decided to run away from the home. One of the other foster kids, George,
decided he was going to run away. The other foster kids found out and decided to
go with him. Erick being the follower decided to go also. After the second day of
being on the run, all the kids were walking along a highway towards Salem,
Oregon. A state police man who knew they were missing, drove along side of
them asked them were they were going. They said they were going to Salem. The
officer offered them a ride and they all accepted. The office instead of taking
them to Salem returned them to our home.
31. During the time he lived with us and was under our care, Erick attended
Tillamook High School and had no problems while he was there.
-
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32. During the time that Erick attended Tillamook, my husband also substituted as a
teacher in high school grades 9th thru 12th• He also substituted in the alternative
school for Tillamook High School.
33. We were not given a lot of information about Erick or his home. David did
mention that Erick's mom, Jean, was always going out drinking and bringing
home different men. Erick was placed with my husband and I because of Jean's
behavior and not Erick's.
34. Because of my experience with unstable children, I do believe that Erick
experienced sexual abuse. Regardless of the weather, Erick would not want to
take his coat off and always insist on remaining fully clothed. Even though Erick
had a private bathroom to shower or change, he would not shower or change.
35. My husband and I always tried to be demonstrative ofour love for them by giving
them hugs. Erick was never very comfortable with this.
36. I do not remember how Erick was removed from our care. I knew that Erick was
a temporary stay with us.
37. When I think of Erick and the young man that he was in our home and I see the
extenuating circumstances of his life, and all that has to be taken into account, it
breaks my heart. If guilty, Erick should be held accountable but not with the
death penalty.
DATED this ),3 day ofMarcb, 2007.
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MARK D. CUNNINGHAM, PH.D.
(CAPITAL CASE)
Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D., states under penalty of perjury that the following is true to
the best ofhis knowledge:
1. I am a clinical and forensic psychologist, licensed as a psychologist in the States of
Idaho, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. I am
over age 21. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit and am
competent to testify about them
2. I am the same Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D., who was retained by defense counsel to
provide expert clinical and forensic evaluation services in preparation for Mr. Erick Halls
capital sentencing trial and who subsequently testified before Mr. Halls capital sentencing
jury.
3. My education, employment and experience are set forth in the attached Curriculum Vitae.
Affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D. Page 1
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4. I have reviewed additional documentation from sources not available to me before trial
regarding the background, history, and circumstances ofMr. Erick Hall including:
Letter of James R. Merikangas, M.D., dated April 22, 2007;
Affidavits of James R. Merikangas, M.D., dated April 13, 2006; June 5, 2006; October
14, 2006; September 26, 2007;
Affidavit ofShannon Pambrun, older brother;
Affidavit of Kimberly Bacon, ex-sister-in-law;
Affidavit ofKenneth S. Douglas, maternal cousin;
Affidavit ofJeffLangston, foster brother;
Affidavit ofHarry Selby, foster parent;
Affidavit ofSophronia Selby, foster parent;
Affidavit ofEvelyn Denise Dunaway, former girlfriend;
Affidavit ofWendy Levy, friend.
5. I have reviewed information and history not known to me at trial that has subsequently
been obtained from additional interviews of persons who had been interviewed by me
and/or defense investigators prior to trial as reflected in the affidavits of:
Jean McCracken, mother;
John Thompson, brother;
Tamara McCracken, paternal half-sister;
Frank Alvin Charles McCracken, paternal half brother;
Shawndra Hemming, paternal half sister;
Frank Owen McCracken, father;
Deanna Hormann, sister.
6. Had I had the benefit of the additional information and history contained in these
affidavits prior to Mr. Hall's capital sentencing tria~ I would have incorporated this
history and clinical information into my testimony before the jury.
7. Extraordinarily important in this regard are the fmdings of Dr. James R. Merikangas
regarding his neurological evaluation of Mr. Hall which included MRI scan of the brain,
PET scan of the brain, and other diagnostic procedures. Dr. Merikangas described the
fmdings of these diagnostic procedures in his Third Affidavit of September, 2007,
stating:
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: Erick's brain is anatomically and functionally
abnormal. Erick has anatomical damage to his frontal and temporal lobes, and an
abnormally developed corpus callosum. Erick's brain in also functionally impaired in
the temporal lobe regions. It is my professional opinion to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that Erick's sexual behaviors and difficulties with impulse control
and the exercise ofgood judgment are consistent with the brain damage identified by
the brain scans... it is readily apparent that the specific damage to Erick's brain could
account for his alleged actions that evening and alleged prior criminal behavior.
Affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D. Page 2
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The results of the brain scans are consistent with Erick's history of head injuries,
pervasive developmental deficits, and other childhood deficits, disorders, and
mistreatment. Moreover, Erick's background would cause him to develop multiple
and serious emotional triggers. While persons with undamaged brains may have
those triggers and not react violently, it is much more difficult for a person with
brain damage - particularly brain damage affecting impulse control - to resist the
urge to react violently.
8. These clinical fmdings of brain abnonnalities in Mr. Hall as an adult were critically
absent from information available to me at trial. Though there had been documentation of
Mr. Hall's deficient cognitive abilities and developmental deficits in childhood, I did not
have the benefit of these clinical findings ofabnonnal brain functioning in Mr. Hall as an
adult. Accordingly, I could neither incorporate this profoundly important conclusion into
my analysis ofdamaging development factors impinging on Mr. Hall, his life trajectory,
or his mental resources at the time ofthe offense.
9. Abnormal brain functioning and the tragically synergistic combined effects of brain
damage and pervasively traumatic experience were fundamentally important factors in
explaining Mr. Hall's disturbed development and marginal adult adjustment; as well as
his criminal history, impulse control deficits, and vulnerability to aggression -
particularly when accompanied by substance abuse.
10. Had I had these findings ofbrain abnormalities in Mr. Hall I would have offered
testimony supporting a nexus between Mr. Hall's brain dysfunction and his criminal
history and offense conduct. I would have testified that there is a relationship between
brain dysfunction and violent offending, particularly in the face oftraumatic experience
and substance abuse. I would have cited and discussed psychological, psychiatric, and
neurological literature which identify that brain damage is present in disproportionately
high incidence among violent offenders.
11. The diagnosable presence ofbrain dysfunction and its potential association with violent
acts can be a significant mitigating factor in a jury's deliberation regarding whether a
penalty ofdeath is justified.
12. Dr. Merikanangas, in his Third Affidavit, further reported that the MRl scan had revealed
the corpus collosum ofErick's brain to be abnormally thin or narrow. The corpus
collosum is a large group ofneuronal fibers connecting the two hemispheres ofthe brain.
Such thinning is consistent with exposure to alcohol in utereo, i.e., Fetal Alcohol
Spectrum Disorder (FASD). Also consistent with FASD are the learning deficits,
attention deficits, impulsivity, and other symptoms exhibited by Erick in childhood.
Further consistent with FASD is his mother's history ofdrug and alcohol abuse. The
information available at trial resulted in me suspecting FASD,but I lacked sufficient
confirmatory data to offer this factor to the jury. Had I had the results ofthe MRI scan
and associated clinical interpretation, I would have had the necessary level of
confirmation. Accordingly, I would have described the both the childhood implications of
Affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D. Page 3
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FASD as well as FASD-related deficits in impulse control and judgment that persist in
adulthood.
13. Because prenatal exposure to alcohol occurs at the most innocent and vulnerable stage of
life, damaging the child even from earliest formation, a capital jury may give this factor
particular weight. This is weight is augmented if accompanied by perspectives that
alcohol exposures that are outside ofany conceivable volitional choice ofthe fetus
materially affect the quality ofvolitional choices this fetus-aIl-grownup makes in
adulthood.
14. Also absent from the information available to me prior to trial were the observations of
JeffLangston, Mr. Hall's foster brother in the household ofLinda McQuery. His report is
quite important in demonstrating that significant deficits in Erick Hall's emotional and
social functioning continued to be quite evident in mid-adolescence. In his affidavit, Mr.
Langston described these continuing deficits in graphic and poignant detail. For example,
he described that at age 16, Erick Hall's hygiene was "disgusting." He detailed that Mr.
Hall had to be reminded by Linda McQuery to brush his teeth, change his underwear, and
use deodorant. Erick repeatedly wore the same dirty clothes rather than washing them.
For a l6-year-old to demonstrate this little attention ofhygiene/grooming speaks volumes
regarding developmental deprivation and parental neglect, as well as deficient social
development and socialization. Consistent with these implications, Mr. Langston
described that Erick Hall hoarded new clothes rather than wearing them, anticipating that
he might have to live on the streets again.
15. The descriptions ofErick Hall's hygiene deficits as a teen and associated evidence ofa
history ofprofound deprivation were also reported by Harry Selby, another foster parent.
I did not have the benefit ofMr. Selby's observations at the time oftrial. Mr. Selby
reported that on first encountering Erick:
Erick did not have any personal belongings with him. He only had the clothes he was
wearing. The clothes that Erick was wearing were very dirty and smelled. It was
obvious from the smell that the clothes had not been washed in a long time. The
smell was a horrible mixture ofbody odor and cigarettes.
16. Mr. JeffLangston also described behaviors exhibited by Erick Hall that are reflective of
significant psychological disorder. These not only include his poor attention to hygiene,
but also mood swings, oddities, and erratic behavior. He described avoiding Erick Hall
because he found him "odd and weird." Mr. Langston described Erick as reporting
hearing voices (i.e., auditory hallucinations), as well as observing in conversation that
Erick make odd comments as ifreacting/responding to voices speaking to him. He
described that Erick unprovoked would suddenly get upset in a conversation and start
"ranting and raving," ''pacing and waving his arms around." Mr. Langston noted that
there was "no apparent reason of rhyme for his [Erick's] behavior." These behaviors are
consistent with a psychotic disorder.
Affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D. Page 4
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17. Consistent with recurrent ifnot longstanding experience ofpsychotic experience in
childhood and adolescence, Shannon Pambrun (older brother) described Erick as hearing
voices from age 8, with accompanying odd behavior. This was not known to me at trial.
18. Also important and unknown to me at trail was Mr. Langston's report ofbeing seduced
by their foster mother, Linda McQuery, and subsequently maintaining an incestuous
sexual relationship with her during the two months that he and Erick both resided with
Ms. McQuery. This report is important in two respects. First, Erick Hall had reported to
me in my interview ofhim in August 2004 that Linda McQuery had seduced him [Erick]
into an incestuous sexual relationship with her during his tenure in her home. I did not
testify to this at trial as I had no corroboration ofsuch a relationship. Had I known that a
foster brother ofMr. Hall was contemporaneously sexually involved with Ms. McQuery
during this same tenure, I would have viewed this as providing important confirmation of
perverse sexuality in this setting and inferentially supportive ofhis report ofalso being
sexually abused. I would have testified to this at trial.
19. At the very least, Erick's report ofhis having had an incestuous relationship with Ms.
McQuery supports a conclusion that he was aware ofthe incestuous relationship between
JeffLangston and Ms. McQuery. The highly sexually disturbed family context ofthe
McQuery household represented still another instance ofpoor familial sexual boundaries,
compounding Erick's recurrent exposure to incestuous sexual exchanges that were so
pervasive in his biological family system Again, I would have testified to these
implications at trial had I been aware ofMr. Langston's report.
20. Other information unknown to me at trial included Shannon Pambrun's descriptions of
sexual molestation and perverse family sexuality. Though I had had information
regarding sexual trauma in the family and background ofErick Hall from other sources,
Shannon provided important perspectives that I did not otherwise have. Most important
ofthese were his report ofhis maternal Uncle Allen, who had molested Erick's mother in
her childhood, also attempting to molest Shannon and his brothers including Erick.
Shannon additionally described a belief that their maternal Uncle Mark was molesting the
children of the home. Equally important are Shannon's descriptions of inappropriate
kissing between Erick's mother (Jean) and Erick's older brother, Frankie (Jean's
stepson); as well as her sexualized behavior towards Erick. As Mr. Hall's capital offense
had a sexual context, experiences and exposures to disturbed sexuality in his background
have particular importance and relevance.
21. Important in the observations ofHarry and Sophronia Selby were their recollections of
the insecurity, vulnerability, and anxiety exhibited by Erick Hall as a teen. Such
descriptions provide a compelling understanding ofthe trauma ofhis childhood, as well
as the resultant inadequacy and fearfulness that later took expression in his violent
offense conduct. These observations would have corrected misapprehensions the jury
might have otherwise had that he was and had been simply volitionally predatory.
Illustrative ofErick's fearfulness, Mr. Selby reported that Erick was reluctant to remove
his clothing for them to be washed or to take a bath because he felt vulnerable without
them on. He reported that Erick had a pronounced "deer in the headlights" look and was
Affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D. PageS
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reluctant to even venture outside ofthe house aloneforfour months. Whether Erick's
profound feelings ofsafety and body vulnerability were the result ofpervasive
developmental trauma, or arose from specific sexual abuse and trauma, or both, is
uncertain. Regardless ofetiology, in the absence of such anecdotal descriptions the jury
had little mechanism know or give informed weight to these demonstrations ofthe extent
ofErick's traumatic experience in childhood as reflected in extreme anxiety.
Unfortunately, these were unavailable at the time oftrial.
22. There are innumerable additional details and anecdotes contained in the affidavits
obtained in the course ofthe postconviction mitigation investigation that I would have
incorporated into my trial testimony had this information been known to me at that time.
23. As a result ofnot having the above described information available to me at the time of
trial, I was unable to either incorporate into my own evaluation or to testify to the jury
regarding fundamentally important developmental and mitigation factors including
neurological evidence ofbrain dysfunction, severe psychological disorder with psychotic
symptoms in childhood and adolescence, profound socialization deficits in mid-
adolescence, extreme fearfulness and marked vulnerability as a teen, additional sexually
perverse exposures in his family oforigin and in foster care, and direct experience of
sexually inappropriate interactions with his mother and his maternal uncles. I believe that
these factors and events are ofsufficient magnitude that their inclusion at trial could have
resulted in a different sentencing verdict.
DATED this 1sl day ofOctober, 2007
2. CmuringhMn, PhD. ----------
Notary Public for ~\ l V\. Y? YV, S-t !l- ~-L
I, ~p '" ') hI-<-,. >t 0.,J-"': J.!Jv , a notary public, do hereby certify that on
this 1sl day ofOctober, 2007, personally appeared before me Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D., who,
being by me first sworn, declared that he is the above mentioned person and the he signed the




Notary Public, State of New York
Qualified in Kings County
Reg. No. 01DA6123060
My Commission Exoires Feb. 28, 2009
Affidavit of Mark D. Cunningham, PhD. Page 6
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MORGAN: - (Inaudible).
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
••

























Hey, could you get a drink for me, I'm just.
I'm going to talk about that. Alright. You are in custody. I am obligated to advise
you of the Miranda Rights. (Inaudible) I know you didn't (inaudible) for the same
reason (inaudible). Let's just say, you have the right to remain silent, anything you
say ma:fbe used against you in the court of law. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer (inaudible) while you are being questioned. Ifyou don't have (inaudible) for
a lawyer, one-will be appointed for you, simple, free of charge. Do you have any
questions (inaudible) exercise these rights prior to any questions or making
statements. Number six says I understand these rights and what I really want to do is
to talk to you about (inaudible).
MIn-huh (affirinative).-
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Okay. Okay, you 00, I have been curious to ask you why you think you're going to
be over here?
(Inaudible).
Okay, this is what I am going to do. We are investigating the Cheryl Hanlon
homicide. (Inaudible). We are investigating her (inaudible).
(Inaudible).
And 00, we've been interviewing many, many, many of your (inaudible), come
across, do you understand why, as a question ofreference. Where you live, where do




Okay, Erick, urn. What I would like to do is just maybe go through and if you can
remember urn, where you were when these things happened, and particularly the
Friday night. Do you recall when this happened? It was a Friday, the last date of
February, Saturday, the first day of March. Do you remember where (inaudible)
Saturday night, and that Saturday?
I think I was passed out drunk.
(Inaudible) what you were doing? You have a drinking problem, do you.
(Inaudible).
(Inaudible).

























                 
   
 
               
       
 
            
               
             
   
  
 
                  
            
                
            
     
       
            
 
 












































Jackson's. You're not (inaudible) are you, Erick?
No.













































       
 
                 
 
 
   
 
     
























About six, uh. I don't know when I exactly saw her. I (inaudible).
When did you arrive home?
(Inaudible). The guy that (inaudible).
Can you tell me, uh, I (inaudible)? (Inaudible) go, are they coming back?
There was (inaudible) and then, I don't know, just (inaudible).
Just (inaudible)? What's her real name (inaudible)? Tell me about her, (inaudible)?
Do I have calls from here? (Inaudible). Mom and dad thought that (inaudible). I had
brothers and sisters (inaudible).
(Inaudible)?
(Inaudible) and I just scare people around me. (Inaudible).
(Inaudible) you?
Most people that I, urn (inaudible) girlfriend.
I am sorry to hear you say that.
(Inaudible) girlfriend.




(Inaudible) to see (inaudible), alright?
Yeah.
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(Inaudible) from six to nine. What is your response to that?
Urn, usually around four (inaudible) by St Vincent.
Mm-huh.
Head down there (inaudible).
Do you (inaudible) for that?
(Inaudible) my problem was that I couldn't keep up. (Inaudible).
What kind ofproblems (inaudible)?
We would usually go out there (inaudible).
So you (inaudible), what, I mean, that seems better than stealing, but (inaudible).
(Inaudible).
(Inaudible) after a while, is there a (inaudible)?
(Inaudible).







(Inaudible) we weren't really fighting, and urn.
Okay. (Inaudible).
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SMITH: So you kind of set everyone up?
ERICK: (Inaudible) no. (Inaudible).
MORGAN: (Inaudible).
Page -6-















I lost my (inaudible). Yes, myoid man (inaudible).
(Inaudible) do to investigate.





But, 00, where are your friends that (inaudible)?
I don't know about (inaudible).
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Have you tried any (inaudible)?
Huh-mm?
Have you tried any crack?
Amphetamines, I mean, I was doing (inaudible).
Do you (inaudible)?
Yeah. (Inaudible).
Let's get some of these things settled. This is while you were living on the street.
How many times have I (inaudible), going once, and then I got (inaudible) and I
(inaudible).
(Inaudible) some ofthe other cases going on (inaudible). Excuse me a second. Yeah.
Anyway, so I was trying to (inaudible) the last time you did drugs.
(Inaudible).
I
MORGAN: You can see the (inaudible). We want to get dressed like (inaudible).
(Tape inaudible).




























     
 
     
       
   
  
                
               
 
              
             
Um, I can't remember (inaudible). 
(Inaudible)? Alright, how (inaudible). 
(Inaudible) very high (inaudible). 
Tell me about Amanda. 
--.-......~ 
Mm-huh. Amanda. 
There's been some pretty (inaudible). 
 






          it 
 
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -8-
MORGAN: Your way here, (inaudible) is getting over it. Because (inaudible) is ever going to.
ERICK: It's so hard to (inaudible) over.
MORGAN: Yeah.
ERICK: Everything was spots, like she (Inaudible) punched me, you know.
MORGAN: Yeah.
ERICK: I'm still trying to get over that, it's like really thick.
MORGAN: Yeah.
ERICK: It's really thick, seriously, pudding.
MORGAN: Yeah, nasty stuff. Not every, then you get better and then someone else comes down
with it and kind ofreinfects you with it. You know. Hoping the weather is going to
turn nice and warm and everyone will heal up and be done with it, but.









Cardboard boxes next to the church. Just nuts. (Inaudible) you been.
Yeah, sorry. (Inaudible) rushing. Yeah, I was just saying, tell me about Amanda.
Which we had got from you to Washington to Burley at 18, here for the last twelve
years. Then I asked you about Amanda.
What do I know about Amanda?
Well how long you known her?
Urn, since last year. April or May. And since then, we been pretty much glued to
each other's hips.
Pretty serious?
Yeah, kind of. I mean, (inaudible) anything that I told her, a few times, you know.
There's a few things she gets confused on, sometimes she wants to be, you know,
stuck to my side and sometimes she don't, (inaudible). She never did. She was
always chasing that guy around.
000724
      
               
       
  
           
  
            
  
      
                
                 
               









           
              
                 
       
      
      
                
   
  
                
               
              
     




















You were telling me that you had a drinking problem and then you said the same
about Amanda. That doesn't sound for a good relationship. But the two ofyou are
on the juice, did you have any problems verbally fighting, or (inaudible)?
Oh yeah. We argue a lot.
Any particular problems. Is she working?
No, she made her (inaudible).
Right, and to let you know, Greg and I have spent some time with her and Cathy.
But, doesn't she go by the name, nickname, her street name is, what is it?
Rosebud or Rose.
Yeah.
Her mom told me a story that like (inaudible). Her mom says they gave her that er,
yeah gave her that name because some kind of stalking.
So they gave her the name Rosebud?
Yeah, Rose.
Rose.
Everybody I know, everybody on the street that I am aware says that she knows
always calls her Amanda. You know so, that's what everybody knows her as.
Okay. Alrighty, urn, let's go back to ifyou can remember Friday, Saturday. You
thought that you were intoxicated, passed out. Is there a particular event that
happened, that you remember drinking excessively, passing out during that weekend
that I am talking about, the last day of February, first ofMarch. Do you recall any
specifics, anything through the weekend?
I remember Saturday.
Tell me about it. What do you remember?
I woke up Saturday, atuh, 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon.























                
               
            
      
      
     
                 
               
   
 
                 
          
       
  
 
               
             
              
             
           
                 
     
   
        
          
                
  










I think so yeah.
Okay.
I remember I woke up and was kind ofcold. Got up and smoked a cigarette. Waited
a few minutes, then I woke her up. Then we got up and walked around a bit. And we
got a (inaudible) and.
I'm sorry.
(Inaudible) spanged.
Where did you do that at?
Everybody does it down on Sixth and Main. All over Main, actually.
You just changing people, spare change.
And, our daily routine, is we get drunk, and we get drunk, pass out. Wait to go eat
something like at the Community House. We woke up for lunch because then she'd
get drunk again and pass out.









Urn, Between 5:00 and 5:30, sometimes we don't eat until 6:00. So (inaudible) food
is nasty.
Other than Amanda, who do you, and the gentlemen that you said works at the hot
dog place, what was his name?
Art.
Art. Do you have any other friends, associates, acquaintances that you're close to?
Urn, just the kids I hang out with. I talk to the kids.
Erick's getting married tomorrow, who are you inviting to you wedding here, your
friends?
I'm getting married, me?
•
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It was a joke, Erick. Ifyou are getting tomorrow, who are you going to invite to your
wedding that's your friends that you know here?





Are they a couple?
Mm-huh (affirmative).
Man and wife?
Uh, soon will be (inaudible).
How do you know them from?
Urn, I've known Rosta, I've known for three years. Sky, I've known for a year and a
half. Urn, they are kind of like my brother and sister.
Do they live on the street?
No.
Where are they living?
I think they live in Nampa.




ERICK: His real name's Josh. It's not Rosta, we all call him Rosta. Um, they live in Nampa.
I know a lot ofpeople out there that. There's a girl that I call my sister, her name's
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You know, she's cool.
Okay. Let's go back to that Friday and Saturday. Would there be any reason that you
can think ofthat someone would say that they might have saw you outside the Cactus
Bar area. Do you know where the Cactus is, downtown bar area?
Mm-huh (affirmative). I know where the Cactus is.
Okay. Well in that general area, I am not so certain it should be exactly the Cactus,
but that someone might have seen you outside that bar with 00, Spider.
Spider, the blonde headed Spider? (Inaudible) No, maybe over by urn, by Willy Dog
Cart. We sat up by the Willy Dog Cart for a while.
On that particular night? We are talking about Friday night.
Yeah, that's when we started drinking.
Were you with him?
Huh?




Okay, is he related to you?
Kind of. He is Tim Turley, I think nephew. Me and Tim are kind of like, really
close, we are like brothers.
To kind ofjog your memory now that maybe somebody saw you and him together
downtown.
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Okay, you were at, where at 8:00?























We go down there, most ofus to hang out. Go down there and help set up the carts
and uh,just hang around, because there ain't nothing else to do.
Did you call him Zack, or did you call him Spider?
I call him Spider.
Okay. Well let's call him.
I call him a little Spider monkey.
Let's call him Spider okay. You're at, it's 8:00 Friday night, you and Spider are at
the Willy Dog Cart.
Amanda was with us too.
Amanda is there too?
Yeah and we moseyed on and went on got my alcohol.






So you, all three ofyou?
Yeah, we just walked down there and he walked with us.
Did you mean Spider?
000729






















       
    
 
                   
           
           
    
     
       
                
    
     
    
           






      
           
    























Went and got my alcohol and went back up to my camp area.
How much do you buy, when you.
I just buy three.
You buy three cans?
Three cans, that's it.
Okay.
I have learned from past experiences if! let her drink more than one beer, then she's
pretty violent, so (inaudible).
Then you drink two beers.
About, seriously (inaudible) she will just.
I appreciate that. Okay, so you bought your beer and all three of you are still
together?
Mm-huh (affinnative).
Then what do you remember?
Uh, going up to the church, crawling in the bushes, sitting there drinking my beer.
Gave her, her beer. I don't know if she passed out or not.
Okay.
I know I passed out.
Do you remember what time you passed out?
It had to have been about 10:00 maybe. I don't know, I don't have a watch.
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Usually we ask other people. If there is somebody around that has a watch, I ask
them what time it is.
How about that same evening, have, per chance did you bump into Venom?
Venom was with Spider. Venom, James, I don't know about that kid. yeah, they
were sleeping in the bush on the other side ofthe road that we were. We were over
here and them two passed out over on the other side.
So when you are telling me that three ofyou went to Jackson's at Capitol and Myrtle,
was it actually the four ofyou? Was Venom with you?
No, it was three ofus. There was three ofus. Coming back, Venom was downtown,
came up to us. They all called me Pops.
Why do they call you Pops?
I don't know.
Do you want me to tell you, they told us?
Huh-rom.
You are a little bit older than they are.
(Laughs) (inaudible).
Kind ofsucks because I get that called that too, so don't take it personal alright. That
just happens.
Yeah, huh. Yeah we ran across him downtown and (inaudible). We went back up
there in the bushes, him and Zack went over into their side. They threw a blanket
down. (Inaudible) it was cold. (Inaudible) sleep over in those bushes and me and
Amanda went over to our side.
I am going to help you out a little bit, here on that evening also. It snowed a little bit.
Yeah, it even got me. Our stuffwas wet.
Do you remember now?























                
     
             
              
                  
           
                 
           
                
         
      
   
          
 
         
  
                 
  
              
                
              
      
                    
         
    
                  




















Okay. Tell me what you know of the circumstances involving the case of the lady
that was killed. Tell me what you know about that. Have you read anything, have
you seen it in the news?
What we seen in the paper.
Um, we being?
Me and Amanda.
Did you go buy a paper, or go read a paper?
Yeah, we went and got a Boise Weekly.
Okay. Can you tell me what you remember of that?
Urn, I remember looking at it. Scanning over it. I guess there was two people that
were kind of. There was a guy named urn, Abdullah killed his wife and his kids.
And I don't know, Amanda I guess knows those people.
Huh-mm.
I was just reading over it.
Ok, Did you, did you see a picture? The one in the paper that you looked at?
Oh, a picture of the person?
Yeah.
Yeah. I kept telling her that they put on a bean hat. I said put on a beanie.
No, I'm talking about a picture of the victim.
Uh, I dido't pay attention to that.
Okay, you, you didn't see that person. Okay.
I kept telling her that they put on a beanie. I told Venom. Me and Amanda were
teasing Venom. We told him ifhe put a beanie on, he would kind of look like that
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I am assuming that you are talking about the composite ofthe sketch that was put out.
Yeah.
Okay.
So everybody was talking, everybody was talking about it. You know, put a beanie
on and it looks like you. I'm like mm. .
SMITH: Does Venom wear a beanie?
ERICK: He does sometimes.
SMITH: Do you ever wear a beanie?
ERICK: I had one, just up past (inaudible).
SMITH: So you don't have a beanie anymore?
• ERICK: Uh, just a baseball cap.• SMITH: Baseball cap, okay. Urn.ERICK: In high school, but it got stolen too.
MORGAN: What kind was it?
ERICK: It had a skull and a (inaudible) and two·little fingers on it. One ofthe kids gave it to
me. I thought it was cool, but then I was like (inaudible).
MORGAN: A beanie or a baseball cap?
ERICK: No. It was a baseball cap.






Vb, Nike, (inaudible). It was huge?
Who stole it?
I think I lost it back at the other camp. I am not sure.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -18-
ERICK:
SMITH:
Urn, there was a church. It was up under a stairwell area. Stayed in a dumpster full
of cardboard once. (Inaudible) me and Amanda. I don't dare camp out on the
Greenbelt, or near the park anywhere, so we have gotten tickets for doing that of
course.
You got tickets?
MORGAN: You used to camp out on the Greenbelt?
ERICK: Just (inaudible) you know where the park is and Myrtle. There is like an abandoned















Yeah. We used to camp out behind some debris and stuff back there. It was well
sheltered. Itwas covered. It was safe, because you know, nobody was going to come
back there and mess with us.
You said that you had been with Amanda for about a year. How about the year prior,




How long did you live there?
(Inaudible).
One year, eight years.
.I don't know, at night, about a year. I think. it was like a year, because I had a house
up there. I bought a trailer (inaudible).
Oh did you?




      
 
 
                 
              
               
 
   
         
                
    














                
               
      
                 
    
   
   
  
      
 
    
                     
       
   




























What was the address up there?
Huh-rom?
What was the address?
7701 V-Stick, mine was number 31.
Do you remember when you bought that?
Vh, probably the spring of 2002. Around there, or 2001.
Okay.
(Inaudible) screwed me out of it though. He asked if he, he was only asking five.
hundred dollars for the damn place and it wasn't even worth that. But, I told him that
somebody else was offering to buy it. The guy kept backing out on him. I told him
that I would give him a thousand dollars. I paid him his thousand dollars. He
wouldn't give me no receipt. So I got screwed over on that. That's (inaudible)
Idaho. Then I lost that and then went to jail, he saw his opportunity to sneak up and
take it, so. I got screwed out of that one.







It's in Garden City. Used to belong to a person I call my sister, Wendy Taggert.
How long did you stay with Wendy?
Mm, I stayed there for like seven months.
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I know where I lived. I know where I lived.
I would think that as much as you tell me you drink and pass out, you would have.
Do you ever get amnesia or?
Long-term memory's not a problem. I can remember things from back when I was a
kid. Then something, then I have black outs. Urn, there's times like in the past. Like
I forgot to go in and register. I didn't even remember.
Register?
As a sex-offender. I didn't remember. I was like, I was too depressed. In a drunken
haze to even think about anything but death for a while there. You would drink and
feel this way. I was feeling good. Smoke some pot and wow, this feels good too.
Takes you away from reality?
Mm-huh (affirmative).
Temporarily.
Yeah and then I definitely got a (inaudible). Oh wow, what the hell, I (inaudible).
Just out of curiosity, do you remember where you lived before Alworth?
Mm-huh (affirmative), in prison.
Oh, okay, yeah.
(Laughing).
To be honest with you, I've done my homework. I know about that.
That's great.
The '91 incident in Garden City.
Oh yeah. Oh yeah, yeah, I know.
We don't need to discuss that right now.
Yeah, that was a real ignorant time. Rick Giambo, I don't know ifyou guys know
























          
                  
      
               
                
           
 
                
                
                
     
  
 
               
            
    
   
 
             
  
      
       
        
                
     
 



















Fortunately, or unfortunately we do. So, urn, anyways, let's go uh, let's go to the task
at hand today, alright. Back to the newspaper clipping, was that the only time you
had ever seen or learned anything about this particular case?
Yeah, it is. Amanda went to go to the bathroom and spanged. I don't remember
exactly what was going on there and then she come back and she told me that we
better not walk today. We got the newspapers (inaudible) newspaper but, and we got
them and brought them back, sat there read them and there was something about this
guy killing his wife and his three kids. Amanda knew something about that. I don't
know. She (inaudible). .
Do you think that's what I am talking about?
(Inaudible) talking about.
I'm talking about a lady that was found in the foothills here.
Urn. Amanda read about that. Amanda also told me that she saw something on that,
the news, downtown. About somebody getting found in (inaudible). Something else
(inaudible) found behind Camels Back. And Venom said, yeah I saw that, yeah. I
guess that was up by Venom's house.
Have you ever read anything about that?
I haven't read anything about that.
Have you ever seen any news articles on that?
I don't even know where Venom lives.
Well, just out of curiosity, you said that you and Amanda went and walked and, do
you like have a particular place where the two ofyou go shower or clean up or wash
or something. Is there one spot in particular that allows that or that you do that.
MIn-huh. We could have went to.
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I think that since the time we got back into Boise, we got to go shower like two,
maybe three times. Other than that, we didn't.
When was the last?
The last time, it was probably.
No, I mean you've been together a year. You are saying that you only showered three
times.
Oh, no. Not in a year. Since we got back urn, before.
Is there somewhere you would go do that?
We had a motel room at the Sands Motel. We and a bunch of people went together
on it and got a motel room. Uh (inaudible) taken off, because.
Okay, let me keep you focused here. Pay attention to me. Okay. Back to the lady
behind Camels Back, that you said you heard about but have never read about.
I never seen anything on it, but I heard about it because Amanda said that she seen
something on it.
Okay, then talk to me about the beanie cap person that you saw in the paper. What
was that article related to?
About some lady getting found in the foothills. I am not sure where that was.
Camels Back or something outside oftown I think.
Are you familiar with that area?
No, no. I haven't even been up there on (inaudible) road.
So you have never been up in that area ever.
Urn, yeah, up offof Sixth, all the way up Sixth, in the Foothills area. Because they
said that you can camp up there. I tried to camp up there, I can't. There's ants,
mosquitos.
How long ago was that?
That was last year, summer.
"
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Okay. You said we, you and Amanda tried to camp up there. Up Sixth street?
Yeah.
How far up?
Vh. It is where it starts to go up the hill like this. You go up into the Foothills, there
is like a little mole and like trails. There was just too many bugs up there.
But you are not familiar with the area. How long did you spend up there in that
particular camping excursion?
Probably a week at most.
And then you moved back into town.
(Inaudible) right back down into that one spot we were and got arrested for camping.
Not arrested, but taken in.
Okay.
Because the ants and the mosquitos were just horrible.
Well Erick, I'm going to tell you that Amanda recalled it not being Sixth Street. She
recalled it being Fifth and Alturas. Does that sound familiar?
I don't know.
Could be?




Okay. Well then we'll talk about the memory recollection.
(Inaudible) as I've got.
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And she said that, urn, that last summer I believe it was, that you spent some time at
the. She kind ofrecalled that, she recalled the area, but you described much the same
area that this area actually is. It's a dead end and then you keep going up a little dirt
drive and it kind of goes in and dead ends and there's a knoll up there. Kids walk,
dogs walk, joggers hike.
Yeah, it's like a little indentation in the hillside.
Yeah, that's where this lady was found.
Oh. (Inaudible) not good.
Why's that?
Because it was a spot for camping. There was a lot of people that went up there.
When was the last time that you were up there?
The last time that I was up there was last year or last summer. I went to retrieve my
sleeping bag.
So you haven't been up there recently?
No.
Okay.
I found out that Shadow had stole my sleeping bag.
This particular lady that was murdered, her name is Cheryl Hanlon. Have you ever
heard of that name?
(Inaudible) oh let me think. (Inaudible) reading the article.
Did the article show her picture?
Urn.
I apologize, I don't have that here with me. Maybe.
It might have, I don't know. I never seen that composite sketch thing though.
Not the composite, I'm talking about a picture ofher.
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Does she look familiar?
I can't tell. The pictures blurred (inaudible).
I know it's blurry (inaudible). She's forty-three years old. She weighs about a
hundred and.
MORGAN: I think we've got a better picture ofher Dave.
SMITH: Okay.
MORGAN: Hanging out downtown.
SMITH: Okay.
SMITH: She doesn't look familiar?












(Inaudible) like she's been hanging around downtown. Might have spanged her.
You might have what?
Spanged her, panhandling.
She drives a 00, abrown, '87 Ford Ranger, with a camper shell on that matches.
Does that sound familiar?
No.
It doesn't. There would be no reason that you would have ever been in her truck
would there?
No.
Okay. I mean that you oon't know her, I mean.
No. I don't know her.
Okay. Well I was describing the kind of vehicle she has, that she drives. Would
000741
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall












Probably saw a pack ofcigarettes in there and crawled in there and got them. I don't
know, there's a few times I've done that.
Stealing?
Yeah. Windows are rolled down and crawling in, I'll grab the first pack ofcigarettes
and something.
But you don't know her well enough to go.
No, I've never met her in my life.
Here is the vehicle. Have you ever stole anything out of that vehicle.
Heck, (inaudible).
Do you steal a lot?
Just when I see cigarettes.
Okay. So it would have beenjust going in and grabbing the cigarettes and Bominos,
right? •ERICK: I check in the ash trays sometimes.
SMITH: Check in the ash trays for snipes?
ERICK: Snipes, sometimes and a few times I've check ash trays for (inaudible) a dollar or
two. I don't know, I mean. There have been plenty of trucks like these, and cars,
vans.
SMITH: Okay. I am sure I'm peaking your curiosity, there's a reason for that. I want you to
pay real good attention to me, okay. Because the infonnation that we have been
getting is that you did come in to contact with her on that particular night that I am
talking about. Friday night and Saturday night, just outside of a bar and you might
have been seen by a bartender and Spider might have been with you and seen this



















             
                 
        
 
               
  
         
        
             
  
     
     
              
 
       
       
               
                
 
                  
              
                  
               
                
            
  
   
 
 





















Well Venom went back home to the camp with Amanda. Does that kind ofjog a
memory recollection?
Mm.
That doesn't do anything for you? On that same evening that we were talking about
where you went and got your beer at.
We went and got beer and went back to the church.
Okay.
If I wandered around, I don't know. I get to a point where when I drink I don't
remember.
Okay.
I think that I am either passed out. I mean I haven't woke up in any other place
where I should have been.
So you have a hard time with your memory recollection. So let me ask you this?
With as much as you drink, the short term memory that you have, is it possible
somebody could have seen you with her outside at a bar downtown talking to her?
I might have bumped into her, I don't know. I really don't.
She would have said something to you like, I think I know who you are and might
have asked about a girlfriend, whose your girlfriend and are you homeless, where are
you living and maybe something, some kind of conversation about going home,
maybe sleeping on her couch.
Mm-huh.
It doesn't do anything for your memory?
No, I'm still trying to remember the dates. (Inaudible) you could show me a picture
of Amanda and I would remember like that, or Venom or Spider, yeah, people I.
know, but.
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night, Saturday night that you do may recall is that there are several people that recall
a different version. One would be Amanda. She says that you didn't come home that
night, you actually showed up early the next morning, quite late. Quite late being





Six, it gets daylight out.
Five thirty, six, five to six, somewhere give or take. She was, she was unsure too, but
she knows that the conversation that took place with Venom. Venom had said that
you had met a lady that was a little bit older than you, shoulder length brown hairand
Amanda wasn't very happy about that. She was concerned about what your.
She thought I was cheating on her.
Does that recall how now you remember what I am talking about.
I ran across my friend Joyce. Joyce Glover.
Where is Joyce at?
Uh, I don't know where Joyce lives. Joyce used to live in the Community House.
She wanted to become a stripper or a topless dancer at a gentlemen's club. But urn,
she's like forty-eight, forty-nine. She's got black hair. I ran across her, I haven't
seen her since. I mean, she pops in and she pops back out.
Where is it that you ran across her at?
Uh, in front of the Willy Dog Cart.
Do you remember what time that was, roughly?
No, I don't.
How much time did you spend with her?
Probably about forty-five minutes, just talking with her and we bullshitted.
•,... .~.:~;......•.::..-:~{;~
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Venom (inaudible). She asked me ifI wanted to go smoke some pot and I said yeah.
So I went and smoked pot with her. I remember Zack and I remember Joyce. Um.
Not Talking about Joyce, talking about. I am going to keep trying to jog your
memory.
I hope you will.
Erick, (inaudible), I am going to keep trying to jog your memory. When you came
home, Amanda said that you didn't smell very good. And there was a particular
reason for that. You told her that you had, had an accident in your pants.
Yeah, I probably shit my pants. I had diarrhea.
Erick, does, does that, am I helping you?
Not really, I mean, there's quite a few times I've shit my pants. I was drinking and I
wouldn't eat. Ifyou don't eat and drink, you get diarrhea and dehydrated.
Sure.
So.
Okay, we are going to continue. You have an argument later on that day. You take
from your personal possession a ring and a watch. The watch has no band attached
and Amanda has seen these and in fact given the watch.
Yeah I found that watch in a car. I (inaudible) the car.
Do you remember now what I am talking about?
I remember the watch because I gave it to her.
Okay, do you remember the ring that she saw as well?
No I don't remember having a ring. I remember a bracelet I gave her. I think I stole























   
                
                
               
 
    
               
              
               
         
        
                  
              
 
 
                 
               
           
            
         
          
           
                  
               
 
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -30-
ERICK:
SMITH:
But I found that downtown by the Pita Pit. It was (inaudible) it was little plastic that
stretched.




SMITH: Amanda drew a drawing
MORGAN: I can (inaudible) and find it. We asked Amanda about the ring that she saw that you
were playing with. She says that it's a ring that separates into three pieces. You
know when you have it offyour finger it would look similar to this. Then you shape
it all back together and it fits in like a one kind of band.
ERICK: I never gave her anything like that.










I've never had anything like that. Venom might or Spider, but not me. I had a
bracelet and a watch that I got out ofa car. Spider's already busted for burglarizing
cars or something. Yeah, it's one of their favorite past times.
Okay, now keep going. You take out your cigarette pack. Pretty much you
exclusively smoke.
We smoke USA golds.
Okay, that's what she said. And you had two different type ofcigarettes, (inaudible)
cigarettes inside this pack.
MIn-huh (affinnative).
Do you remember that?
Mm-huh (affinnative) yeah, it was offcigarettes.
What kind of cigarettes were they?
Urn, either Camel lights (inaudible).
••
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Show him the pack, that's what they were. Okay.
They were gold, they had like, like a little band around them. I bum cigarettes all of
the time. We used to go snipe hunting and put the snipes inside ofthe other packs.
Then we would (inaudible) back up.
I understand that, and I don't know Erick ifyou are getting a feeling here as to where
I am going with this. I have some concerns on what some people have told me
regarding her, this truck that you said you've never been in.
No, I don't know if I've seen it or not, I've been inside of vehicles like that and
there's trucks and jeeps all over Boise.
Okay, hear me out. A location ofFifth and Alturas, the fact that you had first told me
that you recalled getting alcohol, drinking all night, passing out, to not coming home
all night until the next morning. And when your friends saying that you left with
somebody that pretty closely resembles that and Amanda saying that we used to camp
at Fifth and Alturas.
Yeah, we stayed there for a week last year.
Hear me out, okay. I've got a whole lot more that I haven't told you Erick. I only
feel it's fair to tell you, okay. I know the whole story and I have to be honest with
you. Now it's time I am going to be honest with you, okay. And in tum I am asking
for the same.
I can be honest, but I don't remember a lot of things.
I understand that you don't remember a lot of things, but I am going to help you.
Physically, evidentiary wise, I am going to help you. The only thing that I am asking
for is that ifyou want to help yourself, you listen intent and hear what I have to say
and we'll try and make some kind ofunderstanding as to what happened that night,
okay. Amanda said that you were concerned and told her about something that
happened with a woman up at Fifth and Alturas; okay.
Mm-huh.
She said that you went on to further tell her what you did to this particular person,
okay. That being what led to her demise. She kind ofblew it offat that point until
you did go get a newspaper and you did look at it.

















         
                 
                 
      
                  
                
           
                  
       
                  
              
               
              
    
         
                  
                   
                   
   
            
                 
                
                   
               
             
          
 
                 
                  
            
    


















And you did ask Cowboy to check the composite and see if you looked like it and
you were told that you were in the clear, you didn't look like him. Poo-poo'd the
jeep. We know there was no jeep involved either. But here's somethings ofconcern,
items that you have on your person might have belonged to her. Things on her
person, things on her person, might belong to you. Okay. Your skin, your DNA,
cigarette butts might have been left in the area or in the vehicle. A certain urine spot
where somebody urinated right close and DNA, okay. So what I am trying to do now
is piece together.
What kind of DNA are you looking at?
Hold on that, hold on that. I am trying to piece together. I'm trying to get a flavor as
to what kind of person Erick is and you have been very genuine with me. You've
been, I feel more than trying to be honest with me and I feel like now maybe you're
getting a little apprehensive, scared about maybe what happened up here and you're
concerned about what I have evidentiary wise to tell you. Hold on now.
Well I'm not scared of what you got, I'm not guilty or anything.
Okay. So why would your DNA be found up at this crime scene?
I don't know.
Have you ever had sex with her?
It looks like Joyce to me, I don't know.
Have you ever had sex with.
I've bad sex with Joyce, Joyce Glover.
Okay, this isn't Joyce Glover now.
Behind Sixth and Main, not Sixth and Main, but on that comer.

























                 
                
              
               
              
                 
                
   
        
                   
                
                  
             
             
             
             
   
       
         
      
       
      
            




         






















She came upon a couple ofpeople that she knew and walked over and talked to them.
They also saw you. They also described a very unique beanie cap, of which is in
your backpack.
MIn-huh. Amanda found it then.
It was in your backpack.
Okay, so she found it.
Okay, found some other interesting things in your backpack. I have your backpack. I
have all ofyour property that you booked into the jail. I served a search warrant on
your property in the jail and took all of that. Also served a search warrant on your
backpack. I have all of that. Do you understand what I am telling you so far?
Yeah, you've got my backpack.
Okay, right.
You've got a lot of stuff in that.
Did.
Didn't belong to ·me.
Like?
Probably, I don't know, things that were sitting on dashes, seats, just.
Which, what in there in your backpack might not belong to you.
Urn, a thing that looks like a1ittle air cleaner, since, I don't know.
Where did you get that?
I got it offofa dash.
Do you remember when?
No.
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I don't know. I get drunk and I go out.
A day, a week or a month?
I would say probably about a week.
A week prior to your getting put in jail.
Mm-huh (affinnative).
Do you remember where the vehicle was that you took that out of?
Uh, over by a church and a high school.
A church located.
I don't know where the church is located.
School.
Urn, they had a track. They had a, like a tennis court some type. We used to go back
all through that area.
Is this downtown?
It's off of State Street, I think.
Just off of State Street?
I think so, I am not sure. Over down there by Fancy Freeze.




What else did you take out of the car?
I don't remember what all I had.
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What else in your backpack are you concerned about that is not yours?
I've got a bunch of stuff.
Help me out.
People give me stuff. They say, well I don't want this, do you want it. I'm like, well















What's that, do you remember?
There might be a cell phone there, I'm not sure if that is there or not.
It is.
Okay.
Where did it come from?
I have no idea where that came from. But somebody else gave it to me.
Okay.
Ifl don't want it, it's locked and I'm like here let me see it. So I played with it a little
bit and he gave it to me, so.
Alright.
I don't remember what else is in there. There's a bunch ofstuff. People try and steal
stuffand I'll be like, well ifyou don't want it, I'll take it.
There's a piece ofnylon rope about that long.
It's for our sleeping bags.
Okay.
We take and rope the sleeping bag up. We run it through the sleeping and if you
notice on top of my backpack it has these two little loop things, we tie it thfough
there. That's how I carty it around.
When you were arrested you had also some rope and some surgical gloves, were you.
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The gloves I got from the Co-op out of a dumpster.
Okay. How long before you were arrested did you get those?
I got those on Saturday evening. We were digging through there and found a bag that
had meat in it. It had raw chicken and shit like that. Sometimes I (inaudible) have to
eat that stuff.
Okay. To continue on with what Amanda said. And Amanda was just one ofmany,
Erick, like I said, I am giving this to you bit by bit. I am testing your truthfulness as
well as your memory. Your memory is working very good on things that you want it
to remember. It is not working so good on things that I think you wished I would quit
asking you, but we've got to, we've to ask.
You can continue to keep asking me, but I am going to keep telling you, I don't
know.
Okay, hang on. Amanda said that when you came home you didn't smell very good.
She questioned you about that. You told her that you had diarrhea. She said you told
her that a guy approached you and asked you to suck his dickfor her and that he had
a gun. You got into a fight with him and then (inaudible) with the gun and then some
convoluted story about another female being involved and somebody then throwing
him in the dumpster.
I don't know about that.
Well she does.
Well I don't.
Okay, do you want me to continue.
She told you I told her a story like that.
No. I mean that particular part, yes.
I've had people pull knives on me.
Then she said thatyou were concerned about this gal that you took her up to where
you used to camp up at Fifth and Alturas. And she's not really sure as to why or
what the problem was that you two got into an argument or some type ofthing. That
you told her you actually choked her, strangledher, killed her. Hold on a minute, I
am telling you what she said, okay. So you've got to be honest with me and hear me
000752
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out. She said you choked her, strangled her and killed her and that you covered her
body with grass and dirt. Okay, that's what she said. And she said then you had
some discussion and dialogue about, did you leave any evidence. And you told her I
pee'd, but I wiped, I wiped everything down, so I didn't. But guess what, you didn't.
I didn't know I had a conversation with her (inaudible) that.
You think she just made this up out of the blue?
Well, it's just like her story about.
Okay, hold on a minute. Let's take Amanda's story and set it over to the side over
here, okay. Now we need to work with forensic evidence that isn't going to be a
story coming from Amanda. That is going to say whether you either were or were not
there, period. DNA, fingerprints, hairs and fibers, things that were found on your
clothes or weren't found on your clothes. Maybe the shoes that you had and got rid
of, that you think you got rid ofbut you might have been carving up the bottoms on
with a knife and thought that you got rid of. Maybe youjust thought that you got rid
of them. Are you with me? They might match the footprints up there, those are the
shoes you got from Cathy. Bear with me, okay. I'm not BSing you, I am trying to be
a hundred percent honest with you as I can. What I am asking for· is, there is
something you need to understand. I know you are scared about this, but everybody
makes mistake Erick, and there's going to be ajudge have to make a decision as to
what to do with you someday. This is as serious as it gets. Don't paint yourselfinto
a hole. Give yourselfa chance for somebody in a black robe to see that humanistic
aspect from you. I do feel bad about it. Things got carried away. I don't know what
happened up there. Things got carried away somehow for this to have happened. I
don't know if she came on to you. I don't know if she upset you. I do know from
doing my background on her, I know she can piss people offthat quick. I know she
has a violent temper.
That's only Amanda.
I know she drinks a lot, I'm not talking about Amanda.
That sounds like Amanda.
I'm talking about right here. And then this vehicle was driven from Fifth and Alturas
and it may have been picked up on certain video cameras and audio cameras placed
throughout strategic locations in the city: It may show exactly who was driving that.
And I am giving you an opportunity to let me explain to a prosecutor, the judge, and
there may be twelve, intelligent people someday who is going to hear this as to
what's going through Erick's mind when this happens. You've got to help me Erick.
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I don't either, that the problem.
I am trying to give a humanistic aspect into this. I am trying to show that there is
some remorse going on right up here.
That's my problem, I don't remember.
Do you think I'm BSing you on this?
I hope you are because I.
Erick, do you think I am lying about this? Believe me partner, I'm not.
Because I don't remember. There's a lot of things, when I drink I don't remember.
I can see you're already starting to tear up.
I'm freaking out man, I'm like what the hell's going on dude.
You have been sitting in that cell worried to death that I am going to come and talk to
you about this.
Actually, I've been worried about Amanda.
Well.
I don't know where she's been, the guy that she's with.
We know where she is and she's fine.
She's safe then.
She is, I promise you that. Okay~ Right now, youneed to worry about Erick. You
need to worry about what's going to happen to Erick. You can't tell me that you
cannot sit there and logically tell me Erick that you don't remember this. I am not
going to buy alcohol amnesia and neither is the judge and neither is the twelve smart
people. You are going to have to give me Erick, some kind of reason as to what
happened up there. People make mistakes, hold on listen to me.
(Inaudible).
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Look at me and listen to me. These things happen, they just happen. And this is not
going to go away. This happened and this is something that you are going to face the
music in. Flat out, period, bar none, it happened. And what you are going to have to
help me with, is explain to me what happened and why it happened and what's going
through Erick's mind. I don't know Erick and I'm not sitting next to a serial killer. I
don't know that. Do I need to look at you for all of the sexual assaults or to go on
throughout the entire United States. Was this an isolated incident that just happened
because ofsomething that she caused, I don't know. But this is your opportunity to
tell me, to let a prosecutor know and to tell the judge so that you have some faith or
hope ofever seeing the outside again. It don't get any more serious than this. That
charge that you got charged with in '91, this is serious Erick. And I have to have you
help me. And I know deep down in your heart, you know what you did was wrong.
Whether it got carried away up to this point and you didn't mean for that to happen
and it did and you're freaked out and then the rest happened, the covering up. I will
tell you this, Amanda says you like rough sex, you like to choke her when you are
having sex. That could have been, I don't know. You're not giving it to me and I
have got to explain it to them. There are twelve hundred people in the Idaho State
Penitentiary to say I ain't telling you nothing.
I know.
And I know you are being the man in the black robe, okay. You're not sitting here,
you are sitting on that bench. Detective Smith, when you went to Erick and you
asked him for an explanation as to what happened, did he show any remorse? Watch
me, did he show any remorse? Did he have any feelings ofwhat he, that he knew he
did wrong, or did he just tell you get it on? Now you are the man in that black robe
and you have to sentence Erick. What are you going to do to the guy that says, I
made a mistake and its ripping me up inside. I want to tell you what happened.
(Inaudible).
But either we were having sex and this happened and it got carried away and then I
realized from what was happening that things had gone overboard and then that led to
this happening. That I can understand. You are not going to be able to sit here and
tell me that I don't recall this whole night Erick.
I remember drinking and I don't remember what else happened after that. I
remember I told you, I go into vehicles. I get like cigarettes or sometimes there's
money in the ashtray.
We're way past going into vehicles Erick.
Sometimes there's pills. You know sometimes I mix them.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
SMITH: Forensically, scientifically we are going to get you there, okay.
Page -40- t)
tv
ERICK: Ifyou can, you can. I can't remember.
SMITH: I know.
ERICK: I don't remember.
SMITH: Don't remember, conveniently because you are absolutely scared to death inside
about coming forward and actually saying. Sorry. This here was found in your
property.
MORGAN: Erick, I want you to, I want to follow me, like you have been doing with Detective
Smith for a minute. We wouldn't have you sitting in that chair right now today ifwe
weren't ready to talk to you. For the last two weeks, since her body was found we
have worked around the clock, nonstop. We got onto you about four or five days
ago, actually about a week ago and we have been building a case and so what is
important for you to know right now is you've got an opportunity to show that you're
maybe sorry for what happened. Because I can tell you from point 1 to point 97 what
that evidence is going to be. Ifyou sit there and you don't have to, that you're sorry
for what happened, that is going to come across to a jury. Because we are going to
walk out ofthis room at some point and we are going to sit down and type our reports
and we are going to have to reflect exactly what happened in this room. Your own
friends are going to be the ones that tell the story, Venom, James Tackett is going to
testify you did it. While you are sitting at that park bench or that thing on the Willie
Cart. Cheryl Hanlon, that lady in that picture, walked over to you, approached you
and said, hey how are you doing. Where's your girlfriend. And you said to her, well
I'm cold,I'm tired and she says I am going to take you home with me and you are
going to sleep on my couch. You tum to him and say, no, no, no and she grabs you
by the arm and starts pulling you down the street and you tell him, go back to camp.
I'll meet you there later and off you go. That's one that is going to testify against
you. I showed him a picture very similar to that one and I said on a scale of one to
ten, you tell me, are you sure this is the lady we're talking about. He says I'm one
hundred percent sure. I've seen her down there before. That's the gal he walked off
with. Not this Glover lady that you are talking about, Cheryl Hanlon. Number two,
you are seen again by a bartender. He was out and remembers calling a cab for you
later on.
ERICK: Qnaudible).
MORGAN: Hang on. Don't say, don't use, I don't remember, because just trust me it doesn't
work, okay. You are seen again. She calls, a friend ofhers, calls a cab but you leave
two minutes before the cab gets there. Okay. Do you remember that, is that coming •
back. Alright.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
SMITH: Okay, across from the Idaho Youth Ranch.
Page -41-
MORGAN: You tell.
ERICK: (Inaudible) through their stuff (inaudible).
••
MORGAN: You tell Amanda the story. She's mad as hell the next morning. You come back
late, you made up some stupid story about men having a gun pulled out on you and
you have to fight and the woman that is with you is getting you in and you have to
smack her around a little bit and you get the gun away and you think you killed
somebody. That's a stupid story, but guess what, it's corroborating because another
person hears the same version ofthe story. A little different version because what we
know is when you tell a lie, it is, we can't remember the what. You remember the
truth, you can tell the truth ten hours from now and you will still tell the same story.
But it is hard to remember the lie. It is hard to remember it because you have to add
more, and more, and more and then pretty soon it'sjust too hard to remember. So
you tell Amanda the story and she questions you eventually about it. She can't
believe that you've done this, but she's actually kind of relieved that you haven't
slept with her because you tell her that. You know, we both know that that's not the
case, alright. Problem is, is that you admit to her and when you admit to her you may
as well tell the world. When you tell, there's an old saying in homicide, even ifyou
remember twenty-five things that you don't like when you consider the evidence, you
forget twenty-five things. Then you told her because you care about her and you had
to provide some kind ofstory. She gives details. There was a place that you camped
in the past.
ERICK: But I already told you guys me and her have camps up there.
MORGAN: I know, we know that.
ERICK: For a week, last sUmmer.
MORGAN: But that shows me, I never camped up there. If! was going to do something like this,
it would be the last place in the world that I would ever think to go. But you already
had prior knowledge of that place. Cowboy comes strutting into camp and you tell
him, watch the news, see ifmy name's on tv, in the papers. Get alook at the guy,
and you hide out at camp for a couple days, you won~t leave there until he comes
back to you and says I watched the news, you know, the composite doesn't really
look.
ERICK: We left camp plenty oftimes.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -42-
MORGAN: Yeah, not for a while. Not according to Amanda. And Cowboy comes back and says
I watched the news, composite doesn't look that much like you and you said okay.
He says you're in the clear, bro, quote him. And you talk to him. And actually when
you are asking him about it, that Saturday afternoon, you know about the homicide
prior to anybody else in Boise does. It is not on the news yet. You are asking him
too soon.
ERICK: I didn't ask anybody anything.
MORGAN: You asked him to watch the news, you asked him.
ERICK: Everybody was telling me that, me and Amanda, or Amanda went downtown first, to
spange. She said she saw something on the news about somebody being found
(inaudible).
MORGAN: Not according to Amanda.
ERICK: Well, that's what she told you.
MORGAN: That you woke up at the same, you told us that she woke up at 4:00 in the afternoon
in this interview.
ERICK: Yeah, I we woke up, or I woke up at 4:00. I don't know ifshe was awake or not.
MORGAN: You said you woke her up.
ERICK: I did. She lays there and acts like she is sleeping sometimes.
MORGAN: (Inaudible) okay.
ERICK: I can verify that.
MORGAN: The biggest thing, forensically speaking is the evidence that you left behind that you
are not even aware of probably at this point because we haven't told you about it.
Detective Smith told you he served a search warrant on all ofyour stuff at the jail.
Take a real, hard look at that photograph (inaudible).
ERICK: I told you, I don't remember.
MORGAN: Look at it.
ERICK: I did look at, I don't.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
MORGAN: Okay. Take a look at her ears.
ERICK: (Inaudible) know where those earrings carne from, Amanda. Yeah.
MORGAN: Take a look at the picture ofher ears.
Page -43-
ERICK: Yeah, go to Amanda's house and go through Amanda's house and look for one shiny
one. The one that is all cluttered looking is the one I wore and had to take out ofmy
ear.
MORGAN: I'm not talking about this. This is in your wallet, this is in your property.
ERICK: I know that.
MORGAN: You know what, what's special about this particular jewelry, it's handmade by the
victim.
ERICK: It's not handmade, she bought that at Wal-Mart.
MORGAN: And 00, this is handmade by the victim. I've got a whole box ofit in my office right
now.
MORGAN: Do you want to try tO,just what I have told you so far, do you want to stay with the I










Then she sold them to Wal-Mart. Because that's exactly where I got that from.
Erick.
I'm telling you guys.
Erick, listen. I told you I'm not going to (inaudible) this.
Are you trying to tell me that those earrings.
Erick, forget the earrings. They told you about all of the video cameras. You have
no idea where all the video cameras are at.
I know where the video cameras are at.
There are some driving this vehicle and parking it at Thirteenth and Franklin,
Thirteenth and Washington and leaving it. How are you going to explain. How do
you explain your DNA as to having sex with her anally. How are you going to
explain all that. How are you going to explain to Amanda saying you covered her
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -44-
SMITH:
body up with dirt and twigs and grass. Guess what, that's the truth. Nobody knows
that. Nobody. Nobody in this city knows that. You are not helping yourselfErick
by the I don't know, I don't remember, because forensically that's (inaudible). I
think I have a pretty good idea as to what happened up there between you and her.
By the personality I know, I have come to know you and by the personality I have
come to know her. She's a heavy drinker too. And she gets nasty too. I've got a
pretty good idea as to what happened. Plus this vehicle told an awful lot of what
happened on two different occasions when they were thrown up against the vehicle
here and what happened inside. The vehicle, the whole scene, the story, the evidence
that you thought you got rid of, the boots that you were cutting, the.What kind are
they?









The one's you got from Cathy that you were trying to cut up when you threw away,
you remember those that I am talking about.
Actually the heals were coming out right here.
Do you remember what I am talking about?
I remember my shoes.
Yeah, remember where you threw them away?
No, I don't.
Okay. (Inaudible) said everything that I am telling you here, the urine stain where
you peed up there, that coupled with semen, hair, pubic hair, you know, skin from the
belt that is tied DNA from the belt. That was a long drag, a long drag. And you're
not giving me any other alternative just to, other than to think that you are a cold-
hearted, calculated killer. And I don't think that Erick. I know better, I know better
from knowing you and I know better from knowing her. And you've got to believe
that youdon't leave it like that. Don't leave it this cold-hearted, calculated killer that
I need to look at for everything wherever you ever been. I don't know, and it isn't
truth. I know it's not the truth, but you haven't been able to help me. And I know
you're afraid, but you've got to help yourself tell me what happened up there. I've
got a pretty good idea as to what happened up there and you know exactly what
happened up there and the whole things gotten carried away, but that's what I've got
to be able to tell the prosecutor. Because they are going to determine what's going to
happen to you for the rest ofyour life. I absolutely promise you that. So help me
with what happened. I know her, I know what she's capable of. I know what she's
capable ofdoing. I know how she's capable ofacting. Nobody can clean up a crime
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scene when they commit a homicide, that they didn't leave something or take
something with them. That's what I told you, do you think twelve intelligent people
are going to believe that that wasn't you up there. Absolutely not, they know the
truth too. Now they have to determine what's going to happen to Erick and I've tried
to explain this to you Erick. You've got to tell me what happened up there because
that's not an abandoned malignant heart type case. You're not that type ofperson are
you. Things get carried away.
Sometimes I can drink and I do things and I just sometimes I do and I don't
remember shit.
Yeah, I understand that.
I had my arm all scraped up to hell.
I understand that.
It come back all road-rashed.
I understand that too, but you don't sober up the next day and tell your girlfriend
what happened and get rid of evidence and tell friends to look to see if I match and
not know what happened. So all I am asking from you, I'm not telling you what
Erick. I can get up and walk out of here right now and I'll tum the reports in and
you're on your own. Thejury, the judge is not going to hear that that actually works.
I haven't seen one bit ofconscience from you. Do you know right from wrong?
I know what'sright and what's wrong. Getting into cars is wrong. I know stealing is
wrong.
Okay.
Everything I did is wrong.
This is something that got way out-of-control above stealing. Right and wrong. I
don't know how you believe in what happens to you in the hereafter.
Right.
That's beyond that, but the man in the black robe is going to have to determine what
do I do with Erick.
MORGAN: You are forcing people you care about and that absolutely love youto have do things
that they don't want to do. Amanda drew me a picture the other day ofthat ring. Can I
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -46-
you tell me the significance ofthat particular ring and what she sees in him, that one.
The victim, Cheryl, the reason that she wore that ring all of the time because
MORGAN: she couldn't get it offher finger. She had a hard time because her finger had swollen
up a little bit. There's not that many ofthem around and you show up in camp that
very night with the watch band. You tell her, or the watch itself. You tell her that
you took it from her.
ERICK: (Inaudible) like that.
MORGAN: No, it was on her wrist.
ERICK: I don't remember.
MORGAN: And you took it from her body.
ERICK: I don't remember anything. (Inaudible)
MORGAN: (Inaudible) like that. Do you know how ridiculous that sounds when you tell people
the next day.
ERICK: Put yourself in my situation okay.
I
MORGAN: I am going to and I can tell you this. If! had done what you've done, I would want to
give some people a reasonable explanation for what had happened that night. I
would want to make people think that I am not a cold, black-hearted person. That I
do care about my actions and I am sorry about what I did. I would want to express
that, I would want to throw myself at the mercy of the court. I would want to tell
people that I am so sorry for this, I can't live with myself. And that's what I am
telling you that I am not seeing from you (inaudible). And I am hoping that there is a
part ofyou that inside ofyour heart that is saying, I can't live with myself. I've got to
tell you guys. I've got to tell the world that I am responsible and I am sorry for what I
did and that there's a hope in your heart that the judge is going to take pity on you
because ofyour age, and because ofyour circumstances and because ofwhat he has
already told you. That we know that that particular lady would take on anybody. She
would tell you what's on her mind. She doesn't care how big you are, how strong
you are, she is going to say what is on her mind. And her own friends and family
have told us when she's been drinking, she's a handful and she can make people mad.






She'll take on Mike Tyson ifhe pisses her off. She'll hit him right in the face.
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MORGAN: We know that about her. We know that about her. We also know that you were
drinking that night. Bad combination all. You know, she's drinking, you're
drinking.
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -47-
ERICK: I know I took some pills too.
MORGAN: Then you may have. I don't know.
ERICK: I did.
MORGAN: But that doesn't alter the fact that the very next day you are bringing back her
property into the camp. And that same day you are telling Amanda what happened
that night.
MORGAN: Ifyou told her when you had those memories. Pardon.






The only thing I remember having with me was the watch.
It matters what that scene is telling us.
MORGAN: The shoes that you were wearing, that you have" been wearing every since Cathy,
Amanda's mother, had given them to you. They are the same shoes that we find
footprints ofup there at the mountain, on the hillside. Pretty much puts you up there.
Your urine puts you at that scene. I
SMITH: Your DNA.
MORGAN: You had been drinking.
SMITH: All of the twigs that you touched.
MORGAN: You may have thought you got all of the cigarette butts. Maybe you thought so, I
don't know. Maybe you thought you had done a good job when you wiped down the
truck.
ERICK: I didn't wipe any vehicles down. When I crawl into a vehicle, I really don't care. I
don't pay attention to what I am doing. I just take the cigarettes and whatever else I
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can find.
MORGAN: We're not talking about vehicle burglaries, okay. We are way, way past vehicle
burglaries.
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -48-
SMITH:
ERICK:
We are talking about that vehicle. That vehicle alone. That is hers.
That looks like (inaudible).
MORGAN: Interesting that you would say that you had been burglarizing vehicles in that general
area, of Boise High School, which was where that car was parked. We know
ERICK: We burglarized all over that area.
MORGAN: I bet you did.
ERICK: We did.
MORGAN: I don't doubt that.
ERICK: I don't know.
MORGAN: But you know what, I have talked to a lot ofvehicle burglars, because I used to work







I don't think you're appreciating the severity of this Erick. I really don't. I don't
think at your tender age, with your minimum exposure to the criminal justice system,
what is happening here today. Are you grasping this. Are you understanding what
we are telling you?
I get that you are trying to say that I did something.
Not, I'm not trying to say it, I'm saying that forensically, scientifically, evidentiary
wise, friends, witness and testimony are saying it. And the only thing that we haven't
heard said, is anything, one ounce ofremorse. One ounce ofresponsibility coming
from you that I am going to be able to explain to somebody. A prosecutor is waiting
for me to tell him about our conversation that we are having right now. What would
you like me to tell him. That Erick has come across as truthful. He tried the I don't
remember theory, but he was scared to death. And partner, believe me, if I was
•
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sitting in that chair, I would be scared to death. But like he said, I am going to put
out a little bit of remorse and hope for the fact that there is a light at the end of a
tunnel. I am going to pray to god that somebody will see that this got out-of-control
and I'm not this cold-hearted serial killer that deserves a death penalty. I am just not
that type ofperson. Here's what happened and here's why it happened, and here's
how it happened. And I know I've been sitting here and not even hardly, one time'
you started to tear up. That was the only bit ofemotion I have ever seen from you
and you hit it right on the head when you said what would you do ifyou were in my
shoes. I know exactly what you are thinking, I know exactly what you are feeling.
But see, I am on this side of the table. I am going to go home tonight and go home
from here on. You're not. You are sitting there developing the stages for the rest of
your life. The rest of Amanda's life, and the rest ofyour baby, your unborn baby's
life.
Didn't she go and have it aborted. She has been talking about aborting the kid.
Okay.
She talked about it the night, just like the night we got arrested.
Are you hearing what I am telling you Erick? I have not heard one thing other than
the, I don't know defense isn't going to work. Do you honestly think twelve people
hearing what all we've told you are going to believe that you really don't know.)
anything. When scientifically, evidentiary, witness testimony, eye witnesses, video
camera films, are going to lie. Do you think that they are all lying? Do you think
that's all lies? Absolutely not, and you are sitting there and you are going, I think this
is a bad dream. But partner, I am telling you what. I am promising you this is reality
and you need to do some soul searching right now and decide what is going to be best
for Erick. Do I give myself an opportunity to let my feelings out and to tell these
guys what really happened. (Inaudible) my advice, like I said, I will get up and walk
out of here partner. I will write it down exactly like it has happened between the
three of-us in here and the judge and jury can make their decision on what they have
seen at this point. Or you can give me some reason to tell them what actually
happened here. That you really do have a heart in there. That you actually do feel
bad for somebody that was trying to actually take you under her wing that night and
things got carried away. It's not that hard to tell the truth, everybody makes mistakes
Erick. I promise you everybody makes mistakes. Just because I am a JDlice man.
I know.
That we don't make mistakes. Look at me. It's how you handle that mistake that is
going to effect you for the rest ofyour life. You need to be man enough to say, it got
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you've got all ofthe reason in the world to be. I understand that and I'll sit here with
you for however long it takes and listen to everything you want to tell us. The one
thing I ask is please be honest with yourself. Be honest with yourselfand you will be
honest with us. You are not really a cold-hearted serial killer are you Erick?
No I am not.
Can I ask one question, just answer me one question. Hearing what you've heard,
things got out-of-control, didn't they. This is an out-of-control situation. I am just
asking for a yes or no, don't expound. Things got a little out-of-control, yes or no.
From what I'm remember telling you. I don't remember exactly everything that's
happened.
I am not asking for exactly. Could things have gotten out-of-control Erick? From
what was, is that a fair assessment?
Yeah, that's a fair assessment for the situation, yes.
Okay, not the cold-hearted, calculated you took her up there to do this. No. Did you
intend on doing this when you guys went up there? I don't think so. I have done a
whole lot ofbackground on you. I don't think you intended on doing this, did you.
No.
I didn't do anything to anybody. Other thanbreaking into cars.
Okay, so back to fair assessment, things got out-of-control. Now tell me what got
out-of-control. Did you want to have sex, she didn't. Did you say something that
upset her. Did she say something that upset you. I don't have a problem with her
even popping you and a physical confrontation. But I can tell you what the scene
says and I want you to match the scene with what comes out and then give me some
humanistic aspects on what happened Erick. Give me the little parts that you
remember. Like I said, I've got all ofthe time in the world. I will sit here and listen
to you. But for god sakes;~i\ie\' me something to take to this prosecutor because
that's your fate. And at this point, all I've got from you, Erick. Look at me. All I've....-
got from you is okay, I'll agree things got out-of-control. I don't know to what
degree of control and you told me you didn't go up there premeditatedly with the
intent to kill somebody. Will you give me that, is that a fair statement. You didn't
intend, when you left Amanda Friday night, you didn't intend to go find the lady, take
her up in the mountains to kill her did you.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -51-
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -52-
SMITH: So now we are back to out-of-control. Things got out-of-control. Things how. It's
this, this is that slowly killing you Erick. And I am telling you what (inaudible) when
you start talking, it is going to come and you just let it go. I am not going to think
any less ofa person ofyou because you want to cry.
-', ERICK: I do.
I
SMITH: I have been doing this.
ERICK: I worry about everybody else out there.
SMITH: Good, I have been doing this for twenty-seven years. I have worked in homicide for
twenty years. I have had many, many, many Erick's sitting right here. I have worked
,cases that they have been executed on death row, okay. I don't see that in you. I
.' don't see that in you, my friend, please show me different. This is eating you up
inside and you've got to give me the opportunity to express that and the only person
that is going to be able to do it is me. It's alright to cry, go ahead and do it. I don't
think any less ofyou. In fact, it tells me something about you to see this. This is the
first time, Erick, that I have seen you emotional. And you just go ahead because I














(Inaudible) the only other people in the world that ever seen me cry.
Well, you've got a pretty good reason.
Yeah, I fucking black out. I don't fucking remember half of the shit I do.
Tell me what you do remember of it. Let's do that.
Can I have a cigarette?
I have some. I need to get a (inaudible).
All I need is a trash can.
Youuh.
(Inaudible) need is a trash can.





      
              
                
                    
            
    
 
      
        
                
               












.                 
                
                      
                   
                
 W      
             
       
               
           
     
         
       
 
      




Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
SMITH:
ERICK:
Do you want a drink?
(Inaudible) waters fine.
Page -53-
SMITH: What do we have for an ashtray?
MORGAN: You can use the trash can.
SMITH: That will start it on fire.
MORGAN: So. I will tell you what.
SMITH: (Inaudible) bring water again?
MORGAN: I'll get you more (inaudible).
SMITH: On our way, we will all three (inaudible).








(Inaudible) I guess, (inaudible).
I don't have a lighter. Do you want to give this a light Erick? (Inaudible). Take a
minute. I want you to collect your thoughts.
I'm trying to.
And I want you to remember everything you can.
I'm scared shit, because I don't remember.
I know, I know that you're scared.
From being downtown to wherever the hell it ever happened. I don't remember a lot
of shit.
I know. And, and we will help fill in the details. The problem is helping to
remember what got out.-of-control. Because, like I said, I know her and everybody
that has come and talk to us that knows her. I've got a pretty good idea, Ijusthaven't
heard it from Erick yet. We could start allover Erick, this didn't none of this
happened up until now. We haven't even talked.
ERICK: It was being recorded, so it did happen.
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I'm slow in the head, but I'm not an idiot.
And I know that. I know you're not an idiot.
(Inaudible) my life.
I know you're not an idiot and that's why I was sitting here thinking to myselfwhat
in the heck are you thinking with what I am telling you. And all I've ever asked for
Erick is the truth. I am a gather, we are a gather offacts. That's all I do. I gather the
facts and I present them. You are the one that is going to control.
(Inaudible) on my own for life.
You might feel like you don't have control over right now.
(Inaudible) control over my own brain half of the time because I drink. I do pills, I
smoke pot.
I understand. And that does. I can't soley promise youI understand how that does
make a Jekyll and Hyde personality change.
You know, I've seen that in Amanda plenty of times.
Alright then.
Busted my nose. I mean.
So what else can you see in you?
I'm telling you.
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I mean as a character reference, a character witness, she could be one. I am not
(inaudible). I was a violent person and her brothers (inaudible) her. Her brother
found me one time, I remember this because we were downtown and this security
guard came up. He came over and talked to me and told me that I did the right thing
by walking away. Sitting there with brass knuckles and shit. (Inaudible) you know.
I want to switch gears here for a minute. That has calmed you down a little.
What this?
I want to see, I want to see the person that I saw a few minutes ago. And you told me
you are scared to death. I understand that. Look at me Erick, I understand that. So
let's start with the fIrst time that you know. That you can remember seeing Cheryl.
Like I said, all I am asking for is the truth and honesty from you. I know that there is
some serious things that you can help yourselfwith and you can help what happened
up here. When did you fIrst see her, that you remember?
(Inaudible) that she looks like my friend Joyce.
This is not Joyce, this is the person up at Fifth and Alturas. Okay. I am going to help
you fIll the blanks in here. Like he told you, the work that we have been doing along
with the entire unit. The fIrst time that you saw her that night probably is when she
came out of the bar that you were sitting there with Venom.
(Inaudible).
And she walked up to you and she said exactly what he told you.
I was talking to a vendor.
Okay, but that's when I think, we think I (inaudible). That's going to be
acknowledged probably the first you saw her. And she recalled giving, giving, I think
some money in the past and she actually told people in the bar that she was going out
to see some ofher homeless friends.
She ain't one ofour people hanging around down there (inaudible).
MORGAN: Erick, no more games, okay. She approaches you outside ofthe Willie Dog stand.
ERICK: I was sitting on this concrete (inaudible).
MORGAN: Planter.
ERICK: Yeah. I was talking to Ray about something and then I had like (inaudible), I don't
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know how long we were down there. Then I had a lot of people a lot ofmy friends,
people I know, walk up to me and tell me (inaudible). Hey what's going on. And
when I'm drunk I.
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -56-
MORGAN: And she says, and I quote, "How are you doing?" You said, "cold and tired." And
she grabbed on to you.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: She said I am taking you home and you are going to sleep on my couch tonight.
Initially you said no, I don't want to, I'm going to get. She insisted and grabbed on to
your arm and offyou go and you tell Venom I'll see you back at camp later. Take it
from there.
SMITH: Are we alright so far on that?




MORGAN: It's okay to say her name.
ERICK: But I don't know her name. I know that I thought that the person that was right there
with me, talking to me was Joyce.
MORGAN: And what happens then?
ERICK: I got up and started walking.








Like over, back to the thing up by the bank. And sat down and had a beer still
stashed in my coat.
Did you share it with her?
No, I was drinking it myself.
Okay.




      
                   
                
    
                 
     
  
                  
                  
                   
  
        




       
                   
       
     
       






                  
    
      
      
 
                  
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
the hell they were. I know that I took one.
Page -57-
SMITH: Erick, listen to me.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
SMITH: Listen to me. Pills aren't going to get you the amnesia that you are going to try and
do here. Okay.
ERICK: I'm not trying to tell you that, I'm just saying I took some pills and I started getting
fuzzy in the head. And I was like, yeah things are here, things are there, things are
around and it's like nothing that was there.
SMITH: Okay, well let's stay in and not out. Like I said, we need to find out what happened
to you next.
MORGAN: Where to go to next James, or Erick?





Because I was looking for blankets for me and Amanda. Our stuff was like soaked.
That was my whole purpose in being in that area was, urn.
MORGAN: Where did you go after that?
ERICK: That I don't remember, from the Youth Ranch, I don't really remember what all went
on, you know. Urn, Renegade, have you ever seen Renegade? I don't know ifyou
guys know who he is.
MORGAN: Urn, Mike?
ERICK: Yeah.





No, down by the Youth Ranch. Closer down by the Youth Ranch. We seen him.
Where does he hang out at, these days?




      
          
     
  
                   
   
                   
                 
        
                   
   
         




               
            
       
                
               
     
   
  
           
                
         
                   
and there, we (inaudible) looked at me and I could hear him saying, are you okay,
something wrong. He looked, he looked scared.











So are you saying this to Renegade, or is he saying this to you?
He told me I looked scared. I was like. He noticed that I had been drinking, he could
smell it on me. And (inaudible).
Was Renegade on a bike?
Yeah.
Is he a pretty tall guy?
He's got blonde hair, beard.
Pretty tall?
I don't, probably about my height.
How long has he been here?
Renegade, I don't know.
MORGAN: He's got the bike that's got the sleeping bag on the back, right?
ERICK: No, he wears it on his backpack like I do.
MORGAN: On a big pack on his back?







Yeah, kind of like mine.
Has he been staying at the mission at all?
I don't know where he stayed. He (inaudible) sometimes (inaudible).
Right.
I know that but, (inaudible).
Down there on State Street.
•
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
SMITH:
Page -59-
Anyway, you remember running into Renegade. She's with, Renegade remembers it
to.
ERICK: Okay, but (inaudible).
SMITH: Now wait a minute.
ERICK: Scared dude.
SMITH: You don't just remember Renegade being there. She's with you too because at that
same time, one of the people she works with at the intersection you were at, is
watching the three of you. He was thinking about taking her home, but instead he
just watches you.
MORGAN: It's her. It's her. Do you remember walking up to Elliott's, the old rider's bar?
MORGAN: In fact, you walked across the street right in front ofhim, against the light. He has a
green light and he thinks about honking to yell at you because you should have been
on the cross walk (inaudible), I know you don't remember, but the guy that we talked








I remember we walked around, but I am not sure. I don't know, sound like that was
her. I don't know.
By the Youth Ranch.
Is that over by the overpass?
It is the one where she ran up and talked to her friends. You told Amanda that.
MIn-huh.
Her friend's sitting outside.
MORGAN: In a white truck, she called you a cab.
ERICK: I don't remember that
MORGAN: You don't remember that, okay.
IIJ!:\ ERICK: I'm not saying that didn't happen. '
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -60-
ERICK: I'm telling you, I'm not (inaudible).
MORGAN: So then you walk back.
SMITH: I am sure that you wanted to blank this, that is why we are helping you.
MORGAN: You are walking back, downtown.
ERICK: Uh, I was drunk and I had some pills in my system.
SMITH: Not drunk and pills.
MORGAN: Okay, stay with us now. You walk back and you go to where her car is parked. Her
pickup's parked. Do you remember that?
ERICK: The only time I remember seeing a pickup like that was over by that school and
church. I saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the dash.
MORGAN: Okay, we're getting way ahead, way ahead. You get in her pickup. She is going to
give you a ride home to her house, to let you sleep on the couch. •
ERICK: I don't know.
MORGAN: That is what she's told you downtown.
ERICK: I don't remember.
MORGAN: That's what Venom says, come on you're going home with me. You're going to
sleep on my couch. How did you end up at Fifth and Sherman?
SMITH: Alturas.
MORGAN: Alturas.
SMITH: Is it your idea, or hers.
MORGAN: Your camp.
ERICK: I don't know, I was drunk and (inaudible).
I
I
MORGAN: Did you tell her that maybe you had to go check on Amanda, at camp up there?




      
       
      
                 
      
             
     
                   
      
                 
           
                 
                
    
        
    
               
             
  
  
       
   
         
                  
        
MORGAN: Did you say, let's drive up here and check on her. Will you drop me off or
something?
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -61-
ERICK: (Inaudible) I knew that me and Amanda lived over by the church on State Street, St.
Michael's. We were sleeping in the bushes.









This is true time Erick, we started over.
I am telling you, I am trying to.
I know it's coming back to you.
Everything's like, just (inaudible) a blur.
It's really not.
It is.
It's just trying to.
ERICK: When it's, you know when I get freaked out, somebody does something that freaks
me out and then, it is like when I was a kid. You know I have mental blocks. There
are years that I don't remember.
MORGAN: What you are trying to do is repress it because you don't want to rememberbut the
problem is that the next day you do remember it. You tell Amanda about it. So.stay
with us now. You are doing good, just stay with us. you guys end up, up there. Do
you drink a beer together in the car, do you have another beer up there?
ERICK: (Inaudible) no. I had pills, I was taking the pills that I found.
MORGAN: Did she have a beer, you guys sitting on the truck talking, smoking cigarettes?
ERICK:
SMITH:
Urn. I was taking some pills.
(Inaudible).
e::··l.:-.... MORGAN: You told us that. Something happens there. You can only think thatyou beinga guy,
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and her being alone, and you both been drinking for a while. Did you put the moves
on her a little bit? Do you remember?
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -62-
I
ERICK: I remember she was hanging on me when I was downtown. When I saw Renegade.
And Renegade came up to me asked me ifI was alright. He said I looked scared, but
you know.
MORGAN: Okay, we know, we know about that, let's move up to where you guys are.
ERICK: We were downtown and had sex or something in alley.
r (,. : i
MORGAN: Not that night.
SMITH: Erick, let me help you here. What you are doing is you're wanting to tell us what you
think might be beneficial or might not be beneficial. You know what happened.
This goes back to how much do you want to tell us, how much do you want to help
yourself. As I said, for the first time during thiswhole conversation, Jsaw a different
Erick. The person I think I thought I know from doing all ofthe history on you. And
you said it yourself, you are scared to death and what would you do ifwe were sitting
in your shoes. And we've all told you what we would do. The problem is, is you are
not listening. You do know and you know a whole a lot more than what you're
saying. You are just afraid to say it. But the problem is, you telling it explains what
happened up there. You not telling it gives full circumspection for everybody to
gUess what happened: Alld it can't be hard, there's a whole lot worse than what I
know happened. I'll, do you want me to go get the pictures and show you what
happened.
MORGAN: Do you know what they are going to say, what they can say, is that you take
advantage ofa situation. You are downtown, this lady walks up to you. You know
she's drunk and you're thinking, huh-mm I've got money from her in the past.
Maybe you even saw her carrying some money around. So you walk her over to her
truck and say hey, we're going up to my camp to check on my girlfriend, get her up
there, kill her, you rape her.
SMITH: Drag her (inaudible).
MORGAN: Drag her in, you try to hide her body, you steal her stuff and that becomes a first-
degree, premeditated crime. Because they are going to say, this happened downtown.
You thought about that, this is the planned activity that you took advantage of a
situation that occurred. And what we are trying to tell you here, and once you get this
through your head is, we don't want to present that case. We want to know what
really happened up there. We want to know that you are up there, yeah you've been
MORGAN: drinking, she's been drinking. And we're thinking that something happened up there
•
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that caused this to happen. And we can make either case, we have to hear it from
your mouth what happened that night. And you saying you took pills and that you
drink and you have sporadic memories. That doesn't fly because we know the next
morning, day, later on that same day when you get back to camp, so just before dusk,
or right at dusk, you are telling Amanda what happened. You know what happened.




Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -63-
ERICK: I've been trying to remember a lot of things.
MORGAN: Well I am sure that you can. (Inaudible).
SMITH: (Inaudible).
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: This isn't the time to try to forget, not in this interview.





I'm not trying to forget, I am trying to remember things. I mean.
Before you asked for a cigarette, we were on this and you agreed things got out-of-
control, right. You said, okay, it wasn't premeditated downtown, agreed. That's
what you said. Am I right? You said things got out-of-control. I'm right again.
Okay and then you said, can I have a cigarette.. What you are telling me is, okay. I
am going to tell you what happened and it is not the premeditated downtown
situation where you took her up there with the intent to do what happened and so I
don't want to hear from you again that you took pills. I don't want to hear from you
again that you don't remember anything, because all I want tod~!s go bac!c ~d.find
o~t from Erick, whathappene4 up th~re. Because Enck I absolutely promise you,
we;11 jUst walk out and you~ stand on your laurels with what's here, and YOll've
heard the'possible consequence. Do you'unaerstand what I'm, what we're saying
here? And I am sure, and I am sure that it's going to eat you up inside. And I'm sure
it's hurting you. Go ahead, and I told you I don't think any different ofyou because
you sat here and shed a tear in front ofus.
I know, I know.
MORGAN: Maybe it's not bothering you. Is that the case, it doesn't bother you 6naudible).
e·', .fi:
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page-64-
MORGAN: Does it not bother you at all, are you the cold-hearted person that we thought a week
or two ago. Are you that guy, because I need to know that too. If you don't care
what happened up there, you tell me that. That's not what I am reading from you. I
do think it bothers you, but the longer you sit there and say I don't remember, I was
taking pills and drinking, the more I'm beginning to lean the other way.
SMITH: You've already acknowledged that things got out-of-control up there, Erick. Ijust
want to know how out-of-control. And he's already hit it on the head when he said,
we know you were both up there and more than likely, it's three in the morning and
you'd been drinking. And I want to say it, and I can't say it, you can. And when two
people who hitting rounds in the park, only one thing happens after that and you
know and I know it. We're men and that's what you go up there for. Now what
happened after that, that's where you are going to help fill in the blanks and that's
where you are going to have to help us with the out-of-control part. And you
probably got scared once you realized that she wasn't breathing. That's what I think,
because I know, Amanda's told us you choke her sometimes when you are having sex
with her. That is not uncommon, okay. I understand that. Look at me. I understand
that. What I don't understand is what happened up there. Amanda's already said that
this is something that you enjoy. And I'm not saying that's right, wrong, or
indifferent and I could care less.
MORGAN: And then you panic, we understand that too.
SMITH: And now what am I going to do. My hell, she's not breathing, what have I done. Are
we pretty close? Pretty close, you're shaking your head.
MORGAN: You go up there and you think that.
SMITH: Go ahead.
MORGAN: I mean this lady is being nice to you.
SMITH: Go ahead.
MORGAN: This is what she what she wants to have happen up there, alright?





Yeah, that's about what I thought.
(Inaudible) type ofpeople, I get myselfdrunk, I like them to try and, you know they
choke me. They make me pass out. I like the asphyxiation. That's what they call it,
the technical term, some people (inaudible).
Did you get scared?
•
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€8 Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -65-:t~;':'~.: :?~.,-<:,
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MORGAN: Did it scare her?
ERICK: She was drunk. You know.
MORGAN: Did it scare her when you started doing that?
ERICK: No.
SMITH: Is that what got carried away a little too much.
ERICK: I was being choked or asphyxiated.
SMITH: You were being what?
ERICK: Asphyxiated.
SMITH: You were, by her?
• ERICK: And then. Yeah, that's.MORGAN: So what happened?
ERICK:
SMITH:













I don't remember what it was, but I remember I couldn't breathe. I couldn't breathe
and I couldn't breathe and it was cold.
It's okay to say it Erick. We know ~tlulppened. We've seen it, you're n9t going
to shock 'us, you're not gonna. .Do you remember choking her? Erick.
She said she was into that kind of shit too.
She said she was into that?
We were talking about that.
So how was you choking her, was you choking her with yourhands orwas you using
000781


























    
     
         
 
          
      
    
 
    
    
   
           
 
           
  
               
        
        ened.       
             
          
      
     
                 
















No, she took a belt and put it around her neck. She put the buckle somewhere right
here and said to pull on it and hold it.
Were you having sex with her when this happened?
The whole time, yeah she was doing that for me too.
Okay. So now you are having sex with her and she's asking you to pull this belt. Is
it her belt?
I don't know. It was in the truck.
It's not yours?
No. I don't have a belt.
Okay, so now you're having sex with her and she asked you to pull the belt tight.
Was you having, do you know ifyou are having either anal or vaginal sex with her,
okay? But you both have.
I was downtown, just one (inaudible) at one time. And then.
Okay, so we're back to, you're having sex and you have the belt around her neck and
she asked you to pull it tight. What happened then?
I got carried away and I just kept going.
Okay.
When I stopped she.
MORGAN: Were you in the truck or outside the truck?
ERICK: We were outside the truck and on the ground.







We had boots up there. Laid out a coat.
Okay. You said you got carried away and then what happened?
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -67-


















I tried for a pulse.
Did she pass out?
I think she did.
Okay, now she's passed out with a belt around her neck. What did you do?
I tried to get the belt off and I checked and she still wasn't breathing. I tried CPR.
But I don't know how to do CPR.
Pinched the nose off and tried to blow air into her mouth.
MORGAN: Any chest compressions, how did you do that?
ERICK: My friend (inaudible), he's a paramedic. He says, if they're not breathing and
they're, when you get a pulse, he says you (inaudible).
MORGAN: And that's what you did?
ERICK: Tried it.





I got scared and I pulled her up there and I took off.
Wait, wait You've got a whole bunch there that you left out. You said you pulled
her up there, where did you pull her up?
Into the little area by the treetop.
I000783
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How did you pull her?
Grabbed her up by her arms.
How did you pull her, just remember how you pulled her Erick.
I remember I grabbed her up by her arms.
Did she still have that belt around her neck?
Yeah.
Okay. Did you try using the belt to pull her too?
I might have once, I don't really remember that.
Okay.
But I was scared and I my hands were shaking. I was having a hell of a time..
You weren't using a condom were you?
No.
I mean, I know you wasn't, but I am just asking you, I'm testing your truthfulness
here.
Yeah, I know.
So you pull her, how far up to the truck?
Up to that little wooded area.
Okay.
MORGAN: Up or down?
ERICK: I think it was up.
MORGAN: Do you remember when we kind ofdescribed this area, this impression. There's the
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trees and just up above, probably where you drove up in there is an area on the cliff
there that looks like a little cave. Do you remember that? It's kind of sandy there,
it's not really a cave, but it's kind ofcarved out a little bit. Up there by where you
took a leak.
Mm-huh.
Is that where you are having sex initially? In that area
No, we were down by the truck.








I don't know. I don't remember.
Over by where the trees were?
Mm-huh (affirmative).
Did you walk up into that cave he is talking about?
Yeah, I took her coat.
And that's where you walked up in to? Would you grab those couple of pictures
that's (inaudible).
MORGAN: So you took her coat, what did you do with the coat?
ERICK: I put it up in the sand and put a little sand on it.
MORGAN: Bury it, tried to.








My hearing is going, I can't understand. I apologize, you did, what now with her
coat?
I put it up, put it up under some sand, or tried to. (Inaudible).
I don't know (inaudible) cave. I was scared.








                  
                
                   
   
 
           
       







      
      
  
           
     
               
  
             
               




   
               
 
              
       
 
 
         
     















Could you have buried anything else?
I might have. I was really scared, I can't.
How was she clothed?
Urn. She had a coat that we used on the ground. A sweatshirt.
What color her sweatshirt was?
No.
Okay, go ahead.
Urn. Levi's I think.
What articles did you take off to have sex with her?
Urn, my pants.
On her?
On her. Her pants. She pulled her pants and her panties down. She pulled off that
sweatshirt.
SMITH: Did she have her bra on?
ERICK: Uh, I don't remember.
SMITH: Did you have oral sex with her?
ERICK: Uh-huh (negative).
SMIm: Did she on you?
ERICK: No.
SMITH: How long did you have sex, roughly?
ERICK: It seemed like forever, I don't know.
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When you were pulling her with the belt, up into that little wooded area that you
described, how was she clothed then? Did her pants come, did she take her pants off,
were her pants on.
No, they were down, like mine were.
Down.
Down to here.





What did you use?
(Inaudible).
Did you use anything to help you get clumps ofdirt or grass or anythirg?
(Inaudible) probably a stick.
A stick?
Yeah, a stick.
Okay, here's a, here's a truthful test, okay. I know, and youdo to, thatshe is missing
. some things from her body. Tell me what you took off of her person, before you
(inaudible). You might have done that for ID, I'm not sure. I know you're scared, I
know how it feels, but to the best ofyour memory. You are doing good now, tell me





I didn't take any ofher clothes off.
Okay.
Took my clothes off.
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I'm talking about anything that is on her person.
(Inaudible) watch was in the car, in the truck.



















I took the watch, something else that was in like a little baggie looking thing.
Okay, what's something else. You are going to have to help me.
It looked like, like urn, a thing on a watch band. It was broken.
Is it separate from the watch itself?
Yeah.
What about the ring on her finger?
That was inside the baggie.
That one that you drew a picture of.
That was in that bag thing that was sitting inside the console.
How about her earrings?
No.
You don't remember her having earrings on?
No. Those earrings that you have I got from Amanda, Amanda's moms.
Forget that. Stay here with me. Did she have earrings on?
I don't remember.
How about a necklace?
No.
I
MORGAN: You resold it downtown by one ofyour friends.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
000788
      
          
          
           
                
             
               
        
  
        
      
 
 
        
            • 
     
  
        
             
            
    
     
  
          
  
 























How about the money that was in her pants. Could you taken her money?
I didn't take any money.
You just took the watch.
The thing that was on the console.
In the truck?
Yeah, because I was fidgeting with it.
Did she take those offprior to you walking up to that little cave area, or did she even
have them on?
She didn't have them on. She didn't have them on downtown either. She didn't
have them on when she walked up on me over at Ray's cart.
Tell me what the weather was like that night.
Um,um.
Was it snowing?
No, it wasn't snowing. But it snowed on Saturday night, early Friday morning,
Thursday, or late Thursday evening, early Friday morning.
Okay, what.
I remember that.
What did you do with the boots that you were wearing?
My boots.
Another truthful test.
I threw them away.

























              
     
     
       
   
       
                   
   
              
             
         
 
   
             
        
  
   
           
  
   
    
       
   







And why did you throw them away?















Here, look at me. Stay with me. Could you have thrown them away because they
might have been the footprints that were left up there?
I didn't think about that.
You didn't. But those were the ones that you were actually wearing that night,
correct. The ones that Cathy gave you.
(Inaudible).
They were, okay. Back to what happened up there. There is no easy way to do this.
She has a black eye and the black eye came that night.
It wasn't from me.
Wow, just a minute, hang on here. Hang on. If she's allowing you to put a belt
around her neck and she's allowing you to (inaudible) this choke out she likes, I'm
assuming it's called rough sex. Now are you (inaudible).
I told her asphyxiation.
Okay. Did she ask you to hit her? Did she.
No.
You never hit her.
No.
Areyousme?
MORGAN: Erick, when you left her, when we found her, tell me about the belt.
I
ERICK: I wrapped it around a tree.
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MORGAN: Why did you do that?
Page -75-
ERICK: I don't know.



















I didn't think so.
Did you say (inaudible).
Chest wasn't moving. It wouldn't.
I have one question here, back when you say you were attempting CPR and stuff, and
you are just having sex with her and she's not breathing. There's a house fifty yards
away, why didn't you run down and have them call for help.
Scared.
Scared ofwhat?
I was just scared, I didn't know. I wasn't thinking. Scared.
Scared.
I mean that I tried and it didn't work.
Scared ofwhat? Verbalize your thoughts.
Being in the paper, they would have wanted the truth. I would have told them the
truth and they wouldn't have been too happy about that (Inaudible) other people.
They being?
People I (inaudible). I really didn't want other people knowing what my sexual
preferences are.
Erick you went home and told Amanda this whole story.
After I sobered up.
You've already told Amanda this.
I told her bits and pieces. (Inaudible).
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -76-
SMITH:
ERICK:
You told her you choked and killed a lady and buried her, just like you just told us.
I didn't choke her and kill her on purpose.
MORGAN: Okay, let's talk about after this happens. After you cover her up and everything, you
get in her truck and where do you drive to?
ERICK: Urn. I remember going down some back roads, parking it.
MORGAN: You stopped at any convenient stores while you were in the truck?
ERICK: No.
SMITH: So you left the keys in it?
ERICK: Yeah, the keys were left in it whenI left it.
SMITH: Are you sure?
ERICK: Yeah.
MORGAN: Erick, they weren't found in there.
ERICK: Maybe somebody else jockey boxed it.
MORGAN: Could you have taken them, could you have taken them and tossed them on your way
back?
ERICK: No, I left them in the ignition.
MORGAN: Did you stop at the store before you went back to camp?
ERICK: No.
MORGAN: You didn't stop at.
ERICK: I went straight back to the camp at church.
I
MORGAN: You've got somefeces on your pants.
ERICK: Yeah, I shit my pants.
MORGAN: Was it hers?
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
ERICK:
Page -77-
It wasn't my shit, I shit my pants. I have been constipated ever since then.
MORGAN: Okay, there is feces up at the scene, whose is that.
ERICK: Probably hers.
SMITH: Probably. From getting choked?
ERICK: Asphyxiation.
SMITH: Did she?
ERICK: Did she what?
SMITH: Did she defecate, did she?
ERICK: She probably did.















Well, lam asking you, not probably. It's up there and it's right in line with the drag.
Did you?
I didn't stop and look.
Did you get some on you?
No not hers, I mean I shit my pants and (inaudible) area. It was coming out my back.
Did you do this while you were having sex with her or earlier on that day, or when
did that happen?
No, that happened whenever I was scared and I had some on my back.
When you were walking?
That was on Friday. I couldn't really see that well.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -78-
MORGAN: (Inaudible) had anal sex with her?
ERICK: She had shit herself up there.
ERICK: Downtown.
MORGAN: When did that occur?
ERICK: Over by the bank., at Sixth and Main, by Capitol. You've got the bank. and there's the
alley area over here. We went over to the alley, looked in there. Decided to go over
to the bank, behind the bank, where the statue was.
MORGAN: Are you talking about the Bank of America?
ERICK: I don't know where it is.
SMITH: That great, big, tall huge building.
MORGAN: Where they have hockey.
ERICK: Statue that looks like a.
SMITH: Okay.
ERICK: Like a.
SMITH: Like a what? So are you having sex on the statue, out in the open. This is obviously
before you went out up in the hills.
ERICK: (Inaudible) yeah.
SMITH: Okay, where was her?
MORGAN: Tell me more ofwhere you are talking about, because I don't know.
SMITH: (Inaudible).




(Inaudible) those statutes that were out there.
You go up some brick steps and walk on to a brick area and it goes back there and it
goes in to bushes there's no line, it's just that they are there.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -79-
SMITH: Right across from the (inaudible).





That's where a lot ofpeople go there (inaudible).
So before you got in her truck, you went and had sex with her while you were
walking around downtown and that's where you have anal sex with her. Did she say
that hurt? Is that all you did was just have anal sex?
Yeah, I kissed her on the neck a couple oftimes and we started walking around over
there and so we had to walk. That's when I went across that 00, Renegade.
Okay.
MORGAN: Do you remember, tell me how it is that you got up to Fifth and Alturas. Where you








Somebody had to suggest that location and it just aims to reason that you have been
up there and camped. Are you driving or is she driving?
She drove up there from the neighborhoods. With those street lights, I couldn't see.
Okay, she's driving are you telling her where to go.
I told her there was a place up in the foothills at Main and Sixth. She went up Sixth,
turned around and came back down. Went up the other hill, saw that there was like a
driveway thing going in. She says, my truck's 4-wheel drive. So she pulled it up in
there.
I thought you were on the bottom of.








(Inaudible) dirt flat, dirt (inaudible). And then, you level up from that is where the
trees are.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -80-
ERICK:
SMITH:
That's not pavement there. (Inaudible) road.
And if you just give us a minute here, we've got some pictures of it and you can
actually show us where you parked. What do you recall doing with her shoes?
ERICK: Her shoes.
SMITH: Do you remember if she had them on or did she have them off?
ERICK: I don't remember.
SMITH: Do you remember doing anything with her shoes?
ERICK: No.
SMITH: Okay. Are you sure?
ERICK: They should have been up there.
SMITH: Did you ever take them off? Okay, what he's talking about, this drives back in from
down here. Are you with me?
ERICK: Right up there, is where we parked.
MORGAN: And the cave, you can't see it.
SMITH: Okay. Are you familiar with this road. Let me, let me acquaint you up there. Fifth
street runs down this way. You come up Fifth and it dead ends and if you keep
coming straight up Fifth, it turns in to this dirt road that comes back in to here. This
is down here below here.
ERICK: Mm-huh (affirmative).
SMITH: Where did you park?
ERICK: Down in here.
SMITH: Down below.
ERICK: Yeah.
SMITH: Did you walk up in to here, in to here?
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -81-
ERICK:
SMITH:
I walked up in to here.
Okay, well do you see that mark right there. That's a drag mark. So something


















That's probably where I put her coat.
Ifyou follow, I'm sorry.
That's probably where I put her coat.
Show me where you put her coat.
Right there.
And you buried it with.
(Inaudible) used my hands.
Okay. Anything else around there that you buried?
(Inaudible).
Okay, you can see the drag mark. Show me where you went from here. This comes
out here now. Where did you take her? He is standing by where the drag marks, see
right there.
In here.
Okay, did you go up in here?
I remember following a path.
You remember following a path?
MIn-huh (affirmative). .
Okay. Did you put her over into these bushes over in here?
(Inaudible) from here to here.
Okay, right over in here?
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Pretty good recollection because that where she is, I mean. Do you remember
anything right next to where you buried the body? How did you see, how could you
see to do all of this?
It was light because there is a street light up there.
Did you have any aided vision, did you have any flashlights with you?
No.
Did you use her truck lights?
No.
Was it total darkness?
No, there was a street light out there, there was a street light or maybe the moon or
something. It felt like a street light.
When you got back to Amanda this morning, was it still dark?
Yeah, it was just starting to get urn, not like dawn or dusk.
Remember that play house right next to the area? Did you ever see that?
Mm-huh.
Okay, that's her shoe. Did you take it and throw it or do anything with it?
I might have kicked it.
You might have kicked it, away from where you were burying her?
Not knowing, I probably kicked it while I was stumbling around.
Could you tell me anything about those?
What is it?
It's an earring and that's (inaudible) here. Those are your shoe prints.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
ERICK: I don't remember anything about that.
MORGAN: Do you remember the two ofyou walking over in that area together?
Page -83-
ERICK: What area?
MORGAN: Below the cave and (inaudible).
ERICK: That's where we parked the truck.







The truck was parked there. You go up the dirt and (inaudible) driveway. There's
two ways up there. There's one that goes down (inaudible) where the truck was
parked.
Alright, I'm going to ask youthis. Because it is another thing that concerns me that
was found in the autopsy. So why does she have the black eye? She's also got this
unique pattern on her back. I told you she has a
What is it?
You want me to guess or can you tell me how that happened.
When I picked her up, I dropped her down.
MORGAN: Do you know what a pattern injury is?
ERICK: I don't know.






Ifyou look at this, these are all symmetrical and they all, see how they all follow a
certain distance away from each other and it is a perfect pattern of something that
made this mark on her back. And it was this night that it happened and this is a heal
and this is a toe and this matches the shoesthat you were wearing. Do you remember
doing this?
I was stomping the dirt down.




      
       
              
   
      
       






              
              
 
               
                 
           
   
             
         
         
    
                   




                  
               
                   
                 
  
      
    










I was trying to stomp the dirt.
Oh, stomping the dirt down on her, when you were burying her?
Trying to cover her up, yeah.
That's an awful hard stomp. Did she ever upset you to the point that you would have
stomped her like this?
No.
How did she get the black eye?
I don't know.
Are you stomping the dirt down hard enough that it is going to cause that?
Probably would.
MORGAN: You know Erick.
ERICK: Probably (inaudible) got.
MORGAN: The problem with that is, is that ifyou look at that, that's flat across her back, okay.
There's an even better picture of it. Right across her back, across her shoulder
blades.
SMITH: There is no dirt, weeds, or debris that can inhibit that pattern.
MORGAN: Ifyou took the two, shoe print and this pattern injury on her back with a little Lugz.
You could see them identical and when she's found, she's laying kind ofon her side.
SMITH: We've covered, we've uncovered.
MORGAN: And she's uncovered and the reason I am saying this, the position ofher, she's kind
of on her side, okay. Which means that you couldn't have given that kick by
stomping the dirt aroundherm you can see what I am talking about
EIUCK: (Inaudible) on top.
MORGAN: I understand what you are saying, but what I am saying is that is a positional straight
down hard kick, stomp. In a fight stomping somebody. Okay and the problem with
your theory that you're (inaudible) is that on her front, is just an injury.
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MORGAN: Just below the shoulder. I can show you.
ERICK: (Inaudible). When I was still trying to stomp the dirt down.
SMITH: Actually it's here (inaudible).
ERICK: (Inaudible).
SMITH: (Inaudible). I need to take just a second.
MORGAN: This is an injury going across the front. There's another one across the back. So if
you are saying that you are stomping dirt down over her, then she's kind oflaying on
her front, it doesn't account for that injury.
ERICK: I moved her around. I was trying to position her to get the dirt to stay. (Inaudible)
stomping on it.
MORGAN: That doesn't account if she's on her~ Think about it, ifyou're laying down. You're
laying on your stomach. Okay. You're kneeling, if what you're saying is correct,
stomping on the back, which it isn't, but just for instance for this second I will say it
is correct. It doesn't account for the injury to her throat. We have two separate
injuries. What that means is, that this is a violent struggle of some fonn. What we
do know, medically speaking, is that people when they are dead, they don't bruise
anymore. Once your heart stops, your blood will quit circulating. It is going to drain
to the lowest portion ofyour body. It is called lvidity. You don't bruise, you don't
bleed. If you have a cut, the blood won't leak: out from around there because it
doesn't spread anymore, okay. Because your heart's not pumping and your
circulation, your circulatory, circulatory system, you learned that in school. It means
all that blood's being pumped through your, through all ofyour veins and arteries and
return to your heart. Once (inaudible) heart's dead. Those injuries occurred prior to
her dying. Okay. We are seeing indications that, and you've come a long ways from
what you have told us. When we started out to where we are now, but ninety percent
ofthe truth isn't enough. You know, what we have to do is explain it and now what
we are talking about here is some medical, scientific stuffand it doesn't match up to
what you're telling us. So we've got to account for that. So we can't stop now and
say, well it's look that bad ifI tell mm everything because it's going to look bad.
MORGAN: We've got to account for, bad or not, we still have to account for it. What I think
happened is, you said, when you said things got out of hand. There's a fight,
obviously there's a fight.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
ERICK: (Inaudible).
Page -86-
MORGAN: She's got a black eye. She's got those vicious stomp marks on her body. She's got
blood on her shirt.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: She's got a cut lip. She's got a bloody nose. Blood on her shirt. Not dirt, this is
blood. She's bled. Okay. There's a fight.
ERICK: (Inaudible) where I grabbed her up here.
MORGAN: Now wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute. When we account for the time that
she leaves the bar to the time she's up there and that she tied that thing around her
neck, right. So we're not going to get the boogie man who suddenly appears and
does all ofthis damage to her. She's fine when she leaves the Cactus Bar. She's fine
when she is seen with you at the hot dog stand. She's fine when Renegade sees her
and you,right. Everything that happened to her, doesn't stop off. This isn't
somebody else beating her up. This is what happens up there on the hillside. Okay.
The injuries to her occur when you and her are together. Now I know that you are
sitting there and the easy thing to do is to try and minimize to try and make it look
better than it is. But we can't do that at this point. We've got to tell the whole truth.
I still believe you, I don't think this happened from you're not the guy that saw an
easy mark downtown and was going to end things for her. This isn't that, I don't
believe, right. Whatever happened, there's an argument that occurred that night.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: She wanted to go home, maybe you wanted to go home. I don't know what happened
but
ERICK: There was no argument. I tried to pick her at her house.
MORGAN: There had to be an argument.
ERICK: There was no argument, I'm telling you.
MORGAN: Well I'm telling you that, that doesn't make sense of the injuries and that's the part
that is going to harm you now. Now you've got through the pass of I don't
remembers, which is a good thing because that is better than where you were before
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -87-
ERICK: If there was a struggle then I would have claws on my face and shit.
MORGAN: Not necessarily. You are six foot tall, six foot one (inaudible). Hundred eighty,
hundred ninety, two hundred pounds.
ERICK: No, I don't think I'm six foot.
MORGAN: She's a hundred and thirty, five foot four. She's not going to struggle with you very
much, she's gone. You're a man, she's a female. This happens, whatever happened,
whatever set it off happened. Does this, kind of make sense. Something happened
between the two ofyou. This is maybe a (inaudible) downtown, maybe not, I don't
know. What I am saying that up on the hillside there was a struggle at some point.
Not when you pull her down the thing, it's done by then or almost done.
ERICK: There was no fight. I know she didn't struggle, I mean.
MORGAN: There had to be a fight, Erick.
MORGAN: There had to be some violent thing on your part, because of those injuries to her.••
ERICK: There wasn't.
e:·..
ERICK: All I did was stomp the dirt down and.
MORGAN: Prior to.
ERICK: Try to pack around it, it kept coming off ofher.
MORGAN: No, no, no. Prior to her death, we've established that, because you can't have
bruising after death. You're going to have to trust me on that ifyou don't know that
for a fact. You will have to trust me because I do know. You can't have bruises, you
can't have bleeding after death because the- heart stopped. You know what bruises
are fonned from, right. Damaged tissue and blood being broken, from little
capillaries and veins in the tissue. Okay. Once, and I've seen a lot ofdead people
because that is what I do. And I know that they sometimes get dropped and after
death, knocked around and are bumped in the loading process and they don't bruise
because they are dead. So be done with that. This is before she was dead.
ERICK: So she was still alive when I took her up to that hillside and tried to bury her up there.







      
                
 
                
              
     
        
                 
             
             
               
                 
               
            
         
   
                 
          
   
            
               
                 
                  
             
            
                
                
              
               
                     
                  
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -88-
ERICK:
died. (Inaudible) represent conclusively, I know that much.
(Inaudible) when I dragged her up that hil~ I thought she was dead.
I
MORGAN: Then you would have to have held that belt and saw her to get her to die. Ifwhatever
caused the reason you did, that's what you had to do.
ERICK: (Inaudible) I kept trying to grab the belt and pull her up over to make her stay in a
position until I wrapped it around a tree.
MORGAN: Prior to that or maybe you just went into there, I don't know. Did you kick her,
stomp her hard enough that it is causing deep tissue bruising, leaving those patterns.
You bumped your knee, you bumped your arm. You know what it takes to get a
bruise, a small bruise. This is something different. This is deep tissue bruising,
pattern injuries is what we call it. This is a very hard, it's a stomp and both sides
were. On her neck, below her throat and also along the back. Alright. We also
know that she has a black eye. We also know that she has a cut lip and her nose is
bleeding. And this happened, we know that much, prior to her shirt coming off.
Because there is blood on her shirt.
ERICK: (Inaudible) her shirt, went up like this.
MORGAN: Her shirt's not on her when we find her.
ERICK: I know. It was offwhen we got up to that one spot. One arm was out so I took the
thing off.
MORGAN: You already told us earlier that she was completely undressed, okay and so we got a
problem.
ERICK: She was down here, I didn't see no bra.
MORGAN: And you said that you used the coat and you're laid down and she peeled her shirt off.
You didn't remember about a bra or not. She peeled her panties and her pants down
around her ankles and you pulled your pants down. Then she consensual had sex.
That's your story. But that's not consistent with what we're seeing.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: Okay. And I'm not lying to you. What I am telling you is I've been a homicide cop
for a long time and you know and I've been a policeman almost as long as you've
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been alive. I've been a detective for a good part ofthat time. I have worked a lot of
crime scenes and I am telling you what I am seeing at that crime scene. There was
violence there. And that's what the experts are going to testify to, that there was
violence there. The coroner is going to come in and say that there was violence there.
And any third grader could see that there was some violence there. Okay.
I didn't, she didn't struggle with me. Not up at that spot at all, or down there on the
flat spot by the truck. I took her up there to try to carry her by her arms.
She had (inaudible) an injury to her mouth and to her nose. Started pulling her shirt
off. She had to. Do you want me to show the picture that had blood on it. She had
to Erick. You know what, police work is just logic. I mean, that's (inaudible) right
now, of course (inaudible) going to go.
(Inaudible) like this.
MORGAN: And where would it go? A scrape off your chin on to the.
MORGAN: Saw the picture. Saw the blood on her shirt. She's got it on when her mouth and
nose is injured. That's not what you are telling me from what happened earlier when
you said that you went up there, she took her coat off, took her clothes off, pulled her
pants down and started having sex. She had an injury to her mouth before she took





It could have happened up on there on that spot where I tried to bury her.
MORGAN: No, no, no. It didn't.
ERICK: It didn't happen down below.
MORGAN: It happened wherever she was wearing that shirt.
ERICK: Probably at that spot, that is where I took her shirt from there.
MORGAN: You already told me that you took her shirt off, she took her shirt off.
ERICK: She had it up'like this. Up like this.










                   
                 
               
                
             
                   
                  
                
                   
               
       
   
              
  
                  
               
                  
                
          
                 
      
      
         
              
                
         
                   
   
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -90-
MORGAN: She lays it on the ground. She pulled her pants and panties way down. Takes her up,
upper clothes off. Okay. Before she ever. What I'm saying is, before she took that
shirt off, she has blood coming from her mouth and lips. It gets on her shirt.
ERICK:
ERICK:
She laid it on the ground.
I don't remember exactly what happened, I know that I tried to bury her.
MORGAN: Yeah, I know that. But that's not enough.
ERICK: I know I wiped her face off with it or something, I don't know.
MORGAN: No.
ERICK: I don't know.
MORGAN: What I am going to try to tell again is, you know from where we were, from the I
don't knows, I don't remembers, I took pills and alcohol to. We can't delete that
because that's what happened. That's the evidence, it's there. (Inaudible) it is, take
that evidence and tell the truth about it and we'll go from broke. Ifyou say, you
know this is what happened. You know, I didn't want it to happen that way and I
wasn't expecting it to happen that way. You know, I misinterpreted the situation.
We've all been in bad spots, you know. We've all made bad mistakes and bad
decisions, you know. My guess is something very similar to this happened. She gets
you in the truck and you had been walking around downtown together. She gets you
in the truck and you go on to find a spot and then I don't know how you end up, up
there. Was it because you know that spot and that's where you end up. You're
talking, she's been nice. You're talking back and forth. You assume that she wants
some romance. And I think that she didn't want to have it there. And then became,
she's in your face.
ERICK: That never happened.
MORGAN: She's in your face. I think you lost your temper.
ERICK: That ain't what happened.
MORGAN: I think she lost, you lost your temper. And the fight was on. Or maybe she was
going to (inaudible) a little bit, but wasn't prepared to go quite as far as what you
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wanted. That would account for the blood on her shirt. That would account for the
stomp marks on her. That would account for the belt around her throat, her own belt.
Her being dragged. You know when I talked to the people, your friends, Amanda.
People that know you best, I asked them specifically, every single one of them.
When he came back to camp that morning, did he have any injuries. Did he have any
scratch marks, did he have anything on his face, on his hands. You know what they
all said?
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -91-
••
ERICK: Huh-rom?
MORGAN: He didn't have anything on him. I know that if you were to put your hands around
my throat, there is going to be bruising. If you're going to put a belt around my
throat, there is going to be bruising. Alright, even it's on for a short time. Because,
just do me a favor,just reach up there and put your, while you're sitting right there,
on your neck and throat. Can you pinch it together, alright. And right down here on
your fat roll, there is such fine skin when you get that when you get that, what we call
peticular bruising. Which means those little teensy blood vessels in those areas break
easily.
ERICK: MIn-huh.
MORGAN: And in your throat, by god's own design, he doesn't design to be choked. That's why
we pass out so easy when we're choked. It's very fine, there's a lot of muscle
(inaudible) there. I mean there's just, there's just nothing there to bare. It is one of
the little areas of our body that can't withstand a whole lot ofdamage and so when
we have something around our throat, it's going to leave a bruise. It's going to be
that little teensy pinprick bruising called petichial hemorrhaging. It is also very
(inaudible) pattern injury there, there should be a pattern injury same way around
here. Someone should have seen it.
ERICK: (Inaudible) right here.
MORGAN: Pardon?
ERICK: Cut me right here. (Inaudible) Pulled it up like this around and cinched the buckle
down over here.
MORGAN: (Inaudible) did this.
ERICK: It stops the air.
8",,··.,.
.'1).'..v
MORGAN: I understand that. I understand it all, the mechanism of asphyxiation works. I'm
saying this, I am going to assume that no one sees any injuries on you at all. Amanda
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was concerned, what did he do. You know did you leave anything up there. Did you
pee, well, yeah I did. How about your fingernail, because she knows that you are
playing with little match fingernail, maybe it's got caught in her hair or something.
But she's checking you over with a fine tooth comb to make sure that you didn't
leave something or drop something. Get scratched. Is there going to be any ofher,
your skin cells under her fingernails. What we find is that on her neck, where she's
tried to get that belt off. You can see where she scratched herself trying to pull that
belt back.
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -92-
•IJ
ERICK: That wasn't very good on that either.
MORGAN: Well you may not have, but it's dark. She's struggling, she doesn't want this to
happen. Not that way. And I believe that a couple of things are going on in your
mind. I believe that you're angry. I believe you're scared. Right.
I ERICK: I'm scared because I thought I had killed her at that point.
MORGAN: Prior to that. Prior
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: Everybody I know, that I talked to. Whoever we talked to dozens, ofher family and
friends has told me the same thing about her. She's the nicest person in the world. In
fact Amanda told me that she saw her picture and said, she gave me a couple of
bucks downtown one time. Do you remember that?
ERICK: I don't remember that. I remember getting fifty cents from her.
MORGAN: Okay, so you knew her in the past.
ERICK: I bump into a lot ofpeople down there.
MORGAN: Okay. Amanda didn't recognize her picture in the newspaper because it is her
driver's license picture. Nobody looks their driver's license. She saw the picture that
we showed you on your, a version on the (inaudible).She gave me a couple ofbucks.
This woman is salt ofthe earth and also she would get right in your face. (Inaudible)
friends (inaudible). Very strong opinionated. You know she would, like you said,
she would hit Mike Tyson ifhe said or did the wrong thing, and she was going to tell
you the way it was. That was the way she was. Something happened up there, that
caused it to happen. She got in your face and you got in hers and there was obviously
a fight.
ERICK: Well she didn't hit me.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
MORGAN: She probably didn't.
Page-93-
ERICK: She didn't call me, she didn't struck me.
MORGAN: I know that.
ERICK: She did not struggle.
MORGAN: I don't believe she didn't struggle.
ERICK: She didn't struggle.
MORGAN: Did you take the belt out ofher pants and put it around her throat?
MORGAN: What else was she into?





No, she took it off first. It was in her truck. It was in her truck, it was on the seat of
her truck.
Then I asked her, I said, you know about if she was into asphyxiation. She was into
other stuff.
She started telling me about cocaine and other shit that she had done.
MORGAN: In the past, yeah.
ERICK: I don't know if it was in the past or.
MORGAN: Years ago. I'm buying most ofwhat you are saying, but like I said, I think I can deal
with the truth, but I can'tdeal with ninety percent ofit, or even ninety-nine percentof
it.
ERICK: I am telling you that she did not struggle. That I did not fight with her.
MORGAN: Well ifthat's the case, then what you are telling me is that once you got up there, you
overcame her quickly, raped her and killed her. That she didn't even have the chance
to struggle.
ERICK: No, I didn't rape her either.
MORGAN: How can you say that?
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -94-
ERICK: Because I didn't.
MORGAN: Do you know about tears, do you know about rough sex, what it does to a woman?
Huh-rom.
ERICK: I know what it does to men, I mean if somebody takes it and asphyxiates you, your
muscles tense up.
MORGAN: Okay, the skin around the woman's rectum, or anyone's rectum and in their vagina,
when they are not prepared for sex, it is going to tear. It is going to rip. Okay, it
hurts. She's got that. I want you to think about it now. When I come back in, we
need to finish this up and be truthful.
ERICK: I am being truthful.




MORGAN: How are you doing Erick?
ERICK: Doing alright.
MORGAN: Erick, we talked and we know, I am going to say it again. And we are proud ofyou
because you've come a long, long ways from where we started when we walked in
this room. And like I said, eighty-nine percent, ninety-nine percent does notquite get
enough. We need to clean it all up and then move on. I guarantee you, there's not a
person in the world that wouldn't want to turn back the clock and relive things over
and do things different. We can in what we do, in what we say, I am going to learn
something from this one. I am going to go on with my life. I am going to stand tall
at some point in my life. Make people proud of me. start now, start that progress
right now. And you've done that with whether you believe it or not. You're starting
to get there. People respect when someone's truthful. People understand that you
make mistakes. We've all been there. I mean that's common to all man. We've all
made mistakes, we've all made bad ones. What people respect is that, yeah I screwed
up. I'm sorry for what I did. I truly am sorry. I screwed up bad, I shouldn't have
done it. But I'm not a bad guy, really. There's people that we've talked to that
couldn't believe that you might be responsible for this because that's not the Erick
they knew. They said he's a good man. Even, ifhe did it, itmust have been, he must
have been really mad
MORGAN: or angry. And we know from doing these kind ofinvestigations that typically that is
~.;.'. ,
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exactly what happens. For one moment in time they lose control and things, bad
things happen that you wouldn't have done normally ifyou had been thinking. That
things wouldn't have been that way. There were several opportunities that night, that
could have ended easily, you know peacefully. You go back, you know. Cheryl in
her case and in your case. But it didn't. So the only thing to do now is we can, I
mean for a lot ofdifferent reasons, one for your own benefit and one for her family's
benefit, put some closure to it. So I can go back there and say, Erick's not happy
about what happened that night. He's sorry that, that happened that night. He would
undo it if he could. (Inaudible) message to the family and he's sorry for what
happened that night because he knows that Sharon, Cheryl wasn't probably normally
like this either, you know. It'sjust two ships passing in the night and had a collision.
..."
I
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -95-
SMITH:
ERICK:
Especially for Amanda and your unborn baby. Do you want her to have to take the




••: .,~). v ...';
MORGAN: Of course you don't. Ofcourse you don't. What I do know Erick, things once you
got up to the hillside didn't occurjust exactly like you are telling me because there
are too many things unsaid. We talked about pattern injuries until (inaudible) talk
about something else. Fabric impressions. Imagine if you will. Blue jeans, these
things, if you look closely at them, you will see that they are all woven material.
That's how they stay together. Inside ofher truck,right here, right back here, right
there in particularly. If you were to see that, this rug, there;s fabric impressions in
that. That's sand, that's wet sand sitting here to the side ofthat truck. Her pants, her
clothing hit that with force and left a print. A fabric impression on the side of that
truck. Just like leaving your fingerprints in something. That doesn't happen unless
you were thrown against it, hard enough to leave an impression. Does that make
sense? About the fabric impressions, do you understand what I am talking about.
You've got a surface, that will hold that impression. You've got the moisture and
grit that is going to leave that impression there, just like your shoe print in the sand.
(Inaudible) we know that you was up there. We know that her hair came in contact
with that because it swirled. And believe it or not you can see directionality in these
sorts of things. We know the pattern injuries on her throat and on her back came
from a great deal offorce. We know that her rectum had a tear on it. We know that,
typically speaking, is not a consensual sex act when there is damage to an orifice like
that. It hurts, it hurts. I mean it's like, having a cut. You don't want anything to
touch me. It hurts, okay. The blood on her shirt, we know that she was hit in the
face. She was hit in the eye. She had a swelling inher eye. Do you remember when·
we talked about the heart stopping, we don't bruise, there is no swelling any more.
She was hit, she was hurt. This was not a consensual sex act. We understand that
and that's okay.
ERICK: She could have got that when I took there and dropped her on the ground.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
MORGAN: Couldn't get that fabric impression that is on the side of the truck.
SMITH: Explain that Erick, what happened there.
ERICK: When we were (inaudible) up in there (inaudible) went up there.
MORGAN: What were you doing then?
ERICK: When I picked her up, I didn't think she was breathing.
MORGAN: You told me earlier that you pulled her, and that her pants were down.
Page -96- I)
•
ERICK: I tried to carry her and I couldn't, so I dropped her back on the ground.
I MORGAN: You told me that she had a bowel movement.
ERICK: She did.
MORGAN: I didn't think you would want to touch her to bad. The important thing here is when
you are telling me that, inside of her pants there is no fecal material. Your story is
not matching up. From what the scene and the evidence tells us. Trust me, I am
telling the truth, it is going to sound better.
ERICK: You guys said that there was a trail from the truck where I had to drag her and now
you said there was no fecal matter.
MORGAN: Not inside ofher pants.
ERICK: I already told you what happened.
MORGAN: Tell the truth Erick.
ERICK: I did tell you the truth.







I already told you, I (inaudible) her up on the truck because I thought that she wasn't
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Okay. What happened back here?
Back there (inaudible).
There's another spot like this back here, it's in the shadows, you just can't see it.
I don't know. I don't know.
So you're telling me from what I understood here that you pulled her pants up.
On the ground, I leaned her up, picked her up, tried to carry her and then.
So did you pull her pants back down?
No, they came down when I dragged her. (Inaudible) carry her. I almost fell down
myself. That's why I dropped her.
MORGAN: Isn't it true that when you were standing over her and you've got that belt tied tight
around her throat and you're hanging on to it. That's when you kicked her in the
shoulder, and across the back. Tried to get her to die, she's not cooperating, you kick
her in the throat the same way.
ERICK: No.
MORGAN: Explain the injury to her back and to her throat.
ERICK: I told you, I was trying to stanp some dirt down.
MORGAN: That's what you want to leave it as.





Would you voluntarily consent to give me a sample ofyour saliva?
MIn-huh. (affirmative)
Okay. This just says, alright, I'm going to fill it in here, Erick Hall, hereby pray and
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voluntarily consent to provide Detective Smith and Morgan, representing the Boise
Police Department, with a DNA specimen, oral swab or blood (inaudible) may be
used to include or exclude me as a suspect in current or future criminal
investigations.


















Or past, okay. I am going to write in here, or past investigations. I fully understand
that I have a right to refuse to give the specimen. I have read and understand the
above statement and I consent to provide this specimen ofmy own free will without
any threats or promises having been made to me. Do you understand that?
Mm-huh (affirmative).
Okay. That just says, it is pretty self.explanatory. It says please print full name.
Do you want my initial or just (inaudible).
That's fine. Date of birth.
(Inaudible).




Mm-huh. It is 4:45 hours (inaudible). Sterile swabs. I just need you to lean forward
here and stick your tongue out here. I need the sides ofyour cheeks. Okay, just, two
more. Do you understand DNA?
No.
You don't. Let me explain it to you. DNA is a genetical makeup ofthe body that is
unique to you and you only. It is like a fingerprint. Only you, once they can figure
out the DNA that I just took from you and give it a schematic drawing, numeric
figure. It is unique to you and you only. Only your cells will contain your DNA.
Nobody else in the world will have DNA like yours. Does that make sense, unique to
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the fluids of the human body. That is the best way I can explain it to you. It is
carried in saliva, semen, blood, hair follicles, etc, etc okay. And when I told you that
I wasn't sure ifyou were this mass murder and that we would look at our other cases,
I have a concern about another case that we have been involved in and that we have
DNA on. We have semen on a homicide that occurred from a missing person on
September 28th of2000. Okay. I am going to help you here a little bit. There are so
many unique characteristics between this one and that one, that it would, it is
imperative that I have to ask you this, okay. Now keep in mind when I am asking
you this, I think that you have been somewhat cooperative here with us. It is going to
blow the whole thing ifthis right here will be the tell-tale. I have DNA ofthis female
that was sexually assaulted and I have the semen from her body. Okay. She was
walking down the Greenbelt on September 28th of 2000 about 7:00 at night. She
came from the Julia Davis Park area and she was walking down the Greenbelt. She
was an airline stewardess, flight attendant. Her name was Lynn Henneman. Okay.
She came up missing, we found her, two weeks later in the river, nude, strangled,
with her own clothing on (inaudible) now. And there was some unique things about
her body that had happened. The most, foremost importantly, we have DNA, and I
can't tell you why, we are just going to tell you that either that DNA is going to
match you, because you lived down in that area at the time, you were on the
Greenbelt. We have now established the fact that you committed a rape in 1991, that
you were convicted of. We have now established the fact that you committed a
homicide in 2003 of which sex took place, of which choking took place, ofwhich
some type ofbattery took place on that particular person~ Okay. This is all one and
exact with this particular person, Lynn Henneman on nine, twenty-eight of two
thousand. Her body was discarded in the river and we find contents ofitems ofhers
throughout the city. We have never had a DNA match. I have had her in the
National Data Bank, compared to sexual offenders and homicide suspects who are
arrested and convicted and that have been compared against since we have located
her body. We have not had a match. You are not in there. Okay. You are not in that
system.
I showed you that I had a DNA check in prison.
You are not in the system, I have had them check you by social security, your full
name and it took.
They took blood out in the prison a long time ago.
Okay, they didn't put it into a system as ofthe '95 mandated. Okay. ·In other words,
of what I am telling you is that you haven't been compared against that particular
case. I want to reiterate again to you, real slowly that she was walking down the
Greenbelt in the area of 30th and Main, coming from m Park, 7:00 at night. She
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was discarded and she was choked. Either it is or it is not you. And I want to tell
you what. You cannot, absolutely cannot negate the fact that is either going to match
or it is not going to match. I mean I am going to get those results right here soon. So
when (inaudible) are coming back and saying I was on pills, I was drinking, I don't
remember, because we have established the fact Erick, that you remembered a whole
lot more than what you wanted us to originally think that you remembered, agreed.
A little bit, I don't remember everything exactly like I remember some.
Okay, okay. Are you familiar withe the homicide I am talking about?





Okay, I'm not concerned about what (inaudible) telling you so much about it as your
opinion and recollection as to whether or not this could have been another one of
those nights where you are out in this excited state, and you run across this person
walking down the Greenbelt and maybe the same type ofinteraction occurs. Maybe
you had been drinking.
No, I was using meth back then with heroin. So I don't.
That would explain even more.
My brain has been frazzled by that shit, so.
Okay. I am going to go out on a limb here and just ask you this. Is there a possibility
with yourusage ofmeth and the possibility that you don't remember that that's going
to match the semen we took out ofher.
I don't know. I don't know. I'm you telling you guys that I don't know. (Inaudible)
out walking back in 2001, no shoes on or just a pair ofpants.
Okay hold there, let's go back a little bit. And I have known and I have dealt with
and I have interviewed a lot ofmeth users. I am, I am going to sit here and tell you,
000816
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It don't, it don't get any worse. And that does make a good person violent and that
does make him do things that never in their wildest dreams would they ever believe
that they did. What I am here to absolutely promise you, that is going to tell whether
you did it or not. And ifyou did, let's clean the slate tonight. We have been here a
long time. I don't want to go through all ofthis I was taking pills, I was using meth, I
was using heroine. Either that sample is going to match or it is not going to match,
so we canjust leave it at that. Okay. Now I don't know. Because I don't know ain't
going to cut it Erick. And like I said, you have not been compared against that
particular situation and there are so many unique characteristics, similarities, ofthose
two that I am concerned. I know where you were living at the time, right there. I
know your mode ofthinking when you are under the influence. Now you are telling
me meth or heroine, that accentuates it ten fold to an angry, out-of-control person that
can't control their behavior. Would you agree that's what it did to you?
Yes, it did hurt me, bad, in bad ways. It made me noncoherent in what I was doing.
Okay.
There have been times that they have found me walking and I would just, was like.
Well let me ask you this.
I couldn't figure out the hell I got there, down in the damn street.
You heard what I just told you.
Mm-huh (affirmative).
Is that a fair assessment to say that it, a pretty good chance that it might match.
It might.
Based on what you were doing back there in nine, twenty-eight oftwo thousand. If
you said you were on crank and heroine. Okay, you are saying it might.




SMITH: Let's go back. I don't, I don't want to know wandering. I want to know September,
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that I have sat there and talked to people using the same, (inaudible) that they still
have memory function, portions. You still know that you got in to a fight with your
best friend. You might not remember what it was over, but you still remember that
you got in to a fight with your best friend and you are kicking yourself the next day
going how could I possibly have fought with my best friend. I love him more than
anybody in the world. I trust him and he trusts me. How could that have happened.
You still know the act happened, you can't put a why on it. But I can tell you why, it
was because ofthe drugs. And I am here to promise you, you know whether you did
that or not. And before I told you a little bit of the time ofevidence we had. And I
haven't told you everything here because again, I want to be able to tell them you
were truthful with us on this and I know that because when I talked to you about this,
we didn't have to go through a forty-five minute ordeal on I was using crank and
heroine. I'll establish that, I'll acknowledge that and we'll get on to telling what you
do remember because I promise you, you know whether you did or not. I am not
going to (inaudible), but I know.
And I know that I had confrontations with people, okay. I'm a (inaudible). I know I
did have confrontation with people.
When you had confrontations with people.
I mean fights, literal fights.
Okay.
People on the Greenbelt (inaudible).
Any names.
Males, mostly one time I got in a fight with a chick. I heard it was messy. I don't
even know who she is. Because I was down by her house.
IfI showed you a picture ofher, would that help jog your recollection?
I've read the newspapers, I don't.
You've read newspaper articles on this?
Yes.
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Because I really don't recall any of that shit (inaudible) I don't remember getting in
fights with people. I do remember fighting people but (inaudible).




I was like using so bad, I was up for thirty days straight at a time.
Could be, okay. Let's play both sides here for a minute, okay. If it could be, this
lady is here from out of town, she is an airline attendant who has only been married
two weeks. She didn't give you consent if that matches. Agreed.
Mm-huh.
She didn't have you put a belt around her neck and ask you to choke her, did she. I
don't think so. I know her, like I almost know my Wife, because I have lived with
this case for three years. I have lived with the family and I can promise you that she
would not have let you drive her up to Fifth and Alturas and put a belt around her
neck. So back to safe to assume, that matches. It wasn't consensual with you under
the influence ofmeth or heroine, agreed.
Mm-huh. (affirmative)
Okay. Safe to assume, we call them victims ofopportunity, because ofthe state of
mind you are in, because ofthe unfortunate location ofwhere she is at, she became a
victim of opportunity for your aggression because you are under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. Agreed, (Erick nods affirmative) okay. Another unique thing,
some jewelry is missing.
So um, Michelle Hunter, I've been with Michelle Hunter. She's a (inaudible). I met
her back there, it was her and her kids, her boyfriend, her dad.
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Where's Michelle these days.
I don't know.
What can you tell me about Michelle Hunter?
Urn. She was into meth. She's a big girl. She's.















No, I was at Alworth. And I went and stayed back with her because I got hooked in
to meth. They neglected the place, but that was supposed to be taken care of.
(Inaudible) meth though. I was doing meth with her.
Did you shoot it or did you snort it?
Shoot it.
Has anybody ever asked you about this? About this case, this Lynn Henneman case.
Have you ever in the back ofyour mind went, was I so messed up back then. Could I
have been responsible for that. Because.
There's a lot of things that have gone on in this town that I ask myself about it.
Because people tell me hey, you walking around (inaudible). You were walking
along with some dude. Like, was walking by and you guys were like both (inaudible)
out there and screaming at you and pushed you and you got in a fight. I mean, I have
come around, so. Part of one ofmy eyes were black, my nose was broken. One of
my damn teeth were loose, I mean.
You were using meth back then, did you work anywhere back in that time frame that
we are talking about?
000820
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Where did you work?
Um. For a period of time, I worked for construction. A temp agency.
Which temp agency did you use?
Um. Shit. (Inaudible) Businessmen.
Where did you work at, what part of town?
Um. Up on Ustick, way out Ustick and Five Mile.
Did you have any transportation?
No.
How did y'Qu get around?
My niece would give me a ride to work, or I would ride a bike.
You'd ride a bike?
Page -105-
SMITH: Tell me about your physical appearance back then. Your hair style, your beard.
ERICK: No beard.
SMITH: No beard?
ERICK: No. I don't know, it was pretty shaved back then. Um. (Inaudible).
SMITH: How long was it, show me?
ERICK: It was about that long.
SMITH: , Okay. Same color?




SMITH: Did you wear a ball cap or anything back then? We are talking September 28th, it's
000821
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cool, but it's not cold, it's not hot.
I really couldn't tell you, I was so messed up on meth that I couldn't tell you ifit was
snowing or raining.
Alright, then let me ask you this.
(Inaudible) on the back of my head.
Okay, let me ask you this. I want to know how you'd react then, when I send this
out. Like I said, it is going to either to be you or not be you. I don't think they are
going to be shocked if I tell you it matches, will you. By what was going on back
then.
It would surprise me.
And why's that?
Because most of the time that, when I was using meth, urn. I stayed like within the
fifty-first area ofthe fairgrounds. I would go up on like U-Stick, screw around up on
U-Stick, Fairview. Urn.
Did you ever hold any part-time jobs in the downtown area back then?
No. I never had a job back then.
(Inaudible) waiter, busboy.
I never had a job as a waiter or a busboy.
Or drive taxi.
No, never had a driver's license. Huh, I rode my bike.
Did you ever work at any hotels?
No.
























        
                   
   
       
       
                  
                     
                  
 
    
   
                 
                
   
             
        
   
           
   
           
       
 
             
   
  
Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -107-
ERICK: Yeah, you don't spange on the Greenbelt. That is not a good place to spange.



















No it wasn't. Because right after I got out ofprison. A kid named Doug, we call him
Doogie was down there, he was a neighborhood kid. He spanged a couple ofpeople
that he knew and they kicked the living shit out ofhim.
When did you get out of prison?
December 3, 1999.
Okay.
I had to remember that date because I had to wait for somebody to come get me.
Then I got stuck out on the, uh, Victory. I was stuck way out there and, urn, my ride
left me there and I didn't have a car. So I had to come into town.
Did your uh. When you were staying with Michelle, did you ever like get so messed
up that you would spend the night under a bridge, or sleep out.
No. No.
Did you ever frequent the Broadway area?
Broadway.
Broadway to Warm Springs. Have you ever hangout down there?
Not that I am aware of.
Could you have?
Maybe, urn, (inaudible) up there. Did construction up there. Top ofthe hill you have
concrete (inaudible). Shit like that. I was supposed to go to ajob there, but it was
too far to ride from Garden City there. So I didn't ever go there.
Okay. Erick, do you believe me when I tell you that it's either going to match or not
match. Do you believe that?





      
                
















                  
               
            
       
   
 
                 
                   
                
                
              
  
       
 
          
      
   
               
                
              
                  
     
          

















Okay, you know. Do you believe me when I tell you, I have semen?
Mm-huh.
Okay, do you believe me. You said you know about the case of the stewardess.
Because I saw it in the papers and it was all over the news.
Okay, do you know where she was found?
No, I don't.
Okay. I told you the similarities between this one and that one, okay. And it
concerns me. It very much concerns me when you say that could match you because
of your state of mind at the time. Can you expound on that, tell me what you are
thinking when you made that statement?
I just, I got in a lot of fights, had a lot of confrontations with people.
Did you take sexual liberties without consent?
No. But I did get in a lot of fights.
But what you are telling me is, you could have.
I don't know. I don't know, I was so high on that shit for eight months. Eight,nine
months I was so high on that shit that, (inaudible) I'm surprised I'm still alive. I
wouldn't eat. I would be away for like thirty days, in some cases. Some cases like
two weeks. People (inaudible) me. (Inaudible) yeah, he eats fine, I would eat
something, I would throw it up. I would eat, then I would throw it up. You know.
Kept something down.
Okay, back to, her name's Lynn Henneman. Safe to assume what the presence of
mind that you had then, that she wouldn't have consensual sex with you, agreed.
I wouldn't have even consensual sex, I mean shit, I was all sucked up.
Okay. I am not going to say it, she had just been married two·weeks. She's not even
from Boise. She's here on a night layover. She's very to herself and she's very
religious. Safe to say she wouldn't consensually have sex with you.
Yea, probably if she was that kind ofperson, yes.
000824
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Okay. Also safe to assume, ifyou wanted it, you would have got it back then.
I don't know.
Are you safe to say, with your state of mind though?
State ofmind, body condition.
Ifyou wanted.
With my body condition, I don't know.
You're pretty, (inaudible).
Now, but before, I was like sucked up skin and bones. You could see my freaking
bones.
You look like you could handle yourself if you needed to.
I can know. I have been eating, I take care of myself, or try to.
We're talking a small statured female though. If you wanted it, you could have
gotten it. Meth does nothing but accentuate what you think is physical strength. You
become with an'S' on your chest.
(Inaudible), either that or stupid.
Let's go over all of the above.
(Inaudible).
I've got another family member her mother has not ever been right since this. I don't
ever think she will be. Ifyou come back and you match her. She's not, and I think
she'sjust she had that type ofrelationship with her daughter. They talked everyday,
but what I hear you telling me is that you are so strung out on meth and heroine,
pretty much anything is possible. Is that right?
Yeah, that's whatI'm saying I don't. I mean (inaudible) that you've never used that
shit.
(Inaudible).
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understand. The short tenn effects ain't shit. The first couple ofweeks you do it for
a few weeks and then you quit and you're fine. Then you do it, thirty days, sixty
days, ninety, hundred and twenty, you go from eight months ofdoing the shit straight
and youjustday and night don't make a damn bit ofdifference. You can'ttell ifit's
daytime or ifit's nighttime. You can't tell them what time ofday it is. You cannot
what the date is. Halfofthe time, you can't figure out what your own damn name is.
You know.
Let me ask you this, how would you feel if you found outyou were responsible for
that?
Like shit.
How do you feel now that you are responsible for Cheryl?
I feel like shit.
Tell me what you think you did wrong, what crime did you commit?
Well, I let it go too far.
Okay, what should happen to you?
(Inaudible) down.
Tell me what you think should happen to you for what happened up there.
Well, I know I'm going to prison, so.
Okay, you be your own judge for a minute. What should happen to Erick Hall?































                
                 
               
              
                
                  
  
                 
 
  
           
    
             
       
      
  
              
        
               
          
 













I get that fucked up and I don't think about.







I mean life incarceration is life incarceration. You get stuck in a cell, you don't get
out of that cell. That's just how it goes.
Okay.
Ofcourse, what you are going to think, sit there thinking about it over, and over and
over.
Think you find out you're responsible for? How ~e you feeling about the one that
you are responsible for?
Like shit.
MORGAN: Erick, let me ask you something.
MORGAN: Let me ask you something. I know something about sex, sexual offenders. Typically
speaking that you have urges that you can't control and typically it's not about sex,
it's about anger and being in control of the situation because you don't feel like
you're in control ofyour own life sometimes. (Inaudible).
ERICK: I just let things go in the wrong direction.
ERICK: (Inaudible) control ofmy own life for, forever.
MORGAN: In anger, unresolved anger. You taking it out on a victim, a woman, a child, someone
weaker than ourselves. Do you think you have those urges, those problems?
ERICK: I don't know, I've never sat and talked to a psychiatrist. I don't.
MORGAN: You don't have to (inaudible).
ERICK: (Inaudible) evaluate my own self. I don't know.
MORGAN: Do you feel like sometimes, life's out-of-control, in this case. I mean when I am
talking about with Cheryl. That really, that's what it was all about, you'rejust angry.
You're living on the street.
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MORGAN: Well maybe not, but I mean, maybe you're angry at the situation that you're involved
with your girlfriend. That's not what you want. She's drinks, she's angry at you,
she's mistrustful of you. And is it an anger issue, is that what we're talking about
here. Because let me tell you, looking at the scene, looking at what happened to her.
That's what it really was about, it wasn't really about sex, it was about anger. Okay.
She was punished. I think that's because she pushed your buttons, she pushed your
buttons, combined with everything else going on in your life. It's really not about the
sexual part of it. I mean, yeah that happened, but really it was about the anger.
That's why the stomp marks, that's why the bloody eye, the black eye and the, the
choking, strangling. Isn't that fair to say?
ERICK: Angry, yeah, because I thought I had killed her at first. But, the asphyxiation was
something that, I don't know. I was introduced to that by somebody and.
MORGAN: Okay, maybe it's a sexual preference, I don't know, but, the rest of it is anger.
Destroying somebody. You hit them in the face, you throw them against the side of
the truck. One thing that I didn't tell you is that you can lean up against the truck, but
it is not going to leave those impressions. There has got to be a certain amount of
force to leave an impression. Just like I can step on someone, even with shoes on, I
can step on them and it is not going to leave those kind of impressions. Okay,. so I
know that's anger.
ERICK: I didn't 00, stepped on her. I was trying to stomp the dirt down.
MORGAN: I know what you just said, but I know (inaudible). Either you know or you don't.
ERICK: I don't.
MORGAN: And it is going to be conclusive, by what's in that little box over there. And that's
what I want to talk to you about is with that box and those urges and that being out-
of-control at that time ofyour life. And chances are that since you frequented that
area, you are familiar to that area. You know.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: No, no, no. And that's generally right in the same era. (lnaudible)justwalks,you're
on a bicycle. We both know we can get on a bicycle and ride several blocks and in
no time flat. Okay.
ERICK: I was in pretty good condition then too.
000828
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MORGAN: Even being in poor condition, you can still cover a lot more ground on a bicycle than
you can on foot, okay. The Greenbelt is a pathway through town. We found stuff
across town. You know, and believe it or not, they are a similar situation, that you
have already taken, strangulation, clothings, her own clothing. We find articles that
belong to her clear across town, near the Greenbelt again. That is a common path
flight. You are all over that downtown area. We can debate here all night whether
you did or not, and you can say yes or no. What we are trying to do is to give you an
opportunity again to explain yourself. That is a lot easier than saying I don't know.
It sounds a lot better to explain it then to say I don't know. (Inaudible) results back
saying, guess what Erick, it's you. Oh you know what, I forgot.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: (Inaudible) forgots, earlier on this case.





What it means, I don't know, I forgot. You know. I said ifyou've ever done meth.
Explain Henneman. I carry it with me in my notebook. Do you know her?
I've seen a picture ofher in the paper.
ERICK: I don't know, I've only seen her in the paper.
SMITH: Okay.
MORGAN: The other question is, did you have sex with her?
ERICK: And again, I am telling you, I don't know. Ifyou've ever been hooked on meth and
all of that other shit, you would know. (Inaudible).
SMITH: So what you're saying is?
ERICK: I don't know.
SMITH: Consensual, you agree.
ERICK: It would not be consensual. (Inaudible).
000829
   
      
                  
               
                
            
               
               
                      
               
                 
            
   
       
                   
               
          
                
           
  
           
                  
         
      
    
    
       

















MORGAN: Neither was Cheryl Hanlon's death an accident?
ERICK: That was an accident.
MORGAN: No. No. After everything else we've talked about. Not with the injuries. Not with
those injuries, it's not an accident. Not with tying her around that branch to make
sure that she was dead when you walked offand left her. That's not an accident.
MORGAN: She wasn't alive then.
ERICK: It was so she wouldn't fucking roll over again on her fucking belly.
•ERICK: She would just flop over.
MORGAN: She wasn't going to, she was in a little depression.
ERICK: Hell, I didn't know that.
MORGAN: You put her there. You put stuffaround her, you stomped dirt on her. You stomped
her prior to that. You threw her into the truck. You hit her in the eye. You bloodied
her mouth that she bled on her shirt.
ERICK: I didn't hit her, I am telling you.
MORGAN: Well, just looking at you (inaudible) truthful (inaudible) concern.
ERICK: Well I am truthful.
-
MORGAN: Erick, a couple of things and then we'll be done in here, okay. I want to tell you a
little bit about Cheryl. She's been with Jeff, her boyfriend (inaudible) sixteen,
seventeen years almost. She also has a daughter and a grandchild. It would be real
important for her daughter to pass down on her grandchild some, one memory. ••
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(Inaudible) because that's real important to Cheryl. She wore that everyday.
(Inaudible)?
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I don't know where it is.
When's the last time you remember seeing it?
When I took it out of the seat in the truck.
MORGAN: And you brought it back to camp because Amanda saw it.
ERICK: (Inaudible) it was in my hand.
MORGAN: Amanda saw it and drew a (inaudible) camp. She said the last time she saw it, you
were sitting (inaudible). Did you (inaudible)?
ERICK: No.
MORGAN: Did you sell it someone, give it to somebody?
MORGAN: I have been down on my hands and knees looking all through there and I can't find it.
ERICK:
ERICK:
No, If it's not at that truck then it's got to be at the church.
Is it at the church? I don't know where it's at then.
MORGAN: Would you have pawned it?
ERICK: No.
MORGAN: Given it to a friend, sold it to a friend?
ERICK: No.
MORGAN: Do you understand what (inaudible) is? You do? I mean society's kind of built
around external urges that play all ofus. (Inaudible) numbers in a store, in a grocery
store. You go and you buy your food and as you're walking out and have to stand
there along, and it's always busy. You've got the National Enquirer and ali ofthose
magazines, and paperback books and stuffwith (inaudible). While you're waiting in
line, you get bored and look over there and there it is, and so you grab it and buy that
too. (Inaudible) store. That's kind ofan external marketing thing, urge that people
have compulsion. It's called, a real good example of compulsion b~ying. We're
talking about something different, with you, that's something internal. It started, I
don't know when, in about 1999, in Garden City there was an example of what
000831
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compulsion can do, coupled with alcohol. And one ofyour ambitions, you had been
drinking that night right. You did something to that little girl that you probably
wouldn't have done sober, right. Time goes on, those urges don't leave.
MORGAN: Even though you want them to, they don't. Personally, you think you don't want
(inaudible). Responsible for that, okay. And I say that based on the way that you
answered the questions when you were talking with Detective Smith. Could have
been responsible. Don't remember, but I could be. But you were just because of
those compulsions, those urges. Not thinking, clouded mind, in that time.
ERICK: Maybe I'll sleep in a cell by myself back injail, (inaudible).
MORGAN: I'm sorry.
ERICK: Maybe, I'll sleep in a cell by myself (inaudible).
MORGAN: Are they or are they not?
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: (Inaudible) minimum. Did you do it?
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: Responsibility and reason. Strong possibility. Did you (inaudible)?
ERICK: I could believe about anything right now.
MORGAN: No, I want the truth. Is that, would you say that's accurate, a pretty strong
possibility?
ERICK: (Inaudible) telling you, I mean. People would look at me and I did some stupid shit
(inaudible) dude. (Inaudible).
MORGAN: Are you talking about (inaudible). Yeah, I know what you mean back then. We can
also talk to me about some compulsion. The sexual anger issues too. Iwas watching
you, when you answering these questions. I could see the (inaudible) memory.
(Inaudible) in the paper, a couple of three hours now probably when we mentioned
that name. By the way it was answered, by the way that your eyes look, I know why
your wheels are turning, because you answered it. I know that you believe there is a
very strong possibility that you are responsible for that Alright.
ERICK: (Inaudible) out. •.. '.;~
•
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MORGAN: I want to talk to you about something completely different, Amanda. That tape
recorder you were on.
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ERICK: On right now. I'll never see her again, so.
MORGAN: Well, you probably will.
ERICK: No, I won't.
MORGAN: We brought a tape recorder in the room and what I'd like for you to do is you tell her
what you told me in summary. Tell her (inaudible). Tell her to stay strong and do
the right thing. Can you do that?
ERICK: I don't know.




I (inaudible) shit. She probably already gone and found herself somebody new
already.
I bet she has (inaudible). I do. I know her brothers really well too. Yeah. Onthat
day I took her (inaudible) they probably (inaudible). Let me tell you, somebody
comes up on you and all you've got is a god damn backpack and he's got a pair of
brass knuckles and a piece ofpipe made out some (inaudible) or something. I don't
know what the fuck they had. I know one ofthem had brass knuckles. We're gonna
hit you and they were spun out on meth. I'm drunk, but I know they're spun out on
meth.. Some kind of (inaudible). I don't know why (inaudible) on meth.
MORGAN: I can tell you one reason that, tell her to be strong, do the right thing. This is hard on
her too.
ERICK: It don't make a difference what I tell her. I'm never going to see her again anyway,
soon I'll go up to the prison and that's probably a good thing. I will never hear from
her again.
MORGAN: It's up to you, it's in your statement or it's not. What I would like for you to do is
give her an apology and the victim's family an apology for what happened.
(Inaudible) apologize to Amanda for all ofthis. She'll have something.
ERICK: I'll apologize to Amanda (inaudible).
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
MORGAN: What do you think?
ERICK: (Inaudible) apology. (Inaudible) fucking slow in the head. (Inaudible).
MORGAN: I want to tell you this. Let me tell you where Amanda's at, okay.
ERICK: Okay.
Page -118-
MORGAN: She's gone from living with you for the last year. I mean I'm sure you've had your
ups and downs and your fights. Because I know you have.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: To suddenly being brought into the police station. Having to give up infonnation
concerning the person she cares about and has lived with, possibly has a baby with
and in to a situation where her own families going to turn against her. I know she
needs some strength.
MORGAN: Ifyou want to.
ERICK: They won't tum against her. Well, actually they already have for a long time now.
Her mom just uses her. ' Shit too. An apology to her.
ERICK: Can I have a cigarette? Well Amanda, hey. Do you know it's me. I wish things
were different. In a different situation. But it's not. You know, I've made some
mistakes. Hopefully you and the others out there will learn from my mistakes, you
know. Don't do what I did. Don't get fucked up you know, in the alcohol, or in the
drugs. I'm sorry ifyou are pregnant. I am sorry that I left you with that burden. It's
really hard because I won't be there to love that child and care for that child. Try to
teach that child right from wrong. It's kind of impossible for somebody like you to
do that. Because I don't even know myself. Especially when I read from this, urn.
They don't officially got any charges yet, filed, but I haven't been charged. There
will be, so, I need you to stay strong for that child and for your son. Just don't drink,
stay away from the meth. Stay away from people that do meth or you will end up like
I did. You already know what I am talking about too. (Inaudible) shit about some
shit you've done well I am telling you right now. Stay away from the meth. Hove
you more than anything in this world. More than life, and I told this (inaudible). It is
going to take some pretty severe shit for you, with you, over you. I just want you to
know I didn't do it because I had to, I did it because I love you. You are the only
person that has ever been around me and made me feel like a human being, made me
feel safe. Made me feel like I was worthy being human. Shit, I forgot why I was
here. For a long time, I thought maybe (inaudible) a little piece of shit, you know.
Pretty fucked up, but that's just the way it was. I don't want you to ever hit your
kids. Don't be, be careful who you have around with you. Vou know things happen
•
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that could fuck a person's head up. You think your head's already fucked up. Try
get inside my (inaudible). I know you don't like being alone or by yourself. I know
you're quite attached. Be comforted because I was around and you felt safe around
me,
which in fact was true. But what I need is, I need help. You need help. I'm not going
to blame you if you're not there for me. I'm not going to make you get up on the
stand and testify against me. I don't want to make anybody else. What you guys did,
by making statements, you weren't doing wrong, you did the right thing. Yet, I won't
forget that. That is just the shit way this is. Your uncle, your mom, your brothers,
ain't none of them ain't going inside. You did the right thing. I love you and I'll
always love you. I thought maybe you would write me keep correspondence or
something. (Inaudible). Don't go back to the streets either. I am telling you. Please
don't go back to the streets. It (inaudible) program. Ifyou love me, you'll love your
son, don't do that. I bet you are already out on the streets, and if you are, I know
where the hell you are. And I will have them put you in a cop car. Shackle and cuff
and me and I will take them to where you are to see you get this damn tape. I can
track you down like I can track anybody down. You can't hide. You know, you've
got a mind to think something like mine. Plus when it gets close to me, I have a
sense that Idon't know. Ijust know where they hide. I just can't help knowing that
shit. I don't care what anybody else thinks. You know it's like a relief getting this
off my shoulders. Then realizing that, the way·what I had actually done, because I
really didn't know I did, but I didn't. I was piecing shit together. I am still piecing
shit together. It ain't easy, but don't go back to the streets. Ifyou can't live with
your mom, go to the City Lights program. Anything's better than being on the streets
and getting around people that don't care about you. There's a lot ofpeople out there
that have got problems just as bad as I do, ifnot worse. And you've got to run across
them. You need to use common sense. That little gut feeling that you told me about
that you had, use it. Use your gut feeling. Use your common sense. Be smart about
it. Because ifI have to I will call your mom and I'll ask her ifyou are there, just to
make sure you're there. I might not talk to you, because I'm ashamed ofmyselfand
what I've let myselfcome to. I don't know what to say to the family ofthe woman. I
don't know. There's no excuse. There is no excuse. There's never gonna be an
excuse either. I wish there was a way I could just make something good out of this,
but I can't. There ain't nothing I can do to make it better. There ain't no turning it
around. Just remember 1 love and I don't want to see you on the news or the
newspaper where something happened to you. And if you do carry on with this
pregnancy and have that kid with (inaudible). Try to remember all ofthe good things
I tried to do. How I was very successful at most of them. Try to remember,
(inaudible). When the kid gets old enough to ask questions about other things that
(inaudible) here. He's not proud ofwhat be did, he's ashamed. He screwed up. He
paid his price for it. I'm sorry, Amanda. I love you. Goodbye.
MORGAN: That was good (inaudible).
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It ain't good enough.
That's why we asked you here.
But you don't know her, I do. That girl ain't going to listen.
MORGAN: She will.
ERICK: No she won't.
MORGAN: Maybe not know.
ERICK: She's back with her (inaudible). I going to tell you something that she told me once,
okay. When we found out, for sure found out that we knew that she was pregnant.
She had gotten alcohol from someone downtown. (Inaudible). She told me, she goes
I was afraid this shit would happen.
MORGAN: I know.
ERICK: I don't want a baby, I don't care anymore. Fuck you, but. If you go to jail, I am
going to go out and I'm going to kill this baby and I ali1 going to go out and I'm
going to get fucking eight ball and dope from my friends and I'm going to kill this
baby. You know. I would snitch that little fucker out in a heartbeat too. I would.
MORGAN: You are not responsible for anybody else but yourself. I know that, that's very
heartfelt, but those who she mayor may not listen to, I don't know. It's obviously a
good start. I think. (Inaudible) it's a good start.
ERICK: When you've lived the life I (inaudible) fuck.
MORGAN: (Inaudible).
ERICK: Step-dad fucking pawned the piece ofshit on (inaudible) come up missing. Doesn't
matter. (Inaudible). You know what happened, it wasn't his. (Inaudible) didn't clear
his name. I don't know who my dad is. I don't remember who his dad is. His
neighbor (inaudible). I asked my rna about that once, you know what she told me.
He's in (inaudible). You know. Fred fucking Francis McConki~.
MORGAN: Remember when I told you about control, rage, anger. And transferring those things
to somebody else because you have to strike out somebody because it becomes
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ERICK:
Page -121-
I was so fucked up, I (inaudible) still fucked up. My brain's still fucked up.
MORGAN: Do you know what you said to me, or you didn't say it to me, but you said it to her.
You said you felt relief.
ERICK: I do. So now I am starting to feel like, you know okay. Things are starting to flood
back in my head (inaudible) too.
MORGAN: It's weight, you weigh the guilty weight lifted off your shoulders. You look over
your shoulder every time a police car comes by, or you see a police man. You know.
ERICK: (Inaudible) fucking think about it, you know. Then you can, I need to get a goddamn
counselor and talk to a counselor. I need to get all of this shit out of my head.
MORGAN: I am hoping that's exactly what is going to happen to you.
ERICK: It's not good. It's not good.
MORGAN: You're young.
••
ERICK: I'm thirty-two and I look down and I probably got fucking, I don't know. I don't
even (inaudible). There's been days out there, when I just, you know. I wanted to
drink myself to death. I even tried it a couple of times. Some ignorant shit, you
know, I mean, (inaudible). People come up to my house, I (inaudible) fuck ups. I
went to jail because somebody came up to my house and came in my door. Which is
some place you keep (inaudible). Kicked one person out of my house, three more
fucking come in, get fucking attacking me and shit, you know. Pushing me, kicking
me and shit and this went on when I kicked this lady out. I made some bad choices
on people I talked to and hung around with. I'm not a (inaudible) person, but
(inaudible) if I had to do something with my (inaudible). I love gardening, I love
roses. (Inaudible). I also (inaudible) with my probation officer. (Inaudible) I don't
him, right after I had gotten out ofjail, for not showing up to a meeting one day. I
told, I says, I lost my house. (Inaudible) sleeping. He says, I don't know. I probably
could be sleeping. It's cold out, storm (inaudible). He said, but I figured out, when I
left that office that day, I remember, I went back to see her again. You know, I had
people stealing shit (Inaudible) everything I have is in a backpack when I moved
out. Pictures ofpeople that I loved, I care about, except for my mom. Still trying to
figure out how I was going to eat. (Inaudible) somebody staled my fucking shit. I
have been jumped on the Greenbelt here too, you know it was not too many times
ago. Been kicked in the bead, snapped in the bead with a stick (inaudible). Ijust
don't, I don't know.
MORGAN: Do you think it's that rage and everything that's happened to you.
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I didn't fight back with these people.
MORGAN: Sometimes (inaudible).
ERICK: Oh yeah. What's up with the hat. Sometimes I would get so mad that I just like
would let everything go, this tunnel vision.
MORGAN: I see.
ERICK: I wouldn't see faces, I would see a physical form and they liked looked like they were
going to attack me and I would just fucking berserk. Sometimes it worked.
MORGAN: Mm-huh, and see that's what I was talking about. Now you and I are finally talking
about what I am talking about. It happened up there that night. It wasn't about sex
necessarily.
ERICK: Downtown, there's (inaudible), I mean I didn't. I don't know. I was drunk.
(Inaudible) I was so drunk that I took some pills and she said something, let's go over
here and there, so I would do this (inaudible). Had an orgasm. I was like that's
(inaudible) alright. (Inaudible) off the back ofmy head, I would just think about it
back here. •
MORGAN: Did the fight happen?
ERICK: I mean she didn't fight, I didn't fight with her, I thought she was dead and I was
pissed offat myselfand (inaudible), you know. (Inaudible) do this and you're drunk
and when you're sober you can because you (inaudible). You know, I've just been
thinking about it. I didn't see her chest move when I looked down and she wasn't
breathing. I fucking freaked out. Literally freaked out. Tried CPR and it makes
sense (inaudible) if I would have been thinking. In a clear state of mind, I would
have thought (inaudible). You know.





Scared me. I know it upsets you guys and I am pretty sure that it upsets everybody,
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
ERICK: There's a lot of things that nobody knows, nobody knows.
Page -123-
MORGAN: I know.
ERICK: I'm sure you guys want to get on with (inaudible) to get home to your families and
stuff That's, that's understandable. You've been here all damn day sitting here
listening to me.
••
MORGAN: I've had some time. (Inaudible) something similar occur?
ERICK: Hoping fuck to quit being (inaudible). Hope I wouldn't. (Inaudible) alright, yeah.
This is what a (inaudible) murderer's life has gone to. This is what I do (inaudible).
When I think about shit and I'm like, well you know, back then I was using meth. I
didn't fucking, I didn't know anything. What was going on. I read books and you
know urn, medical tech stuff. For psychological shit. (Inaudible) comprehend some
of the shit, more words, but when I was in prison I would watch TV. I would sit
there and watch television. He, like they would talk about the effects ofdrugs. I took
that stuff, a huge class on it. This is over on alcohol, we shut out our higher, some of
our higher functions. We were right down to the reptilian brain. I remember that's
always, you know.
MORGAN: Certainly lowers our inhibitions.
ERICK: Something about are you going to start functioning on a reptilian brain. I'm like I
ain't a reptile in my fucking head.
MORGAN: Do you want some water?
ERICK: I need to go to the bathroom, I've got to pee.
MORGAN: Let's do that. Let me just, kind ofstretch your.
ERICK: Then I talked to Amanda, you know.




MORGAN: We'll get you some water and some more kleenex and you can stay there ifyouwant
We'll be right back.
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ERICK: Ah shit. (Inaudible).
Page -124-
MORGAN: Here you go. Let me get a piece of paper.
ERICK: Did I tell you that I used to be an artist?
MORGAN: You were?
ERICK: Mm-huh (affirmative).
MORGAN: Is it shocking?
ERICK: We used to (inaudible).
MORGAN: You drawed?
ERICK: I used to.
MORGAN: Now we kind ofwent through some things and sometimes I was right and sometimes
I wasn't. Now you told me that you grew up in what town. In what town were you
born?
ERICK: (Inaudible). I was born in (inaudible). I don't remember anything from a couple
times in my life, there. Urn, it was like two times in my life I remember from that
part ofmy life. My step-dad (inaudible) and gives (inaudible) away. He made these
little, like trucks and shit. I was playing with (inaudible) Johnny and Steven
(inaudible). I remember I (inaudible) broke one of the wheels off (inaudible). He
was a person too. Not sure what.
MORGAN: Step-father.
ERICK: He never claimed me, he didn't. I used his last name in school, but (inaudible). He I
remember I looked like his face too. (Inaudible) felt like my mom was. He came to
the house and he saw me try to put (inaudible) fucking so he grabbed me by the neck.
I was about, maybe six. (Inaudible) fucking threw me across the room. There was
another incident, I had to go to the hospital because I had some kind ofrash, on my
(inaudible) scrotum. (Inaudible) just me and him. This was in Vancouver. I am not
sure what happened, I don't know. Right after that, (inaudible) I just did not feel
comfortable being around the man. We moved to, he bought a house in Camas,
Washington, a place called (inaudible). I went to school. He, 00, he pissed offa few
ofthe other kids. Like my brother's friends and (inaudible). That's when the school
(inaudible). Some of his tools got lost. He took us all out in the, (inaudible).
Shannon Frank, he didn't do nothing there. Never even asked him about it.
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(Inaudible) his tools, me and Johnny and Steven. He missed, went right like this and
put (inaudible) and shit. Pulled us up on the rafters, started beating us. (Inaudible)
hear him whooping the shit out of us with a belt, punching us. Then a couple of
times (inaudible) he kicked the fuck out of (inaudible) punching bag. Kicking me,
kicking the head, then my arm got dislocated. I didn't even touch his fucking tools.
How old were you?
(Inaudible) my birthday, he would just. I was about ten, almost ten, and shortly after
that my mom had a separation. Took us over to this place (inaudible) motel thing.
Stayed the night there and everything was cool that evening. (Inaudible) summer
sometimes living in that house in Camas. He had this pit bull. Urn, (inaudible) was a
female too. Cool dog, she had puppies. Then he got pissed offone day and urn, he
(inaudible) went to bed and my brothers weren't there. My mom came down and left
me there (inaudible). I got in trouble because I stayed the night. I got in trouble for
(inaudible) my bed, son-of-a-bitch. Took me out, threw me on the floor real hard.
Started to kick the shit out of me. Took his, he had a stick that he found out of the
river (inaudible) stick. I kept trying to crawl away from him. I got away up between
the couch and the (inaudible) refrigerator. I was hiding back there. I had about this
much space and I was hiding and I was still (inaudible) stick, stabbing at me with his
fucking stick. Knocked me out, came to. When I come to, he was sitting there and
pulled me up by neck out from behind the couch and the wall. Threw me on the
ground, let his dog fucking bite the shit out of me. Tried to tell it to mom.
(Inaudible) She didn't believe me. I had red marks on my neck. Bruises all up and
down the fucking side of me. Then she had this guy (inaudible). A friend ofhers,
(inaudible) house that he bought for her, and uh, my brother and my cousin, Kent
Douglas, were there. (Inaudible) got pissed off at me and told me to do something,
and I told him, you ain't my dad. You can't tell me what to do. Then he kicked me
in the chest. My brother and my cousin just sat there and watched, his leather strap,
pulled it over twice and started beating the shit out of me with it. I (inaudible) ran
back into the bathroom, locked the door. Then my cousin, (inaudible) to come back
there. He said he was gone. So I opened the bathroom door and she comes in there
and she's looking at me, like fucking like, (inaudible). When my mom died, mom
died in (inaudible). She died in a van accident. She had a van, that got rear-ended by
(hiaudible).
MORGAN: When did you (inaudible)?
ERICK: What?
MORGAN: When did you fucking get out of (inaudible)?
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ERICK:
ERICK:
(Inaudible) thirteen or fourteen. My mom moved off with this guy, Jeff, over the,
(inaudible) left me in Camas, Washington. My brother was already eighteen at the
time. He had a girlfriend, he didn't want to take care ofme. He took offand went to
live with my grandma. I was in (inaudible) all to myself. And then ran out of
food. I was there for a fucking month and a halfby myself. Drove into town and get
in the store dumpsters, eating garbage. Then I saw my brother's friend. His name
was John, a big tall guy, he was in the military. He (inaudible). He felt sorry for me,
and he picked me out and took me out to where my brother was living with
(inaudible). Some girl that was staying with us, stayed there for about a week. Then
they stoled her guns. My brother and my cousin, Kenny, stole her guns and blamed it
on me. (Inaudible) called her up (inaudible). I didn't know what alcohol was at that
time, I didn't know what drugs were. I didn't know what cigarettes were. I knew she
smoked (inaudible). This is out, way out in the country. I did kind ofa walk from her
house all of the way into Camas. Then I walked from Camas to (inaudible) to a
friend, his name is John. (Inaudible), Oh, I can't remember his last name. He was
my friend, a good friend, because at school would pick on, because he was fat. He
had kind of, fat (inaudible) he was a white kid. People would try to beat him up and I
would get in the way of them. I remember we were in fifth grade, I was in fifth, he
was in sixth, I would come over to the (inaudible) school would get out and I would
go over and wait for him and the kids, the Eighth graders and shit would try and beat
him up. I would get in the way. Try to defend him. One time I didn't get there in
time and they beat him up real bad. (Inaudible) I go, no I don't want to fight,
somebody wants to fight me. So, I can take it. Then this kid, uh, Steve Williams,
this little (inaudible). His name was Robbie, and so I asked my friend John. Well I
beat this kid Robbie up a little bit. Me and Robbie were good friends at the
(inaudible) then one day I was over there defending John and Stevejust, this guy that
was (inaudible) beat him up. You're the son-of-a-bitch that beat my brother up and
I'm gonna kick your ass. Then he got like one ofhis buddies going, and they started
beating me and kicking me and I was up against the wall and (inaudible). His dad
was a cop, he was a good kid I was in school with. He opened up a door to one ofthe
classrooms in the area, was JDZ. James (inaudible). And I went in there and crawled
in there and he shut the door. I was laying in there and one ofthe teachers there, she
saw me. She was like, what's wrong. I told her looking for something and then I
grabbed something off the counter. (Inaudible) go out there and scare them off. I
went out there and chased these son-of-a-bitches off. I plunged at one ofthem with,
that had (inaudible). He had (inaudible). He threw it down and smacked the side of
the head, took it from me and there I was with a fucking black eye. (Inaudible) part
ofhis fucking (inaudible). Son-of-a-bitch broke my fucking nose, broke my glasses,
kicked the shit out ofme, took me behind the school to a place called the (inaudible).
Threw me in the water, I couldn't fucking swim. I almost drowned. His older
brother (inaudible) had come back there, he heard commotion back there and he came
running back there and he's my coat floating on top ofthe water. He sees me trying
to swim, I was sinking. He fucking jumps in and saves my ass. (Inaudible) puked
•
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
out the water. I had water in my lungs.
MORGAN: When did you finally, I mean how did you finally get to Boise?
Page -127-
••
ERICK: (Inaudible) these problems there. I went to a group home, they put me in a foster
home. Urn, couldn't find my mom. My mom took me to Oregon with her, when I
was with (inaudible) Jeffand they left me in Oregon. Urn, then they came back, went
to California to my step-dad (inaudible). Tony and Mark are his step-sons. Mark's
about your size, about the size you are now. I was just a small kid, I couldn't have
been, but five feet tall, fucking eighty pounds. When Mark wasn't getting a, an
aggressive match, wrestling match, he was a drinker, he was drinking (inaudible)
step-dad's he would drink. He got pissed off because I had pinned him, and it
amazed me. I was just a little shit and I couldn't believe that I had actually pinned
somebody that big. So I was proud ofmyself, you know, I am happy, I am proud. I
had pinned this big (inaudible) he was trying to beat my ass. My step-dad got in
between him and me and then my step-brother Tony started hitting me, beating the
shit out ofme. Urn, I started to walk offover by the tree and Icouldn't stop crying. I
was crying because I thought I had done something wrong. My step-dad, you know,
had screamed at me, telling me I was a bastard child and a little worthless son-of-a-
bitch. (Inaudible) nothing, urn, (inaudible) it might have been. He couldn't handle it
and then he picked me up, then I (inaudible). My step-dad would come over
(inaudible) and fucking buck knife out. He was going to cut my fucking throat and
he told me so. (Inaudible) like a baby, but I took off running. (Inaudible) got me
outside of that fucking (inaudible). Mark fucking ran, (inaudible).
MORGAN: Get you away from this house?
ERICK: Then Tony, took me to a (inaudible) house and he left me there. He went home and
then he came back later that night and he sat there and he talked to me. I was scared.
I thought for sure, my fucking step-dad was going to find me and kill me. That
mother-fucker, he was psychotic. Db, anyways,OO, he told me it okay, he says you
don't have to (inaudible). He says, you can stay here ifyou want to, and I did stay
there for about two weeks. And then my step-dad found out where I was. He came
over there and was knocking on the door. Screaming, so I ran out the back of the
house and (inaudible) in California and (inaudible). For the summer and I figured I
got through beating to crap. And ub, one day I was over by the house, where my
step-dad owned the house. I was going over there to return the bike that Mark bad
given me, because Mark: wanted his bike me. He put it together just for me. And I
figured I didn't want it to keep so, so I went over there, and ub, (inaudible) Mark
wasn't there. Tony was, Tony came out with a baseball bat and chased me off. So I
took off with the bike (inaudible) if it got stolen. Me and this kid named urn, John
Hall. I don't know if I am related to him or not. (Inaudible) up together and
everything (inaudible). We were out screwing around doing yard work and got some
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
ERICK:
Page -128-
money together and we got fifty dollars between the two of us. This guy sold us a
little, old, war-time boat man. It couldn't start because it didn't have a throttle cable
or the punch cable to start it. So we push it once and kick this little time lever under
the (inaudible) and start. I am over there by my dad's, step-dad's house to see ifI can
catch Mark at home. Mark wasn't home again, and my step-dad wasn't home, the
girl who lived next door come out and saw me and she says you need to get out of
here. I go why. She says, cause Tony says if he sees you, he is going to kill you.
Tony come out of the house and he was coming over to see her. And she got in
between us, and (inaudible) said, fuck that I am going back in the house and I am
going to get my act together and I will shoot you. And I will fucking kill you right
here. You know. It really scared her. (Inaudible) I'll kick his ass or (inaudible). I
guess my step-dad came home. He sees me and (inaudible) I don't realize
(inaudible). He gets in his garage and gets out his truck and looks at me. He starts
coming towards us. He says, where did you get that moped. I started peddling.
Right then, John hit the start lever, and he took off. And 00, he threw something at
me and (inaudible). It wouldn't go very fast, it actually peaked fifteen miles per
house. Uh, threw something at us, almost hit me. And, he came running down the
road after us and the damn thing stalled on us. He started to dig in and figure out that
we had the (inaudible) shut off. Turned it on, got away. I started laughing. I ended
up laughing because I thought it was funny that (inaudible) scared to death. This man
is six foot, two hundred and sixty pounds, no muscle. He had been in prison with
(inaudible). And I knew he (inaudible) he would have killed me. Then there are a lot
ofthings I don't remember. They just block out ofmy mind what he did to me when
I was a kid, that I don't remember. There are things that he did do to me that I do
remember. But that's.
I
MORGAN: So is that when you came to Boise?
ERICK: No, went back to Washington. They put me on a bus and sent me back to
Washington. And 00, (inaudible). I didn't have any family. I had a friend and I
(inaudible) well I will be staying with my friend, John, and my grandma. Uh. Then
her boyfriend, Jeff, (inaudible) moved back in with his mom. Theyjust, (inaudible).
I started being a runaway. (Inaudible) friend's house. And they, my mom called the
cops on me. (Inaudible). Urn. I remember they took me to detention, I was in
detention for about three days. They took me to a group home and from the group
home, I went in to a foster home. From the foster home, I ran in to the wrong kind of
people. I started (inaudible). Urn. (Inaudible) foster home, and urn. While I was in
(inaudible). Then I ran away from there because she, I don't know, fifteen, almost
my fifteenth birthday. I remember I already (inaudible) sleep, and I missed the school
there the next day. I woke up and she's, in my bed right next to me and she was
naked. My pajama bottoms were gone. I felt sick. So I got up the next morning,
went back to sleep and got up the next morning and got on my bus. I went to school.
Instead ofstaying in class, I ditched class. From, right across some kid was living on
the streets. He talked me in to talking him back to my foster home. So I went back
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
ERICK:
Page -129-
to my foster home, one more time. Linda (inaudible). I stayed there overnight to the
morning. He came to the garage and wanted some (inaudible). She (inaudible). We
left the house and I stoled this jar, this square jar. And there was other kids living
(inaudible). Urn. I stole the square jar. There was about twenty-five dollars and
some change in there and uh, put (inaudible). I've got enough money to get wherever
I get, you know. I couldn't get very far. This kid I ran around with, urn, he
introduced me into stealing cars. (Inaudible). I've never been very good at drinking.
(Inaudible) vehicles. Amanda's mom's car. I (inaudible) drove that damn car..
(Inaudible) to Boise to go to Wal-Mart. Took her brother Danny in to get something
at the store and these Christmas gift-cards are just (inaudible) from her mom and the
situation (inaudible) for a while. I drove that freaky car, I was hoping, you know.
(Inaudible) ifthey just catch me speeding and pull me over, take us to jail, on account
of the freaking car.
MORGAN: Keep in mind that I do have to go and see Amanda in the morning. (Inaudible) gets
too terribly late. When did, when did you come to Boise?
MORGAN: 1989?




I came to Boise back in February, early February.
Oh, are you talking when did I come to Boise, or '89.
ERICK: '89, it was January.
MORGAN: Who did you live with then?
ERICK: (Inaudible) living on the streets, me and Marvin. Marvin (inaudible). Marvin, his
little sister's name is Dora, urn. Dora Malcolm. She was my girlfriend for a while.
MORGAN: Before you moved here, did you ever come down to visit?
ERICK: Once or twice.
MORGAN: Were there a lot of (inaudible)?
MORGAN: Was it like ayearbefore, or two years before when you had come here to visit, before
you actually moved here?•1fJ,.\
~
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No, it was like three years. It was the last probably two years from the last time I
came to visit when I, uh, well I got here in '89, when I, to stay. (Inaudible) and Rick
Giambo, (inaudible) Carmichael. I also think that they are full of shit because of
drugs, and coke and crank and heroine. Got in trouble and went to prison,
Cottonwood, uh, (inaudible). I lived with Rick and Wendy and I got in fucking
trouble again when I convinced their brother Craig to get and they caught me. All
fucked up in the head. And (inaudible) in prison.
MORGAN: So when you went to prison, in 1991, did you do, serve eight years until 1999, or did
you (inaudible)?
ERICK: I did the full time. (Inaudible) pretty abusive shit from people out there.
MORGAN: So you have just been back out.
ERICK: December 3, 1999.
MORGAN: I don't, girlfriend?




I was so fucked up, though. (Inaudible), do you know her?
No, (inaudible). She (inaudible) all to another time that I got hooked into drugs. I
tried to get her offofthem, but I wasn't strong enough to do it. Because I fell right in
to bullshit with her and her daughter, Crystal. (Inaudible). I've been thinking, with
my right head (inaudible) I would have turned everybody in. That's how much I
hated crank. I knew that Julia, (inaudible) and the (inaudible) got out a little bit of
the paranoid schizophrenic at this point in my life and shit. I got over too much
pressure or I get stuck in that spot where I am all, all by myself, closed in. I just I'll
freak out. I don't exactly (inaudible) to be locked in a cell by myself.
•
MORGAN: I was wondering why you were asking to move.
ERICK: I can't handle it When they put me in one ofthose (inaudible) and say (inaudible),
give you this blanket that looks like a (inaudible). Sat there with my fists and beat
my head against the door and (inaudible). I fell like I'm being trapped in ajar, I
couldn't get out. They take me out ofthere and threatening restraints. Calm down
for a little bit and then I, nobody to talk to and started getting fucking, really freaked
out in my head again. Then they took me from there and put me in CCU. In single
cells. Finally I run in to the people that I know, good people I know. When I am by
myself, I can't I can't handle it.
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -131-
MORGAN: Well, tell me what your background
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: First ofall, I am sorry because no kid deserves that, not even a part ofthat. You have
certainly explained some things to me.
ERICK: And how fucked up I'm in the head, I know.
MORGAN: You talked about, you know (inaudible) beat me up with it, because (inaudible).
ERICK: I beat myself up with it everyday.
MORGAN: This stewardess thing on the Greenbelt.
MORGAN: During that time period, September of200l, did everyone ever tell you, Erick you
think you did this?
ERICK: I stopped being around people. I literally stopped being around people. Stopped
working, I stopped being indoors for a while. I got off the fourth floor behind the
elevator. I found a guy over there that was homeless and a Christian. (Inaudible). I
don't know what (inaudible). Urn, you are the only person I've ever talked to. You
are the only person I've ever talked to about that. I stayed there. Next I ran across
somebody I knew from prison. Got talkingto them, come back and was looking for a
ride, got (inaudible) with a bicycle and (inaudible). Virginia Perkins make money.
She helped me buy my trailer house up on U-Stick and Cole. And I stayed with her
for a bit. Things were going good and then (inaudible). And then I went to jail
because (inaudible) not came home. And she (inaudible) spying and shit. I was
coming down offofit, but I (inaudible). Yeah, why don't you take two wires and tap
them together and get that electrical circuit man. That's what I was feeling up here.
. But (inaudible) crush her right hand on top of my head. One of the muscles was
tensed up and when they took me to jail, I was just. I was a nut. I would just not
cooperate. (Inaudible) said it to them. I was stunned, I was like, I didn't say that.
Yes you did, we've got you on video tape too. This is you. I still didn't believe
them. The psychologist came in and said well, do you want to see footage and I said,
alright, you're saying or you're not saying, youknow I am doing this thing. Then I
must have remember what I did. So they, uh, they finally released me, on probation.
I was so scared. I lost the damn house. I was really alone.
••
•.~\,
ERICK: Want to know something funny. When I was doing that meth, the reason why I know
about (inaudible) things that (inaudible) period of time. Because if I let anything
happen (inaudible). (Inaudible) handed. (Inaudible). Tell me about (inaudible). We
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall Page -132-
MORGAN: When we talked about.
ERICK: (Inaudible).
MORGAN: (Inaudible) does this collar belong to you? (Inaudible) you are down on the
Greenbelt. So, I think there is a part ofyou that is afraid that you did, right?
ERICK: I'm scared to death of some of the shit I probably did. Some shit people have told
me. You know, they told me, well you, you lashed out at others, you screamed at
everyone, you told everybody that. They said Iact like the, like a little child, like a
little kid and I didn't have, the whole time I face like I do now. I said I (inaudible)
fucking little kid, I was scared, afraid.
MORGAN: In 2000, did you ever leave town, after September, did you ever leave?
ERICK: No. I was a (inaudible) in Boise. And that old man, he was homeless, he helped me
out. When that old man helped me out.
MORGAN: Do you remember his name?
ERICK: His name was Joe. He was a Vietnam veteran. GI Joe, with long, blonde, scraggly
hair. Spoke like crap with his voice. He had an alcohol problem. He left (inaudible)
town. He went to a treatment center or something like that. (Inaudible) the first I had
(inaudible) the only person that I could ever talk to me in trust. But (inaudible)
matches that I had (inaudible). He started stepping towards me and I back off. He
(inaudible) I tum around and I run. Then I had my (inaudible) back me up here
around my anchor. I had to use my anchor.
MORGAN: So you camped in with him for quite a while, do you think?
ERICK: (Inaudible) took care ofme, got me clothes, clothing. When I got on my feet, I took
him in to my house and gave him (inaudible). I told him, you know if (inaudible),
sorry man.
MORGAN: And that was during September when you were with him?
ERICK: (Inaudible). October.
MORGAN: October?
ERICK: Yeah, when I fmally wandered up across him, I was hiding out, then fucking
(inaudible) recycled newspaper dumpsters and passing out in the park. (Inaudible).
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Interview with Erick Virgil Hall
MORGAN: In September, you would have been living with Tim?
Page -133-
ERICK: Who? Tim who?
MORGAN: Tim (inaudible).
ERICK: When I first came to Idaho?
MORGAN: No, in September of2000.
ERICK: No, Tim (inaudible) was in prison. I don't (inaudible). He was in and out ofprisons.
MORGAN: Can I get you anything?
MORGAN: Urn.





Well, I'd ask for a regular pen and a pad ofpaper, but I know I already have that back
at the jail. I want to talk to .somebody at the jail, you know a psychologist or
something, somebody that I can talk to. To get this shit out ofmy head, so that I can
talk to somebody (inaudible) my lawyer's going to be.
Because I don't tobe by myself. I don't want to be in a stupid little cell, where I just
don't. I can't stand being by myself.
(Inaudible) live with on donn 3, like Shawn Dempsey, you know.
MORGAN: (Inaudible) at the jail. I will see what I can do for you.
ERICK: I took care ofhim on the streets, you know I, tried to. He gets (inaudible) past a year
and six months, seven months, I don't even know (inaudible). In the jail, I finally
found a (inaudible).
•
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STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF SANTA FE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NO. D-6101-CR-200400521
D-OI01-CR-200400522











First .Judlai:;tl DiRtflot Sourt
JllN - 82001
s. .. ·t, RIo Arrib.a &
L"s ,\loiIrnOS Counties... PO Box 2268




ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING AND
PARTIALLY DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the filing of the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Death Penalty and the Court having reviewed the motion, authorities, exhibits and
having held a hearing to submit expert testimony, finds as follows:
t. The venue for this trail is proper and is not contested by the parties hereto.
2. Upon any conviction of first degree murder in this case, the State has elected to seek
the death penalty as a aggravating sentence herein and this matter has been certified as death
penalty qualified pursuant to NMSA §31-20A-I et.seq. (1978).
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3. Defendants are challenging the constitutionality ofthe New Mexico Capital Felony
SentencingAet, NMSA §31-20A-l et.seq. (1978).
4. Defendants factually rely upon the recent results of the Capital Jury Project, the testimony of
Dr. Wanda Foglia and Dr. William J. Bowers, as well as the numerous other projects and studies
submitted to the Court for review. The State has questioned the tenninology/interpretations of
the Capital Jury Project and the expert opinions ofDr. Foglia and Dr. Bowers. The State has not
presented any of its own witnesses or other evidence for review by the Court.
5. The legal basis for Defendants' constitutional challenge to the New Mexico Capital
Felony Sentencing Act, NMSA §31-20A-l et.seq. (1978), arises from the authority established
by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and its progeny.
6. It is undisputed by the parties that the qualitative difference ofdeath from all other
forms ofpunishment requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny by the Court in cases
involving a capital sentencing determination. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
7. The Capital Jury Project was an extensive multi-year project covering 14 states and the
collection ofpost-sentencing survey data from overl,lOO actual death penalty jurors (in 354
capital trials). The 14 states selected are responsible for approximately 76% ofthe individuals
on death row as ofJune 2002 and approximately 79% of individuals executed between 1977 and
September 2002. The project was funded by the National Science Foundation and similar
sources. The reliability of the data and methodology used in the Capital Jury Project has been
evaluated, approved and re-approved within the scientific community. The Capital Jury Project
researched the decision making process of actual jurors during the course of their trials and
identified specific points during trial and specific influences regarding how actual jurors reached
I
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their final sentencing decisions. The United States Supreme Court had made it clear that social
science research and studies ofcapital sentencing schemes must use actual jurors from capital
punishment trials. See Witherspoon v.Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1987), Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 171 (l986);McCleskey v. Kemp, 41 U.S. 279 (1987).
8. The State ofNew Mexico was not included withing the fourteen states covered by the
Capital Jury Project, but Dr. Foglia and Dr. Bowers identified the consistency ofNew Mexico's
capital sentencing scheme with several other states included in the project. The findings and
results from the Capital Jury Project are applicable nationwide pursuant to the opinions ofDr.
Foglia and Dr. Bowers.
9. The Capital Jury Project identified several unresolved problems existing in the current
statutory capital sentencing schemes ofthe fourteen states studied, which include the following:
a. Premature death penalty decision making by the jury;
b. Failure ofthe jury selection process to remove a large number ofdeath biased jurors~
c. Failure by jurors to comprehend and/or follow death penalty instructions;
d. Erroneous beliefs amongst jurors that the death sentence is required;
e. Evasion of responsibility for the decision imposing the death penalty; and
f. Racism in the determination and imposition of the death penalty.
10. The problems identified by the Capital Jury Project were reasonably consistent
throughout the fourteen states included within the study, despite several differences in the
statutory structure and legal procedure used by each of the states to effectuate its capital
sentencing scheme.
11. Dr. Foglia and Dr. Bowers testified and provided expert opinions that in their analysis
and interpretation ofthe results from the Capital Jury Project, the following significant statistical
problems are identified with regard to existing capital sentencing schemes:
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a. Approximately 50% ofall jurors absolutely thought they knew what punishment
should be given during the evidentiary (guilt) phase oftrial and prior to the start ofthe sentencing
phase (300.10 absolute for imposing the death penalty and 200,!o absolute for not imposing the death
penalty). These jurors do not waiver from these decisions which were made prior to the start of
the sentencing phase.
b. 60010 ofjurors with a pro death penalty position did not change their premature death
penalty position and 97% ofall pro death penalty jurors felt strongly about their pro-death
penalty position during the evidentiary phase of trial.
c. 30% ofjurors fail to understand the instruction that aggravation must be proven by a
standard ofbeyond a reasonable doubt.
d. 30 - 44% ofjurors fail to understand the instruction, legal standard and legal
considerations regarding mitigating evidence.
e. 24 - 71% ofjurors believed that the death penalty was the only acceptable punishment
for six specific types ofmurder.
f. 37 - 44% ofjurors understood that the death penalty would be required if the defendant
would be dangerous in the future or the defendant's conduct is heinous, vile or depraved.
g. Only 15% ofjurors believe that individual jurors or the jury as a whole is/are
responsible for the defendant's punishment (imposition ofthe death penalty).
h. Jurors in all 14 states underestimated (by statistical median averaging) the sentence
which the defendant would receive ifthe death penalty was not imposed.
i. At sentencing, jurors who estimated the non-death penalty sentence to be 20 years or
longer are 11.8% less likely to impose the death penalty over jurors who estimated the non-death
penalty sentence to be from 0 to 9 years.
12. The opinions and results reflected in the Capital Jury Project are considered to be
consistent with previous research and studies conducted prior to the start of the Capital Jury
Project, including various mock jury studies.
13. The Capital Jury Project also analyzed the black/white racial aspects of the decision
making process in death penalty cases. The project identified racially significant problems which
continue to exist in the application of the death penalty where black/white racial dynamics occur
within the jury or where the accused is a black defendant. Due to the ~thnicallydiverse
population (a significant percentage being Hispanic and Native American) and the unique
historic background ofthe State ofNew Mexico, the Court does not find the black/white racial
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addition, both Defendants identified in this case are asserted to be Hispanic and AnglolHispanic
in origin. The Capital Jury Project did not study any ethnic issues regarding Hispanic jurors or
racially unique problems regarding accused individuals ofHispanic origin.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED that the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Death Penalty in hereby granted in part and denied in part as follows:
A. The premature detennination ofthe death penalty during the evidentiary (guilt) phase
of trial is contrary to the clear and objective standards established by the New Mexico Capital
Felony Sentencing Act and constitutes an arbitrary and capricious violation of the United States
Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution. The Capital Jury Project has scientifically
determined that nearly one-halfof the 1,200 actual death penalty jurors participating in the
survey indicated that they made a premature determination regarding the death penalty during
the evidentiary (guilt) phase of trial. This percentage is so significant that this Court must take
steps to protect the Defendants' right to a fair trial without a premature determination of the
death penalty during the evidentiary phase oftrial rather than the during the sentencing phase of
trial. It now appears impossible to eliminate this improper and wholly discretionary
misapplication ofthe law by the evidentiary phase jury when the same jury is impaneled to
decide the capital sentencing punishment phase immediately thereafter. The only way to
properly and adequately protect the sentencing phase from being tainted by a premature j ury
determination during the evidentiary phase of trial is to impanel a separate jury for the sentencing
phase of trial. Such a requirement is contrary to the statutory scheme established by the New
Mexico Capital Felony Sentencing Act and the understanding mandated by Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) and its progeny. The Capital Jury Project, however, has now scientifically
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· established that without formal separation of the juries assigned to the evidentiary and sentencing
phases ofdeath penalty cases, the Constitutional principals mandated by Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) and its progeny cannot be mel When death penalty juries consistently fail to
adhere to the standards and essential requirements of law as set forth in the detailed instructions
from the Court, and a rational review of this premature decision making mistake cannot be made
by the Court, then the principals required under Furman and its progeny are violated. Science
has now proven that despite the United States Supreme Court's desire to allow the States to
establish standards to guide juries through the evidentiary and sentencing phases ofdeath penalty
cases, premature decision making has not been eliminated and continues to be done by nearly
halfof all death penalty jurors. Without separate juries during the evidentiary and sentencing
phases of trial, Defendants rights under United States and New Mexico Constitutions are being
violated. Separate juries will be required for the evidentiary and sentencing phases of this trial.
All portions of the New Mexico Capital Felony Sentencing Act inconsistent with the
impanelment ofa separate jury for the death penalty sentencing phase of this trial are determined
to violate the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution. On this point, the
Defendant's motion is partially granted to require a separate jury during the death penalty phase
of trial, if in fact a death penaltyjury becomes necessary at that time.
B. Despite potentially ineligible jurors being identified as having sat on death penalty
cases reviewed by the Capital Jury Project, this issue can and should be addressed by careful
questioning of the panel by the parties and the Court. The Court's strict adherence to the
eligibility requirements during the jury selection process can eliminate ineligible jurors from
inclusion within the sentencing jury. It is the Court's responsibility to insure that ineligible
000890
               
             
                 
                
                
               
                
              
               
              
              
               
             
                
               
               
              
             
                
                
            
              
jurors are stricken from the sentencing jury in a death penalty case. With the capital sentencing
jury being separately selected from the jury determining guilt during the evidentiary phase of
these trials, close scrutiny will be made by the Court to insure that ineligible jurors are removed
from any sentencing jury selected. The Capital Jury Project did not establish that a proper jury
cannot be selected in all death penalty cases, it only established that some ineligible jurors may
have gotten through the jury selection process. Defendant's motion is denied regarding
Constitutional challenges based upon ineligible jurors having been identified as serving on prior
death penalty cases studied under the Capital Jury Project.
C. Despite jurors having stated a misunderstanding of the aggravation and mitigation
instructions of the Court as reflected by the Capital Jury Project, the Court and parties can take
appropriate steps during the separate sentencing phase of trial to carefully explain the instructions
and avoid further significant errors ofthis nature. Defendant's motion is denied regarding
Constitutional challenges based upon jurors having misunderstandings of the aggravation and
mitigation instructions of the Court which were reflected by the Capital Jury Project.
D. Despite jurors having stated a misunderstanding ofthe sentencing alternatives if the
death penalty is not imposed as reflected by the Capital Jury Project, the Court and parties can
take appropriate steps during the separate sentencing phase oftrial to carefully explain the non-
death penalty sentence so as to eliminate this misunderstanding. Defendant's motion is denied
regarding Constitutional challenges based upon jurors having misunderstandings of the non-
death penalty sentence which would be imposed as the alternative to the death penalty which
were reflected by the Capital Jury Project.
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E. Despite some jurors having stated a misunderstanding of the jury's responsibility for
the imposition ofthe death penalty as reflected by the Capital Jury Project. the Court and parties
can take appropriate steps during the separate sentencing phase of trial to carefully explain the
ju.ry's responsibility for the imposition ofthe death penalty so as to eliminate this
misunderstanding. Defendant's motion is denied regarding Constitutional challenges based upon
some jurors having misunderstandings ofthe responsibility for imposing the death penalty as
reflected in the Capital Jury Project.
F. The Court does not identify any racial bias issues as reflected in the Capital Jury
Project that would apply in this case. Defendant's motion is denied regarding Constitutional
challenges based upon assertions ofracial bias having an effect of the death penalty
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On July 2, 2005, Mr. Duncan was arrested and detained for Kidnapping by the State of
Idaho. On August 8, 2005, the State ofIdaho charged him with three counts ofFirst Degree
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forth its intent to seek the death penalty. On.October 16, 2006, Mr. Duncan entered pleas of
guilty. Mr. Duncan was sentenced to life in prison for the kidnapping charges, but the sentencing
for the three capital counts was stayed and the State ofIdaho advised that it reserved the right to
seek death sentences on these counts should Mr. Duncan not receive death sentences as a result
ofthe federal prosecution.
On January 18, 2007, the federal grand jury returned a 1O~count indictment against Mr.
Duncan, three ofwhich subject him potentially to a punishment ofdeath.
Because the death penalty continues to be imposed in an arbitrary, capricious and random
manner it cannot longer be constitutionally acceptable. The imposition of the death penalty, as
detailed below, violates the Eighth Amendment as set out in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238,
33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct.2726 (1972), violates continued evolving standards ofdecency, and
violates principles offundamental fairness; consequently, the death notice must be stricken.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The findings of the Capital Jury Project ("CJP") are irreconcilable with the deat
penalty jurisprudence since the decision of the Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
In Furman the Court struck down capital sentencing as it had been historically applied by








unreviewable on appeal, that it violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause ofthe Eighth
Amendment. In fue three decades since Furman the Court has repeatedly reiterated tllat "vesting
ofstandardless sentencing power in the jury violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280,302 (1976). To be constitutional, a capital jury's
sentencing discretion must be channeled by clear and objective standards which provide specific
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mtionally reviewed. Godfrey '\I. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); lvlaynard 11. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356 (1988).
The requirement ofclear and objective standards to guide capital jurors has led the Court
to strike down vague statutory criteria which cannot be reviewed objectively on appeal. In
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), Georgia's "outmgeously or wantonly vile, horrible,
and inhuman" aggravator was invalidated. The Court concluded it was so vague that it failed to
provide any meaningful guidance to the jury. A capital jury making a sentencing decision on
such a factor was as unconstrained in its sentencing choice as juries were under the schemes
invalidated by Furman. Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or crnel" standard was
struck down on this same basis in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). The Maynard
Court reaffirmed that its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence since Furman had "insisted that the
channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a
fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action." ld. at 362.
In Stringer 11. Black, 503 U.8. 222 (1992) the Court concluded that the presence ofa
vague aggravator in the weighing process created a greater risk of arbitrariness:
A vague aggravating factor employed for the purpose of
determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty
fails to channel the sentencer's discretion. A vague aggravating
factor used in the weighing process is in a sense worse, for it
creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as more
deserving ofthe death penalty than he might otherwise be by
relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance... [T]he use
of a vague aggravating factor in the weighing process creates the
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Thus, the Court's jurisprudence has made it clear that capital sentencing decisions must
be made according to criteria that are sufficiently clear to pennit ordinary citizens to understand
and apply them and that the jury's discretion must not be arbitrary.
As set out below, the research oftb.e CJP demonstrates conclusively that capital juries, as
currently selected and instructed, violate the Eighth Amendment in spite ofefforts to provide
those standards and instructions in at least seven distinct ways.
1. The Capital Jury Project's Proof that Capital Sentencing is Unconstitutional
The Law and Social Sciences Program ofthe National Science Foundation (grant NSF
SES-9013252) first funded the Capital Jury Project ("CJP") in 1990. For the more than fifteen
years since its creation in 1990, the CJP has systematically researched the decision-making of
actual capital jurors. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and a
Previe'w o/Early Findings, 70 Ind. L. J. 1043 (1995).
Within each state chosen for its research study, the CJP picked 20 to 30 capital trials t
represent both life and death sentencing decisions. From each trial, four jurors were selected fo
in-depth three~to-four-hour personal interviews. Interviewing began in the summer of 199I.
The current CJP working sample includes 1,201 jurors from 354 capital trials in 14 states
Bowers and Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to Purge Arbitrariness fron
Capital Sentencing, 39 Crim. Law. Bull. 51, 51 (1993) [hereinafter, Bowers and Foglia].
Data collected and analyzed by eJP researchers, has been cited by the United State























542 U.S. 348,356 (2004); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170 (1994); United State
23
v. Young, 376 F. Supp.2d 787, 797 (U.S. App. 6th Cir. 2005); People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2
24















          
             
               
     r ~       
              
              
          
           
             
               
              















 a         
       .          
               
 -to-fou -h          1  
      .          
           a  
 .            
              
                
       .        
 OZln                 
        1      e 
 
I














1993, some 30 articles presenting and discussing the findings of the CJP have been published'
scholarly journals. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, The "Deadly Paradox ofCapital Jurors.
74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 371 (2001); Garvey, Johnson & Marcus, Correcting Deadly Confusion.
Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 627 (2000); Bowers
Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration ofFalse and Forced Choices in Capita
Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605 (1999); Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases.
What do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. 1. Rev. 1538 (1998); Hoffman, Where's the Buck - Jura
Misperception ofSentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 Ind. 1.J. 1137 (1995).
According to Bowers and Foglia (and other articles on the same subject) the CJP dat
reveal profound discrepancies between what the federal and state constitutions require and ho


















premature decision-making which renders the penalty
phase meaningless;
the failure ofjury selection to remove large numbers of
death-biased jurors, and the overall biasing effect ofthe
selection process, itself;
the pervasive failure ofdeath qualified jurors in actual
cases to comprehend and/or follow penalty instructions;
the wide-spread belief amongst jurors that sat on capital
trials that death is required;
the wholesale evasion of responsibility for the ptmishment
decision;
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These "seven deadly sins of capital sentencing" are discussed in turn below wi
reference to the article by Bowers and Foglia and other articles publishing the results of the
research and with reference to relevant authority.
. (a) Premature decision-making
Nearly half (49.2%) ofall capital jurors make their sentencing decision before the penal
phase begins. These jurors feel strongly about their decision, and they do not waver from it ove
the course of the trial. Bowers and Foglia, supra, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at ~6. Prematur
decision making occurs in every state studied by the CJP Thus, bifurcation and instructions -th
mechanisms relied on by the Courts to insure fairness in capital sentencing, have little effect .
guiding capital jurors on their sentencing decision:
Requirements such as bifurcating the trial, allowing presentation of
mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase, and the use of
jury instructions aimed at guiding sentencing discretion are of little
use if jurors have already decided what the penalty should be.
Interviews with capital jurors throughout the country show that
jurors have often decided what the penalty should be by the end of
the guilt phase, before they have heard the penalty phase evidence
or received the instructions on how they are supposed to make the
punislunent decision.
Bowers & Foglia, supra, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at 56.
Approximately 30% of all capital jurors, nationwide, made the decision
defendant should receive the death penalty at the end of the guilt phase. Of these jurors makin
early decisions to impose the death penalty, 54.6% indicated that they "thought they knew wha






These jurors reach their decision long before they have even had the opportunity t
discuss it with any of their feHow jurors or heard any of the capital defendant's mitigatin
6 Bowers, Sandys & Steiner, Foreclosedimpartiality in Capilat Senlencing: Juror's Predispositions,
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evidence.8 Many of these early pro-death jurors cite convincing proof of guilt of th~ underlyin
crime as the reason for their early pro-death stands:
For some jurors, it was the nature of the crime itself that convinced them that dea
should be the punishment. II Many jurors stressed the role of physical evidence, especiall
photographs or video tapes, as critical in their punishment decisions.12 In addition to the natur
of the crime and the evidence of guilt, some early pro-death jurors focused on the defendant t
explain what caused them to take a stand for death during the guilt stage of the trial. Thes
accounts typically concerned the demeanor of the defendant during trial and the juror's earl
perception ofhis future dangerousness.14
In terms ofhow strongly early pro-death jurors felt about the decision they made to
impose the death penalty, and in terms of how consistently they stuck to their early decision, the
CJP data establishes that 97.4% of all early pro-deatll jurors nfelt strongly about their early pro-
death stance," with 70.4% indicting they were "absolutely convinced" and 27% indicating they
were "pretty sure" about their decision. Bowers & Foglia, supra, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at 57.
Presenting mitigating evidence during the penalty phase cannot be
very effective when so many jurors declare that they were already
"absolutely convincedII that the defendant deserved death before
they heard any mitigation evidence. Given the human proclivity to
interpret information in a way that is consistent with what one
8 Bowers, Fleury-Steiner & Antonio, The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided Discretion, Reasoned
Moral Judgment or Legal Fiction, in Acker, Bollm & Lanier, America's Experiment with Capital
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already believes,16 it is not surprising that most jurors never waver
from their premature stance.
Bowers & Foglia, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at 57.
This premature decision undercuts efforts to insure fair and constitutional capital
sentencing and precludes consideration of mitigation. Thus, decisions granting the defendant th
right to present mitigation and to have instructions requiring jurors to consider it cannot protec
the defendants from jurors who have decided the penalty before hearing any mitigation at all.
Beginning with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Court has repeatedly made i
clear that capital jurors must be permitted to consider a wide range of mitigating circumstance
in deciding whether death is the appropriate sentence. This principle flowed from earJie
holdings rejecting capital sentencing schemes that made death mandatory for certain murders
The -Eighth -Amendment dictates individualized determination of the appropriate sentence.
Lockett, supra. Just as the statutory scheme cannot preclude consideration of mitigatin
evidence, so too "the sentencer [may not] refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any reIevan
mitigating evidence." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982). Simply allowing th
mitigating evidence to be admitted is not enough. "The sentencer must also be able to conside
and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 31
(1989); see also, Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) ("Evidentiary ruling excludin
relevant mitigating evidence of defendant's adjustment to prison setting violates Eddings); }.Ifill
v. At/my/and, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (Requirement of unanimous jury finding on mitigating factor
created unconstitutional barrier to consideration of relevant mitigating evidence). Only when th
capital juror is free to consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence is there an assuranc
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Where the jurors have already made up their minds before hearing any of the mitigatio
evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial, the Eighth Amendment's requirement 0
consideration ofmitigation is violated.
(b) The failure of jury selection to remove large numbers ofdeath-biased
jurors and the overall biasing effect ofthe selection process
Potential jurors who have reservations about the death penalty are not automatically
disqualified from serving on a capital jury. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). A
sentence ofdeath returned by a jury biased toward death violates the Constitution:
A State may not entrust the determination ofwhether a man should
live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.
Specifically, we hold that a sentence ofdeath cannot be carried out
ifthe jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction. No defendant can .
constitutionally be put to death at the hands ofa tribunal so
selected ... Whatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is
at least clear that its imposition by a hanging j ury cannot be
squared with the Constitution.
Id. at 522, 523. Only potential jurors whose reservations about the death penalty would "prevent
or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as a juror in accordance with [their]
instructions and [their] oath" can be disqualified under federal law. Wainwright v. Witt,469
U.S. 412, 424, 729 (1985).
Witherspoon's prohibition against a capital jury biased toward death was extended in
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), to require the disqualification ofdeath-biased jurors.
The Morgan Court held that potential jurors who would automatically impose a sentence of



























           
               
             
     
            
          
            
               
             
            
             
            
           
         
         
         
            
            
             
    
               
               
             
     
            
              
              
             
 


























Leaving such jurors on a capital jury violates the capital defendant's constitutional right to an
impartial jury.
A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty will fail in good faith to
consider the evidence ofaggravating and mitigating circumstances.
circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed,
because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits,
the presence or absence ofeither aggravating or mitigating
circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore,
based on the requirement ofimpartiality embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant
may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains such
views. Ifeven one such iuror is empanelled and the death sentence·
is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence.
For this reason, attorneys must not be precluded from examining potential jurors
about their ability to consider the mitigating evidence likely to be presented. Adequate voir dire
on these subjects "plays a critical function" of insuring that the jury is not skewed toward a
verdict ofdeath. Id. at 730.
In addition, the Morgan Court defined what the term "impartial" means in a capital case:
"In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to tlle
criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standards of due process. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process.' In re lvJurchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955). In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a
man ofhis liberty or his life. In the language of Lord Coke, a juror
must be as 'indifferent as he stands unsworne. 1 Co. Litt. 155b. His
verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial.
This is true, regardless of the heinousness ofthe crime charged, the
apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he
occupies. It was so written into our law as early as 1807 by Chief
Justice Marshall in 1 Burr's Trial 416 (1807). 'The theory of the
law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartiaL'
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1879)."
****
Thus it is that our decisions dealing with capital sentencing
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decide here today, [citations omitted], have relied on the strictures
dictated by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to ensure the
impartiality ofany jury that will undertake capital sentencing.
Id. at 727-28, (emphasis added).
The holdings in Witt and Morgan teach that potential capital jurors must be indifferent 0
the question of the appropriate penalty in the case at issue. The real question for potential juro
regarding their views about capital punishment is whether those views would prevent or impai
the juror's ability to return a verdict of life without parole without benefit or death in the cas
before the juror.
To understand why so many jurors prematurely decide to impose death the C
researchers investigated the possibility that jury selection procedures, despite being conducte
pursuant to the Witt or lv/organ standards, fail to identitY jurors for whom death is the onI
appropriate penalty for the cases on which they served. The jurors were presented with th
following question/matrix:
Do you feel that the death penalty is the only acceptable
punishment, an unacceptable punishment, or sometimes acceptable
as punishment for the following crimes? Murder by someone
previously convicted of murder; A planned, premeditated murder;
Murders in which more than one victim is killed; Killing of a
police officer or prison guard; Murder by a drug dealer; and, A
killing that occurs during another crime. 17
The CJP survey results documented profmmd deviations between what capital





screened as capital jurors tmder Morgan standards, and who decided an actual capital case,
approached this task believing the death penalty was the only appropriate penalty for many ofthe
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kinds ofmurder. In effect, mandatory death penalty laws, while bmmed by the Supreme Court
under Woodson, are applied byjurors despite the procedural safeguards ofMorgan and
discretionary statutory schemes on which jurors were instructed.
Over halfofthe CJP jurors indicated that death was the only
punishment they considered acceptable for murder committed by
someone previously convicted ofmurder (71.6%); a planned or
premeditated murder (57.1 %); or a murder in which more than one
victim was killed (53.7%). Close to halfcould accept only death
as punishment for the killing ofa police officer or prison guard
(48.9%), or a murder committed by a drug dealer (46.2%). A
quarter of the jurors thought only death was acceptable as
punishment for a killing during another crime (24.2%), i.e., a
"felony murder." Nearly three out often jurors (29.1 %) saw death
as the only acceptable punishment for all of these crimes.
Bowers & Foglia, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at 62; CICCOI'd Bowers, Fleury-Steiner & Antonio
(Carolina Academic Press, 2003); Bentele & Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is
Overwhelming.' Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation in no Excuse, 66 Brooklyn L. Rev.
1011 (2001); Bowers, Sandys & Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Criminal Sentencing:
Jurors' Predispositions. Guilt-Trial Experience, Clnd Premature Decision.Making, 83 Cornell 1.
Rev. 1476 (1998); Bowers & Steiner, Choosing Life or Death: Sentencing Dynamics in Capital
Cases, in Acker, Bolun & Lanier, America's Experiment with Capital Punishment, Chapter 12
(l5l ed., 1998).
In addition to identifying large numbers ofjurors who enter the jury box with their own
personal mandatory death penalty opinions to guide them - as opposed to the court's instructions
- researchers identified to a statistical certainty that there was a direct relationship between
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either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror." Morgan a
729. It is for that reason that the Morgan Court went on to say that U[i]f even one such jUror i
empanelled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence.'
Id.
Further, the process ofcapital jury selection itselfproduces the worst possible group of
jurors precisely when a criminal defendant should have a right to the most qualified jurors. The
studies demonstrate that the process negatively impacts the guilt/innocence phase of the capital
trial in several ways. First, by questioning potential jurors extensively about their attitudes
towards the death penalty, substantial numbers ofjurors believe both that the defendant must be
guilty, and that apparently they are going to be asked to sentence him to death. After all, ifthe
judge and the lawyers were not operating on the assumption he was guilty and that death was the
likely sentence, then why are they spending so much time talking about what his punishment
should be? Moreover, many jurors, after seeing which jurors stay and which leave, believe that
ifselected, it is understood that they will find the defendant guilty, and that they will sentence
him or her to death. 21
Early studies showing that death-qualifying voir dire results in the least representative
juries, which have been validated by the CJP, established rather obvious phenomena. Attitudes
towards capital punishment do not exist in a vacuum. One's attitudes about this very
controversial topic, over which Americans have very divergent views, are strongly associated
with a whole constellation of attitudes about the criminal justice system. These studies
24 21 See, e.g., Haney, Hurtado & Vega, "Modern" Death Qualification: Nelv Data on its Biasing Effects, 1
Law & Human Behavior 6J9 (1994); Haney, On the Selection ofCapital Juries: The Biasing Effects of
25 the Death-Qualification Process Effect, 8 Law & Human Behavior 121 (1984); Haney, Examining Death
Qualification: Further Analysis ofthe Process Effect, 8 Law & Human Behavior 133 (1984).
13
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established, for instance, that people who support the death penalty - and who not only support
it, but are able to tell the lawyers and the judge in the courtroom that they would be able to
impose it - hold a number ofother views about the criminal justice system that work strongly
against the capital defendant.
The data demonstrates that these jurors, much more strongly than non-death-qualified













so is affirmative proofofguilt. Death-qualified jurors do not believe in the presumption of
innocence. They believe much more strongly that "where there is smoke, there is fire." They ar
extremely distrustful ofdefense lawyers and view everything they have to say with a great deal
ofskepticism. On the other hand, they are extremely receptive to the prosecution and its
witnesses - especially police officers - and believe them.
They do not believe in Due Process guarantees like requiring the prosecution to bear th
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They are highly suspicious of experts called by th
defense. In short, death qualified jurors are the jurors least representative of the community as
whole and are the jurors least likely to give a criminal defendant the benefit of the doubt,22 Wi
such jurors, the defendant not only is denied a fair determination of the appropriate sentence, h
is denied a fair determination ofguilt or innocence of the underlying crime.
19 (c) Capital jurors fail to comprehend and/or follow penalty instructions
20
21
The CJP research demonstrates that capital jurors fail to understand andlor follow th





conclusions that significant numbers of capital jurors fail to understand the concept and role 0
22 Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, The Effects ofDeath Qualification on Juror '3 Predisposition
to Convict and on the Quality ofDeliberation, 8 Law & Human Behavior 53 (1984); Fitzgerald
& Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 Law &
Human Behavior 3I (1984).
14
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consider mitigation, but they are required to do so even if it does not excuse or lessen the capi
defendanfs culpability for the murder. Thus, the commands ofLockett are being ignored.
Over half of the capital jurors (56.4%) studied in California failed to understand that th
jury did not have to be unanimous about individual mitigating factors before they were allowe
to consider them. Moreover. a third (37.6%) believed mitigating factors had to have been prove
to them beyond a reasonable doubt before they could be considered?4
The reasons for this massive misunderstanding of the rules which are supposed to guid
and channel capital jury decision~making is the lack of familiarity with the capital sentencin
process - Le., the total absence of any culturally normative experience with the unique kind 0
decision capital jurors are called upon to make.
Americans are very familiar with a jury's role as fact-finder. This role is a longstandin
part ofour culture. On the other hand, Americans are not familiar with the role a capital jury ha
in making the decision as to whether the capitally accused should live or die.25
23 See, e.g., Sandys & McClelland, Stacking the Deckfor Guilt and Death: The Failure of
Death Qualification to Ensure Impartiality, in Acker, et al, America's Experiment with
Capital Punislunent (2d ed., 2003); Lynch & Haney, Discrimination and Instructional
Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 Law &
Human Behavior 337 (2000); Haney & Lynch, ClarijjJing Life and Death !vIaUers: An
Analysis ofInstructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 Law
& Human Behavior 575 (1997); Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors
Understand Mitigation?, 1995 Utall 1. Rev. 1 (1995); Haney & Lynch, Comprehending
Life and Death Matters, 18 Law & Human Behavior 411 (1994); Eisenberg & Wells,
Deadly Confilsion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell 1. Rev. 1 (1993).
23 24 Bowers & Foglia, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at 66-71.
24 2S See Lynch & Haney, 24 Law & Human Behavior 337; Haney & Lynch, 21 Law & Human Behavior
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American jurors are accustomed to finding facts such as whether a weapon was used
whether a taking of property was a theft, or whether a driver was legally intoxicated. They ar
unaccustomed to deciding what weight to give a capital defendant's dysfunctional childhoo .
serious psychiatric disorder, or brain damage in a capital sentencing. Capital jurors have t
resort to their own rules because terms like mitigation and aggravation have no meaning to them:
[CAjuror:] The:first thing we asked for after the instruction was,
could the judge define mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Because the different verdicts that we could come up with
depended on if mitigating outweighed aggravating, or if
aggravating outweighed mitigating, or all of that. So we wanted to
make sure. 1said: "I don't know that 1 exactly understand what it
means." And then everybody else said, "No, neither do I," or "I
can't give you a definition." So we decided we should ask the
judge. Well, the judge wrote back and said, "You have to glean it
from the instructions.
[CAjuror:] 1 don't think anybody liked Using those terms because
when we did use them, we got confused ... They were just
confusing and 1 had never really used them before in anything. So,
yeah, they sit there and throw these stupid words at you and I'm
like, "Well. what do they mean?" I'd get so confused "cause they
sound the same." I'm thinking, "Now which one was that again?"
you know. And it totally confused me.
Haney, Sontag & Costanzo, 50 Journal of Social Science Issues at 168-169.
The net effect of these misunderstandings is that capital jurors are skewed toward a
sentence of death.
The misunderstandings reflected in these incorrect
responses on the questions regarding how to handle mitigating and
aggravating evidence aU make a death sentence more likely. It is
more difficult to find mitigating evidence than the law
contemplates when jurors think they are limited to enumerated
factors, must be unanimous, and need to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt. The CJP data show that nearly half (44.6%) of
the jurors failed to understand the constitutional mandate that they
be allowed to consider any mitigating evidence. Two-thirds
(66.5%) failed to realize they did not have to be unanimous on
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incorrectly thought they had to be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt on findings ofmitigation .•. The constitutional mandate of
Gregg and companion cases to guide jurors' exercise of sentencing
discretion is not being satisfied whenjurors do not understand the
guidance.
Bowers & Foglia, 39 erim. Law ~ulletinat 71.
(d) Jurors' believe they are required to return a verdict ofdeath
Given the findings reported about premature decision making and the failure ofvoir dire
to remove pro-death penalty jurors, it should come as no surprise that many jurors believe death
to be required ifcertain aggravating factors are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In no state are jurors free of the misconception that the law requires the death penalty i
the evidence establishes that the murder was "heinous, vile or depraved" or the defendant would
be "dangerous in the future." CJP data shows that substantial percentages ofjurors "erroneousI
believe that death is required if certain aggravators are proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
These mistaken beliefs result in a jury which is much more likely to return a verdict of
death.
17









Capital jurors must not be misled so as to diminish their sense ofresponsibility for any
death sentence imposed. Caldwell v. Jvlississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). Each juror must
understand that he or she, alone, is responsible for his or her sentencing decision. Uncorrected
beliefs that "responsibility for any ultimate determination ofdeath will rest with others" create a
possible bias toward a death sentence. ld. at 333.·
A jury tIDconvinced that death is the appropriate punishment, "might nevertheless wish to
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assumption that the ultimate sentencer will correct any error. Id. at 332. A jury led to believe a
life sentence cannot be increased to death may vote death because it understands any decision to
"'delegate responsibility" for a sentence ofdeath "can only be effectuated by returning" a death
sentence. Id.
As the Court explained in Caldwell, "[b]eliefin the truth ofthe assumption that
entencers treat their power to determine the appropriateness ofdeath as an 'awesome
esponsibility' has allowed this Court to view sentencer discretion as consistent with - and indeed
indispensable to -- the Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability in the determination that death
s the appropriate punishment in a specific case. 'n 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985). CJP data
emonstrates that this assumption is false.
Almost no capital jurors, however, view themselves as most responsible for the decision
ey make. They place primary responsibility elsewhere:
The vast majority of jurors did not see themselves as most
responsible for the sentence. Over 80% assigned primary
responsibility to the defendant or the law, with 49.3% indicating
the defendant and 32.85% indicating the law was most responsible.
In contrast, only 5.5% thought the individual juror was most
responsible, and only 8.9% believed the jury as a whole was most
responsible ...
Bowers & Foglia, 39 Crim. Law Bulletin at 74-75.
Death penalty statutes are not effectively guiding discretion when jurors misunderstand
the instructions, mistakenly believe death is required by law, and do not appreciate their
responsibility for the sentence imposed. The CJP finding that a large majority ofjurors believe
the law is "primarily responsible for the sentence is particularly ironic considering their lack of




























          
                  
                
               
  
             
             
              
             
                
      
             
       
           
        
          
          
          
            
  
         
           
              
               
               
       
 


























(f) The continuing influence ofrace on iuror decision-making
CJP data demonstrates that in all 14 states, the process ofcapital jury decision-making is
influenced, not only by the race of the defendant and the race ofthe vi~tim, but by both the racial
composition of the jury and the race ofthe individual jurors. CJP data demonstrate that along
gender lines, the outcome ofa capital jury's verdict is greatly dependent on how many white
males make it on to the jury, and whether any African American males serve as jurors.
The data demonstrates, for instance, that white male capital jurors (generally speaking)
do not experience lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt. They see the defendant as
remorseless and are unable to put themselves in either the defendant's shoes or his family's
shoes. They believe that the defendant will be dangerous in the future unless executed.
On the other hand, African American male capital jurors (generally speaking) frequently
have at least some doubts about the evidence of guilt. They are able to see the defendant as
someone who is sorry for what he has done. They are able to put themselves in the defendant's
situation and understand what it must be like for the defendant's family. And, they do not see
the defendant as someone who will hurt other people in the future.
It would be difficult to imagine a more arbitrary circumstance than having to depend on
the racial composition of the jury for a life sentence. Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that the
outcome ora capital case is greatly dependent on the race of the individual jurors and on the
overall racial composition of the jury as a whole.35
35 Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of
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Case 2:07-cr-00023-EJL . Document 136-2 . Filed 11/05/2007 Page 20 of 26
(g) Underestimation ofthe alternative to a death sentence
In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), the Court held that because the jury
that sentenced Simmons to death reasonably may have believed he could be released on parole if
he were not sentenced to death, this misunderstanding uhad the effect ofcreating a false choice
between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited period ofincarceration."
Id. at 162. In Shir/er v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001), the Court reaffirmed the principles
established in Simmons. A capital jury's choice to sentence someone to death should never be
premised upon false, misleading, or inaccurate beliefs about parole eligibility or early release.
As Simmons and Shafer hold, a death sentence returned by a jury that was "forced" to
impose a death sentence because ofits false belief that a life sentenced defendant would be
eligible for release on parole is unconstitutional.
The data revealed that most capital jurors grossly
underestimated the amount oftime a defendant would serve in
prison if not sentenced to death, and that the sooner jurors believed
(wrongly) a defendant would return to society if not given the
death penalty. the more likely they were to vote for death ...
Both statistical analyses and jurors' narrative accounts of
the decision process demonstrate that these unrealistically low
estimates made jurors more likely to vote for death. Jurors who
gave low estimates were more likely to take a pro-death stand on
the defendant's punishment at each of the four points in the
decision process.
Shafer at 80, 82.
The CJP research has confirmed.thatjurors do not understand that a vote for life is a vote
for life without parole.
20
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Case 2:07-cr-00023-EJL Document 136-2 Filed 11/05/2007 Page 21 of26
Capital Jurors' Estimates and Mandatory Minimums ofTime Served Before Release from
Prison by Capital Murderers Not Sentenced to Death by State
State Median Estimate Number of Jurors Mandatory Minium*
Alabama 15.0 35 LWOP
California 17.0 98 LWOP
Florida 20.0 104 25
Georgia 7.0 67- 15
Indiana 20.0 75 30
Kentucky 10.0 74 12,25 **
Louisiana 15.0 23 LWOP
Missouri 20.0 47 LWOP
North Carolina 17.0 77 20
Pennsylvania 15.0 63 LWOP
South Carolina 17.0 99 30
Tennessee 22.0 42 25
Texas 15.0 106 20
Virginia 15.0 36 21.75
=Ie These are the minimum periods of imprisionment before parole eligibility for capital murderers
not given the death penalty at the time of the sampled trials in each state.
** Kentucky gave capital jurors different sentencing options with 12 years and 25 years before
parole eligibility as the principal alternatives.
Thus,jurors are confused about the impact of their decisions in ways which increase the
likelihood that death will be imposed.
21
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The findings ofthe CJP are consistent with other studies based on in-depth interviews of
actual capital jurors were conducted in Florid~ California and Oregon. These studies showed
that capital jurors were not following the constitutional guidelines established by the Supreme
Court~s post-Furman jurisprudence:
Shortly after the McCleskey decision, researchers
undertook studies based on in-depth interviews with persons who
had served on capital juries in Florida, California. and Oregon.
These interviews focused on how jurors actually made their
decisions and whether, or to what extent they were guided by the
capital statutes in their respective states. The questioning was
largely an open ended inquiry into what factors influenced the
sentencing decision, and whether jurors' decision making was
being guided by statutory provisions and the Court's conception of
the sentencing decision as a reasoned moral choice.
In Florida, Geimer and Amsterdam (1987-88) interviewed
some 54 jurors from 10 trials, five in which the jurors voted for
death, and five in which they voted for life. They asked jurors to
explain the reasons for their life or death sentencing decisions and
to evaluate the role or influence of Florida's statutory aggravating
and mitigating considerations on their decisions. Two out of three
jurors (65%) indicated that Florida's statutory aggravating and
mitigating guidelines had "little or no influence" on their
sentencing decisions.
From jurors' explanations of how they did make their
decisions, Geimer and Amsterdam identified what they called the
"operative factors" that actually shaped jurors' sentencing
decisions. While most of the jurors who voted for death (64%)
cited the "manner of the killing" as an operative factor, more than
half (54%) gave the impennissible "presumption of death" as a
factor, the constitutionally forbidden belief that the death penalty
was the correct or appropriate punishment, unless they could be
persuaded otherwise (at 41). As one juror bluntly put it, "[o]f
course he got death. That's what we were there for" (at 45-46).
Next in line as influential operative factors in the death decision
22
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were "defendant's demeanor" and "defense attorney performancell
(32% and 21% ofthe jurors in death cases, respectively). The
former was illustrated by a juror's comment that the "[defendant]
seemed callous, indifferent. Nobody saw a heartbeat ofregret. He
didn't move a muscle except for crossing his legs. By the time of
the penalty phase, the jury was not inclined to feel sorry for him.
Minds were already colored" (at 52).
Likewise, Geimer and Amsterdam identified operative
factors among the jurors who voted for life. Most common (65%)
was "lingering doubtll about the capital murder verdict. An
example ofthis explanation was "we found him guilty, there wasn't
anybody else to put it on • . .. But we didn't want to execute him
because some evidence might come out in the n.lture about the
other guy" (at 29). Concerning the defense attorney's performance,
a juror said, "l shouldn't say it, but I feel it in my heart and always
have, his lawyer left a lot to be desired. I realize he was hired by
the state to do ajob and probably not paid much .... I didn't
mention it at the jury room but I think he was not determined
enough. He didn't try enough and that affected the jury" (at 53).
In California, Sontag (1990) interviewed 30 jurors drawn
from one death and one life case in each offive counties
throughout the state. In Oregon, Costanzo (1990) interviewed 27
jurors from five death and four life cases from a single urban
county responsible for the majority ofOregon's capital trials. The
findings of these two studies are reviewed and contrasted in
Haney, Sontag, and Costanzo (1994).
Under California's statute, which lists "factors in
aggravation and factors in mitigationll without specifying whether
those factors are to be considered as aggravating or mitigating, and
without indicating how the factors are to be weighed in deciding
on the defendant's punishment, juries seemed quite conn.lsed about
how to make the sentencing decision. Sontag found that California
juries deliberated with much broader and less coherent agendas,
and took approximately three times longer to reach a sentencing
verdict than did the Oregon juries studied by Costanzo. Many
California jurors tended to search for a key factor that would make
the decision clear-cut. They typically narrowed the decision by
focusing almost exclusively on the crime and on issues which had
already come up in the guilt phase ofthe trial. Haney et al.(1994)
reported that "fully one-third ofour sample refocused the penalty
phase inquiry entirely on the nature ofthe crime itself, and did so
in a way that amounted to a presumption in favor ofdeath" (at 162)
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the most common operative factor among Florida jmors who voted
for death.
This tendency to reduce the complex question oftife or
death to one decisive point among California jurors is illustrated in
the comments ofa few jurors. For example, one death-jury
member recalled the nature ofthe penalty decision as a matter of
determining premeditation: "[A]ccording to the instructions, the
main thing was, was it premeditated? Did he deliberately, did he
intend to kill these people? Ifso, then we should give him the
death penalty. Ifnot, then we should give life without the
possibility ofparoleII (at 162). Another juror confused the penalty
decision with the legal standard ofinsanity: "l think the bottom
line was, at the time he was committing [the crimes], did he know
what he was doing? Did he know right from wrong? That's the
whole thing" (at 162).
Oregon's directed statute, modeled on that ofTexas, made
the life or death sentence rest heavily upon jmors' answers to a
single question: "whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.1I Oregon juries, compared to those in
California. appeared more coherent in their decision-malting but
were much more constricted in the range of information they
considered. The directed statutes used in Oregon and Texas have
been challenged for discouraging the consideration ofmitigating
evidence. In this connection, Costanzo reported that many of the
jurors' comments underscored the narrowing effect ofthe directed
statute on the range of issues they considered: IIWe just had to stick
to those four [sic] basic criteria. We couldn't deviate with this
mitigating circumstance, or testimony ofpeople that had spoken on
his behalf or against him. We just had to go by those guidelines
that they give you when you make that decision ll (at 165-166).
Oregon jurors relied upon the sentencing instructions not
only to narrow the scope of the evidence they considered but also
to minimize their responsibility for the outcome of their
deliberations: "We are not sentencing him to death--we are just
answering these questions. We talked about it. We are just
answering these questions-to get a clear mind so as not to feel
guilty that I sentenced him to die. That's how the law has it--just
answer these questions II (at 161-167). Oregon jurors also generally
underestimated how long convicted defendants who were not given
the death penalty would spend in prison before returning to
society, and fully one-halfof the Oregon jurors did not believe that
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Concerning both the California and Oregon studies, the
investigators observed that "there was a tendency among jurors
from both samples to shift or abdicate responsibility for the
ultimate decision-to the law, to the judge, or to the legal
instructions-rather than to grapple personally with the life and
death consequences ofthe verdicts they were called upon to
render" (Haney et al. 1994:160). In addition, the researchers
concluded: "Capital penalty instructions fail to acknowledge (let
alone clearly frame or carefully guide) the inherently moral nature
of the task that they direct jurors to undertake. They seem to imply
that death sentencing involv~s nothing more than simple
accounting, an adding up ofthe pluses and minuses on the balance
sheet of someone's life (at 172)."
These studies raised serious questions about the operation
ofpost-Furman capital statutes. Jurors appear to understand
sentencing instructions poorly, especially their obligation to give
effect to mitigation. Many appear to presume that death is the
appropriate punishment for capital offenses without regard for
mitigation. They seem to focus narrowly on a single issue to
simplify decision making and to reach consensus on plmishment.
In explaining the decision to impose the death penalty, they invoke
guilt related considerations as ifthe sentencing process was merely
a replay of the guilt decision. These soundings were sufficiently
ominous to justify a more extensive investigation ofthe capital
sentencing process, one that would take a more systematic look
into the black box ofjury decision making.
Bowers, Fleury-Steiner & Antonio, The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided Discretion,
Reasoned Moral Judgment, 0,. Legal Fiction, (chapter 14 in Acker, Bohm, Lanier, America's
Experiment With Capital Punishment. Carolina Academic Press, 2d ed., 2003) at 8-11 (emphasis
added.).
III. CONCLUSION
Because the traditional means of guiding the discretion ofjurors in capital cases have
been shown by the research ofthe Capital Jury Project to be constitutionally inadequate and
because there are no other means available identified as protecting the defendant's rights, the
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Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:





09:18:52 - New case
STATE OF IDAHO
09:19:16 - Other: Owens, Nicole
on behalf of the petitioner as well
09:19:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court received email this morning. Notes amended petition w
as filed April 7,
09:20:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
2009. State's amended answer due August 6, 2009. Mr. Ackle
y has Abdullah
09:22:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
post conviction trial coming up and Ms. Bennetts involved wi
th Darrell Payne
09:22:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
re-sentencing.
09:22:41 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts stated in looking at deadlines. If depositions
are ordered, Mr.
09:23:10 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Chastain and Ms. Kristall involved with Mr. Payne and may be
difficult to
09:23:28 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
coordinate depositions in the Hall case and don't want to in
000920
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09:24:35 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
their duties on the Payne case.
09:26:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded
09:26:54 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley notes atty/client privilege waivor pending. Stat
e at disadvantage
09:27:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
without 20,000 some pages that petitioner's counsel have tha
t the State does
09:27:37 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
not have.
09:27:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
If amended answer filed on August 6th, the Court will set st
atus conf. on
09:29:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.







     
      
     
   
     
        
   
     
         
    
     
  
     
            
   
     





Friday. July 24. 2009 at 01 :22 PM
JB~~VIDN~COURT
De ut Clerk
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff,
Vs.











NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Status Hearing
Judge:
Friday, August 28,2009 @11:00 AM
Thomas F. Neville
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,



















The State of Idaho, by and through the undersigned deputy Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney, Jan M. Bennetts, responds and answers the Amended Petition
for Post Conviction Relief and moves for dismissal of each and every claim, as
follows as contained in the Answer as set forth below. The State denies each and
every claim set forth in the Amended Petition, unless specifically admitted herein.
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 1
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The State admits that this Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to
various Idaho statutes and rules. The State denies that any international human
rights laws are applicable or have been violated or give the Court additional
authority that it did not otherwise have.
The State admits that the petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho State
Department of Corrections pursuant to a judgment and sentence pronounced by
this Court in Ada County after conviction in Ada County case number H0300624
for the crimes of Count I, Murder in the First Degree and Count II, Rape. The
State admits that the petitioner pled not guilty and that a jury returned verdicts of
guilty and the death sentence. After a finding by jury that the death penalty was
the appropriate punishment for the defendant's criminal behavior, this Court
imposed a sentence of death on January 3, 2008 for the crime of Murder, with a
consecutive fixed life sentence for the rape charge.
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY REGARDING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL CLAIMS
The State will respond to the specifics of the petitioner's claims using
largely the same order outlined in the Amended Petition. However, before doing
so, a review of the current law on post-conviction claims for ineffective assistance
of counsel and other similar claims is appropriate. The Idaho Supreme Court has
stated the standard for judging ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Pratt v.
State, as follows:
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." State v.
Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1168, 120 S.Ct. 1190, 145 L.Ed.2d 1095
(2000) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692-93 (1984)). The
test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received
the effective assistance of counsel is two-pronged and
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 2
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requires the petitioner to establish: (1) counsel's conduct was
deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional
nonns; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of that
deficient conduct. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d
931,936 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,104 S.Ct.
at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693). In assessing the reasonableness
of attorney perfonnance, counsel is "presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment." Id. at 329-30 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,
104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695). In addition, strategic
and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a
basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130, 115 S.Ct. 942, 130
L.Ed.2d 886 (1995).
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 PJd 831,833 (2000).
The Idaho Court of Appeals further defined "prejudice" as it relates to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct.
App. 2002). The court stated:
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must show that the attorney's perfonnance was
deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, (Ct. App.
1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65 (Ct. App. 1990); Davis v.
State, 116 Idaho 401 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish a deficiency,
the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758 (1988); Russell,
supra. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
perfonnance, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Aragon, supra, and Russell, supra.
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272; 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002).
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In other words, it is not sufficient for current counsel to merely point out
that trial counsel conducted the trial differently than current counsel would have
done. It is not even sufficient to point out that trial counsel committed a mistake in
the law or the facts. The petitioner must establish that trial counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant
was prejudiced, and that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for
the deficient performance.
The Court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of
law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644; 873 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v.
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156; 715 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1986). The Goodwin court went on
to say that a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in a civil
action because the petition must contain more than "a short and plain statement of
the claim" that would be sufficient for a civil complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1):
Rather, an application for post conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of
the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application
must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the application. Idaho Code §19-4903. In other words, the
application must present or be accompanied by admissible
evidence supporting its allegations or the application will be
subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code §19-4906 authorized summary disposition of an
application for post conviction relief, either pursuant to motion
of a party or upon the courts own initiative. Summary dismissal
is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested
relief. If such a factual issue was presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Citations omitted.
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-272 (Ct. App. 2002).
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An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not a test of whether "another
lawyer, with the benefit of hindsight, would have acted differently, but whether
'counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d
1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Strickland v. Washington supra.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently emphasized, "the relevant
inquiry under Strickland is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but
whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable." Siripongs v.
Calderon, 133 F.3d. 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1998).
It is important to point out that the petitioner's claims cannot be mere
conclusions, but must be supported by admissible evidence. As the Idaho Supreme
Court stated in State v. Lovelace:
Lovelace's argument that counsel should and would have
advocated for a plea bargain, but for his campaign challenge to
the sitting prosecutor whom he claimed was 'soft on crime' is
speculative and nothing more than a conclusion. We do not
give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by admissible evidence. Paradis v. State, 110
Idaho 543 (1986).
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61; 90 P.3d 278,286 (2003).
Finally, trial counsel is not required to file frivolous motions or motions he
knows are going to be rejected by the trial court. United States v. Quintero-
Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th
Cir. 1994); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985). As discussed in
Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotes and citations
omitted), such an argument can be accepted "only if based on the proposition that
a defendant has everything to gain and nothing to lose." The court further
explained:
The defendant stands to lose two things of value - a
significant quantity of his lawyer's scarce time, and some of
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his lawyer's credibility with the judge. Lawyers are not
called "counsel" for nothing. The judge is counseled by the
lawyers as to how he should proceed. The attentiveness with
which the judge listens to the lawyers' advice is tempered by
his judgment about the credibility of the particular lawyer.
An unmeritorious motion to suppress may cost the particular
defendant some deference by the judge to his lawyer's advice
on other issues later in the case. It will certainly cost the
particular defendant the time his lawyer wastes in the library
and at his desk generating valueless paper, when he could be
working on better motions, interviewing witnesses,
examining locations and evidence, researching likely
evidentiary issues, and preparing for trial.
ld.
II. RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY
The State admits, as alleged on page 3 of the Amended Petition, that the
petitioner is "a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State of
Idaho, under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections." However, the
State denies there is any location in the penitentiary system designated as death row.
Moreover, although the petitioner may currently be housed in a single cell in the
Administrative Segregation section, his housing assignment is at the discretion of the
warden. The State admits that the restraint of the petitioner's liberty is pursuant to
his convictions in the present case as well as in H0300518 for Murder, Kidnapping in
the First Degree and Rape. The State denies that either the restraint is illegal in any
respect or that the convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the
laws, the rules, or the Constitution of United States or of the State of Idaho. The
State denies that the petitioner's conviction, sentence, or the restraint of his liberty,
are violations of any applicable intemationallaw.
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III. LACK OF SPECIFICITY
Petitioner alleges that the petition lacks specificity for three reasons: trial
counsel has "failed to fully cooperate"; petitioner has not had access to the jury
questionnaires and petitioner was prohibited from contacting the jurors. The State
denies that trial counsel has acted in any way improperly in their dealings with the
State Appellate Public Defender. The State denies the implied argument that the
jury questionnaires are necessary to the preparation of an adequate petition. The
Court has inherent authority, as well as authority pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
23.1, to manage juror information and, therefore, contact. Idaho Criminal Rule
23.1 provides that
In order to provide for open, complete and candid responses
to juror questionnaires and to protect juror privacy,
information derived from or answers to juror questionnaires
shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to anyone
except pursuant to court order. For the limited purpose of
trial preparation, copies of the juror questionnaires and
answers may be made available by the clerk to any attorney
for a party or to a party appearing pro se. Such disclosure
shall be subject to the rule of juror confidentiality stated
above and any further limiting order of the administrative or
trial judge...
I.C.R.23.1. The Court can, as it has, limit a petitioner and his counsels' access to
the questionnaires. The Court may also issue a limiting order regarding the release
of information contained therein.
The State further denies that any jury contact by petitioner or his counsel is
appropriate. The petitioner's ability to use information obtained from jurors as
evidence is limited by Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b). The Court of Appeals has
summarized that rule in this way:
Pursuant to this rule, a jury's verdict may not be impeached
by a juror's affidavit or otherwise except on the grounds that:
(1) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
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brought to the jury's attention, (2) outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on a juror, or (3) the verdict was
determined by resort to chance. Statements regarding any
other aspect of the jury deliberations are inadmissible to
impeach the jury's verdict.
State v. Webster, 123 Idaho 233, 236; 846 P.2d 235, 238 (Ct. App. 1993). The
Court of Appeals has, since Webster, continually held that juror affidavits are
inadmissible except to the degree such affidavits address the three areas of inquiry
delineated in I.R.E. 606(b). See State v. Setzer, 136 Idaho 477, 36 P.3d 829 (Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 38 P.3d 1285 (Ct. App. 2001).
Insofar as jury contact is not necessary to support any claim, jury contact is not
appropriate.
Finally, the State does not concede that the reasons set forth by the
petitioner for inadequacies in the Amended Petition are an appropriate basis to
justify lack of specificity.
IV. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
The State denies that the conviction and sentences entered against the
petitioner were in violation of either state or federal: laws, rules or Constitutions.
The State further denies that any applicable international law was violated.
Accordingly, the State denies each claim of the petitioner unless explicitly
admitted herein.
Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel claims, prosecutorial
misconduct claims and cumulative error. The State denies each of these
allegations and will address them in turn.
A. BREAKDOWN IN THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The petitioner argues that there was a breakdown in the attorney client
relationship which amounted to a "complete denial of counsel, see United States v.
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Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)" (Amended Petition at 6.)1 The Supreme Court in
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) discusses the complete denial of
counsel, stating:
The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires
us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied
counsel at a critical stage of his trial. Similarly, if counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful
adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself
presumptively unreliable.
Id. at 659. The Supreme Court in Cronic is instructive regarding what kind of
counsel people are entitled for their defense in criminal cases.
Thus in McMann the Court indicated that the accused is
entitled to a 'reasonably competent attorney', whose advice is
'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases'. In Cuyler v. Sullivan ... we held that the
Constitution guarantees an accused 'adequate legal
assistance.' And. .. the Court referred to the criminal
defendant's constitutional guarantee of 'a fair trial and a
competent attorney.'
u.s. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the petitioner had two very able, very experienced and
very competent attorneys who worked extremely hard at every stage of the
proceedings on his behalf. He certainly was not denied the benefit of counsel. Nor
did his counsel fail to subject the State's case to adversarial testing. Accordingly,
the State denies this claim.
Alternately, petitioner suggests that the breakdown of the attorney-client
relationship amounted to a conflict of interest. The Ninth Circuit has recently
addressed the same issue, stating:
1 The State will hereinafter cite the Petitioner's Amended Petition at "AP." The State will refer to the Trial
Transcript as "Tr." and the Clerk's Record as "CR."
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Obviously, the word "conflict" is also used in common
parlance to describe a personality conflict, an artistic conflict,
a family conflict and many others sorts of antagonism - even
war. In this context, however, as the Supreme Court cases
make clear, we are talking about legal conflicts of interest -
an incompatibility between the interests of the two of a
lawyer's clients, or between the lawyer's own private interest
and those of his client.
Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008). The court went on to note
that, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to counsel who is free of conflicts of interest. It also has held that a
defendant does not have a constitutional right to an appointed lawyer with whom
he has a 'meaningful relationship' so long as the lawyer acts as the client's
advocate." Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2008). No actual conflict of
interest existed in this case and the "quality" of the petitioner's relationship with
his counsel does not rise to a level which merits a remedy. Although counsel
moved to withdraw due to a breakdown in communication and their
professional/ethical concerns, they performed admirably and no harm can be
inferred from the difficulties they may have been experiencing. The petitioner
cannot meet the test under Strickland for this claim.
B. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ACT WITH
DELIGENCE IN ENSURING THAT ALL THEIR CLAIMS WERE
FULLY INSULATED FROM ANY FUTURE CLAIMS BY THE
GOVERNMENT THAT THE CLAIMS WERE NOT
SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED.
In presenting this argument, the petitioner cites the ABA Guidelines as
authority. These guidelines are suggestions made by entities and individuals,
many of whom practice defense work. These guidelines have not been developed
or adopted by the courts and are, therefore, not controlling. In fact, the Idaho
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Court of Appeals has stated that the failure to satisfy the guidelines is not,
"ineffective assistance of counsel per se." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 973
P.2d 749 (Ct. App.l999) citing State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 792, 948 P.2d 127,
147 (1997). The State denies the implied argument that the guidelines provide the
standard of performance for defense counsel.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel By
Failing to Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Allow Defense To
Provide Copy of Grand Jury Transcript to Defendant" From
Future Attacks by the Government That The Claim Was Not
Sufficiently Preserved.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was not effective with regard to their
motion to permit them to provide a copy of the Grand Jury transcript to the
petitioner. (AP at 7.) Trial Counsel moved for permission to provide the
petitioner with a copy of the Grand Jury transcript. The Court granted trial
counsel's motion in part, allowing petitioner to have access to the transcript.
Petitioner states, without citing any supporting document, that the time given was,
"never adequate to allow Mr. Hall to read the transcript in its entirety or
adequately review the transcripts for inaccuracies or discrepancies." (AP at 7.)
Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have referenced more of petitioner's
constitutional rights and should have done so more specifically.
The State denies this claim. Trial counsel's argument achieved the goal of
giving petitioner access to the documents. The State denies that the time to review
the transcript was inadequate. Petitioner has not demonstrated why citing the
constitutional provision to which he refers would have been preferential over, or
even helpful, in comparison to the grounds cited by counsel. (See AP at 7.) In
fact, petitioner has not provided a single case or reasoned argument why these
constitutional provisions were even implicated by the motion.
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Further, petitioner has not even articulated a basis to conclude prejudice as
it relates to this claim, and accordingly, he has not met the second prong of
Strickland. Finally, whether trial counsel's efforts were insufficient to preserve
the issue is speculative and without any legal or factual basis. It should be denied.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel By
Failing to Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Declare Idaho
Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional" From Future
Attacks by the Government That the Claim Was Not Sufficiently
Preserved.
Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to "fool-proof' their Motion To
Declare Idaho Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional. The State denies that
making things "fool-proof' is the standard of performance for defense counsel.
Further, this claim is completely speculative and without legal or factual basis. It
should be denied.
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel By
Failing to Raise Any Constitutional Grounds in Support Of
Their Motion to Reconsider Selecting Jury in Gooding County.
Petitioner first concedes that trial counsel did federalize the motion to
reconsider. Petitioner then argues that, "to the extent the Court deems this motion
not federalized, trial counsel was ineffective." (AP at 9.) This claim is completely
speculative and without legal or factual basis. Moreover, the petitioner has failed
to articulate how or why the Constitutional grounds he references would have
furthered or improved the arguments in the motion. It should be denied.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of
Their "Motion To Strike/Dismiss Aggravating Circumstances"
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 12
000934
            
               
          
               
         
         
      
          
 
           
          
           
             
   
         
         
         
           
             
             
CUlati             
            
            
         
         
   l    
       
     
The petitioner concedes that trial counsel moved to strike and/or dismiss
the aggravating circumstances found by the Grand Jury. Trial counsel did make
such a motion. (CR at 88-91.) Trial counsel also moved to declare Idaho's
Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional. (CR at 92-99.) The Court denied
the petitioner's Motion to Declare Idaho's Capital Sentencing Scheme
Unconstitutional. (See Order Denying Motion to Declare Idaho Capital
Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional, CR at 373-74; see also decision issued by
Judge Neville on record June 17, 2004; Tr. June 17, 2004, at 366-85.) The
petitioner states that trial counsel made that motion based in part on the
inadequacy of definitions given to the Grand Jury. The petitioner then seems to
indicate that this argument is of constitutional merit. However, he argues that
because trial counsel did not specifically refer to the constitution in making the
appropriate argument, there was error.
The State's recitation of relevant definitions exceeds three pages of the
transcript of the Grand Jury proceeding. (Grand Jury Tr., at 179-182.) The Court
considered written arguments of counsel; considered oral arguments of counsel;
and considered trial counsel's concerns before issuing its decision. There is no
reason to assume a reference to the constitution would have changed the outcome.
The petitioner has established neither deficient performance by trial counsel nor
prejudice to him in the outcome. This claim should be denied.
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of
Their Oral Motion To Strike Juror No. 138
Trial counsel moved to strike juror number 138. The petitioner now claims
that trial counsel should have invoked the constitution in making that argument.
Doing so would not have changed the outcome. There is no reason to assume a
reference to the constitution would have changed the outcome. The petitioner has
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established neither deficient perfonnance by counsel nor prejudice to the outcome.
This claim should be denied.
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of
Their Objection To The State's Introduction Of Photographs
The petitioner notes that trial counsel objected to certain photographs. The
petitioner now claims that trial counsel should have cited a litany of constitutional
provisions in the hope of making those objections more meaningful to the Courts
on review. Arguing the constitutional provision proposed by the petitioner would
not have changed the outcome of the motion or of an appeal. The petitioner has
established neither deficient perfonnance by counsel nor prejudice to the outcome.
This claim should be denied.
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of
Their Objection To The Courts Instruction To The Jury During
Deliberation
The petitioner, again, takes issue with the manner in which trial counsel
made objections during trial. The petitioner argues that when objecting to the
particular instruction given in answer to a question, and in objecting to any
instruction being given at all, trial counsel should have referred to a series of
constitutional rights. Again, the petitioner's argument that such a reference would
have better insulated these arguments for appeal is speculative. Further, there is
no legal or factual reason given to believe that such a reference would have been
successful. Arguing the constitutional provision proposed by the petitioner would
not have changed the outcome of the motion or of an appeal. The petitioner has
established neither deficient perfonnance by counsel nor prejudice to the outcome.
This claim should be denied.
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8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of
Their Objection To The States Introduction Of Victim Impact
Testimony
Arguing the constitutional provision proposed by the petitioner would not
have changed the outcome of the motion or of an appeal. The petitioner has
established neither deficient performance by counsel nor prejudice to the outcome.
This claim should be denied.
9. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of
Their Objection To The State's Introduction Of The Belt
Arguing the constitutional provision proposed by the petitioner would not
have changed the outcome of the motion or of an appeal. The petitioner has
established neither deficient performance by counsel nor prejudice to the outcome.
This claim should be denied.
C. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO ENSURE THAT ALL PROCEEDINGS WERE RECORDED
AND THAT MR. HALL WAS PRESENT FOR ALL PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioner claims that unrecorded bench and in-chambers conferences
violated his Sixth Amendment right to be present as well as his due process rights.
The petitioner argues that, "[o]nly where the record clearly demonstrates counsel's
waiver of recording and the consent of the trial judge is the requirement waived."
(AP at 13 citing State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 231, 542 P.2d 63, 65 (1975).) The
case the petitioner cites for this proposition actually deals with a court reporter
who did not record the closing arguments of counsel. State v. Wright, 97 Idaho
229,231,542 P.2d 63,65 (1975). Although the Idaho Supreme Court agreed that
court reporters are required to record closing arguments, the Court also affirmed
the conviction. Id.
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 15
000937
         
         
         
 
          
              
           
     
         
         
         
          
              
           
     
         
        
         
        
               
           
              
                 
             
              
           
            
   
       
     
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed informal conferences. In State v.
Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985), Justice Bistline's dissent takes the
district court to task for conducting an off-the-record bench discussion. The
majority, in contrast, affirmed the judgments of convictions and sentences. Id. In
State v. Adair, 99 Idaho 703, 587 P.2d 1238 (1978) counsel was given the
opportunity "on the record" to object after an off the record discussion in
chambers regarding jury instructions. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded this
was sufficient opportunity and counsel had waived any objection on the issue.
The petitioner was present at all critical stages of his tria1. There is no
showing that the chambers conferences and bench conferences weren't thereafter
described on the record with the petitioner present. In fact, the petition
acknowledges that he was aware both of existence of the conferences and of the
content. No prejudice has been shown. This claim should be denied.
The State denies that any unrecorded conferences violated the petitioner's
rights.
D. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
IMPANELING A JURY FROM GOODING COUNTY IN LIEU OF
CHANGING VENUE
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to object to the impaneling of
a jury from Gooding. The petitioner notes that "trial counsel argued that there was
an unacceptable risk that the jurors would punish the petitioner for exercising his
constitutional rights to a jury tria1." (AP at 17.) In the same colloquy where trial
counsel voiced that concern, Mr. Chastain also objected to impaneling a jury from
Gooding. (Tr., May 7,2007, at pg. 8, In.22 - pg. 11, In.18.) The petitioner claims
that the bus ride likely left the jurors fatigued. Mr. Chastain made this point when
objecting to the Court. (Tr., May 7, 2007, at pg. 10, In.24 - pg.ll, In.18.)
The petitioner argues that the Court was required to find that:
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1. That a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled in the
county where the criminal complaint, infonnation or
indictment is filed;
2. That it would be more economical to transport the jury than
to transfer the pending action; and
3. That justice will be served thereby.
I.C. § 19-1816(a).
(AP at 17.) The petitioner acknowledges that the Court made the first finding.
(AP at 17.) The petitioner argues trial counsel should have objected in the absence
of a finding by the Court on the economics and justice prongs set forth in the
statute. (AP at 18.)
The Court did consider the expense of impaneling a jury from Gooding and
trying the case in Ada County. (Tr., May 7, 2007, at 5, Ins.l-12.) The State
submits that the Court also clearly found that justice would be served by this
procedure, or it would not have taken such a course.
E. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DURING JURY SELECTION
It is helpful at the outset to set forth the legal framework applicable to juror
views on the death penalty. "[I]t is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of
Witherspoon that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment,
regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed
for cause." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992). Similarly, "[a] juror
who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good
faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the
instructions require him to do... a capital defendant may challenge for cause any
prospective juror who maintains such views." Id. at 729. The Court here was well
aware of the demands of Witherspoon, its progeny and the reverse- Witherspoon
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requirements as well. The Court made inquiries of each juror to which the SAPD
objects, obtaining a clear commitment from each juror to follow the Court's
instructions and to consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. Insofar
as the jurors were life and death qualified, the observations of the SAPD are not
sufficient to indicate that jurors should have been excused for cause.
In summary, the Court subjected each juror to Witherspoon and reverse-
Witherspoon questions. Each juror who was selected affirmed an intention to take
the case seriously and consider all the appropriate factors. The petitioner's
criticisms often rest on small, sometimes unfairly framed, pieces of the jurors'
answers. When considering the totality of the jurors' responses it is clear the
panel was properly passed for cause. The State moves for each of the petitioner's
claims regarding these jurors to be dismissed.
1. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to draft a jury questionnaire sufficient to elicit all
relevant views on the Death Penalty.
The jury questionnaire was very detailed. It was 30 pages in length and
contained 173 questions. Petitioner concludes that some jurors did not take the
questionnaire seriously and others left questions unanswered or answered
incorrectly. (AP at 20.) Counsel engaged in a lengthy jury selection process
beyond the jurors filling out the questionnaires. Counsel for petitioner questioned
jurors in detail not only about their answers to jury questionnaire questions; their
failure to answer questions or their confusion about the questionnaire, but they
asked jurors detailed questions about any and all aspects relevant to the jurors'
ability to be fair and impartial. Petitioner's claims are speculative and he has
shown no prejudice. This claim should be rejected.
Petitioner also argues that the jury questionnaire failed to list any
aggravating circumstances and specifically he argues that the jury questionnaire
failed to list the "prior murder conviction aggravator." (AP at 21-22.) Had the
prior murder conviction aggravator been contained in the jury questionnaire, the
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petitioner would most certainly now be claiming egregious error. The petitioner
would be arguing that the mere question itself would have suggested to the entire
jury panel that the petitioner had a prior murder conviction. Most certainly the
argument would now be that the entire jury panel was tainted and should have
been excused. In addition, if the aggravating factors were delineated for the jury
during jury selection, the petitioner would now be arguing that either they were
stated in a misleading fashion or the jury would have believed them to be true
regardless of the evidence presented at trial because he would argue that the
State's sentencing case was outlined in the questionnaire prior to a finding of guilt.
Trial counsel did ask jurors how they would handle the case if they were to find
out he had a prior criminal record, even violent crimes, or even a prior conviction
for murder when they believed it was appropriate for a particular juror. (See, e.g.,
Tr. Vol. 3 at 1582-84; Tr. Vol. 3 at 2061-62; Tr. Vol. 4, at 2440-41.) The decision
whether to question an individual juror, outside the presence of other jurors, about
those topics was strategic. Defense counsel asked questions related to that issue
only during individual juror questioning so that the responses would not taint other
Jurors.
Petitioner cites Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) in support of his
argument. In Morgan, the Court reiterated the WitP holding: "the proper standard
for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of
his or her views on the capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. at 728 (citations and quotations
omitted). A juror who either would automatically impose the death penalty or
who would never impose the death penalty, despite the evidence presented in
mitigation and aggravation, is not a qualified juror. See id. The jury selection
process in this case was in direct compliance with Witt and Morgan. There is no
2 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
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requirement that each and every aggravating and mitigating circumstance be listed
for the jury to consider. In this case, the defense team thoroughly questioned the
Jurors.
The petitioner's allegations are conclusory and speculative and should be
denied.
2. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
stipulating to the excusal of prospective jurors based solely
on their completed questionnaires.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel should not have agreed to exclude
jurors based upon the jury questionnaires. The State likens this situation to a
criminal appeal where there may be a variety of claims. "[W]eeding out issues
that have little chance of success to focus on stronger issues is a widely accepted
practice at the appellate level." United States v. Briggs, 2007 WL1381792
(D.Idaho 2007). Similarly, trial counsel is unlikely to get great numbers of
qualified jurors dismissed for cause. Rather than losing credibility with the Court,
it was more appropriate to cull out the problem jurors in well-focused motions.
The stipulations were based, in part, on an understanding that these jurors
would be unlikely to get seated and that by stipulating early, the parties were
accomplishing the inevitable at a more efficient pace. However, juror opinions
about death penalty are likely not the only reasons the defense considered in
agreeing to dismiss these jurors. There may have been, and very likely were, a
number of other considerations that impacted the defense trial team's willingness
to dismiss these jurors. They could have used the State's willingness to stipulate
as a way to excuse jurors they disliked for some reason separate and apart from the
death penalty, without using valuable peremptory challenge to do so. There were
legitimate tactical reasons for the defense to strike each excluded juror.
Accordingly, trial counsel's decision to stipulate to their removal was a strategic
decision and not ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim should be rejected
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3. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to object to improper rehabilitation of prospective
jurors.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to object to improper
rehabilitation of prospective jurors. Trial counsel vigorously questioned and
tested each juror's views regarding the guilt phase and the death penalty phase
during the course of a grueling jury selection process. Their decisions to object or
not object to specific questions by Court or counsel were strategic. The
petitioner's argument is speculative and conc1usory. The petitioner has failed to
make an adequate showing that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's strategic
decisions to object to specific questions during the jury selection process.
In addition, the petitioner argues that trial counsel should have requested to
question the jurors first before the State. The petitioner cites no case law or other
legal authority to support his proposition that he is entitled to question jurors prior
to the State. The State has the burden of proof and the State is entitled to question
jurors first. This argument lacks merit and should be rejected.
4. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to conduct an adequate Voir Dire (All Jurors)
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because they failed
to conduct adequate jury selection. First, he argues that trial counsel should have
questioned the jury about the petitioner's prior murder conviction. As has been
noted previously, the petitioner would most certainly be arguing now that trial
counsel was ineffective by asking this question of each prospective juror. Trial
counsel made strategic decisions to ask this question of certain jurors. However,
to ask this question of each and every juror, would have put trial counsel in the
position of telling jurors, who would be deciding the petitioner's guilt or
innocence, that the petitioner had a previous murder conviction. Clearly, the
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petitioner would now be arguing that this decision tainted the entire panel. This
claim is without merit.
Second, he argues that trial counsel did not define the term "consider" as it
related to trial counsel's questioning of jurors about mitigation evidence. This
argument is conclusory and speculative. Nor does he cite specific examples of
how trial counsel's questions were misleading or in any way explain how their
questions prejudiced the petitioner. This Court specifically questioned each mini-
panel of jurors about this weighing process. Both parties questioned jurors about
this weighing process. This claim is without merit.
5. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to request a dual jury to ensure an adequate Voir
Dire on all the aggravators relied upon by the State in
seeking the Death Penalty for Mr. Hall.
The petitioner claims that his case should have been heard by two juries:
one for the guilt phase and one for sentencing. (AP at 29-30)
The petitioner provides no basis to believe that trial counsel would have
been successful in getting a second jury to consider death penalty phase issues.
There is no authority for such a request and it would have been in direct
contravention of the applicable statute. Idaho Code § 19-2515(5)(b), provides
that, "If the defendant's guilt was determined by a jury verdict, the same jury shall
hear the special sentencing proceeding... " and precludes a second jury from being
convened unless it is "impracticable to reconvene the same jury to hear the special
sentencing proceedings due to an insufficient number of jurors." (emphasis
added.) In the present case, there was not an insufficient number of the originally
convened jury to proceed to the penalty phase of the trial. Had trial counsel made
the motion now suggested by the petitioner, the Court would have been
constrained to deny it. Trial counsel was not ineffective in choosing not to make a
motion in direct contravention of the applicable statute. Even if the Court
concludes such a motion should have been made, it could not have been granted
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and therefore no prejudice can spring from the absence of such a motion.
Accordingly, this claim can merit no relief.
6. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to conduct an adequate Voir Dire and/or failing to
strike seated jurors.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct
an adequate voir dire and/or failing to strike seated jurors. He speculates about the
jurors' opinions and concludes, for example, that "the chances are high that [Juror
#16] was exposed to evidence about the Henneman case." (AP at 30.) The
petitioner comes to this conclusion even though the juror did not indicate he knew
anything about the Henneman case. The petitioner claims that this same juror held
disqualifying views about the death penalty based upon his answers in the
questionnaire. The petitioner makes conclusory statements about this juror's
inability to consider mitigating evidence. (AP at 31.) The petitioner comes to this
conclusion despite the portion of the transcript where trial counsel digs deeper into
this juror's opinions.
I guess my own personal philosophy would be that in some
cases, an individual's actions would preclude him from being
a member of society and that can be accomplished in one or
two ways - either life in prison or the death penalty.
(Tr. Vol. 2, at 584, Ins. 10-14.)
This juror went on to state that he would have to rely on the definition of
mitigation evidence in order to know if he would consider it. Trial counsel
explained that mitigation evidence is evidence to be considered in fairness and
mercy. This juror stated that it was a "whole different ball game" and that it
changed his answers. (Id. at 588-89.)
It is clear to the State after revIewmg the petitioner's claims in his
Amended Petition (AP at 30-42) that he would never have been satisfied with any
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juror selected to sit on this case. No juror would have been qualified to hear this
case.
"[I]t is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of Witherspoon that a juror
who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her
instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause." Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992). Similarly, "[a] juror who will automatically
vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require
him to do... a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who
maintains such views." Id. at 729. This Court was well aware of the demands of
Witherspoon, its progeny and the reverse- Witherspoon requirements as well. The
Court made inquiries of each juror, to which the petitioner assigns error, obtaining
a clear commitment from each juror to follow the Court's instructions and to
consider imposing and not imposing the death penalty. Insofar as the jurors were
life and death qualified, the observations of the petitioner in his post-conviction
proceeding are not sufficient to indicate that jurors should have been excused for
cause.
Rather than gIVmg the jurors credit for meanmg what they said, the
petitioner speculates about what jurors "really meant." For example, despite Juror
#97's answer that he would consider and weigh mitigation and follow the law, the
petitioner concludes that "what this really means is that the juror would be willing
to put the evidence on the figurative scale with other mitigation for purposes of
weighing; however, the juror had already clearly indicated that he would assign it
no weight." (AP at 36.) The petitioner cannot speculate about what a juror
"really" meant in order to substantiate his claims.
The petitioner finds fault with each and every seated and alternate juror in a
conclusory and speculative fashion. Because each of these claims is purely
speculative and conclusory, they should be denied.
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7. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to conduct any Voir Dire.
On June 4, 2007, the United States Supreme Court decided Washington v.
Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 75 USLW 4373 (2007), which reversed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision that had held the defendant's death sentence could not
stand due to errors in excusing jurors for cause. The Ninth Circuit had reversed and
ordered a new sentencing because it had determined that the trial court had violated
the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by excusing several jurors
for cause due to the State's concern that they could not be impartial in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme Court
first reviewed its precedents involving capital jury selection, including, among
others, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) and Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985). The Court in Brown reiterated the standard to be applied, which
was the same standard this Court applied at trial in the present case: "Whether the
juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance ofhis duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Brown, 127 S. Ct. at 2223
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court set forth four principles that
those precedents have established:
First, a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury
drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital
punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause.
Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors who
are able to apply capital punishment within the framework
state law prescribes. Third, to balance these interests, a juror
who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose
the death penalty under the state-law framework can be
excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially
impaired, removal for cause is impermissible. Fourth, in
determining whether the removal of a potential juror would
vindicate the State's interest without violating the defendant's
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right, the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the
demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by
reviewing courts.
Id. at 2224 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court further stated that
"[d]eference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the
demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical
importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications ofpotential jurors." Id.
The Court paid particular attention to how the trial court reached its decisions
on excusing or not excusing potential jurors. The Court noted that before the trial
court decided a contested challenge, it gave each side the opportunity to be heard and
recall the potential juror for additional questioning. The trial court also "gave careful
and measured explanations" when issuing its decisions on contested challenges. Id.
at 2225. The Supreme Court also noted that the trial court had given the jurors an
instruction regarding the sentencing phase prior to the commencement of jury
selection. The trial court explained the general structure of the trial; the burden of
proof; and, how the penalty phase would function. Id. at 2226; see also id. at 2226
(quoting trial court's general instruction). The Court further took note of the fact that
the jurors had filled out a questionnaire explaining their attitudes toward the death
penalty prior to individual questioning.
In Brown, one of the jurors the State challenged and the trial court excused
was Juror Z. Juror Z had stated during voir dire several times that he would consider
imposing the death penalty and would follow the law. However, he was also
equivocal about his ability to impose the death penalty and he appeared confused
during questioning. Juror Z was equivocal about his ability to impose the death
penalty if the defendant could be sentenced to life without parole. He seemed
confused about the conditions under which death could be imposed and seemed to
believe that it was only appropriate when there was a risk of release and further
recidivism.
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The Supreme Court held: "Juror Z's assurances that he would consider
imposing the death penalty and would follow the law do not overcome the
reasonable inference from his other statements that in fact he would be substantially
impaired in this case because there was no possibility of release." ld. at 2229. It is
also worth noting the factors that the Court relied upon in reaching its decision. The
Court rejected the notion that the there is an automatic deference to the trial court in
the absence of a basis in the record for a finding of substantial impairment, reasoning
as follows: "But where, as here, there is a lengthy questioning of a prospective juror
and the trial court has supervised a diligent and thoughtful voir dire, the trial court
has broad discretion." ld. at 2230 (also noting that transcript showed considerable
confusion on the part of Juror Z, amounting to substantial impairment).
The United States Supreme Court, accordingly, reversed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision granting the defendant a new sentencing trial.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because they failed
to question Prospective Juror # 17. It is clear from the transcript that this juror
was profoundly confused. He did not understand questions despite multiple
attempts to re-phrase the questions. He was substantially impaired and it was
impossible to determine his views because he was so profoundly confused. He
stated "I don't understand most of this." (Tr. Vol. 2, at 607, 1. 8.) "That's where it
is confusing to me." (ld. at 622, 1. 15.) He stated he would not choose life without
parole or the death penalty: "No, I wouldn't choose either. I'm confused on that
question." (ld. at 623, 11. 6-7.) It was certainly understandable why trial counsel
chose not to question him further. Pursuant to Brown, clearly this juror was
substantially impaired.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because they failed
to question Prospective Juror #87. Similarly, this juror was substantially impaired.
This juror was having a great deal of difficulty not only understanding the
questions and process, but she was having a hard time understanding "the whole
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situation" and further indicated that she was literally "having a hard time." (Tr.
Vol. 3, at 1903, Ins. 12-16.) She indicated that she believed she would continue to
have a hard time if she were to sit as a trial juror. (Id. at 1903, Ins. 17-21.)
Petitioner further argues that counsel failed to make specific arguments to
the court related to this specific juror. (AP at 42-43.) This Court made a detailed
record as to its basis for excusing the juror for cause. (Id. at 1912-15.) As stated
in Brown, "[d]eference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to
assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of
critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors."
Id. The petitioner has failed to establish either that this Court erred in excusing this
juror or that trial counsel was ineffective in not arguing constitutional violations as
set forth in his Amended Petition at pages 42 through 43. Moreover, the petitioner
has failed to articulate how or why the Constitutional grounds and other arguments
he references would have furthered the motion. This claim should be denied.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because they failed
to conduct any voir dire of Prospective Juror #123. This juror falls squarely
within the Brown case. Based upon extensive questioning, he indicated that he did
not believe he could impose the death penalty. (See Tr. Vol. 7, at 2979-91.)
Based upon the foregoing, each of these claims should be denied.
8. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to strike for cause jurors struck with peremptory
strikes.
The petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to strike for cause jurors
struck with peremptory challenges. This is a general claim only with no specific
allegations. The State has insufficient information to admit or deny this claim and
therefore, the State denies this claim in its entirety. The petitioner provides no
basis for this claim. Nor has he established prejudice. This claim should be
dismissed.
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9. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to adequately move for cause.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because they failed
to adequately argue all of their motions to strike for cause and failed to raise all
grounds for excusal. He does not state how or why these arguments would have
changed the outcome. Nor does he state how counsel's performance was
deficient. The petitioner's claims are speculative and conclusory and should be
denied.
10. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to strike pro-death penalty jurors with preemptory
challenges.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed
to move for additional peremptory challenges. Idaho Criminal Rule 24(c) outlines
the number of peremptory challenges permitted. Trial counsel was not ineffective
for not arguing a position that is contrary to law. Even the petitioner concedes that
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568 (1991)
"seemingly precludes this argument in many respects." (AP at 45 n.17.) This
claim should be dismissed. The petitioner makes reference to other arguments that
trial counsel should have made as a basis for this claim. (AP at 45.) The
petitioner fails to delineate how or why this would have changed the outcome.
This claim is conclusory and speculative and therefore, should be dismissed.
11. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to adequately inquire in the Basque conversations.
The petitioner argues that counsel failed to adequately inquire into the
Basque Center conversations. The petitioner concedes that multiple jurors were
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questioned about these conversations at length. (AP at 45.) However, he still
claims that trial counsel should have recalled jurors who had been excused by
stipulation because he concludes, "[t]here was an unacceptable risk of a tainted
jury." (AP at 46.) This is a conclusory and speculative claim. It should be
dismissed.
12. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to object to deviation from procedure mandating
that alternates b[e] removed by lot.
The petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
the process by which the Court and parties knew who the alternates were, although
the jurors did not.
Idaho Criminal Rule 24 requires alternate jurors would be determined by
lot at the conclusion of the case, Even though the parties knew who the alternates
were, the alternates did not know and so to the extent that this procedure was
invented so that all the jurors pay equally good attention, that effect was achieved
by the procedure in this case.
In any event, there is no showing made that the procedure utilized in the
petitioner's case affected the fairness of the trial. No prejudice has been shown
and this claim should be dismissed.
13. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to ob,ject to systematic discrimination of jurors
based on their economic status.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to object to discrimination of
jurors based upon the economic status. He argues without supporting basis that
"[i]t is generally understood with some empirical support that older persons tend
to support the death penalty more than younger people." (AP at 49.) Yet, he
offers no supporting documentation or specific references to the present case as
support for this bald assertion. The seated jurors represented a fair cross-section
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of the community. There was certainly no systematic exclusion of jurors based
upon their economic status. Both this Court and the parties recognized the undue
financial hardship jury service would be for many of the prospective jurors in this
case. The petitioner's argument is conclusory and speculative. It should be
dismissed.
14. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to ensure adequate procedural safeguards.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to ensure all proceedings were
recorded. The petitioner was present at all critical stages of his trial. There is no
showing that the chamber's conferences and bench conferences weren't thereafter
described on the record with the defendant present. In fact, the petitioner
acknowledges that he was aware both of existence of the conferences and of the
content earlier in his Amended Petition. No prejudice has been shown. This claim
should be denied. The State denies that any unrecorded conferences violated the
petitioner's rights.
The petitioner next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not insisting
that peremptory challenges be exercised immediately. The petitioner cites no case
law to support this motion. He cites I.C.R 24 but does not indicate how that rule
was violated. He did not indicate how or why he was prejudiced by this
procedure. Indeed, this procedure gave trial counsel time to be thoughtful about
the use of peremptory challenges. The petitioner's conclusory and speculative
claim should be dismissed.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to ensure that the procedures
of this case did not create an undue hardship on the jury. The petitioner has failed
to establish that there was an undue hardship on the jury or that any procedures
utilized were not in accordance with the law. He concedes that the court indicated
on the record that the jurors had been informed of their choices regarding
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deliberations. Nor has the petitioner established prejudice. This is a conclusory
and speculative claim that should be dismissed.
The petitioner also argues that the normal practice of a full lunch break was
not followed and that jurors were allotted a IS-minute lunch break. There is no
basis for this claim. Indeed, many district court judges in Ada County hold trial
on the very same schedule as this case was held: 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. with two
fifteen-minute breaks (one of which is for lunch). Contrary to the petitioner's
assertion that this is a deviation from normal practice and procedure to
accommodate the bussing, it is a normal practice in Ada County. Regardless, the
petitioner has failed to establish how this procedure resulted in any prejudice. It is
merely speculative and conclusory. This claim should be dismissed.
F. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT
MR. HALL'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
JURY IN LIGHT OF THE EXPOSURE TO EXTRANEOUS
PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION BY JUROR NO. 130 AND JUROR NO.
82
The petitioner contends that trial counsel did not do enough to protect his
right to a fair trial and fair and impartial jury as it relates to Jurors #82 and #130.
At the outset, the petitioner is correct that this is a direct appeal issue and should
be addressed in that proceeding rather than in this post-conviction proceeding.
To the extent it relates to ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court
should dismiss this claim because it is without merit. First, trial counsel did move
to exclude both Juror #82 and Juror #130. (See Tr. Vol. 9 at 4326-28 [Juror # 82]
and Tr. Vol. 9 at 4533-35 [Juror #130].)
The petitioner argues that trial counsel should have objected to the scope
and manner of questioning. Had the court not questioned these jurors at length,
the petitioner would be arguing that trial counsel should have required more
questioning. The questions this Court asked were necessary to determine whether
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these jurors could provide the petitioner with a fair trial. They clearly could give
the petitioner a fair trial based upon their answers to this Court's questions.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel did not request to ask questions of
these jurors. Trial counsel was able to provide questions to the Court to ask these
jurors. Whereupon this Court then asked both of these jurors questions based
upon counsel's questions. (See Tr. Vol. 9 at 4321-25 [Juror # 82] and Tr. Vol. 9 at
4531-33 [Juror #130].) This argument lacks merit.
The petitioner next asserts that trial counsel should have asserted a
violation of the Eighth Amendment and should have "clearly articulated" that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires heightened procedural
safeguards in capital cases. (AP at 52.) Trial counsel did argue that by not
excusing these jurors, it was a violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments as well as Articles 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Trial counsel
did argue that he was entitled to state protections pursuant to due process. (See Tr.
Vol. 9 at 4327-28 [Juror # 82] and Tr. Vol. 9 at 4534-35 [Juror #130].) It is also
important to note that trial counsel objected a second time to Juror #82 remaining
on the jury when trial counsel argued to excuse Juror #130. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 4534.)
Nor does the petitioner indicate how arguing as he suggests would have changed
the outcome.
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1994), the Supreme Court
concluded there was no constitutional error when the jury was advised that the
defendant had been sentenced to death in another case. In State v. Gales, 443
N.W.2d 124, 156 (Neb. 2005), the court determined that merely because the prior
death sentence stemmed from the same case, i.e., a resentencing, Romano's
reasoning "is equally applicable." Similarly, in State v. Jaynes, 549 S.E.2d 179,
190 (N.C. 2001) (quoting State v. Bacon, 446 S.E.2d 542, 555 (N.c. 1994), aff'd
on habeas by Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 483-84 (4th Cir. 2000)), the court
reaffirmed, "[M]ere knowledge by the jurors of the prior death sentence does not
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necessarily demonstrate prejudice to the defendant." When a prospective juror can
disregard prior knowledge, follow the court's instructions and render an impartial
decision based on the evidence, recusal is not mandatory. [d. Likewise, in State v.
Simonsen, 986 P.2d 566, 570 (Or. 1999), the court relied upon general principles
associated with juror bias to conclude the jury's knowledge of a prior death
sentence was not unconstitutional. In Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 223 (5th
Cir. 1998), the court concluded the testimony establishing the defendant had
previously been sentenced to death did not "'so infect[]' the sentencing phase with
unfairness that it rose to the level of a due process violation," and the
"introduction of a prior death sentence is allowable if it does not mislead the jury
in its sentencing role." See also King v. Mississippi, 960 So.2d 413, 434 (Miss.
2007) ("as the jury members were aware of their responsibility for determining
whether King received the death penalty for the murder of Patterson, these
comments (regarding King being 'on death row') did not relieve the jury of its
'separate responsibility to make the determination"') (quoting West v. State, 463
So.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Miss. 1997)).
Although these cases address jurors' knowledge of a death sentence at
sentencing, the same rationale applies to the facts of this case. Jurors who are
sworn to try the case and sworn to follow the law are presumed to do so. In State
v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747 (Ct. App. 1997) review denied (1997), the defendant
claimed that he did not receive a fair trial because of an outburst which occurred
during jury voir dire tained the minds of the jury. [d. at 751. The outburst was a
comment by a potential juror that the defendant was a pedophile. [d. The district
court cautioned the remaining jurors to disregard the dismissed juror's comments.
[d. The court concluded that the defendant received a fair trial: "The district court
properly cautioned the jury to disregard the comment, and we will presume that
the jury followed the instructions given by the district court." [d.; see also Brown
v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). In Brown, the defendant was convicted
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of rape and murder and he received a death sentence. Id. During the guilt phase
of the trial, four jurors were exposed to extraneous information regarding the case.
Id. at 1017-18. They had overheard comments about the case while they were
eating lunch. The jurors reported this to the judge immediately. Although the
record was not as detailed as the record in the present case, the judge questioned
the jurors ex parte. These jurors were not excused. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not
find error in the trial court failing to declare a mistrial. The jurors were properly
instructed to disregard the extraneous information and decide the case based only
on the evidence at trial and 'juries are presumed to follow the court's
instructions." Id. at 1018.
Finally, based upon this Court's colloquy with both jurors, they assured this
Court that they could be fair and impartial jurors and decide the case based on the
evidence. (See Tr. Vol. 9, at 4315-26 [Juror #82]; see also Tr. Vol. 9 at 4521-33
[Juror #130].)
The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel's performance
with regard to this claim was deficient resulting in a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different. His claim is conclusory and speculative.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. Their performance was not deficient.
G. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF MR. HALL'S MARCH 2003
INTERROGATIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Petitioner argues that counsel should have moved to suppress his statements
to police. Petitioner proposes certain grounds for suppression. However, as the
petitioner concedes, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress. (AP at 52; see also
Tr. June 29, 2004 at 431 et. seq.) Petitioner cites no authority for the premise that
the grounds he lists now have some advantage over those cited by trial counsel.
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Petitioner has failed to carry his burden in establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Petitioner also claims that trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the jury
to review inaccurate transcripts. Petitioner notes that the jury was told of the
inaccuracies. (AP at 52-53.) Petitioner has not articulated any reason to believe
that permitting the use of the transcripts was in any way harmful to the defense
case. This claim is merely speculative with no factual or legal basis. This claim
should be denied.
H. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILURE TO CHOOSE AND PRESENT A CLEAR AND PERSUASIVE
THEORY OF THE CASE THROUGH ALL PHASES OF THE TRIAL,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, OPENING STATEMENT
The petitioner opines that, "trial counsel must choose a theory of the case
which is both persuasive and supported by evidence." (AP at 53.) When in fact,
if the defense sat quietly throughout a whole trial, and the State failed to present
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant must be acquitted. To say
that the defense must establish a theory at all is to shift to them a burden that is
never theirs to bear. Further, there are cases, such as this one, where making a
defense argument that is both persuasive and consistent with the evidence is
impossible. The State denies that trial counsel's handling of the theory of the case
was deficient or prejudicial.
The petitioner claims that trial counsel's openmg statement reflects
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The content and delivery of opening statements are tactical by nature. In
fact, "[t]he timing of an opening statement, and even the decision whether to make
one at all, is ordinarily a mere matter of trial tactics and in such cases will not
constitute the incompetence basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."
United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454,458 (9th Cir. 1985.) In fact in a
case where:
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"[trial counsel] failed to make an opening statement, failed to
cross-examine some witnesses, and failed to call any
witnesses in defense. [Trial counsel] did cross-examine those
witnesses who he believed would implicate [the defendant],
and decided not to cross-examine others. This is a reasonable
tactical decision, as is the decision not to make an opening
statement.. .. Defense counsel's conduct and trial strategy
appear to fall within the wide range of reasonable
professional representation."
United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985).
Here, Mr. Chastain was representing a man against whom the State held
evidence of great weight. Mr. Chastain had to, and did, represent him zealously
during the guilt phase, while also maintaining his credibility so that he could argue
for his client's life in the sentencing phase. In light of those dual goals, his
opening statement was well within the range of acceptable trial tactics. This claim
should be denied.
I. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
FOR HAVING MR. HALL WEAR SHACKLES DURING THE
GUILT PHASE OF THE TRIAL
The petitioner claims that his shackles were visible and, thus, were a
violation of his rights. In support of this premise, he cites volume 10 of the Trial
Transcript, page 5130. That section is a discussion of the petitioner's own choice
to take his jacket off during the proceedings, despite being urged not to by his
counsel (Tr. Vol. 1°at 5130, In. 17 & at 5131, In. 1.) Further, the Court voices a
concern that, "That increases the risk that somebody will notice something. I
don't think there's anything in view of the jury that would---. (Tr. Vol. 1°at.
5130, Ins. 21-23.) The portion of the transcript cited by the petitioner for the
premise that the shackles were visible actually disproves that exact point. The
Court noted that removing his jacket increased the risk - and yet he indicated he
still did not think the jury could "view" anything.
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The State denies that the petitioner's shackles were visible. Further, the
Court and counsel made significant efforts to prevent the jury from becoming
aware of the shackles. If the shackles had, for some period, become visible, it
would not have been as a result of deficient performance by counsel.
This claim is speculative and there is no evidence in the record to support
it. Accordingly, it should be dismissed.
J. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY IMPLYING
TO THE JURY THAT MR. HALL WAS DANGEROUS
The petitioner claims that the undersigned committed prosecutorial
misconduct by "implying to the jury that Mr. Hall was dangerous." (AP at 58.)
The petitioner claims that the State communicated to the jury that he was
dangerous by asking witnesses not to give their full addresses and by telling the
jury their sequestration location would be undisclosed. (Id.) The petitioner claims
that such questions and comments implied that he was a "danger to the
community." (Id.) Of course such an implication, if it had been made, would
have been completely fair and accurate. The petitioner had been convicted of
Escape, Kidnapping, Murder and two counts of Rape, by the time the State
prosecuted him for Ms. Hanlon's murder. The petitioner certainly was a danger to
the community, which is a fact objectively discemable from his own criminal
conduct and from the evidence in this case. If the State had implied he was
dangerous through the methods claimed, it would have been harmless due to the
considerable evidence of the same fact, which was rightfully admitted at trial.
However, the State did not imply such dangerousness in the questions or
comments that the petitioner now attacks. The petitioner lists five sections of the
transcript, which supposedly reflect this problem. First, he references Trial
Transcript volume 9, page 4130, where the State asked a witness, "Jeff, you don't
have to give us an address but do you live here in the Boise area." (T. T., V.9, pg.
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4130,lns.24-25.) Such a question is wholly appropriate. The undersigned did not,
as the petitioner claims, tell the witness not to give his address, but very subtly
gave him the choice not to do so. The location of the witness's home was not a
necessary part of his testimony. The crime was not committed at the witness's
home. The jury did not need to know the witness's address to discern venue or
jurisdictional issues. It simply wasn't relevant. The State did not commit error in
asking the question nor was trial counsel remiss in choosing not to object to such a
benign question.
Moreover, asking a witness to disclose his or her home address, when not
relevant, may do actual harm. Even if the defendant presents no risk to the
witness, others in the community may present some risk to that witness. Further,
it is an unnecessary violation of the person's privacy. "Disclosing this type of
identifying information is not the best practice." Nation v. IDOC, 144 Idaho 177,
189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007) (Documents containing witnesses' addresses,
telephone number, marital status, birthdates and social security numbers were
disclosed during discovery process, to the defense counsel and defendants.)
Next, the petitioner finds fault with Trial Transcript, volume 9, page 4170,
line 23, where the State asked, "And Mr. Williams, without giving us your
address, do you live here in the Boise area?" (T.Tr., V.9, pg. 4170, Ins.23-24.)
Again, this question respects the privacy interests of the witness without foregoing
any necessary or relevant information. The question was proper.
Next, the petitioner complains of Trial Transcript, volume 9, page 4227,
line 15. This time the State asked, "Sir, you don't have to give us your address.
Could you tell us if you live here in Ada County?" (T.Tr., V.9, pg. 4227, Ins.15-
16.) This question was proper for all of the reasons outlined above.
On page 4420, the State asked, "Can you tell us what area of Boise you live
in? You don't have to give us your exact address." (T.Tr., V.9, pg. 4420, Ins.5-7.)
This question was proper for all of the reasons outlined above.
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The final comment, in this section, which the petitioner claims was
prosecutorial misconduct, was not uttered by the State, but rather by the Court.
The Court said when discussing the upcoming sequestration, that rather than
returning home once the case was submitted to them, the jury would be taken to a
"different location, an undisclosed location here in Ada County." (T.Tr., V.10, pg.
5310,lns.15-17.) The Court's decision to tell the jury this clearly does not amount
to prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, the fact that the location is "undisclosed"
is important. The jurors have to understand the location is secret or they would
tell people. Also, as anyone who has ever tried a homicide case, particularly a
capital case, knows, the media presents a very real concern. The Judge was
entitled to reassure the jurors that the location would be undisclosed, both to give
them protection from the press and also as a reminder that once in sequestration
they should respect the secrecy of their location.
None of the comments discussed by the petitioner in this section were
prosecutorial misconduct, even the ones actually made by the prosecutor.
K. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE
PROSECUTORS MISCONDUCT OF IMPLYING TO THE JURY
THAT MR. HALL WAS DANGEROUS
Even if the Court discerns error in the State's questions or comments in this
regard, choosing not to object was a tactical decision by counsel. In light of the
evidence being presented that the petitioner was a cold-blooded killer, perhaps
trial counsel did not want to appear petty enough to object to the State's
comments/questions which were harmless and well intentioned. Such objections
may have alienated the jury and would certainly have served no useful function.
Additionally, the petitioner has failed to establish prejudice. Therefore, this claim
should be dismissed.
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L. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO GIVING
A SPECIAL JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING AMANDA
STROUD
The petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for permitting the
Court to give the Amanda Stroud jury instruction. (AP 59-60.) The petitioner
concludes that the instruction "created speculation in the jury's mind regarding a
connection between Amanda Stroud's death and Mr. Hall." (Id. at 60.) The
petitioner's argument itself is speculative and conclusory. The Amanda Stroud
instruction prevented the jury from speculating and told the jury that her death had
nothing to do with the petitioner. The petitioner's proposed instruction is certainly
not an improvement over the instruction given by this Court. Even the petitioner
concedes that this Court's "instruction informed the jury that Amanda Stroud's
death had nothing to do with Mr. Hall ...." (AP at 60.) Jurors are presumed to
have followed the court's instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751 (Ct.
App. 1997), rev. denied (1997). This claim is speculative, conclusory and lacks
merit. It should be dismissed.
M. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE GUILT-PHASE
ISSUES
1. Failure To Challenge The Pathology
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to challenge the pathology
evidence. (AP at 61-62.) There is no requirement that an expert be called to rebut
every expert in the State's case. Trial counsel's investigation "must, at a
minimum, permit informed decisions about how best to represent the client."
Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir. 2006). Calling experts to rebut the
State's experts is not always necessary.
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Trial counsel must make informed decisions about calling experts
witnesses. That does not mean they must call them. "There may be no reason to
question the validity of the government's proposed evidence or the evidence may
be so weak that it can be demolished on cross-examination." Murphy v. State, 143
Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.32d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006) citing Miller v. Anderson, 255
F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 2001), judgment modified 268 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2001).
Further, there must be affirmative evidence of prejudice. "Under the second prong
of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, a showing of prejudice
requires more than mere speculation about what an expert witness may have said
if trial counsel employed them." Selfv. State, 145 Idaho 578, 181 P.3d 504 (Ct.
App. 2007). The State denies that trial counsel's handling of Dr. Groben was
deficient or prejudicial.
Trial counsel did challenge Dr. Groben. Trial counsel conducted a
vigorous cross-examination of Dr. Groben. (See generally Tr. Vol. 10 at 5230-
44.) The petitioner's claims regarding trial counsel's failure to challenge the
pathology evidence are speculative and conclusory. This claim and all related
claims should be dismissed.
2. Failure To Investigate Hanlon's Mental Health, Mental State,
And Level Of Intoxication
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
testimony regarding the victim's mental health, mental state and level of
intoxication. (AP at 62-67.)
Evidence of the victim's level of intoxication the night she was murdered
was presented at trial. Dr. Groben testified that the results of the victim's drug test
were negative for drugs of abuse and the tested prescription drugs and that her
blood alcohol level was .29. Moreover, trial counsel addressed that issue further
during cross-examination of Dr. Groben. Trial counsel questioned Dr. Groben
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about the victim's .29 blood alcohol content and that her vitreous alcohol level
was .34. He further elicited from Dr. Groben that her blood alcohol was well
above the legal limit of .08. He elicited from Dr. Groben that is was a
"significant" alcohol content. (Tr. Vol. 10 at 5236, Ins. 2-25 & 5237, Ins. 1-23.)
The fact that the victim had a high blood alcohol level was made very clear to the
JUry.
Furthermore, trial counsel did elicit the following testimony from Jeff
Carlson about the victim:
that it wasn't uncommon for the victim not to come home
("Sometimes, yes") (Tr. Vol. 9 at 4168, Ins. 20-22);
that he and the victim had heated, verbal, angry argument
the evening she was murdered ("somewhat, yes") (id. at
4169, Ins. 5-7);
that they had been together for quite some time and that it
was not unusual for them to have had arguments every now
and then (id. at 4169, Ins. 11-15.)
Trial counsel did question Mr. Williams about his comments to Detective
Ayotte about the victim "having some sort of mental problem prior to this night."
(Id. at 4206, Ins. 22-25 & 4207, Ins. 1-4.)
Trial counsel's strategic decisions to avoid "victim blaming" where it was
clear from the evidence that the victim did not kill herself and tie herself to a tree
with a belt were entirely reasonable decisions. Trial counsel did challenge the
State's evidence and did present evidence favorable to the petitioner, but they did
so in such a way that the jury would not be alienated. It was reasonable for trial
counsel to conclude that by attempting to blame the victim for her own murder
they would have succeeded in alienating the jury. There was no evidence that this
was a suicide. Further, it would have been a risky strategy for trial counsel to
attempt to claim that the victim was in some way responsible for her own murder
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or that she in some way deserved to be murdered because she had consumed
alcohol. Had they employed that strategy, the petitioner would now be arguing
that they were ineffective. This claim and related claims should be dismissed.
3. Failure To Challenge The State's Presentation Of DNA Evidence
Introduced Against Mr. Hall
The petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to challenge the State's DNA
evidence. (AP at 67.) Trial counsel did consult with a DNA expert because they
had the evidence sent to their own independent lab, S.E.R.I. for DNA testing. (See
CR 493-495 & 496-498.) There are very good reasons why trial counsel would
choose not to present DNA evidence from their expert at trial. Merely because
trial counsel chose not to present evidence from their DNA expert does not mean it
was ineffective assistance of counsel. Quite to the contrary, it is indicative of the
fact that such testimony would not have assisted the defense. This claim is
speculative and conclusory. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
4. Failure To Adequately Investigate And/Or Examine The State's
Guilt-Phase Witnesses
i. Jeff Carlson through iv. Scott Hill
The petitioner argues that trial was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate and/or examine guilt-phase witnesses. (AP at 68-69.) There is no
evidence presented in the petitioner's Amended Petition that supports the
petitioner's argument that trial counsel failed to investigate and/or failed to
examine witnesses. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel's
performance with regard to this claim was deficient resulting in a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different. Trial counsel's decisions
were well within an objective standard of reasonableness. There is not a
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reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. His claim is
conclusory and speculative and should be dismissed.
N. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT DURING
GUlLT PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The petitioner claims that the State's closing argument improperly defined
reasonable doubt and that it improperly vouched for the credibility of witnesses.
(AP at 69-70.)
"[P]rosecutors must have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments,
and thus can argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence, including that one
of the two sides is lying.." u.s. v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.
1992). Id. ...
Such an inference is within the "considerable latitude" generally given to
closing arguments. State v. Payne, ---Idaho---, ---, 199 P.3d 123, 141 (2008). The
State steered clear of problematic, "'I think' or 'I believe' ," statements which are
discouraged because they indicate vouching. State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124,
131,714 P.2d 93, 100 (Ct. App. 1986). This was not an example of vouching
which is, "placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through
personal assurances of the witness's veracity, or suggesting that information not
presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony." u.s. v. Necoechea, 986
F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). Such argument is proper.
1. The prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the definition
of reasonable doubt.
The petitioner states that:
In this case, the State improperly reduced its burden by arguing:
"The concept of reasonable doubt was in the jury instructions
and you will have that back with you, but I want to talk about
for a minute that it has to be a reasonable doubt. It's not
beyond a shadow of a doubt; it's not beyond all possible
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doubt and it's not beyond imaginary doubt." (Tr. Vol. 10, p.
5598, Ls. 14-23.) The manner in which the State separated
possible doubt from imaginary doubt improperly diminished
the State's burden. While true the State need not prove its
case beyond all possible doubt, the correct way to present the
burden is to say the State need not prove it beyond all
possible or imaginary doubt because everything relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt. However, the State must
prove its case beyond all reasonable possible doubts.
(AP at 71.)
The petitioner's argument has no merit. First, the State refers the jury to
the Court's instruction. The State did not attempt to usurp the Court's role in
defining the phrase reasonable doubt. Insofar as the petitioner has failed to
articulate an error in the actual instruction on this issue, there is no ground for
relief.
Further, the phrasing the petitioner purports to be correct is, "the State need
not prove it beyond all possible or imaginary doubt." (AP at 71.) The petitioner
claims that the undersigned separated the concepts of possible and imaginary.
What the petitioner apparently fails to realize is that the language he acknowledges
as appropriate separates the two terms as well. The word "or" is "used to connect
words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives." Webster's Encyclopedic
Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, at 1360 (1996). It is a
disjunctive. Id. A disjunctive is a word which is "serving or tending to disjoin;
separating; dividing' distinguishing ....syntactically setting two or more
expressions in opposition to each other." Id. at 566. Therefore, even assuming
the undersigned's comments can be seen as separating the concepts of possible
and imaginary, which the State does not concede, such separation is syntactically
present in the proper language per the petitioner. Insofar as the petitioner
acknowledges that language with identical meaning to that actually used is correct,
he has failed to articulate a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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2. The prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly vouching for
the credibility of witnesses' testimony and by presenting false
and/or misleading argument regarding the testimony of such
witnesses.
The petitioner claims that the State's argument regarding the credibility of
Mr. Tackett and Mr. Lady was problematic in two ways. First, the petitioner
claims it amounted to vouching. Second, he claims that the State's argument on
this point gave a false impression to the jury.
It is improper for the State to vouch for a witness. u.s. v. Necoechea, 986
F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). However, "prosecutors must have reasonable
latitude to fashion closing arguments, and thus can argue reasonable inferences
based on the evidence, including that one of the two sides is lying.." Id. Here, the
statements regarding Mr. Tackett and Mr. Lady's credibility were references to the
evidence. The State's comments that neither man had a reason to lie were
inferences inference based on the evidence. Such inferences are within the
"considerable latitude" generally given to closing arguments. State v. Payne, ---
Idaho---, ---, 199 P.3d 123, 141 (2008). The State steered clear of problematic, '''I
think' or 'I believe' ," statements which are discouraged because they indicate
vouching. State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 131, 714 P.2d 93, 100 (Ct. App.
1986). This was not an example of vouching which is, "placing the prestige of the
government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's
veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to the jury supports the
witness's testimony." u.s. v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).
Instead, what was being relied upon to demonstrate the witness's veracity was the
witness's inherent credibility due to a lack of bias. Such argument is proper. The
State denies that there was improper vouching.
Even if the Court were to conclude that such argument was improper, that
conclusion alone does not merit relief. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that when
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 47
000969
         
         
        
 
           
             
             
         
               
           
           
                  
            
             
           
          
             "  
            
              
               
          
            
            
             
              
       
             
             
       
     
there is improper vouching during closing argument, there should be a balancing
of the, "seriousness of the vouching against the strength of the curative instruction
and the closeness of the case." Us. v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1278 (9th Cir.
1992). The jury was instructed that it alone was to determine the truth. A general
instruction of this kind can be sufficient to correct "vouching" by the prosecutor
for a witness. Us. v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1992). Curative
instruction need not be contemporaneous with the problem to be effective in
curing it. State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 604, 930 P.2d 1039, 1046 (Ct. App.
1997).
As for the claim that the State's argument gave a false impression to the
jury, the State denies. As to Mr. Tackett, the petitioner claims that Mr. Tackett
was reluctant in his interview with law enforcement to reveal information about
the crime. Law enforcement told Mr. Tackett that if he had information about the
crime, he could be criminally liable if he did not tell law enforcement. That does
not give Mr. Tackett a motive to lie. Rather, the detective was impressing upon
Mr. Tackett the importance of telling the truth during a criminal investigation.
Law enforcement's message was clearly that Mr. Tackett needed to tell the truth.
The State's argument on this point was fair and based on the evidence.
Accordingly, there was no prosecutorial misconduct.
Mr. Lady, according to the petitioner, blogged on an internet cite about the
trial. Accepting for the sake of argument that the posting was actually Mr. Lady,
and not simply someone posing as him, these comments do not establish
prosecutorial misconduct. Mr. Lady's comments can be summed as supportive
and appreciative of the efforts of those involved in law enforcement as well as a
general admonishment for people to appreciate those they care about, because you
could lose them. Neither of these themes can be fairly termed a basis to assume
bias by the witness. The State's argument was fair and based on the evidence.
Accordingly, there was not prosecutorial misconduct.
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O. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING GUILT PHASE
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Insofar as there was no prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument
of the guilt phase of the trial, there was no need for trial counsel to object.
Moreover, even if the Court perceives some objectionable comment in the State's
closing argument, it was a tactical decision not to object. Choosing to object
during a closing argument is a strategic decision, which should be given deference.
See State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,988 P.2d 1170 (1999).
P. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO REQUEST
ADEQUATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING FELONY MURDER
1. Jury Question 1 and 2. Jury Question 2
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request
adequate jury instructions and supplemental questions regarding felony murder.
(AP at 76-85.) First, the issue of jury instructions is a direct appeal question and
not appropriate for these proceedings. Idaho Code §19-4901(b) sets out that post
conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal.
The petitioner argues that with regard to the first jury question trial counsel
was ineffective for not requesting an instruction and that in his opinion any
"proffered strategy would be unreasonable based on relevant law." (AP at 78
n.24.) It is reasonable for trial counsel to request that the Court not further define
what was adequately covered in the jury instructions given to the jury and to tell
the jury that they have all the instructions. There are strategic reasons for this
request as well as legal reasons. The petitioner's claim is conclusory and
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speculative. Nor has the petitioner established prejudice. Therefore, this claim
should be dismissed.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel could have relied upon readily
available Idaho law as support for a proffered jury instruction. (AP at 82.) This
Court had already cited the same law that the petitioner cites in his Amended
Petition as support for the jury instruction given. This Court cited State v.
Cheatham, 134 Idaho 565 (2000); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766 (1985); State v.
Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283 (1974); State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546 (1993). (Tr. Vol. 10
at 5759-67.) It was reasonable for trial counsel to conclude that they did not need
to cite again to this Court case law that the petitioner argues they should have cited
when it is clear that this Court was well aware of the case law. In fact, it is clear
that this Court understood well the case law the petitioner argues should have been
cited by counsel. There is no reason to believe that this Court would have done
anything different than what it did do based upon case law it clearly understood.
This claim should be dismissed.
The petitioner also argues that the instruction should have included
"beyond the reasonable doubt" language. This Court's detailed jury instructions
made it very clear that the State was required to prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt. It was clear from the jury instructions given and taken in their
entirety that the State was required to prove this element beyond a reasonable
doubt. (See generally jury instructions, specifically Jury Instruction #9.) Trial
counsel was not required to make a request that was already clear from the Court's
jury instructions. To require counsel to have requested this instruction is the same
as requiring counsel to request that the Court give the jury all of the instructions
over agam. This claim is without merit.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to object to erroneous
instructions. Trial counsel did object to the instructions that were given. (Tr. Vol.
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10 at 5763-64 & 5788-97.) Trial counsel objected consistently to the jury
instructions that were given on this point. (Id.)
The petitioner argues he should have been in the courtroom during the first
JUry question and that the jury should have been brought back to have the
instructions read to them in open court. With regard to the petitioner being present
in the courtroom for the first jury question, he does not provide a basis for how
that would have changed the outcome in this case. Idaho Code section 19-2204
that the petitioner cites in his Amended Petition indicates that the information
required must be given in the presence of or after notice to the prosecutor and the
defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called. It is clear defense
counsel was present even if by phone with regard to the first question and it is
clear trial counsel had been given notice. There is also no evidence to support the
claim that had this Court brought the jury back in to read the instruction to them in
open court it would have changed the outcome. This Court's instruction was
given to the jury in written form. Had the Court not given them a written
instruction, the petitioner would now be claiming that it should have been done in
writing. The procedure utilized in this case does not merit relief.
Finally, the State certainly does not concede that this Court's supplemental
instructions were error or not supported by the law. This Court took great care to
review the relevant law, cite it on the record and reach an appropriate decision.
The propriety of these instructions is a direct appeal issue not appropriate for
consideration in these proceedings.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
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Q. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY FAILING TO CHALLENGE MR. HALL'S ELIGIBLITY FOR
THE DEATH PENALTY ABSENT IN LIGHT OF THE JURY'S
GUILT PHASE FINDING THAT THE MURDER WAS NOT
PREMEDITATED
The petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the petitioner's eligibility for the death penalty absent a finding of
premeditation. (AP at 86-92.) The petitioner makes this argument despite the
fact that it is contrary to Idaho's Death Penalty statute.
Idaho Code § 19-2515(1) makes an offender eligible for the death penalty
as follows: "a person convicted ofmurder in the first degree shall be liable for the
imposition of the penalty of death if such person killed, intended a killing, or acted
with reckless indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person
directly committed the acts that caused death." I.C. § 19-2515(1) (emphasis
added).3 The petitioner was convicted of first degree felony murder, which
pursuant to the statute made him eligible for the death penalty where he either
killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
statute does not require the State to prove that the murder was premeditated in
order for the petitioner to be eligible for the death penalty. Although the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner killed, intended a killing and
acted with reckless disregard for human life, the State was only required to prove
one of the three. The jury did find, beyond a reasonable doubt at sentencing,
BOTH that the petitioner "by the murder of Cheryl Ann Hanlon, or circumstances
surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human
life" (CR at 1191) AND that "the murder of Cheryl Ann Hanlon was committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, rape and the defendant killed,
intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life." (CR at 1192
(emphasis added).)
3 Idaho Code § 19-2515(1) excludes mentally retarded individuals from being eligible for the death penalty.
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The petitioner engages in wild speculation about what the jury's verdict
means. (AP at 88.) It is also interesting to note that in reaching these conclusions,
the petitioner concedes that trial counsel was effective "at least in part." (AP at
88.) The petitioner apparently ignores both the guilt phase and the sentencing
phase jury instructions and jury findings in order to draw the conclusions he draws
here. (See AP at 88.) First, the element of malice aforethought was satisfied by
the jury's finding of felony murder. Second, felony murder is first degree murder.
The jury did not find that this was an "accidental" murder as the petitioner seems
to be arguing. (AP at 88.) The fact that the jury found that the petitioner
murdered Ms. Hanlon necessarily means that they found that it was NOT an
accident. A finding of murder absolutely excludes the possibility that it was an
unintentional accident. The jury was instructed on lesser included offenses and
did not find that the murder was anything less than first degree murder.
The petitioner goes on to argue that trial counsel should have argued that
the imposition of the death penalty for "accidental killers" does not further the
societal purposes of the death penalty. (AP at 90-91.) The jury clearly did not
find that the petitioner's actions in this case constituted an "accidental killing."
The jury's findings clearly demonstrate that the jury did not believe this was an
accidental killing. An "accidental killing" is certainly not called first-degree
murder. Murder by definition is not "accidental" and the terms "accidental
murder" are mutually exclusive terms.
Trial counsel were not required to file a frivolous motion or motions they
knew were going to be rejected by the trial court. See United States v. Quintero-
Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th
Cir. 1994); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,
because trial counsel were not required to make a nonsensical argument to this
Court and because the petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable
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probability that the outcome would have been different, this claim and all related
claims should be dismissed.
R. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT DURING
SENTENCING-PHASE OPENING STATEMENTS BY
IMPROPERLY APPEALING TO THE EMOTION, PASSION, OR
PREJUDICE OF THE JURY
The petitioner finds fault with the State's opening, in the sentencing phase,
where the undersigned stated that Lynn Henneman, like Cheryl Hanlon, was a:
daughter, sister, wife and aunt. The petitioner claims that, "[t]he characterization
of Ms. Henneman through these multiple relationships was improper and amounts
to prosecutorial misconduct." (AP at 93.) The petitioner claims that this
innocuous list amounted to an inflammatory tactic and was therefore
impermissible. (Id.)
To the contrary, case law demonstrates the State's sentencing-phase
opening was well within the bounds of proper argument. In State v. Griffith, 97
Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604,608 (1975), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Opening statements serve to inform the jury of the issues of
the case and briefly outline the evidence each litigant intends
to introduce to support his allegations or defenses, as the case
may be. While counsel should be allowed latitude in making
an opening statement, the trial court may limit the scope of
that statement in the exercise of its discretion. Generally,
opening remarks should be confined to a brief summary of
evidence counsel expects to introduce on behalf of his client's
case-in-chief. Counsel should not at that time attempt to
impeach or otherwise argue the merits of evidence that the
opposing side has or will present.
The State's comments were fair in light of the evidence that the State intended to
submit to the jury.
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Lynn Henneman's husband and sister testified in the sentencing phase. (Tr.
Vol.ll at 5948, In. 8 et seq and Tr.Vol.11 at. 6149, In.24, et.seq.) Ms. Pettet, Ms.
Henneman's sister, testified that the glow stick and stencils which Ms. Henneman
purchased in Boise shortly before her death were intended for Ms. Pettet's
daughter - Ms. Henneman's niece. (Tr. Vol.11 at 6154, In.20 & at 6155, In.7.)
Ms. Pettet further explained that the last family member to speak to Ms.
Henneman was her son Joshua, Ms. Henneman's nephew. (Tr. Vol.11 at 6155,
Ins. 8-13.) Thus the jury heard evidence confirming that Ms. Henneman was a
wife, sister and aunt. It is a fair inference that she was a daughter. The opening
statement properly introduced information which would be presented in the
evidence.
The petitioner cites State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.2d 583 (Ct.App.
2007) for the premise that arguments by the State's which appeal to the "emotion,
passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are
impermissible." (AP at 93) The State cannot be expected to excise every fact
from a case which may cause an emotional reaction in certain people. The fact
that Ms. Henneman was an aunt may trigger a response in a certain juror. The fact
that the petitioner killed and raped her certainly will. The State is not precluded
from presenting relevant facts just because they may have emotional
repercussIons.
Instead, the Court should look at the operative part of the phrasing in
Phillips, which is that the emotion must not be appealed to: "through the use of
inflammatory tactics." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.2d 583, 588
(Ct.App. 2007). In Phillips, the prosecutor actually urged the jury to become
irritated and upset at what he referred to as "this defense," when he had actually
introduced some of the testimony he attacked as part of "this defense." Id. Such
arguments violate the rule set forth in State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608,
609-611 (1903), which discussed the duty of a prosecuting attorney, saying:
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"above all things he should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds
of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence
introduced." (See Phillips, at 87, 156 P.2d at 588.)
Here, the State's phrasing was not aimed at diverting the jury from the
evidence, but rather a mild comment on the upcoming evidence. The State did
not appeal to the emotions of the jury by stating facts that the jury would hear and
see through the presentation of evidence. The State did not encourage or invite the
jury to view the evidence through an emotional lens. Even assuming there was
some emotional reaction from certain jury members, that does not amount to
prosecutorial misconduct because it was not garnered through inflammatory
means.
The petitioner claims that referring to Ms. Henneman in terms of her
relationships to others may have caused the jury to place themselves in Ms.
Henneman's position. In State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 189 P.3d 477 (Ct. App.
2008), the Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor's argument did rise to the
level of misconduct. There the prosecutor asked the jury to imagine themselves
driving in the oncoming lane toward the defendant, an impaired driver and further
told the jury that the prosecutor's "client" wanted to protect they jury members
from such a fate. Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21, 189 P.3d at 482-483. Here the
State's argument is clearly distinguishable from that in Gross. The jury was not
asked to compare themselves or their loved ones to Ms. Henneman. Ms.
Henneman was murdered. Her life deserved reference as part of the State's case
about who ended it. There was no prosecutorial misconduct in the brief and
benign references by the State.
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S. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
DURING SENTENCING-PHASE OPENING STATEMENTS
Insofar as there was no prosecutorial misconduct, trial counsel cannot be
seen to have been deficient for choosing not to object. Mr Chastain did object to
the substantive evidence regarding Ms. Henneman's life. (See: Tr. Vol.lI at
5902, In.18 & at 5903, In.lI; Tr.Vol.lIat 6151, In.19 & at 6152, In.l; Tr. Vol. 11 ,
at 6152, Ins.16-18; Tr. Vol.llat 6153, Ins. 18-19; see generally, Tr. Vol.llat 5955,
In.22 & at 5969, In.9.) In doing so, Mr. Chastain mentioned that "this is a delicate
matter." (Tr.Vol.llat 6151, In.20.) Certainly, Mr. Chastain's awareness that
objecting to information about the deceased was a delicate matter gives insight
into his decision not to object mid-argument. In doing so, he risked alienating the
jury to whom he had to plead for his client's life. Accordingly, making an
objection at that point was not well advised and choosing not to do so was a
tactical decision.
T. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE
TO PRESENT ADEQUATE SENTENCING PHASE OPENING
STATEMENT
The petitioner argues that he was deprived of effective assistance for trial
counsel's failure to present an adequate sentencing phase opening argument in that
he conceded the prior murder aggravator. (AP at 94-96.)
Incredibly, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was "wholly ineffective"
and; yet, seemingly ignores that the jury was unable to decide whether all of the
mitigation was sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of the death penalty
unjust with regard to the other aggravating circumstances they found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt. Certainly, trial counsel was effective and succeeded in
hanging the juror with regard to their inability to reach a decision as to whether the
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mitigation was sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of the death penalty
unjust as related to the other aggravators which they had found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt. There was no way for trial counsel to ignore the prior murder
conviction aggravator and still maintain credibility with the jury.
Trial counsel's strategy was well thought out and accepted by the
petitioner. The State addresses this strategy and the petitioner's agreement with
this strategy in Section CC infra and hereby incorporates by reference the
arguments made therein. (See infra Section CC.) This claim should be dismissed.
This Court should reject the petitioner's argument that trial counsel did not
explain in detail what the witnesses would testify to during the sentencing phase
opening statement. There are certainly strategic reasons for doing this. If for
some reason trial counsel cannot make good on promises made during opening
statement about what evidence will be presented, it is very damaging to the
defense. In this case, the wisdom of trial counsel's decision was proven to be
correct because, as it turned out, two of the defense witnesses had refused to come
to Boise to testify. Deanna McCracken refused to come to Boise to testify. (Tr.
Vol. 11 at 5879, Ins. 2-3.) Similarly, Betty Kirk refused to come to Boise to
testify. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5878, Ins. 22-25 & 5879, Ins. 1-2.) Trial counsel stated:
"We have one witness who we have anticipated coming to trial who will not get
on the airplane from Portland and come to Boise." (Id.)
It was entirely reasonable for trial counsel to gain credibility with the jury
as they did in this case. Jurors are intelligent and they do not appreciate defense
counsel trying to ignore or hide information that is glaringly obvious to them in
the courtroom. Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
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U. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
EVIDENCE PRESENTED FROM THE HENNEMAN CASE
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to presentation of evidence from the Henneman case. (AP at 96-97.) In
addressing this claim, the petitioner ignores several important things. Trial
counsel did object to the nature and scope of the evidence. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5902-
03; 5955-56; 5959-71; 6151-53; 6157; 6159-74.) Trial counsel was successful in
some, ifnot all, of the objections to the evidence presented.
Second, the State was not only required to prove the pnor murder
conviction as an aggravator, but the State was required to prove the propensity
aggravator. Both aggravators had to be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. In order to prove these aggravators, the State was entitled to present
evidence not only about the fact of the murder, but the nature and circumstances
surrounding the murder. In order to prove that the petitioner has a propensity by
prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the Hanlon murder has exhibited a
propensity to commit murder, which will probably constitute a continuing threat
to society, the State was absolutely entitled to present this evidence. It was
necessary to present the nature, facts and circumstances surrounding the
Henneman murder in order to prove these aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact, nature and circumstances of the petitioner murdering a complete stranger
off the greenbelt was evidence of prior conduct that establishes that he will
probably constitute a continuing threat to society.
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the admission of evidence of a prior death sentence during the
sentencing phase of the defendant's trial. In Romano, the State introduced a copy
of the judgment and sentence from the prior murder conviction, which included
information that the defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder and had
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been sentenced to death. [d. at 4. The State had also introduced evidence in the
form of testimony, autopsy report, photographs and fingerprints from the other
murder case. [d. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the admission
of the prior death sentence evidence did not mislead "the jury regarding its role in
the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility." [d. at 10.
The United States Supreme Court further concluded that the admission of such
evidence did not violate the defendant's due process rights: "we agree with the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that the admission of this evidence did not
deprive petitioner of a fair sentencing proceeding." [d. at 13.
Third, all of the State's evidence regarding the aggravators related to the
Hanlon murder (especially heinous, atrocious or cruel~ utter disregard for human
life~ and perpetration of rape) was presented during the course of the guilt phase of
the trial. The petitioner's argument that most of the evidence presented at
sentencing was related to Henneman is without merit. The State need not present
the same evidence it presented during the guilt phase of the trial. The jury was
permitted to consider evidence from both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase
during their penalty deliberations.
The petitioner argues that "trial counsel should have argued that their
stipulation was of a constitutional dimension ...." (AP at 97.) The State is not
clear as to what the petitioner is arguing and therefore, denies it and requests that it
be dismissed. The argument that trial counsel should have argued that the
admission of this evidence violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights (both United States and Idaho Constitutions) (AP at 97) is
conclusory and without merit. The petitioner does not articulate how it violates
those rights or how trial counsel arguing that it violated those rights would have
changed the outcome.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There was (and is) United States Supreme Court case law
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supporting the presentation of the pnor murder evidence. There is not a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The fact that
the jury determined that the death penalty was appropriate in this case does not
mean that trial counsel's performance was deficient. This claim and all related






The petitioner claims that the State presented victim impact argument and
evidence during both phases of the trial. The petitioner finds fault with two types
of victim impact information: testimony of Bill Williams and argument by the
State in the sentencing phase.
The petitioner claims that Mr. Williams' testimony was irrelevant to guilt-
innocence issues and that he did not qualify as a victim impact witness under
Idaho law. The petitioner claims three sections of testimony amount to improper
victim impact statement by Mr. Williams. First the petitioner cites page 4143,
volume 9 of the transcript. That page of the transcript references testimony by Jeff
Carlson, not Bill Williams. Further that page of testimony is a description of the
events leading up to Ms. Hanlon's death and cannot be described as victim impact
statement. (Tr., Vol. 9 at 4143.)
Next the petitioner takes issue with the testimony recorded on page 4170
and 4176 of the transcript. On page 4170, Bill Williams does begin his testimony.
That testimony encompassed his observations about the personal habits and
hygiene of the victim. (Tr., Vol. 9 at 4170, In. 22 - pg. 4208, In. 5.) As discussed
during the State's response to a defense objection at trial, these matters were
relevant to whether Ms. Hanlon would be likely to have sex in the dirt in the
middle of the night (Tr. Vol. 9, at 4193, Ins. 10-15) and also as to her choice to be
in the company of a homeless man on the night of her death. (Tr., Vol. 9 at 4194,
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 61
000983
            
            
              
            
    
   
   
   
   
   
           
              
            
     
          
              
            
            
              
              
              
      
            
              
          
                 
             
                
                   
                  
       
     
In. 21 - pg. 4195, In. 9.). Accordingly, the testimony did not amount to victim
impact and was relevant to the case then at bar.
Next, the petitioner finds fault with the undersigned's argument that:
Ladies and gentlemen, Cheryl won't be there to welcome her
new grandbaby Hayden into the world. Cheryl won't be there
to see Hayden take his first steps. She won't be there to hold
him in her arms for the first time and she won't be there to see
him grow up. She won't do those things. The defendant
made sure of that.
(AP at 97-98.) The petitioner argues that this argument intended to inflame the
passions of the jury by reference to her "hypothetical future relationship between
an unborn child and grandmother." (AP at 98.) The State notes at the outset that
the relationship remained hypothetical because the petitioner murdered the
grandmother.
The petitioner claims that the grandchild does not qualify as an immediate
family member under I.C. 19-5306(3). Idaho Code Section 19-5306(3) establishes
victims' rights, such as making in-court statements, for certain persons. It does
not prohibit any reference to loss by other members of the family or the
community. Idaho Code 19-2515 specifically provides that:
Information concerning the victim and the impact that the
death of the victim has had on the victim's family is relevant
and admissible. Such information shall be designed to
demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human
being and the resultant loss to the community by the victim's
death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the
defendant and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted
as part of any victim impact information.
I.C.19-2515(5)(a)(emphasis added).
Here, the unborn child did not make a victim impact statement or otherwise
exercise the rights provided in the Victim's Rights statute. The loss the family and
community suffered is certainly fair game at sentencing. See Payne v. Tennessee,
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501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that a "State may legitimately conclude that
evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's
family is relevant to the jury's decision" regarding the death penalty.) In fact, the
loss of the relationship between a child and the child's grandmother, is a loss felt
largely by the parent; in this case, Ms. Hanlon's daughter, who would clearly
qualify as a victim under the victim rights' statute. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,
576, 199 P.3d, 123, 151 (2008). The State's argument does not constitute
misconduct.
W. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
DUE TO THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER USE OF VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT
The petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to object, and alternatively
request a mistrial, admonishment, and curative instruction.
Trial counsel did object to the testimony of Mr. Williams. (Tr., Vo.9, pg.
4190, In.6-pg.4194, In.20.) Mr. Chastain argued that Mr. Williams testimony was
moving toward victim impact evidence. The Court concluded that the personal
habits of he victim were relevant to whether and why she would have been in the
company of a homeless man, the petitioner, on the night of her death. (Tr.,
Vo.9.pg.4194, In.21-pg.4195, In.9.) Requesting additional remedies would not
have been successful in light of the Court's finding the testimony was relevant.
Accordingly, trial counsel's choice not to request additional remedies was not
deficient performance.
In regard to the State's argument about Ms. Hanlon's grandchild, the
argument was proper and it was, therefore, not deficient performance not to object
to it.
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x. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN FAILING TO FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY CHALLENGE
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
factually and legally challenge evidence of prior bad acts evidence presented
during the sentencing phase. (AP at 99-103.)
He argues that with regard to all of the prior bad acts evidence trial counsel
should have argued: that the evidence was not relevant and that its probative value
was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; that their admission violated
due process; that the admission of this evidence violated I.e. § 19-2515 unless
they were relevant to an aggravator; and that counsel should have relied on the
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. (AP at 99.)
To the extent that these are direct appeal issues, they should be dismissed.
To the extent they relate to ineffective assistance of counsel, they should also be
dismissed as is explained below.
1. Damaged Handcuff
The petitioner speculates about trial counsel's unwillingness to litigate this
evidence based upon a conflict of interest or a breakdown in communication with
his trial counsel. The State has insufficient information as to the conflict of
interest or breakdown in communication and therefore, denies this claim. This
evidence was relevant to establish the propensity aggravator; its probative value
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to
I.R.E. 403; its admission did not violate I.C. § 19-2515, due process, or the Eighth
Amendment. Nor does the petitioner indicate how these rights were violated.
2. Other Uncharged Bad Acts
The petitioner apparently takes Issue with evidence presented through
witnesses Deen and Sebastian. (AP at 100.) This evidence was relevant to
establish the propensity aggravator; its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403; its admission
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did not violate I.C. § 19-2515, due process, or the Eighth Amendment. Nor does
the petitioner indicate how these rights were violated.
3. Other Prior Convictions
The petitioner contends that trial counsel should have objected to these
convictions both factually and legally. (AP at 101-03.) The convictions were all
relevant to establish the propensity aggravator; their probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403;
their admission did not violate I.C. § 19-2515, due process, or the Eighth
Amendment.
i. Henneman Conviction
This argument appears to be the same or similar to the other claims
regarding admission of the Henneman evidence during the sentencing
proceedings. (AP at 101.)
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the admission of evidence of a prior death sentence during the
sentencing phase of the defendant's trial. In Romano, the State introduced a copy
of the judgment and sentence from the prior murder conviction, which included
information that the defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder and had
been sentenced to death. Id. at 4. The State had also introduced evidence in the
form of testimony, autopsy report, photographs and fingerprints from the other
murder case. Id. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the admission
of the prior death sentence evidence did not mislead "the jury regarding its role in
the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility." Id. at 10.
The United States Supreme Court further concluded that the admission of such
evidence did not violate the defendant's due process rights: "we agree with the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that the admission of this evidence did not
deprive petitioner of a fair sentencing proceeding." Id. at 13.
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Trial counsel told the jury in opening statement that the petitioner had been
sentenced to death because of the Henneman jury's determination on each of the
four aggravating circumstances. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5932, Ins. 1-5.) Trial counsel told
the jury that the petitioner had been sentenced to consecutive fixed life sentences
without the possibility for parole for kidnapping and rape. (Id. at 5932, Ins. 6-14.)
As discussed further in Section CC infra, and the State hereby incorporates those
arguements by reference herein, this claim should be rejected. Trial counsel put
much considered thought and deliberation into telling this jury that the petitioner
had already been sentenced to death.
First, this was entirely a tactical decision as can be seen from trial counsel's
statements to the court outside the presence of the jury. (See infra Section CC.)
Trial counsel's best opportunity to get a life sentence was to tell the jury that this
petitioner had no way of ever getting out of prison and that he had already been
sentenced to death. If he had already been sentenced to death and consecutive
fixed life sentences, there was no propensity/continuing threat to society
aggravator. He was not a threat. He would never be released; therefore, the jury
did not need to impose another death sentence.
Second, had trial counsel not told the jury that the petitioner had already
been sentenced to death, the petitioner would now be arguing that he should have
because it was his best and only chance to convince the jury that another death
sentence was not necessary because he did not represent a continuing threat to
society.
Finally, even had trial counsel not told the jury about his prior death
sentence, pursuant to Romano, the State could have presented this evidence.
Accordingly, the petitioner cannot establish that the outcome would have been
different.
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Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
ii. Escape Conviction
The petitioner argues that this conviction was not relevant and too
prejudicial and that it violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. (AP at 101-02.) This conviction was relevant to establish the propensity
aggravator; its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403; and its admission did not violate the
petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The petitioner
ignores the fact that this is an escape conviction. Idaho law defines escape to
include the factual conduct that formed the basis of the petitioner's prior escape
conviction. The fact that he walked away from a dairy at the South Idaho
Correctional Institute constitutes an escape and it demonstrates that the petitioner
represents a continuing threat to society. This claim should be dismissed.
iii. Statutory Rape Conviction
The petitioner contends that trial counsel should have requested an
instruction as outlined on page 102 of his Amended Petition. Had trial counsel
succeeded in convincing this Court to give that jury instruction, trial counsel
would have required the State to put the statutory rape victim on the witness stand
to describe the circumstances surrounding that conviction. Trial counsel's decision
not to offer such a jury instruction was reasonable and tactical. It would have
subjected the petitioner to more damaging evidence in the form of the statutory
rape victim's testimony.
iv. Grand Theft Conviction
The petitioner argues that this conviction was inadmissible. (AP at 103.)
This conviction was relevant to establish the propensity aggravator; its probative
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant
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to I.R.E. 403; and its admission did not violate the petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The fact that the petitioner has a long criminal
history dating back seventeen years is exactly the type of propensity evidence that
establishes that he represents a continuing threat to society. Even while in prison,
the petitioner was committing crimes (escape). Had counsel made this argument, it
would not have been successful.
In summary, all of this evidence referenced above is specifically admissible
in a pre-sentence report pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32. All of the evidence
referred to above is directly relevant to the propensity aggravator. All of that
evidence establishes how the petitioner progressed in his criminal career from
non-violent crimes to violent crimes over a period of years and is directly relevant
to a jury's assessment of whether the petitioner's disregard for society's rules
makes him a continuing threat. Not only is this evidence directly relevant, but it
constitutes impeachment questions to be asked friends and family members of the
petitioner when they give opinions about his good conduct. The evidence is
admissible under that theory as well.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. Each of these claims and all related claims should be dismissed.
Y. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY
NON-STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
The petitioner's arguments that the evidence in aggravation implicates the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (AP at 103-05) are nothing more
than appellate arguments on the validity of the list of aggravating circumstances
under Idaho Code §19-2515, which, so the claim goes, involves non-statutory
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aggravating circumstances. Idaho Code §19-4901(b) sets out that post-conviction
relief is not a substitute for an appeal. The petitioner has made no showing that a
motion citing to the U.S. Constitution and the case law outlined in this claim
would have been any more successful.
To the extent that these arguments are repetitive to arguments made
elsewhere in this Amended Petition, they should be dismissed. To the extent that
these arguments are appellate arguments related to the jury instructions and the
constitutionality of Idaho's death penalty statute, they should be dismissed.
As is pointed out elsewhere in this response, the evidence the State
presented during the sentencing phase was relevant to the aggravating
circumstances charged in this case. Trial counsel did not need to make an
argument that the evidence was not pled because the State complied with the
Idaho death penalty statute in all respects. Trial counsel did not need to make an
argument that they were not given adequate notice because he was given adequate
notice. Finally, the petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective in not
argumg Due Process and Eighth Amendment violations with regard to non-
statutory aggravators; however, he does not state specifically what evidence was
presented that was non-statutory. He states generally that his prior convictions
and evidence of "other alleged bad conduct with former girlfriends and
acquaintances" were presented as non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The
evidence presented during the sentencing phase was relevant to the aggravators
charged.
Even assummg the evidence the State presented at sentencing can be
characterized as non-statutory aggravating circumstance, the federal courts have
long permitted the consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors. The Ninth
Circuit has recognized, "Nothing in the Constitution limits the consideration of
nonstatutory aggravating factors." Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d at 1178 (citing
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956 (1983».
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The petitioner's contention regarding an alleged lack of notice is likewise
without merit. First, the State is unaware of any federal case asserting the federal
Constitution mandates defendants be given advance notice of non-statutory
aggravating factors. In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically concluded Idaho's
statutes regarding the imposition of the death penalty provide sufficient notice
under the due process clause. Lankford v. State, 500 U.S. 110, 119 (1991).
Because Idaho's statutes and case law permit consideration of non-statutory
aggravating factors, the petitioner had sufficient notice, if such is mandated by the
Constitution.
The State further denies that the jury was improperly instructed or that trial
counsel was ineffective. Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective
standard of reasonableness. Such arguments as the petitioner proposes here would
not have been successful. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty
was appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
z. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THROUGH IMPROPER
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE EXPERT WITNESSES AND
DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO OBJECT TO SUCH MISCONDUCT AND IN
FAILING TO CONDUCT A REDIRECT EXAMINATION
The petitioner claims the undersigned committed misconduct via the questions
posed to the defense mental health experts at sentencing. The State asked the
defense experts about whether the petitioner understood right from wrong and was
capable of making choices. The petitioner claims that such questions somehow
imply that mental health was only relevant if there was a nexus to the crime. The
State was simply making clear for the jury the limits of the testimony.
The State did not, through these questions, define mitigation for the jury. If
there was a nexus between the petitioner's mental health and the crime, the
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petitioner would have wanted that union to be clear to the jury. \ It is fair that the
State wanted to prevent the jury from concluding that the mencithealth experts
were testifying because of such a nexus, when this was not the case. The State's
questions were aimed at preventing a misunderstanding of the role of the mental
health experts. This claim should be dismissed.
AA. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE AND
PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Trial counsel's preparation for the death penalty phase of a capital case is
examined pursuant to the Strickland standard. Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 948
(9th Cir. 2006). The petitioner "must demonstrate first that the performance of his
counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness at sentencing, and
second, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. '"
Id. at 942. (citations omitted).
The petitioner argues that trial counsel did not present sufficient mitigation
evidence. He argues that trial counsel knew they would need to present more
mitigation than in the Henneman case, but that they presented only half as much.
(AP at 107.) The mitigation evidence presented in the Henneman case did not
convince the jury that the death penalty was unjust. Why would trial counsel think
the same approach would be effective in the Hanlon case? Trial counsel had to
take a different approach because the Henneman approach obviously was not
successful. Had the same approach been taken as was taken in the Henneman
case, the petitioner would certainly now be arguing that a different approach
should have been taken. Accordingly, this was clearly a strategic decision that
cannot be second-guessed. The approach trial counsel took is a reasonable
approach that falls within an objective standard of reasonableness. There is no
merit to this claim. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
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1. Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present evidence
of Erick Hall's traumatic childhood through live testimony of
family members.
v. Shannon Pambrum through vii. Betty Jean Kirk Douglas4
The petitioner argues that insufficient evidence of his childhood was
presented to the jury at sentencing. Clearly, very detailed and extensive evidence
of his childhood that was presented to the Henneman jury was insufficient for that
jury to find the imposition of the death penalty unjust. It was certainly an
appropriate strategy for counsel in this case to employ a different strategy than
trial counsel in the Henneman case employed. If trial counsel in this case
employed the same strategy as counsel in the Henneman case, the State is
confident that the petitioner would now be arguing that counsel should have
employed a different strategy.
That being said, trial counsel did present testimony describing the
petitioner's childhood and "humanizing" him as petitioner states in his Amended
Petition. (AP at 110.) Contrary to the petitioner's assertion, trial counsel most
certainly did present "stories" and "vignettes" "for the purpose of making
mitigation real." (AP at 110.) Some of this testimony was presented through
family members and some through other witnesses, including his expert witnesses.
Merely because trial counsel did not call each and every family member does not
mean that was an inappropriate strategy. If trial counsel had done that, the jurors
would have been desensitized to the petitioner's childhood by hearing it over and
over and over again.
Shawnra Hemming, the petitioner's half-sister, testified at sentencing. She
described in detail the upbringing the petitioner had. (See generally Tr. Vol. 11 at
6289-6325.) She told the jury that the petitioner's father had choked her mother;
kept her in a closet for a couple of days and then buried her. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6294,
4 Despite the fact that petitioner's numbering is off, the State will use the petitioner's assigned numbering
system to avoid confusion.
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Ins. 4-13.) She described that the petitioner was around when the petitioner's
mother would talk about that and would try to scare the children about their father
and that he would choke them. (Id. at 6294, Ins. 14-18.) She described the living
conditions when the petitioner's mom took them to Washington state to live with
her mother. (See id. at 6294-97.) She described that the petitioner was neglected
and left alone by his mother. She described physical and verbal abuse between the
petitioner's mother and father and explained that it was very violent and very
destructive. She described an incident where the petitioner's father hurled a
hammer at his mother. She told the jury that she would have the children sit on
the couch for hours when they did something wrong until the petitioner's father
came home. When he got home, he would explode and punish the children. She
described punishment her as "spankings" and that the punishment for the boys
included punching them, pulling their hair, throwing things at them. (Id. at 6297-
99.)
Ms. Hemming went on to describe a time when her father and petitioner's
father left the home and moved into an apartment. She told the jury that her
mother had to go on welfare and that it was difficult for them to get food. (Id. at
6301, Ins. 1-6.) She described the petitioner as having a vivid imagination and the
he cared about animals. He had imaginary friends she believed made him feel
secure and safe "because nothing at that time in the family was safe or secure."
(Id. at 6303, Ins. 1-11.) She testified that the children raised themselves because
their parents were not there: "Everybody had to fend for themselves, raise
ourselves pretty much." (Id. at 6003, Ins. 12-16.) She described that her father
and the petitioner's father taught the children how to shoplift for food and
clothing. She told the jury that they would break into neighbors' homes and steal
food or whatever they could find that they could carry and hide. (Id. at 6304-06.)
She described the inappropriate sexual activity between her and Shannon,
Betty and Kenny. She testified that the petitioner knew about it but did not
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participate in it. She described one incident where the petitioner walked in while
it was happening and that the petitioner was angry about it. (ld. at 6306-07.) She
described that the rest of the children had their cliques, but that the petitioner was
an outcast because he didn't have anybody to be with. (ld. at 6308-09.) Ms.
Hemming went on to describe that the petitioner was teased about his bed-wetting
problem. The petitioner's mother would hang the sheets out the window when
they boys would wet the bed and the bus stop was right in front of their home, so
all the school children knew about it. (ld. at 6309.)
She told the jury that the petitioner went to live with his father and his
father's new girlfriend who was actually his brother's widow. His new girlfriend
had two sons who were fairly close in age to Ms. Hemming. She explained that
one of these sons would pick on the petitioner. The petitioner and the son who
picked on him had gotten into an altercation and when the petitioner's father got
home he was enraged, so the petitioner left before his dad could do anything. (ld.
at 6311-15.) She went on to describe an incident during which her father got so
angry because one of the boys got a haircut he didn't like that he tried to throw
them into the fireplace. (ld. at 6315-16.) After the petitioner left the home, Ms.
Hemming testified that she ran across him living behind a Rite Aid store in a
dumpster area. She described it as being dirty and disgusting. The petitioner
finally got picked up for breaking into "big rigs" and he went back to Washington
to live with his mom as far as Ms. Hemming knew. (ld. at 6316- 17.)
She described what she believed was a difference in her upbringing and the
petitioner's. She told the jury that all along through it all at least she had her
father who loved her. She told the jury that the petitioner had no one and has had
no one. Ms. Hemming broke down and began to cry as she told the jury about
this. She testified that he got no love from his father or his mother. She testified
that she came to court to tell the jury these things because she could not help him
then when she was younger. (ld. at 6321-23.) She told the jury she still cares
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about him despite what he has done because he "has a big heart. He is a caring,
sensitive person." (Id. at 6324, Ins. 2-3.) "I love him. He is my brother." (Id. at
6324, Ins. 6-7.)
She testified that she corresponds with the petitioner. She sends him
money and writes him letters and he writes back. (Id. at 6324, Ins. 8-13.) She
testified:
He draws beautiful pictures, you know. He loves me. He
doesn't hold it against me that I couldn't help him back then.
I could have. I probably could have. But then, in turn, they
would come to me. They would stop doing it to him and they
would come after me. And it was survival of the fittest, you
know, back when we were younger.... I feel guilty for that
and I'm sorry for that. ... I was a kid myself. I couldn't. But
you still feel like you should have.
(Id. at 6324, Ins. 13-25.)
Shannon Pambrum, the petitioner's brother, testified. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6396,
Ins. 7-10l He described the environment he and the petitioner grew up in. Mr.
Pambrum became quite emotional during his testimony. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6396, Ins.
24-25 and 6397, Ins. 1-25.) Mr. Pambrum described violence in the home. He
described that violence in the home was normal and a way of life. He stated that
the petitioner "was born into that violence. Erick never saw a true day of
nonviolence really, honestly, truly." (Id. at 6402, Ins. 4-6.) Mr. Pambrum
becomes emotional again when he testified that the petitioner was the "forgotten
brother" and the "forgotten child." (Id. at 6403, Ins. 10-12.) He breaks down
again when he testifies that he feels like he let the petitioner down. (Id. at 6403,
Ins. 14-16.) He testified that the petitioner had to rely on his "animal instincts"
and that the petitioner was the victim of "vicious picking on" and that the
petitioner was bullied. (Id. at 6404-05.) Mr. Pambrum goes on to describe an
incident during which he punched the petitioner so hard that it knocked him out.
5 Mr. Pambrum testified that he and the petitioner were "brothers." It is the State's understanding that they
were technically "half-brothers." Clearly, Mr. Pambrum thought of himself as a brother to the petitioner.
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(Id. at 6405, Ins. 8-23.) He testified that the petitioner suffered physical abuse at
the hands of Frank McCracken. (Id. at 6405, Ins. 24-25 and 6406, Ins. 1-7.) He
further described how the petitioner was beaten by his mother with a belt buckle.
(Id. at 6406, Ins. 17-25.) Mr. Pambrum goes on at length to describe the
petitioner's traumatic childhood, neglect, stealing for food and starving family.
(See id. 6407-10.)
The petitioner contends that trial counsel should have presented testimony
that he had "extreme mood swings even at a young age" and that he "could be
explosive when someone touched his head or the back of his neck" and "would
become 'someone else' at times." (AP at 111-12.) It is certainly reasonable to
conclude that this is exactly the type of information trial counsel would not want
before the sentencing jury in light of the violent nature of the crimes with which
he had been convicted.
Dr. Beaver's testimony was detailed as to all facets of mitigation, including
fetal alcohol syndrome; the petitioner's low birth weight; his poor upbringing; the
head injuries he suffered and their cumulative effect; that he had a chaotic, abusive
and neglectful family; that he had less ability to regulate his mood, control his
impulses; and learn from experience. He testified about the petitioner as a
kindergartner wetting and soiling himself and as a seven-year-old not able to tie
his shoes. He testified about the MRI and PET Scan results and that they showed
abnormalities and what that means. In summary, Dr. Beaver testified at length
about all topics in the petitioner's life that could in any way be construed as
mitigation. (See generally, Tr. Vol. 11 at 6348-6389.)
Further, Dr. Beaver's testimony was based upon hours of interviews with
the petitioner, speaking with and/or meeting with the petitioner's family members,
reviewing the information from the experts in the Henneman case, medical
records, mental health records, school records, legal records from juvenile and
adult court, consulting with Dr. Stewart, reviewing the neuroradiological studies
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that were performed on the petitioner and reviewing prior testimony, affidavits,
drug and alcohol evaluations, juvenile records, probation records and
psychological reports. Dr. Beaver also subjected the petitioner to approximately
12 hours of testing. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6346-47 and 6357-59.)
Similarly, Dr. Stewart's testimony by way of deposition during the
mitigation case was detailed. (See generally, Tr. Vol. 11 at 6454-6470.)
The petitioner's probation counselor, Isabel Cookie Quirk, testified about
her observations of the petitioner and his living circumstances as a juvenile. She
worked with him on and off for three years. She saw several hundred children
during that time and she remembered the petitioner because he touched her heart
and she worried about him and the situation he was living in. (See generally, Tr.
Vol. 11 at 6416-34.)
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
viii. Deanna McCracken through xvi. Kimberly Bacon
The petitioner claims that all of these witnesses should either have been
called to testify or their affidavits presented to the jury. Trial counsel's decision to
call certain witnesses testify and not call others is strategic and it is certainly
reasonable for trial counsel to conclude either that these witnesses would not
present well to the jury or that their testimony would desensitize the jury because
they jury would have heard the same information over and over again. As noted in
the previous section, trial counsel presented a lengthy mitigation case that covered
all aspects of mitigation in the petitioner's life.
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In particular, Deanna McCracken refused to come to Boise to testify in this
case. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5879, Ins. 2-3.) Clearly, this witness was not a willing
witness. Even assuming trial counsel had obtained a witness bond, had her
arrested, and then had her brought her to Boise to testify, under those
circumstances, her testimony would not have been favorable to the petitioner. The
petitioner would now be claiming counsel was ineffective for putting a witness on
the stand who was not favorable to him and had to be arrested and brought to court
to testify on his behalf, a fact which would have been readily apparent to the jury.
Even if some area of inquiry merited additional attention from trial counsel,
in light of the overall tenor of the case, there was no prejudice to the petitioner. In
Campbell v. Kinch/oe, the Ninth Circuit concluded that counsel's decision not to
introduce certain mitigating evidence was within the range of professional
competence. Campbell v. Kinch/oe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986). The court then
ruled that even if counsel did not meet the competency standard in that case, no
remedy would be appropriate because the petitioner had not proven prejudice.
Id. at 1464. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that, "'given the
overwhelming aggravate[ing] factors,' and 'the heinous nature of the crime,' there
is no reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different had
the mitigating evidence been introduced." Id.
In Allen v. Woodford, the Ninth Circuit found that preparing for the penalty
phase in one week was deficient performance. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979
(9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit ruled that such a short period of preparation
was deficient performance. Id. In that case, the petitioner was able to develop
more than ten witnesses post-trial who could have testified at the death penalty
phase in mitigation. Their testimony would have ranged from the poor conditions
and hard work of the petitioner's youth to his pleasant and helpful nature as an
adult. Id. at 1002-1003. The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no
"reasonable probability" that "had trial counsel presented the potential mitigation
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evidence developed during habeas, that the jury would have weighed the evidence
in favor of a life sentence." Id. at 1005. The court concluded that the facts which
led the jury to have convicted Allen of multiple murders would have continued to
outweigh the proposed, "humanizing, non-exculpatory," mitigation evidence. Id.
at 1010.
The petitioner asserts that the mitigation that was presented regarding his
childhood was inadequate. He outlines specific witnesses who should have been
called to discuss his childhood. (AP at 111- 119.) The decisions trial counsel
made to call certain witnesses and not call other witnesses is clearly strategic.
Trial counsel would have interviewed these witnesses prior to trial and determined
not only who would present well before a jury, but who would not. It is
reasonable to conclude after reading what the petitioner claims should have been
presented to the jury that the jury would have become desensitized to hearing it
over and over again.
From the entirety of the evidence trial counsel presented to this jury during
sentencing, this jury was given a very real, very clear picture of all mitigating
evidence. Merely because the petitioner could have called more witnesses, asked
these witnesses different questions, or presented this evidence in a different
fashion does not mean that trial counsel's chosen method of presenting this
evidence rose to the level of deficient performance. These are strategic decisions
that do not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Finally, the petitioner concedes in the next section that trial counsel
presented "testimony from family members and two experts that described Erick
Hall's horrific childhood." (AP at 119.) Indeed, they did. Trial counsel's
decisions were well within an objective standard of reasonableness. There is not a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The fact that
the jury determined that the death penalty was appropriate in this case does not
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mean that trial counsel's perfonnance was deficient. This claim and all related
claims should be dismissed.
2. Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present evidence
of Erick Hall's good behavior as an adult.
i. Wendy Levy through v. Amber Lynn (Peterson) Fox
The petitioner argues that trial counsel did not adequately investigate and
present evidence of his "good behavior as an adult." (AP at 119.) The petitioner
claims here, as he did in the above section, that "[t]his infonnation was readily
available for trial counsel to present." (Id.) The mere fact that infonnation is
available to counsel does not mean trial counsel is ineffective if they choose not to
present it at trial. This is what trial counsel does every day - make strategic
decisions about what evidence to present and what evidence not to present. Just
because evidence is available does not make it compelling or persuasive evidence.
Trial counsel did call Wendy Levy. Contrary to petitioner's
characterization of her testimony as lacking in "direction or depth," it was
meaningful. Her testimony covered the topics the petitioner states were lacking.
She described the positive interaction the petitioner had with her children; that she
believed the petitioner would have given his own life to protect her children; and
that her children called him "uncle." (See generally Tr. Vol. 11 at 6449-6454.)
Trial counsel did call Timothy Turley. Nonetheless, the petitioner
complains that it was not compelling enough. In support of that claim, he cites
Exhibit 34, an affidavit of Timothy Turley. (AP at 120.) The exact same incident
cited in the petitioner's Amended Petition was presented to the jury. (Tr. Vol. 11
at 6444, Ins. 5-25 and 6445, Ins. 1-2.) Mr. Turley explains how the petitioner
saved his life. There is no discernible difference between the content of his
testimony at trial and the infonnation presented by way of Mr. Turley's affidavit
as cited by the petitioner in his Amended Petition on page 120.
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 80
001002
            
    
          
        
         
           
              
              
      J        
               
              
             
            
         
            
           
             
              
             
         
              
              
              
              
             
             
            
       
     
The petitioner asserts that three additional witnesses should have been
called to explain his "good behavior as an adult." CAP at 121-22.) Trial counsel's
decision not to present these witnesses was well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. The witnesses counsel did call to testify presented his good
behavior as an adult. They portrayed him in a positive light as a person with
redeemable qualities: that he loved children; that he took care of children; that he
played with children; that he had the capacity to care about other people; that he
saved someone from committing suicide; that Timothy Turley, someone who was
not even the petitioner's relative, thought of him as his brother.
There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different. Trial counsel presented compelling mitigation evidence. The fact that
the jury determined that the death penalty was appropriate in this case does not
mean that trial counsel's performance was deficient. These claims and all related
claims should be dismissed.
3. Trial counsel failed to locate, interview, and present the testimony
of Erick Hall's foster parents and foster brother.
i. Linda McQuery & Jeff Langston through ii. Harry & Sophronia
Selby
The petitioner argues that counsel did not present evidence from his foster
parents and foster brother. CAP at 122.) The petitioner contends that trial counsel
failed to uncover this evidence. It is unclear how the petitioner knows that trial
counsel did not uncover this evidence. Regardless, as indicated previously, it is a
strategic decision as to whether or not to call these witnesses. In determining
whether it is appropriate to call witnesses to testify, trial counsel must evaluate the
witnesses and the nature and content of the evidence those witnesses may have to
offer.
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The petitioner's allegations regarding the impact this evidence would have
had on the jury are completely conclusory and speculative and these conclusions
completely ignore the evidence that was presented.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
4. Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate, prepare and present
evidence through expert witness testimony.
i. Dr. Beaver through iv. Failing to consult with expert MRI & PET
Scan
Despite the fact that trial counsel called two compelling and qualified
expert witnesses, the petitioner claims that trial counsel was deficient in presenting
this evidence. (AP 125-129.) Incredibly, the petitioner also argues that trial
counsel was deficient for calling Dr. Beaver out of order. (AP at 127.)
These arguments completely ignore, first, the evidence that was presented
and second, the realities of trying a case. It is not uncommon that there is a need
to call witnesses out of order. To fault trial counsel for being required to call a
witness out of order is a claim that is wholly without merit.
The claim with regard to Dr. Stewart is conclusory and speculative. Dr.
Stewart's detailed testimony negates the petitioner's argument. (See Deposition
Transcript of Dr. Pablo Stewart, Sunday, October 21,2007, at 17-58.)6
The claim that trial counsel did not consult with Dr. Cunningham, again, is
conclusory and speculative. In addition, Dr. Cunningham testified at the
6 The Transcript of Dr. Stewart's Deposition was admitted as an exhibit by the defense at trial, as was the
CD of his testimony. (CR at 1335.) However, the State does not have that exhibit, so the State used its
copy of the transcript for this Answer and has referred to its copy of the transcript herein not the actual
exhibit.
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Henneman trial and as previously noted, his testimony was not compelling enough
to the convince the jury not to impose the death penalty. Finally, the petitioner
contends that trial counsel failed to consult with an MRI and PET scan expert.
This is yet again a conclusory and speculative allegation. Trial counsel did elicit
testimony from Dr. Beaver regarding the PET scan and MRI results. (See
generally, Tr. Vol. 11 at 6348-6389.)
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
5. Trial counsel failed to present redacted portions of the March 2003
interrogation tape.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel should have played the last portion
of the interrogation tape during sentencing. (AP 129-30.) There are certainly
strategic reasons why counsel would decide not to play that portion of the
interview. The jury heard a compelling mitigation case. This claim is conclusory
and speculative and as such, should be dismissed. Trial counsel's decisions were
well within an objective standard of reasonableness. There is not a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different. The fact that the jury
determined that the death penalty was appropriate in this case does not mean that
trial counsel's performance was deficient. This claim and all related claims should
be dismissed.
6. Trial counsel failed to present photographs, artwork, and visual
aids.
Finally, the petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not
admitting exhibits during the mitigation phase. (AP at 131.) This allegation is
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conclusory and speculative. The State is unclear as to how this would have
changed the outcome in this case.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
BB. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR THEIR FAILURE TO PRESENT LIVE EXPERT
TESTIMONY AND/OR FAILURE TO ALLOW A CONTINUANCE
TO PRESENT LIVE TESTIMONY
The petitioner claims that trial counsel was deficient for failing to present
live testimony of Dr. Stewart and Betty Kirk. (AP at 131-139.)
1. Trial counsel failed to present live testimony of Dr. Pablo
Stewart.
The petitioner argues that the import of Dr. Stewart's testimony was lost in
the playing of the video tape and reading the testimony. (AP at 135.) Most of Dr.
Stewart's testimony was played for the jury via the video tape where they could
observe and watch Dr. Stewart. Only the last few minutes was handled by
transcript because there was a problem with the video that counsel had anticipated
based upon information from the recording company. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6460-61.)
Trial counsel anticipated this difficulty and after the jury left the courtroom (see
id. at 6456, 1. 6), trial counsel informed the court of this potential problem. (Id. at
6460-61.) Trial counsel indicated that a transcript had been prepared in the event
there was a problem and trial counsel indicated that there were only ten minutes
that presented a problem. (Id. at 6461, Ins. 15-21.)
It was impressive that trial counsel had a transcript prepared and ready to
go in the event there was a problem. Trial counsel attempted to play the last few
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minutes of the video for the jury, but it failed to work even after taking a recess
outside the presence of the jury in an attempt to fix it. (Id. at 6462-68.) Not only
did the jury have the DVD of Dr. Stewart's testimony as an exhibit with them
during deliberations (CR at 01335), but the jury had the written transcript of his
testimony as an exhibit with them for deliberations. (Id.) Just because Dr.
Stewart's testimony was presented through DVD does not mean it was ineffective
testimony. The jury was able to see him, observe his demeanor, evaluate his
credibility, and assess the content of his testimony.
Not all scheduling difficulties and technical difficulties can be avoided,
anticipated and overcome with a perfect response. Trials move faster or slower
than anticipated, leaving trial counsel with scheduling difficulties. Technical
problems arise on a daily basis and trial counsel have back up plans, as they did in
this case, with a transcript in hand ready to present to the jury.
The petitioner next argues that the technical difficulties gave the State three
opportunities to play the cross-examination to the jury. The State is unable to find
support for this conclusion in the record. Nor did the petitioner cite to the record
to support this claim. The undersigned does not have a specific recollection of the
logistics of this portion of the trial; however, based upon the record it appears that
the cross-examination portion was read into the record as well. (Tr. Vol. 11 at
6469.) The petitioner concludes that "Dr. Stewart's testimony, as read by trial
counsel's secretary, was distracting and incomprehensible." (AP at 135.) He
further asserts that jurors were sleeping or inattentive (id.) without citing any
portion of the record to support the assertion that jurors were sleeping. The only
support he cites is a joke between trial counsel and the court. (AP at 135-36.) Not
only was this a joke as was clearly stated by both the Court and trial counsel, but it
was not stated in the presence of the jury. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6476-77.) Sometimes
levity in the courtroom is a stress reliever for court and counsel. It was certainly
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not inappropriate; was not said in the jury's presence and was clearly stated as a
joke.
Finally, the petitioner argues that trial counsel should have moved the Court
to hold the jury until Dr. Stewart's testimony could have been presented as live
testimony or that they should have presented all mitigation available to them to
take up time in order to be able to present Dr. Stewart's live testimony. (AP at
136-37.) Trial counsel informed the Court that Dr. Stewart was not available for
any reason during the week of October 22, 2007. (Tr. Vol. 5324-26.) As the
Court pointed out to trial counsel, the Court could not keep the jury sequestered
for a week to wait for Dr. Stewart. (Id. at 5326, Ins. 12-14.) It was certainly a
reasonable decision for trial counsel not to move the Court to hold the jury
sequestered for one witness, particularly in light of the fact that this witness'
testimony was presented to the jury by way of the deposition.
To keep the jury sequestered for a week to wait for a witness would have
been extraordinarily unfair to jurors who do not get to see their families and for
whom sequestration is already an extraordinary burden. Had trial counsel made
such a motion, it is clear from the Court's comments that such a motion would
have been denied. Additionally, the petitioner would now be arguing that the jury
sequestration for a week to wait for a witness was error or ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel should have essentially stalled and
delayed proceedings: "if trial counsel presented all the mitigation evidence
available to them, their case would have lasted long enough that Dr. Stewart
would have been able to testify in person." (AP at 137.) As previously argued,
trial counsel made strategic decisions about what evidence to present to this jury.
To put evidence before a jury merely for the sake of stalling proceedings long
enough to put another witness on the stand would be an inappropriate use of court
time and would be an inappropriate use of jury time. The State is fairly certain
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courts would take a dim view of this type of conduct from trial counsel. This
claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
2. Trial counsel failed to present live testimony of Betty Jean
Douglas.
The petitioner makes a similar claim with regard to Betty Kirk's7
testimony, which was read into the record. (AP at 138.) First and foremost, Betty
Kirk refused to come to Boise. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5878, Ins. 22-25 & 5879, Ins. 1-2.)
Trial counsel stated: "We have one witness who we have anticipated coming to
trial who will not get on the airplane from Portland and come to Boise." (Id.)
Clearly, this witness was not a willing witness. Even assuming trial counsel had
proposed a witness bond, had her arrested and brought her to Boise to testify,
under those circumstances, her testimony would not have been favorable to the
petitioner. The petitioner would now be claiming counsel was ineffective for
putting a witness on the stand who was not favorable to him and had to be arrested
and brought to court to testify on his behalf.
The petitioner himself notes that the presentation of Betty Kirk's live
testimony that was elicited during Hall I is the "an aspect of a pending claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel." (AP at 138 n. 37.) Of course it is. It is a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury in both cases did not conclude
that imposition of the death penalty was unjust. If live testimony had been
presented in this case, the petitioner would be arguing that it was ineffective
because this witness was an unwilling witness. He would be arguing that by
"dragging" her here to Boise to testify on his behalf, trial counsel would have been
ineffective because she was clearly not willing to come on her own, which
certainly would have been apparent to the jury. Trial counsel did all they could do
under those circumstances.
7 Betty Jean Douglas is also known as Betty Jean Kirk.
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The petitioner's argument that Ms. Kirk's testimony regarding the
petitioner's black outs was important evidence (AP at 138) is without merit. The
law enforcement interview of the petitioner that was presented to the jury in this
case clearly demonstrates that the petitioner had not "blacked out." During that
interview, the petitioner remembered details of what had happened; he described
those details and he knew things that only the killer would know. He clearly was
not suffering from a "black out." Had trial counsel presented that evidence or
raised that inference, they risked losing credibility with the jury.
Certainly, the evidence that the petitioner had suffered from head injuries;
had brain damage; had a traumatic upbringing; had suffered from child abuse and
sexual abuse; had been neglected as a child; had flashbacks; dissociative episodes;
gaps in memory; bowel and bladder problems; nightmares that began in
childhood; and many other issues that trial counsel presented at trial. (See
Deposition Transcript of Dr. Pablo Stewart, Sunday, October 21,2007, at 17-58l
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
CC. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR HAVING MR. HALL WEAR PRISON CLOTHING
AND SHACKLES DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE
TRIAL
The petitioner contends that trial counsel's decision to have him wear his
prison clothing and his shackles during the presentation of the sentencing evidence
8 The Transcript of Dr. Stewart's Deposition was admitted as an exhibit by the defense at trial, as was the
CD of his testimony. (CR at 1335.) However, the State does not have that exhibit, so the State used its
copy of the transcript for this Answer and has referred to its copy of the transcript herein not the actual
exhibit.
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was ineffective. (AP at 139.) Trial counsel made a strategic decision that the fact
that the petitioner had already been sentenced to death was a mitigating
circumstance. Trial counsel clearly had put much thought and consideration into
this decision. Trial counsel had reviewed case law and had discussed this decision
with the petitioner who agreed to this decision. (See generally Tr. Vol. 11 5863-
5873.)
Mr. Chastain:
In essence, Judge we want to be able to show the jury, as mitigating
circumstance, that Mr. Hall is now convicted of two first degree
murders; that he is never going to walk free gain; that he's on death
row; that he is given special attention; that his security is intense.
(Tr. Vol. 11 at 5867, Ins. 3-8.)
And so when we come to ask the jury for mercy, we feel it's
incumbent on us to make sure they know exactly where he is; that he
is never going to leave prison. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5869, Ins. 19-22.)
And so Ms. Kristal and I and Mr. Hall - in fact, the whole defense
team, we've - you know, in trying to figure out mitigation, clearly
much in the mitigation that we have is the same that the Henneman
jury heard and was rejected unanimously by those 12 jurors. We
intend to present that. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5870, Ins. 21-25 & 5871, In 1.)
I think this is a completely unique case under Idaho law. We've
talked about it in-depth with Mr. Hall. He's on board with it. He
would prefer to wear his prison garb anyway. It's much more
comfortable for him, and that's what he's going to be wearing for the
rest of his life. So yeah, we don't make it lightly. We are not doing
it to try to cause error. I think this is - this is strictly we regard the
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fact that he is on death row as a mitigating circumstance and
something the jury has to - has to know about. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5871,
Ins. 20-25 & 5872, Ins. 1-5.)
Clearly, trial counsel, the defense team and the petitioner himself were all
aware of, and agreed with, this strategy. This was a brilliant strategic move on
trial counsel's part. Trial counsel did not make this decision lightly and they were
acutely aware of the fact that the mitigation portion of the sentencing proceedings
in the Henneman case was not successful.
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the admission of evidence of a prior death sentence during the
sentencing phase of the defendant's trial. The United States Supreme Court
concluded that the admission of the prior death sentence evidence did not mislead
"the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of
responsibility." Id. at 10. The United States Supreme Court further concluded
that the admission of such evidence did not violate the defendant's due process
rights: "we agree with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that the
admission of this evidence did not deprive petitioner of a fair sentencing
proceeding." Id. at 13.
In State v. Gales, 443 N.W.2d 124, 156 (Neb. 2005), the court determined
that merely because the prior death sentence stemmed from the same case, i.e., a
resentencing, Romano's reasoning "is equally applicable." Similarly, in State v.
Jaynes, 549 S.E.2d 179,190 (N.C. 2001) (quoting State v. Bacon, 446 S.E.2d 542,
555 (N.C. 1994), afJ'd on habeas by Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 483-84 (4th Cir.
2000», the court reaffirmed, "[M]ere knowledge by the jurors of the prior death
sentence does not necessarily demonstrate prejudice to the defendant." When a
prospective juror can disregard prior knowledge, follow the court's instructions
and render an impartial decision based on the evidence, recusal is not mandatory.
Id. Likewise, in State v. Simonsen, 986 P.2d 566, 570 (Or. 1999), the court relied
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upon general principles associated with juror bias to conclude the jury's
knowledge of a prior death sentence was not unconstitutional. In Muniz v.
Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 1998), the court concluded the testimony
establishing the defendant had previously been sentenced to death did not "'so
infect[]' the sentencing phase with unfairness that it rose to the level of a due
process violation," and the "introduction of a prior death sentence is allowable if it
does not mislead the jury in its sentencing role." See also King v. Mississippi, 960
So.2d 413, 434 (Miss. 2007) ("as the jury members were aware of their
responsibility for determining whether King received the death penalty for the
murder of Patterson, these comments (regarding King being 'on death row') did
not relieve the jury of its 'separate responsibility to make the determination"')
(quoting West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Miss. 1997».
Trial counsel's strategic decisions to show the jury how the petitioner lived
every day, having been sentenced to death, in shackles and wearing prison
clothing were well within an objective standard of reasonableness. There is not a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The fact that
the jury determined that the death penalty was appropriate in this case does not
mean that trial counsel's performance was deficient. This claim and all related
claims should be dismissed.
DD. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR THEIR FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO
THE JURY DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to explain
mitigation to the jury during closing argument. (AP at 140-45.)
The Court instructed the jury at length, including an explanation of
mitigation and the weighing process. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 5916, In. 16 & 5919, In. 25.)
In his closing argument, Mr. Chastain also discussed mitigation and weighing as
well as his client's tearful confession and remorse. (Tr. Vol. 11 at 6505, In. 9 &
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6506, In. 16; Tr. Vol 11 at 6507, Ins. 7-14.) Mr. Chastain, in making a tactical
decision also framed a life sentence as perhaps worse than a death sentence
because the petitioner has to think about his crime for the rest of his natural life.
(Tr. Vol. 11 at 6506, In. 17 & 6507, In. 6.) Such an argument could very well
succeed to motivate a jury to impose life without a discussion of mitigation.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The fact that the jury determined that the death penalty was
appropriate in this case does not mean that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
EE. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING SENTENCING PHASE
AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS
1. IMPROPER ARGUMENT LIMITING THE SCOPE OF
RELEVANT MITIGATION TO CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSALLY
CONNECTED TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AND
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT RENDERED MR. HALL INCAPABLE
OF CHOOSING NOT TO COMMIT THE CRIME
The petitioner argues that it was improper for the State to argue to the jury
the State's view of the weight of the mitigating evidence. Apparently, the
petitioner claims that State cannot argue that there is no nexus between the
mitigating evidence and the crime.
The petitioner has to ignore the holdings in several appellate opinions.
While evidence may be admitted without a showing of a nexus, the State is not
foreclosed from arguing the absence of a nexus to reduce the persuasive appeal of
the mitigation evidence. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the death penalty and discussed the State's argument concerning certain mitigating
evidence in Ayers v. Be/montes, 549 U.S. 7, 127 S.Ct. 469, 166 L.Ed.2d 334
(2006). In that case, Be/montes was convicted in California of first-degree
murder. The jury then determined that he should be sentenced to death. The issue
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in the case was a jury instruction in the sentencing phase. Belmontes argued to the
jury that he could lead a constructive life in prison and could thereby be of some
value to the community. The defendant also claimed a religious conversion and
argued that his conversion would contribute to his living peaceably in prison.
The prosecutor argued that the defendant's claimed religious conversion
did not fit within any of the statutory mitigation categories nor in the "catch all"
category, but admitted that the conversion could be a "proper subject of
consideration." The court found that the prosecutor's argument to the jury went
only to the persuasiveness of the evidence and not the jury's ability to consider the
religious conversion at all. The court found that the argument and the jury
instructions were proper.
Here, the State's argument came after Dr. Beaver testified that he was in
court that day to talk about, "why [Mr. Hall] is somebody that is here today,"
among other things. (Tr., Vol.11, pg. 6349. In.9.) Dr. Beaver said he was there to
"give [the jury] a broader perspective and understanding about some of these
things, particularly understanding, to some extent, why Erick Hall is in this
courtroom today standing before you being sentenced for murder." (Tr., Vol. 11 ,
pg. 6348, In.10-14.) The defense then used Dr. Beaver to discuss: fetal alcohol
syndrome; the petitioner's low birth weight; his poor upbringing; the head injuries
he suffered and their cumulative effect; that he had a chaotic, abusive and
neglectful family; that he had less ability to regulate his mood, control his
impulses; and learn from experience. He testified about the petitioner as a
kindergartner wetting and soiling himself and as a seven-year-old not able to tie
his shoes. He testified about the MRI and PET Scan results and that they showed
abnormalities and what that means. In summary, Dr. Beaver testified at length
about all topics in the petitioner's life that could in any way be construed as
mitigation and did so after stating he was going to tell the jury why the petitioner
committed murder. In other words, he proclaimed that the information about the
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petitioner's natural attributes and environment was causal. Although that nexus is
not necessary for mitigation to be admissible, the State was free to attack it where
it was claimed by the defense as the causality goes to the persuasiveness of the
mitigation evidence.
The petitioner has not cited to any case indicating that the State is
precluded from arguing that proffered mitigation testimony is less mitigating if
there is no nexus between it and the crime. Rather, the case law is the opposite, as
is shown in the Belmontes case referred to above. The Arizona Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that while mitigation evidence cannot be withheld from the jury
because of a lack of nexus between the evidence and the crime, a lack of nexus
between the mitigation and the crime is relevant to the weight of the mitigation
evidence. An example is State ofArizona v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369 (2005). In
that case, the defendant complained that during the cross examination of the
defendant's mitigation expert the prosecution "questioned the expert's lack of
formal education 'to make any connection between upbringing and adult
conduct.'" The defendant objected to the State's closing argument wherein the
prosecutor emphasized that there was no connection between the defendant's
upbringing and the murder. The prosecutor said "nothing in his childhood caused
that." III P.3d at 392
The Arizona Supreme Court held that none of the prosecutor's statements
were improper. The Arizona Court held that while United States Supreme Court
decisions require a liberal rule of admissibility for mitigating evidence, there is
"no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that the evidence is not
particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight." 111 P.3d at 392. The
Court found that the prosecutor's comments simply went to the weight of the
defendant's mitigation evidence.
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The Arizona Supreme Court made a similar finding in State ofArizona v.
Hampton, 140 P.3d 950 (2006). In that case, the defendant's mitigation evidence
showed that he had a "horrendous childhood." The court stated as follows:
Moreover, while we do not require that a nexus between the
mitigating factors and the crime be established before we
consider the mitigation evidence . . . the failure to establish
such a causal connection may be considered in accessing the
quality and strength of the mitigation evidence. State v.
Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 132 P.3d 833 at 849 (2006) (internal
citation omitted); Accord Johnson, 212 Ariz. 440, 133 P.3d
750; Anderson II, 212 Ariz. 349-50, 111 P.3d 391-92.
Hampton's troubled upbringing is entitled to less weight as a
mitigating circumstance because he has not tied it to his
murderous behavior. Further, Hampton was thirty years old
when he committed his crimes, lessening the relevance of his
difficult childhood.
In another Arizona case, the State of Arizona v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368
(2006), the court addressed comments made by the state during a penalty phase.
There, the defendant contended that the following comments made by the
prosecutor improperly narrowed the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence.
The transcript showed the following:
Ask yourselves if (Roque's) low IQ affected his life. Did his
low IQ cause this murder? No. Does (Roque's family history
of mental illness) excuse his conduct? Is that why he killed
Mr. Sodhi, because of his mother's illness? Of course not.
The Arizona court noted that the United States Supreme Court had reversed
a death penalty in the Tennard v. Dretke, 542 US 274 case referred to above. In
Tennard, the Texas court did not instruct the jury that the jury could consider the
defendant's low IQ as mitigating evidence and the prosecutor argued that his I.Q.
was irrelevant. The Arizona court in Roque held that Roque's jury instructions
allowed all mitigation evidence to be considered by the jury so that Roque's case
was unlike Tennard's case in that respect. Therefore, when the prosecutor made
the above argument concerning the nexus between Roque's IQ and the murder, the
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argument was proper because it merely went to the weight the prosecutor thought
the jury should give the mitigation evidence. The argument did not make the
evidence inadmissible or otherwise keep it from the jury's consideration.
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona in the case of
Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp.2d 1023 (August 2006) made a similar holding. The
Jones case is a federal habeas corpus case following conviction in state court for
murder with the resulting death sentence. The sentencing was done by the trial
court, not by a jury. The court considered the defendant's mitigation evidence,
which was that the defendant suffered from ADHD and a low level mood disorder.
The trial court considered the evidence but held that the ADHD was of little or no
mitigating value because it bore "no causal relationship to violent conduct."
The Federal District Court held that the trial court was required to consider
all relevant mitigation evidence, but held that the court was "free to assess how
much weight to assign such evidence." The District Court held that the sentencing
court could assign minimal significance to the ADHD testimony because there
was no causal connection between that testimony and the murder.
Finally, in the case of Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560 (9th Circ. 2005), the
Ninth Circuit recently upheld a death penalty where the State argued that the
defendant's bad childhood did not qualify as mitigating evidence because (1)
every adult violent felon had a bad childhood and (2) because there was "nothing
to bridge the background of what happened in [Sim's] family to the murders we
have dealt with here." 425 F.3d at 578. Sim's childhood mitigation evidence was
nearly identical to Erick Hall's. The Ninth Circuit found that the prosecutors
statements "do not suggest that the jury cannot consider Sim's background as a
mitigating factor but rather that it should not find his background, shocking though
it was, mitigated the vicious murders he committed and attempted." Id. at 580.
Here, the prosecutor's comments were appropriate argument. The jury was
correctly instructed. The State's argument was nothing more than a comment on
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the persuasiveness of the mitigation evidence. The trial court cannot withhold
relevant mitigating evidence from the jury on the grounds that there is no nexus
shown between the mitigation evidence and the defendant's criminal conduct.
Once relevant mitigating evidence is before the jury and the jury is properly
instructed to consider it, the State is aware of no case holding that the prosecution
is precluded from arguing that the mitigation evidence has no value because there
is no nexus between it and the crime. Indeed, logic would indicate that the jury's
view of a nexus between the mitigation and the crime would be part of the jury's
weighing process. The State's argument was nothing more than a thorough
response to defense counsel's argument that the defendant's upbringing caused
him to kill. This allegation should be dismissed.
2. IMPROPER ARGUMENT DISCOURAGING THE
CONSIDERATION OF MERCY
The petitioner argues that there are three bases to object to the
following argument:
When you go back and deliberate, I ask you to consider a
few things. Where was the mercy when the defendant beat
Cheryl? Where was the mercy when he anally raped her?
Where was the mercy when he strangled the last breath out of
her body? Where was the mercy then, ladies and gentlemen?
(Tr. Vo1. 11, p.6508, Ls.14-19; p.6508, L.24 - p.6509, L.7.)
First, the petitioner claims that the argument was general response to all
murders and should not, therefore, have been made in rebuttal closing. The
comments were responsive to defense counsel's closing that discussed at length
the petitioner's feelings about the murder. Mr. Chastain focused at some length
about the petitioner's guilt and remorse. (See Tr., Vo1.lI, pg, 6506, In.ll - pg.
6507, In.6.) Mr. Chastain was arguing that the petitioner was having an
appropriate response to his crimes. The State's arguments points out that the
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petitioner lacked the appropriate emotional response to his crimes at the time he
committed them: he had no mercy Cheryl Hanlon. The idea that this argument by
the State was misconduct has no merit.
Second, the petitioner claims that this small paragraph somehow violates
the Idaho death penalty statute which is to "narrow the class of first degree
murderers subjected to the death penalty." (Amended petition, pg. 149.) The
petitioner is a multiple murderer and serial rapist. He certainly falls into even the
narrowest class of first degree murderers. The small section of the State's
comments which the petitioner attacks do not comprise of the whole sentencing
case against the petitioner and do not expand the class of first degree murderers
subject to the death penalty. This argument has no merit.
Finally the petitioner cites cases from other jurisdictions where the use of
the word "mercy" was part of or related to an improper argument. The cases cited
by the petitioner involve arguments aimed at getting the jury to impose sentence
without mercy. The State's argument was simply the observation that the
petitioner did not respond to the pain and distress of his victim with mercy. This
argument was proper.
3. IMPROPER ARGUMENT RELYING ON PREJUDICIAL
PHOTOGRAPHS TO INFLAME THE PASSIONS OF THE JURY
The SAPD states that they don't know what photographs were used in this
case, but that they can raise an argument that the photographs were prejudicial
and, apparently, therefore, prosecutorial misconduct because of, "Mr. Hall's
experience with the State in the Henneman case." (AP at 149.) If the State
charged someone with an offense based on the State's "prior experience with the
defendant," the charge would be thrown out of court. The State objects to the
innuendo that anything was improper about the photographs in Ms. Henneman's
case and further objects to the bringing of a claim without any basis in fact.
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4. IMPROPER ARGUMENT RELYING
DISPROPORTIONATELY ON THE HENNEMAN CASE TO
INFLAME THE PASSIONS OF THE JURY
The State is unaware of any controlling precedent allotting a certain amount
of time to each piece or type of aggravation evidence. In the absence of such a
ruling, the State denies that there was anything improper about the time allotted
each item in the sentencing phase.
The jury had just spent weeks hearing about the death of Cheryl Hanlon.
The information about Lynn Henneman was new in the sentencing phase and
deserved discussion. The State denies that this argument was misconduct or
Improper In any way.
5. IMPROPER ARGUMENT ASSERTING THAT CHERYL
HANLON'S LIFE WOULD BE DEVALUED SHOULD THE
JURY IMPOSE A LIFE SENTENCE FOR HER MURDER
The petitioner makes the argument in subsection 4 above that the State
focused too much on the Henneman murder in sentencing phase argument. In this
subsection, the say that re-directing attention to Ms. Hanlon and the loss of her life
was also misconduct. Asking the jury to consider the life lost in the sentencing
phase of a murder trial cannot, seriously, be considered improper. This claim
should be denied.
6. IMPROPER ARGUMENT COMPARING THE WORTH OF
LYNN HENNEMAN TO MR. HALL
The petitioner makes note of the State's closing argument in which the
undersigned stated, about Ms. Henneman, "[s]ure, she is friendly and she loved
her job, she loved people, but she wouldn't take up with the likes of the defendant,
Erick Hall." (AP at 153.) The petitioner says this was disparaging.
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 99
001021
    
      
      
            
                
             
      
             
            
           
. . 
    
      
       
        
            
             
               
              
            
   
       
     
            
            
                
  CA          
       
     
The defendant was homeless, rarely showered and lived in a camp behind a
bush. The fact that Ms. Henneman would not have made friends with him was
relevant to the circumstances of her murder. What the petitioner fails to
acknowledge is that the other victim at issue, Ms. Hanlon did make friends with
people like the defendant. So if the comment had been disparaging to the
petitioner, it was to Ms. Hanlon as well. It wasn't. Instead it was simply a
comment on the personal habits of Ms. Henneman. Such argument was proper
and not misconduct.
7. IMPROPER ARGUMENT ASSERTING THAT MR. HALL'S FAMILY
MEMBERS TURNED OUT NORMAL
The State made an argument about how several members of Hall's family,
"overcame the bad background that they came from." (Tr., Vol.ll, p. 6493, In.20-
22.) The petitioner is apparently arguing that this comment and the following
comments amount to an argument that some of the family members "turned out
normal" - as described in the caption of this subsection. The petitioner takes
issues with the description of his family members as normal, saying, they: "have
not committed the same crimes as Mr. Hall, they have each struggled in varying
degrees with the abuse and neglect in their backgrounds." (AP at 154.) For the
purposes of the murder trial, it was the commission of crimes, not having personal
struggles, that was at issue. The petitioner's personal struggles were not the issue.
Further, it is reasonable to conclude that the defense wants the family of the
defendant to be likable and normal because that makes taking the defendant away
from his family through imposition of the death penalty more difficult. This is
simply not prosecutorial misconduct. This claim should be dismissed.
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8. IMPROPER ARGUMENT MISCHARACTERIZING TESTIMONY
The petitioner claims that the State's argument that because the imaging
was "broadly within normal limits. So, ladies and gentleman, there is no cognitive
disability here" mischaracterized the testimony. (AP at 154-55.) The petitioner
does not cite to any portion of the transcript or other source to establish that this
statement was a mischaracterization. Dr. Beaver stated during his testimony that,
"as having-some abnormalities that were - we all have some abnormalities on a
scan. And as we get older, more things pop up, which is really surprising. But-
and so it showed some of these white matter abnormalities that was still
considered broadly within normal limits, but at the edge ofnormal." (Tr., Vo1.II,
pg. 6364, Ins.5-10 (emphasis added).) The State denies that this was a
mischaracterization.
FF. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT DURING SENTENCING PHASE AND CLOSING
ARGUMENTS
Insofar as there was no prosecutorial misconduct, there was no ineffective
assistance in choosing not to object during the sentencing phase closing.
GG. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DUE TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO OBJECT
TO THE HENNEMAN CASE PROCEEDING TO TRIAL BEFORE
THE HANLON CASE
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the Henneman case proceeding to trial before the Hanlon case. (AP at 155-56.)
He argues that the aggravator for which he received the death penalty would have
been unavailable and therefore, he would have received a life sentence. His
argument that he would have received a life sentence is purely speculative. It is
equally possible that the jury, not having the prior murder conviction aggravator
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alleged, would have imposed the death penalty based upon the propensity and/or
any of the other aggravating factors alleged, given that the jury in this case found
that all of the aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
There were certainly strategic reasons trial counsel would want the
Henneman case tried first. Trial counsel would have anticipated that there would
be much more trial publicity in the Henneman case given the circumstances of that
case. Trial publicity would give trial counsel a better opportunity to change venue
and drag the Hanlon case out longer. The higher potential for change of venue
coupled with passage of time would mean it would be more difficult for the State
to try the Hanlon case. The longer it took to try the Hanlon case, the harder it
would be for the State to find witnesses and the more opportunity for witness'
memories to fade.
Had the Hanlon case proceeded first, the petitioner would be arguing that it
was ineffective assistance of counsel to allow Hanlon to proceed first. The
Henneman jury would have been in the same position at sentencing as the Hanlon
jury was. The Henneman jury would have had evidence of the Hanlon murder
before it for sentencing.
Moreover, it is conceivable, that the State could well have charged the prior
murder aggravator in the Henneman case had the Hanlon trial gone first. In
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme Court upheld
the admission of evidence of a prior death sentence during the sentencing phase of
the defendant's tria1.9 It is important to note that in Romano, the petitioner had
robbed and murdered one victim in 1985 and a second victim in 1986. He was
tried for the 1986 murder first and was convicted and sentenced to death by a jury.
He was then tried for the 1985 murder and pursuant to Oklahoma state law, the
State sought the death penalty based upon four aggravating circumstances, one of
which was that the defendant had been "previously convicted of a violent felony."
9 This case is discussed in more detail at various other points throughout this response where it is also
relevant to refute the petitioner's claim.
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ld. at 3-4. The defendant in Romano had not been convicted of the prior 1985
felony (prior murder) at the time he committed the 1986 murder and he had not
been convicted of the 1986 murder at the time he committed the 1985 murder.
The prior murder conviction and death sentence evidence that the Court in
Romano upheld was a for a murder conviction that was imposed before he was
tried for the 1985 murder, but that occurred factually after the 1985 murder.
Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. The petitioner cannot now speculate as the outcome in this case
had the Henneman case proceeded second in time because it is just as probable
that the jury would have found that the death penalty was not unjust in the Hanlon
case without the prior murder conviction aggravator. If speculation were the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, no conviction would stand. This





THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO
PRIOR MURDER CONVICTION
The petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the prior murder conviction aggravator. (AP at 156-162.) He first
argues that trial counsel should have challenged the fact that the prior murder
aggravator was neither presented to the Grand Jury nor charged in the Indictment.
The petitioner well knows that, at the time the Grand Jury heard this case, he had
not yet been convicted of the Henneman murder. The Henneman murder had
occurred prior to the Hanlon murder and the petitioner was charged with
committing the Henneman murder at the time the Grand Jury heard the Hanlon
case. The Indictment in the Henneman case was filed on April 22, 2003. 10 The
10 This date is based on the AS400 Register of Actions.
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Indictment and Indictment Part II in the Hanlon case were filed on May 20,2003.
(CR at 14-19.)
Idaho Code § 19-2515(3)(a) requires the State to file a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty pursuant to I.C. § 18-4004A. At that time in 2003, Idaho
Code § 18-4004A required the State to file a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty no later than thirty days after entry of plea. It further requires the State to
include a list of statutory aggravating factors the State will rely upon in seeking
the death penalty. It also permits the State to amend its notice upon a showing of
good cause at any time prior to trial. See I.C. § 18-4004A.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Idaho Code does not require
the State to present the aggravating factors to a Grand Jury. It requires a notice as
described above. The State can choose to present a death penalty case to a
magistrate for a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing or to a Grand
Jury. In either case, there is no requirement of a finding of aggravators nor does
Idaho Code require that.
The State presented the aggravating factors to the Grand Jury that it could
present. The State could not present the prior murder conviction aggravator
because the petitioner had not yet been convicted for the prior murder, although he
had clearly been charged and was subsequently convicted.
On May 29, 2003, nine days after the Indictment and Indictment Part II
were filed, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. (CR at
33-35.) This Notice was filed and served well within the 30-day time requirement.
In its Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty, the State put Court and counsel
on notice that it would file an Amended Notice alleging the prior murder
aggravator pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515. (Id.) On November 2, 2004, after the
petitioner was convicted of the prior murder in the Henneman case, the State filed
its Amended Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty based upon the prior
murder aggravator. (See CR at 382-87.) There is no doubt but that the petitioner
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was on notice of the aggravators and the State complied with the notice
requirements pursuant to the statute. Had the State included this element in the
Indictment Part II, the State is quite confident that the petitioner would now be
arguing error because it was prematurely and improperly presented to the Grand
Jury. There is no requirement it be presented to the Grand Jury in the first place.
The statute permits the State to file an Amended Notice at any time prior to trial
upon a showing of good cause. The State did better than that. It put Court and
Counsel on notice in the initial filing of its Notice of Intent that upon a conviction
in the Henneman case, it would be filing an Amended Notice to include the prior
murder aggravator.
Finally, there is no requirement to charge aggravating circumstances in the
indictment or information. There has never been a statutory requirement to plead
and prove aggravating circumstances at preliminary hearing or grand jury. In
fact, prior to 1998, Idaho did not require the State to file any notice with respect to
its intent to seek the death penalty. I.C. §18-4004A. 1998 Sess. Laws, Ch. 96, §2.
Idaho Code §18-4004A required, in 2003, the State to file its Notice no later than
thirty days after entry of a plea. In 2003, the legislature added the requirement
that the Notice contain a listing of the specific aggravators.
Notwithstanding the State's compliance, the petitioner seems to argue that
there is a constitutional requirement to plead and prove aggravating circumstances in
a death penalty case at a preliminary hearing or by the grand jury. He appears to be
arguing that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 227 (2000), created a new requirement that the State allege
aggravating circumstances as any other element of the crime of murder in the first-
degree.
In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 110 S.Ct. 1251 (1999), the defendant
was convicted under a federal caJ:jacking statute and his sentence was increased
based upon a sentencing factor found to exist by the judge. In Apprendi, the
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defendant fired a number of shots into the home of an African-American family and
pled guilty to a state weapons charge. After the plea, the prosecutor filed a motion to
enhance the sentence under a state hate crime law. The trial court found that the
conduct was racially motivated and sentenced the defendant to a term that exceeded
the maximum for the weapons charge. In Ring, the defendant was sentenced to death
based upon a finding made by the judge. The argument the petitioner seems to be
making here is that statutory aggravating circumstances are facts that increase the
maximum penalty for murder and, therefore, are elements of the crime ofmurder and
must be pled in the Indictment or Information.
The arguments advanced by the petitioner have been routinely rejected by
many state courts. 11 E.g. State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593, 604 (N.C. 2003) ("Our
independent review of decisions from our sister states reveals that to this date every
state court addressing the above-noted issue has held that Ring does not require that
aggravating circumstances be alleged in the indictment"), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 44
(2003); Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001), opinion after
remand, (Ala.App. Jan. 31, 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 828 (2003); Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002); Terrell
v. State, 572 S.E.2d 595, 602 (Ga. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 88 (2003); Garland
v. Com., 127 S.W.3d 529 (Ky. 2003), as modified denial rehearing, (2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 839 (2004), overruled on other grounds, Lanham v. Com., 171
S.W.3d 14 (2005); State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S.Ct. 1417 (2004); State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751 (Mo. 2002), rehearing denied
(2003), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2287 (2003); State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743, 747
(Mo. 2003), rehearing denied, (2003); State v. Oatney, 66 P.3d 475, 487 (Or. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1148 (2004); State v. Holman, 540 S.E.2d 18, 22-23 (N.c.
2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 910 (2001); State v. Faulkner, 2003 WL 22220341
(Tenn.App. 2003), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 853 (2005).
11 Fourth District Court Copsey has rejected similar defense arguments in State v. Abdullah, Ada County
Case Number H0201384.
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The Edwards decision from Missouri is illustrative. Under Missouri law, the
State was required to give advance pretrial notice of the aggravating circumstances it
intended to prove. The State complied with the statutory notice requirement. In
review of the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of first-degree murder, the
Missouri Supreme Court ruled as follows: "[w]here, as here, the state gave the
defendant pretrial notice pursuant to [the applicable state statute] of the aggravating
circumstances it intended to prove at the penalty phase of trial, it was not required to
list them in the indictment." Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 543.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has rejected the argument that
aggravating circumstances must be listed in an Indictment. See Stevens v. State, 867
So.2d 219 (Miss. 2003), rehearing denied (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 858 (2004);
Simmons v. State, 869 So.2d 995 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 960 (2004).
Relying upon Ring and Apprendi, the defendant in Stevens argued that his death
sentences should be vacated because the aggravating circumstances upon which the
State relied for capital murder were not included in the Indictment. In rejecting that
argument, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated: "The State is correct in its
assertion that a defendant is not entitled to formal notice of the aggravating
circumstances to be employed by the prosecution and that an indictment for capital
murder puts a defendant on sufficient notice that the statutory aggravating factors
will be used against him." Stevens, 867 So.2d at 227. That Court further reasoned
that the defendant had sufficient notice of the aggravating circumstances because
they are clearly listed in the statute. "Anytime an individual is charged with murder,
he is put on notice that the death penalty may result. And, our death penalty statute
clearly states the only aggravating circumstances which may be relied upon by the
prosecution in seeking the ultimate punishment." ld.
The defendant in Simmons made a similar argument, i.e., that the indictment
was defective because it did not contain the aggravating factors. The Mississippi
Supreme Court noted that the case before it was not a federal capital case and
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concluded that state capital defendants do not have a constitutional right to have
aggravating circumstances listed in Indictments. "In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court stated that the Fifth Amendment right to indictment had never been
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Absent more explicit
direction, we find that the Supreme Court has not ruled that state capital defendants
have a constitutional right to have all aggravating circumstances listed in their
indictments." Simmons, 869 So.2d at 1011.
The foregoing construction of Ring, Jones and Apprendi is also made in a
Supreme Court case decided concurrently with Ring: Harris v. United States, 536
U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (2002). In that case, the defendant carried a pistol at his
side as he sold drugs at his pawnshop. He was convicted of federal drug and
weapons charges under a statute that increased the sentence if the gun was
brandished. At sentencing, the court found by a preponderance that the defendant
had brandished a gun and sentenced him to a greater term under the statute. Citing
Jones and Apprendi, the defendant argued to the Supreme Court that brandishing,
since it had the effect of increasing the penalty, should have been pled in the
indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court,
noting that the sentence given did not exceed the maximum permitted by the statute,
disagreed and ruled that, "[t]he factor need not be alleged in the indictment,
submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 568.
The Indictment in the present case properly charged the petitioner with the
crime of murder in the first degree. Any person convicted of this offense can be
punished by life in prison or death. There is no statutory or constitutional
requirement that the State allege the aggravating circumstances in the Indictment.
The petitioner also cites Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003), in
support of his argument. Sattazahn involved a Pennsylvania defendant who was
prosecuted for first-degree murder. The jury convicted in the guilt phase, but hung on
the decision of whether the State had proven aggravating factors. Pursuant to
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Pennsylvania law, the court then imposed a life sentence. Defendant subsequently
appealed, his conviction was overturned, and his case remanded for a new trial. At
the new trial, the State once again sought to impose the death penalty. Defendant
objected on the basis of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The
Supreme Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the State seeking
the death penalty on retrial. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 110. In so holding, the majority
of the Court relied upon a line of previous Supreme Court decisions that well pre-
date Ring and Apprendi. These decisions had established the idea that once a finder
of fact, whether a jury or a judge, had failed to find the existence of aggravating
factors and imposed a life sentence, that finding operated as the functional equivalent
of an "acquittal" on the issue of the death penalty and the State could not seek the
death penalty in a subsequent retrial of the offense. See generally, Stroud v. United
States, 251 U.S. 15, 40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L. Ed. 103 (1919); Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981); and Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S.
203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). Obviously, the holding in Sattazahn has
little application to the present case as the petitioner was not "acquitted" on the issue
of the existence of aggravating factors. The jury found the existence each of the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. All Sattazahn holds is
that the State is free to seek the death penalty on retrial when the original sentencing
jury was deadlocked as to the existence of aggravating factors.
In addition to the State courts mentioned above, at least one Federal Court has
explicitly rejected what appears to be the petitioner's argument that Ring, Apprendi,
and Jones require that aggravating factors are elements or "functional equivalent of
elements (AP at 157). " In sum, the narrow holding of Ring did not mandate that
aggravating factors must become elements of new greater substantive offense.[ ... ]
Because Jones, Apprendi, and Ring, do not require the creation of aggravated
kidnapping resulting in death or other new greater substantive offenses, ... , the
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potential constitutional complications raised by Defendant are avoided." United
States v. Lentz, 225 F.Supp.2d 672, 680 (E.D. Vir. 2002).
The petitioner cites United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005), in
support of his proposition. However, the Court in Allen specifically noted that "the
Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement has not been construed to apply to the
states." Id. at 942.
In Schirro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), the United States Supreme
Court held that Ring was procedural rather than substantive and therefore, did not
apply retroactively. In so holding, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
argument that Ring was substantive because it modified the elements of the offense
for which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 353-55.
The petitioner's argument is based on the conclusion that Ring, Apprendi,
Jones, and Sattazahan have held that aggravating factors are now "elements" of a
new greater offense for constitutional purposes. As discussed above, this argument
misreads the holdings in Ring, Apprendi, Jones, and Sattazahn. Indeed, his
argument is contradicted by the language of Ring, Apprendi, and Jones. "What
today's decision says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an
aggravating factor existed. Those States that leave the ultimate life-or-death
decision to the judge may continue to do so - by requiring a prior jury finding of
an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase ...." Ring 122 S.Ct. at 2445 (Scalia,
J. concurring)(emphasis added). The "substantive basis for ... [the] enhancement is
not at issue; the adequacy of ... [the] procedure is." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475,
120 S.Ct 2348. "The constitutional safeguards that figure in our analysis today
concern not the identity of the elements defining criminal liability, but only the
required procedures for finding the facts that determine the maximum permissible
punishment. ..."Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (emphasis added).
The maximum permissible punishment in Idaho for first-degree murder is
death. Like many other states, Idaho now has a statutorily defined procedure for
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finding the aggravating facts necessary to determine that punishment. This
procedure is set forth in Idaho Code §§18-4004A and 19-2515. Idaho's statutory
sentencing procedures in capital cases are virtually identical to the statutory
structures in States that have rejected the defendant's arguments. Again, Missouri
is illustrative.
The defendant in State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751 (Mo. 2002), rehearing denied
(2003), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2287 (2003), argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
to sentence him to death because the Information charging him with first-degree
murder did not specify any aggravating factors and, therefore, only charged him with
''unaggravated first degree murder." Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 771. He argued that read
in light of Apprendi, Missouri's statutory scheme creates two kinds of first-degree
murder: "unenhanced" or "simple" first-degree murder and "aggravated" or "capital"
murder and that failure to allege the aggravating factors in the Information deprived
the court of jurisdiction to try him for "capital" murder because of the Missouri
constitution's requirement that elements of an offense be charged and proven at a
preliminary hearing. In rejecting his argument, the Missouri Supreme Court stated
"[t]he Appellant's contention of a violation ofApprendi is without merit: pursuant to
section 565.005, the State gave Appellant notice that it would seek the death penalty,
and the aggravating circumstances were proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The maximum penalty for first-degree murder in Missouri is death, and the required
presence of aggravating factors or circumstances to result in this sentence in no way
increases this maximum penalty" Id. at 772 (internal quotations omitted). Similarly,
in Idaho, the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death.
There is no requirement that the aggravating factors be presented to the
Grand Jury in the first place. The fact that the State proceeded in an abundance of
caution to present those aggravating factors it could present to the Grand Jury does
not somehow create a requirement that doesn't exist in the first place. It is worth
noting that even with the Grand Jury's return of the Indictment Part II, the
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decision to proceed to seek the death penalty rests with the Prosecutor as is
reflected in the death penalty notice requirement. Accordingly, it was not
ineffective for counsel not to challenge the Indictment as constitutionally
insufficient. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
Second, the petitioner argues that trial counsel should have argued that the
prior murder aggravator must have existed at the time of his crime. (AP at 158.)
First, the "previously convicted of another murder" aggravating factor was in
existence both at the time of the Henneman murder and the Hanlon murder. 12
Second, when the petitioner murdered the victim in this case in March 2003, he
had already committed the Henneman murder 2 12 years prior in September 2000,
but had not yet been caught. The petitioner was convicted of the Henneman
murder on October 22, 2004. (CR at 385.) By the time this case went to trial in
2007, the petitioner had been convicted of the Henneman murder for three years.
Merely because the petitioner had not been convicted of the Henneman murder on
the day he committed this murder, does not mean that the State cannot plead this
aggravator upon his conviction.
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the admission of evidence of a prior death sentence during the
sentencing phase of the defendant's tria1. 13 It is important to note that in Romano,
the petitioner had robbed and murdered one victim in 1985 and a second victim in
1986. He was tried for the 1986 murder first and was convicted and sentenced to
death by a jury. He was then tried for the 1985 murder and pursuant to Oklahoma
state law, the State sought the death penalty based upon four aggravating
circumstances, one of which was that the defendant had been "previously
convicted of a violent felony." ld. at 3-4. The defendant in Romano had not been
convicted of the prior 1985 felony (prior murder) at the time he committed the
12 There was an amendment to I.e. 19-2515 effective July 1, 2000, which added language regarding the
victim's former or present official status in an unrelated aggravating factor.
13 This case is discussed in more detail at various other points throughout this response where it is also
relevant to refute the petitioner's claim.
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1986 murder and he had not been convicted of the 1986 murder at the time he
committed the 1985 murder. The prior murder conviction and death sentence
evidence that the Court in Romano upheld was a for a murder conviction that was
imposed before he was tried for the 1985 murder, but that occurred factually after
the 1985 murder.
Additionally, as the petitioner points out, the Idaho Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue. It was certainly not ineffective for counsel not to raise this
Issue. This claim is without merit and should be dismissed.
Incredibly, the petitioner also argues that trial counsel should have argued
that "conviction" means "final conviction." (AP at 160.) He cites no case law to
support this argument. This claim makes no sense. Merely because a conviction
may be appealed does not mean it isn't a conviction. This claim should be
rejected.
Third, the petitioner argues that the previous murder conviction aggravator
"offended various constitutional principles" and that trial counsel should have
challenged the aggravator. (AP at 160-62.) The Apprendi argument appears to be
a repeat of what the State has responded to above. It will not be repeated here. He
also argues that because he "had already been convicted and punished for the
Henneman murder, that same fact could not be used to establish the prior murder
conviction statutory aggravating circumstance in the Hanlon case under the double
jeopardy protections of the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and statutes of
the State of Idaho.,,14 (AP at 161.) This argument is nonsensical and without
merit. Double jeopardy precludes the petitioner for being punished twice for the
same offense. He has not been punished twice for the same offense. He was
punished for the Henneman murder and for the Hanlon murder - two separate
murders. Merely because the State is entitled to use the prior murder as an
aggravating factor does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
14 Apparently he was "convicted" for purposes of this argument but not "convicted" for purposes of the
argument preceding this one.
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He next argues that the application of the prior murder aggravator violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause. (AP 161.) He states that "the punishment of death for
proof of a prior murder conviction did not exist at the time of the commission of
the crime for which Mr. Hall was tried." (AP at 161-62.) As previously pointed
out, the statute making a prior murder conviction an aggravating factor did exist
both when the petitioner murdered Henneman and when he murdered the victim in
this case. Indeed, the petitioner had been convicted of the prior murder for three
years at the time he went to trial on this case.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected similar arguments. See
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901). In McDonald, the State had
passed a habitual offender law, which increased the punishment for prior
convictions.
The statute, imposing a punishment on none but future
crimes, is not ex post facto. It affects alike all persons
similarly situated, and therefore does not deprive anyone of
the equal protection of the laws. The statute does not impair
the right of trial by jury, or put the accused twice in jeopardy
for the same offense, or impose a cruel or unusual
punishment.
Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
Finally, the petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not
moving for acquittal on the prior murder aggravator because it was inconsistent
with the conclusion the jury reached on the propensity aggravator. (AP at 162.)
The jury found that all of the aggravating factors had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, including both the prior conviction aggravator and the
propensity aggravator. (CR at 1191-95.) Merely because they were unable to
decide whether all of the mitigation outweighed the propensity aggravator does
not make the verdicts inconsistent. Nor does the petitioner cite to any case law in
support of this proposition. This claim should be dismissed.
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Trial counsel's decisions were well within an objective standard of
reasonableness. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. This claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
II. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE IDAHO'S DEATH
PENALTY SCHEME AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the constitutionality of the statutory aggravating
circumstances.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed
to challenge Idaho's Death Penalty scheme as unconstitutional and failed to
challenge the constitutionality of the statutory aggravating circumstances. Trial
counsel did challenge Idaho's Death Penalty scheme as unconstitutional. (See
Defendant's Motion to Declare Idaho Capital Sentencing Scheme
Unconstitutional, CR at 92-99.) Trial counsel went beyond that and filed a Motion
to Strike/Dismiss Aggravating Circumstances. (CR at 88-91.) This Court heard
arguments on these motions on April 27, 2004. (See Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings, April 27, 2004 at 243-356.) This Court ruled on these motions on
June 17, 2004 and upheld the constitutionality of Idaho's Death Penalty scheme.
(See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, June 17,2004 at 371-85; see also Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Declare Idaho Capital Sentencing Scheme
Unconstitutional, CR at 373-75.) This claim should be dismissed.
2. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the lack of notice of all evidence relied upon in proving
the statutory aggravating circumstances
The petitioner argues that trial counsel did not challenge lack of notice of
evidence relied upon to prove the statutory aggravating circumstances. First, trial
counsel did file a Motion to Strike/Dismiss Aggravating Circumstances (CR at 88-
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91) and trial counsel argued it when they argued their Motion to Declare Idaho
Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional (Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings, April 27, 2004 at 243-356.)
Trial counsel had all of the evidence and discovery the State had for both
the guilt and death penalty phases. They had sufficient notice of all of the
evidence. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that trial counsel's
performance was deficient or that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Finally, the petitioner cites no case law in support of this claim.
Accordingly, this Court should reject this claim and it should be dismissed.
3. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the lack of a provision requiring jury findings
regarding facts found in aggravation and mitigation
The petitioner claims that trial counsel should have requested a special
verdict form requiring written findings regarding what mitigating circumstances
were found and the weighing process. The petitioner points out that such findings
are required where the jury is waived and the District Court is making the
findings. Trial counsel's choice not to ask for a special verdict form, which would
not conform to the actual requirements of the jury under I.C. 19-2515(8)(a), was
not deficient performance. It was within the spectrum of acceptable trial tactics to
accept jury forms that were in compliance with the current statutory scheme.
The petitioner alleges that trial counsel should have challenged the
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 19-2515, insofar as it does not require such
findings. To require that the jury prepare special verdict forms outlining their
findings on mitigation would prevent the individual assessment of mitigation that
is contemplated under the current statutory scheme. To the benefit of the
defendant, the jury instructions provide that the jury need not be unanimous on
what mitigating circumstances exist. (See Special Sentencing Proceeding Jury
Instruction #49.) Each juror is asked to decide, "whether mitigating circumstances
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exist, and, if so, then consider them in your individual weighing process." (Id.)
To require jury findings regarding mitigation would require unanimity about what
amounts to mitigation. Such a requirement cuts against a single "hold out"
preventing the imposition of the death penalty. The procedure followed was more
advantageous to the defense than that suggested by the petitioner. Accordingly,
this and all related claims should be dismissed.
4. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the lack of definition for "Sufficiently Compelling"
necessary for meaningful weight.
The petitioner claims it was ineffective assistance of counsel not to
challenge the constitutionality of the "sufficiently compelling" language in jury
instruction #53. (AP at 172.) The "sufficiently compelling" language was
discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d
298 (2004). In that case, the Court stated:
Idaho Code § 19-2515(3) describes a special sentencing
proceeding, where the jury, or the court if a jury is waived,
finds beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance. Then, the defendant shall be
sentenced to death unless mitigating circumstances are found
to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be
unjust. Idaho Code § 19-2515(5) outlines the procedure for
the conduct of the sentencing proceeding before the same jury
that determined the defendant's guilt or, if it is impracticable,
a newly constituted jury. The statutory aggravators are as they
appeared in the earlier version of the statute, although the jury
shall return a special verdict with regard to each statutory
aggravating circumstance alleged by the state. The revised
death penalty scheme only provides new procedures for
determining the aggravating circumstances redefined as the
functional equivalent of elements of capital murder of which
Lovelace had notice.
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State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (2004). If the phrase "sufficiently
compelling" was improper or only proper with some definitions provided, the
Court in Lovelace was in a position to rule on that issue. Instead, the Idaho
Supreme Court, essentially, approved the language.
That language is nearly identical to the pre-Ring language for court decided
death sentences. That language: "[w]here the court finds a statutory aggravating
circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds
that mitigating circumstances which may be presented are sufficiently compelling
that the death penalty would be unjust," was upheld as constitutional by the Ninth
Circuit. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 15 (1998), citing Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d
873 (9th Cir. 1991) reversed in part, on other grounds 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
The petitioner also complains that definitions should have been gIVen
regarding this phrase.
Pursuant to Idaho law, terms that are of common usage and
are generally understood need not be further defined when
instructing the jury. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 264, 923 P.2d at
971; Gonzales, 92 Idaho at 156,438 P.2d at 901. As stated by
the preface to the Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction, "the
irresistible impulse to define words of ordinary English is
unfortunately pervasive. It should be curbed."
State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001). No definitions were
necessary and, accordingly, trial counsel was not deficient for choosing not to ask
for them.
The petitioner's claim regarding the "sufficiently compelling" language in
the jury instructions has no merit. The State denies this claim and moves it be
dismissed.
5. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the lack of a provision assigning the burden of proof to
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravation is not outweighed by the mitigation.
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The petitioner next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the lack of a provision assigning the burden of proof to the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravation is not outweighed by the
mitigation. (AP 174-75.) This argument is without merit and should be rejected.
The Special Sentencing Proceeding Jury Instructions in this case made very
clear that the State has the burden of proof to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that one or more aggravating circumstances exist. It also made very clear that the
jury must be unanimous in finding that one or more aggravating circumstance
existed. (See generally Special Sentencing Proceeding Jury Instructions #39-53.)
The State is unclear from the petitioner's argument how Idaho's capital sentencing
statute violates Ring or any constitutional provisions. Idaho's capital sentencing
statute requires a jury to reach a unanimous decision based upon a finding that an
aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ring requires that any fact which increases the maximum punishment must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact which increases the
punishment in death penalty cases in Idaho is found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt; i.e., at least one aggravating factor.
Nor, contrary to the petitioner's argument, was the burden of proof ever
shifted to the defense. In fact, Jury Instruction #42 states in part, "[t]he State has
the burden of proving the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
that burden remains on the State throughout the sentencing hearing. The
defendant is not required to prove the absence of any aggravating circumstance,
nor is the defendant required to produce any evidence at all."
Because the jury instructions appropriately instructed the jury and made it
clear to the jury that the State had the burden of proof to establish one or more
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no basis for
counsel to object. Nor was there a basis to object to the capital sentencing statute
in Idaho because that statute is not unconstitutional.
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 119
001041
           
               
             
            
           
               
              
            
         
            
          
               
       
           
              
               
       
            
               
            
           
            
           
           
                 
           
               
        
       
     
The petitioner also appears to be arguing that trial counsel should have
challenged Idaho's death penalty statute because the statute fails to require the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that an aggravating factor is not
outweighed by mitigation. This claim is without merit and should be dismissed.
Idaho Code § 19-2515(3)(b) provides that "[w]here a statutory aggravating
circumstance is found, the defendant shall be sentenced to death unless mitigating
circumstances which may be presented are found to be sufficiently compelling that
the death penalty would be unjust." (emphasis added.)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), requires that a jury find the statutory
aggravating circumstances. Ring does not require the jury to weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It is the jury's unanimous finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor exists that gives rise to the
death penalty and it is the mitigation that would reduce the death sentence to life.
Accordingly, it is only the jury's finding that one or more aggravating
circumstances exists that a jury must make beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether a jury is mandated to conduct the weighing process in capital
cases begins with an analysis of Ring, which noted the issue before the Supreme
Court was narrow: whether an aggravating circumstance under the Arizona statute
operated as the functional equivalent of an element so that it must be found by a
jury based on the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the right to a jury trial. Ring,
536 U.S. at 597 nA.
Based upon Idaho's statutory scheme, once a defendant is convicted of
first-degree murder and the jury finds a statutory aggravator, the maximum penalty
is death. The finding of mitigation and the determination that the mitigation is
"sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust" does not increase
the maximum penalty, but actually reduces the penalty to from death to life.
Other courts have carefully examined Ring and the Supreme Court's capital
litigation jurisprudence and recognized Ring does not require juries to conduct the
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weighing process before the death penalty can be imposed. In State v. Gales, 658
N.W.2d 604,611 (Neb. 2003), the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that Ring
marks the convergence of two lines of federal constitutional
authority: one addressing procedures which states must
follow in order to implement capital punishment in
conformity with the Eighth Amendment, and the other
dealing with the extent to which the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a right to a jury determination of the existence of
facts which increase the penalty for a crime.
Examining numerous Supreme Court decisions regarding Eighth Amendment
capital sentencing requirements after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the
Nebraska court recognized Nebraska's capital sentencing procedure was similar to
that of many other states which "employed a process of determining and balancing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Gales, 658 N.W.2d at 614. The court
further explained:
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized this process as
consisting of an "eligibility decision," in which there must be
a determination of the existence of one or more of the
prescribed aggravating circumstances before a defendant
convicted of a capital crime is eligible for a sentence of death,
and a "selection decision," in which the sentencer determines
whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in
fact receive it, based upon an individualized determination of
the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
cnme.
Id. After reviewing numerous Supreme Court Sixth Amendment cases, Ring, and
Nebraska's death penalty statutes, the court rejected the contention that Ring
mandates juries weigh mitigation and aggravation, reasoning:
It is the determination of "death eligibility" which exposes the
defendant to greater punishment, and such exposure triggers
the Sixth Amendment right to jury determination as
delineated in Apprendi and Ring. In contrast, the
determination of mitigating circumstances, the balancing of
aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances,
and proportionality review are part of the "selection decision"
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in capital sentencing, which, under the current and prior
statutes, occurs only after eligibility has been determined.
[Citation omitted]. These determinations cannot increase the
potential punishment to which a defendant is exposed as a
consequence of the eligibility determination.
Id. at 628.
In Oken v. Maryland, 835 S.2d 1105 (Md. 2003), the Maryland Court of
Appeals took a similar approach. Examining the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence, the court concluded:
Ring only implicates the finding of aggravating
circumstances, and not the process of weighing aggravating
against mitigating factors. Of particular import is that
jurisprudence which distinguishes those elements of the
sentencing process which make a defendant death-eligible
from those elements involved in selecting those death-eligible
defendants who actually will be sentenced to death.
Id. at 1122. After examining and explaining the differences between "weighing"
and "non-weighing" states, the court further explained:
In both weighing and non-weighing schemes, it is the finding
of an aggravating circumstance which makes the defendant
death-eligible. The selection process that follows determines,
under both weighing and non-weighing statutes, whether, in
the judgment of the sentencing authority, the penalty actually
should be applied.
Id. at 1123. After completing its review of Supreme Court precedent, the court
determined:
The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated, as has the
legislative history of the Maryland statute, that it is the
finding of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances
which makes a convicted defendant death-eligible. It is this
finding which performs the function of narrowing the class of
eligible defendants as required by Furman. By reverse
implication, it is also this finding which exposes the
convicted defendant to the statutory maximum. Ring, which
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by its terms addresses only the finding of aggravating
circumstances, makes clear that these are opposite sides of the
same coin. We therefore conclude that the selection phase of
the sentencing process, involving weighing, is not affected by
the requirements ofRing.
Id. at 1157-58.
Texas has likewise rejected this argument, recognizing, "The mitigation
issue does not increase the statutory minimum. To the contrary, the mitigation
issue is designed to allow for imposition of a life sentence, which is less than the
statutory maximum." Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 534 (Tex. erim. App.
2004) (emphasis in original). Likewise, Oklahoma has concluded:
Ring describes a substantive element of a capital offense as
one which makes an increase in authorized punishment
contingent on a finding of fact. Using this description, the
substantive element of capital murder in Oklahoma is the
jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance necessary to
support a capital sentence. It is that finding, not the weighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that authorizes
jurors to consider imposing a sentence of death. That is, the
increase in punishment from life imprisonment without parole
to the death penalty is contingent on the factual finding of an
aggravating circumstance.
Torres v. State, 58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (footnote omitted).
The Delaware Supreme Court is in accord. In Brice v. Delaware, 815 A.2d
314,322 (Del. 2003) (footnote omitted), the court explained:
Although a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death
without finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors, it is not that determination that increases
the maximum punishment. Rather, the maximum punishment
is increased by the finding ofthe statutory aggravator. At that
point a judge can sentence a defendant to death, but only if
the judge finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors. Therefore, the weighing of aggravating
circumstances against mitigating circumstances does not
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increase the punishment. Rather, it ensures that the
punishment imposed is appropriate and proportional.
The California Supreme Court rejected this argument because "once the
defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special
circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more
than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense." People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d
1123, 1147 (Cal. 2003). The weighing associated with mitigation merely
determines "'whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact
receive that sentence.'" Id. (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972
(1994)). "As such, the penalty phase determination is inherently moral and
normative, not factuaL" Id. (citation omitted). Tennessee, State v. Holton, 126
S.W.3d 845, 864 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004), Illinois, People
v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 821 (Ill. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 833 (2003), and
Alabama, In re Waldrop, 859 So.2d 1181, 1189 (Ala. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
968 (2003), have also determined the weighing process is not a "factual
determination" that requires a jury finding under Ring.
Other courts that have addressed this issue and concluded otherwise are
distinguishable from Idaho's death penalty statute. In Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d
450,460 (Nev. 2002) (quoting Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554 (emphasis in original)), the
Nevada Supreme Court examined its state statutes and concluded, "Nevada
statutory law requires two distinct findings to render a defendant death-eligible:
'The jury or the panel of judges may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at
least one aggravating circumstance and further finds that there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance of
circumstances found.''' Clearly, I.e. § 19-2515 does not contain the same
conjunctive language.
In Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256,266 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 16-11-103 (2000)), the court addressed a similar statute establishing a three
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judge panel could not impose a death sentence unless it found "(A) At least one
aggravating factor has been proved; and (B) There are insufficient mitigating
factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that are proved." Because
"insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor" had to be
proven before death could be imposed, the court concluded Ring mandated jury
weighing in Colorado. Id. at 266-67.
The same is true in Missouri, which requires the jury to impose "life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole or release except by act of
the governor" if the jury "does not" make four distinct findings, including: (1) at
least one statutory aggravating factor; (2) the aggravation evidence warrants
imposing the death penalty; (3) the mitigation does not outweigh the aggravation
evidence; and (4) under "all the circumstances" the death penalty is appropriate.
State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. §
565.030.4).
Arizona's statute, while similar to I.e. § 19-2515, was markedly different
because the Arizona courts were required to impose a death sentence only "if the
court finds one or more aggravating circumstance . . . and that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 13-703(F) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Ballard, 794
N.E.2d at 821 (distinguishing Arizona's statute). Because the death penalty could
not be imposed unless the fact-finder "conclude[d] that the mitigating factors are
not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency," the Arizona Supreme Court
determined the implicit finding by a jury of a statutory aggravating factor was
insufficient to establish a defendant's capital sentence resulted from harmless
error. State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915,942-43 (Ariz. 2003) (Ring III).
As detailed above, because the weighing of mitigating factors under I.C. §
19-2515 does not increase the penalty from life to death, but actually reduces the
penalty from death to life, the weighing process is not the functional equivalent of
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an element of a greater offense and, therefore, the jury was not mandated to
complete the weighing process in this case.
Finally, in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 783-84, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004),
the Idaho Supreme Court indicated the weighing process is not the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense. Addressing the question of whether
a "'trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice' and that its most important element is 'the right to have the jury, rather
than the judge reach the requisite finding of guilty, '" the Supreme Court
explained:
Section 19-2515 did not define a separate crime of capital
first-degree murder. It merely set forth the procedures that
must be followed in order to impose a death sentence, defined
the statutory aggravating circumstances, and required that at
least one aggravating circumstance be found beyond a
reasonable doubt before a defendant could be sentenced to
death. Ring did not elevate those statutory aggravating
circumstances into elements of a crime, nor did it create a
new crime.... Ring merely held that a state cannot impose
the death penalty unless its sentencing procedures have the
jury, not the judge, determine the existence of a statutory
aggravating factor.
Id. at 784.
Accordingly, because trial counsel's performance was not deficient for
failing to challenge the Idaho death penalty statute on this ground and because
prejudice has not been shown, this Court should dismiss this claim.
JJ. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
FOR FAILING TO ARGUE THAT THE CONVICTION OF RAPE
MERGED WITH MURDER
The petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
the rape conviction merged with the murder conviction. (AP at 175.) This is an
appellate issue that should not be addressed in this post-conviction proceeding as a
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substitute for an appeal. In State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991) rehearing
denied, overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated that the merger issue depends on the facts of each
case: "the issue of whether a charged offense is a lesser included offense of
another charged offense is analyzed in reference to the facts of each case." Id. at
757. Although the Court in Pizzuto found that the robbery conviction merged with
the felony murder conviction, it is a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 757-78.
Accordingly, this is a direct appeal issue that should not be addressed as a
substitute for an appeal in this post-conviction proceeding.
However, even assuming this Court or an appellate court would apply the
principles of merger to this case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Even if the rape conviction merges with the felony murder conviction, it does not
change the fact that the jury found that imposition of the death penalty was not
unjust. The sentence of death still stands. Given the absence of prejudice, this
claim and all related claims should be dismissed.
KK. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO REQUEST SENTENCING PHASE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
The petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
sentencing phase jury instructions which defined and limited the scope of
aggravating circumstances and guided their consideration of nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances and victim impact statements. (AP at 175.) To the
extent that this issue was addressed in the State's prior responses to similar claims,
those arguments are incorporated herein by reference. The petitioner cites no case
law to support his claim. Nor does he suggest what jury instructions would have
been properly requested. It is unclear what he is claiming trial counsel did wrong.
The jury was properly instructed and counsel's performance was not deficient.
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The petitioner next argues that trial counsel should have requested an
instruction that "the jury must weigh individual aggravating circumstance against
the cumulative mitigation." (AP at 176.) Special Sentencing Proceeding Jury
Instruction #49 states exactly what petitioner claims trial counsel should have
requested:
You must each decide for yourself whether all mitigating
circumstances presented, when weighed against each
statutory aggravating circumstance proven by the State, are
sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of the death
penalty unjust.
(Special Sentencing Proceeding Jury Instruction #49.)
There is no discemable difference between the jury instruction the
petitioner proposes and the jury instruction this Court actually gave. In fact, the
petitioner concedes that this "instruction is consistent with ICm 1718, and is
technically an accurate statement of the statutory language." (AP at 176.) There
is no merit to this claim. It should be dismissed.
LL. DEPRIVATION OF THE FFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILING TO CHALLENGE EXECUTION BY LETHAL INJECTION AS
A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The petitioner alleges execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional.
Petitioner acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court recently addressed
lethal injection, "rejecting the challenge to Kentucky's lethal injection procedure."
(AP at 177 citing Baze v. Rees, ---U.S.---, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).) Accordingly,
this claim should be denied.
Further, petitioner has not identified a forum in which his trial counsel
could have challenged the lethal injections statute. His argument appears to be an
attack on the methodology itself. Such an attack is not proper at this juncture.
Idaho Code § 19-4901 limits the granting of post-conviction relief to individuals
who have been "convicted of or sentenced for, a crime," as follows:
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(2)
(3)
(1) That the conviction or sentence was in violation
of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or
laws of this state;
That the court was without jurisdiction to Impose
sentence;
That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by
law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not
previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interest ofjustice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or
conditional release was unlawfully revoked by the court in
which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise unlawfully
held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b)
through (f), Idaho Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the
offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise
subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error
heretofore available under any common law, statutory or
other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy: may
institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this
act to secure relief.
Discussing the parameters of the UPCPA and the claim upon which relief
can be granted, the court of appeals has explained, "the UPCPA was instituted as
the exclusive vehicle to present claims regarding whether a conviction or sentence
was entered in violation of constitutional or statutory law. A writ of habeas
corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful
conditions of confinement." Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 863, 949 P.2d 1068
(1997). Because an attack on the petitioner's method of execution claim does not
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challenge his conviction or sentence, the UPCPA is not the proper mechanism to
raise such a challenge, thereby requiring dismissal of this claim.
MM. DEPRIVATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO RAISE INTERNATIONAL LAW
VIOLATIONS
Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel should have raised international law
challenges. This allegation is despite his acknowledgement that the United States
Supreme Court has specifically ruled that "the Vienna convention may constitute
an international commitment, but it and similar treaties are not binding against the
states unless enabling statutes are passed or the treaty itself conveys an intention
that it be "self executing" and is ratified on that basis." (AP at 177, citing
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. (2008).)
Specifically, the petitioner claims that his death sentence is in violation of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The State denies that
such covenant is binding on this Court. Pursuant to the I.C.C.P.R. the petitioner
alleges that his death sentence is improper because he will endure a prolonged
incarceration on death row. The length of his pre-execution incarceration is
directly correlated to his decision to avail himself of the available Uniform Post-
Conviction Act process and direct appeals. His choice to seek relief is entirely
proper. However, it defies logic that he would forward an argument that the
imposition of his death sentence should be sooner, while also initiating and
participating in the very processes that will delay it. The State further denies that
the length of pre-execution incarceration will be in violation of any applicable law.
The State requests this claim be dismissed.
The petitioner also alleges that he does not have access to a meaningful
clemency process. The State denies that Idaho clemency process is in any way
lacking. The hallmark of a proper clemency process is that the procedures
maintain clemency as the authority of the executive branch. See Ohio Adult
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Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). Such is the case in Idaho. See
Idaho Constitution, Article IV, Section 7 and State v. Starry, 130 Idaho 834, 948
P.2d 1133 (Ct. App. 1997). The petitioner has failed to articulate a claim
regarding the alleged deficiencies of the clemency process in Idaho. Accordingly,
the State moves that this claim be dismissed.
Next, the petitioner alleges that he was "arbitrarily deprived of his life."
(AP at 178.) As explained above, great care was taken in the penalty section of
the trial to prevent the jury's verdict from being arbitrary. In light of such
precautions, the State denies this claim.
The petitioner further claims that he was, "denied his right to due process."
Such a claim is entirely without basis. The State denies that the petitioner was
denied his due process rights. The petitioner underwent a lengthy jury trial, while
fully represented by counsel and with all the protections available under the law.
The petitioner also claims that his sentence is in violation of the American
Declarations of the Rights and Duties of Man, which requires an "impartial"
hearing. (AP at 178.) Such a claim is baseless in light of the record. The trial of
this matter was an impartial hearing. The State denies this and all related claims.
The petitioner also says that the Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment precludes his execution.
However, he does not even articulate an explanation as to why this might be the
case. The State denies the applicability of the convention.
The petitioner grants that the American Convention or Human Rights, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations have not yet been passed. They deserve no further review.
The petitioner states that the "execution of the mentally ill violates," the
principle ofjus cogens (AP at 179), without ever expressing why such a claim is
applicable to this case. Insofar as the petitioner has not articulated deficient
performance or prejudice to the case, this claim should be denied.
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The State denies that the petitioner's execution will violate any binding law,
rule, constitution or principle.
NN. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY
FAILING TO MOVE TO STRIKE THE DEATH PENALTY AS A
VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, BY
FAILING TO REQUEST A SEPARATE JURY HEAR THE PENALTY
PHASE OF MR. HALL'S CASE
The petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective in not further
challenging the death penalty based on Eighth Amendment grounds. The real
question under Eighth Amendment scrutiny, is whether, the sentencing body's
discretion was properly, "channeled."
Under the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution, a
claim of vagueness is analyzed by determining whether the
challenged aggravating circumstance adequately informs the
sentencer what it must find in order to impose the death
penalty, or whether it leaves the sentencer with unchanneled
discretion to make arbitrary and capricious decision. Maynard
v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372
(1988); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92
S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); State v. Pizzuto, 119
Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991). Recently, the United States
Supreme Court in Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct.
3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), and Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), clarified
the requirement for clearly defined aggravating
circumstances. In Lewis the United States Supreme Court
stated:
Our capital punishment doctrine is rooted in the principle that
" '[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be ... wantonly and ... freakishly
imposed.' " Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct.
2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (joint opinion) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2762,
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 132
001054
            
    
       
          
       
       
         
     
           
           
          
    
         
         
      
           
         
        
           
           
          
          
          
           
          
          
      
        
 
          
          
           
         '"  
           
         
           
       
     
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, 1., concurring)); see also
Furman, supra, at 313, 92 S.Ct., at 2764 (White, J.,
concurring) (invalidating capital punishment statute where
"there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not"). Accordingly, "where discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action." Gregg, 428 U.S., at 189, 96 S.Ct., at 2932.
This principle requires a State to "channel the sentencer's
discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide
'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.' "
Godfrey, supra, 446 U.S., at 428, 100 S.Ct., at 1764
(footnotes omitted).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 434, 825 P.2d 1081, 1090 (1991) (cited cases State
v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991) overruled by State v. Card, 121
Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081, (1991) and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)
overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).) The jury's discretion was
properly channeled via the instructions. The petitioner's claim in this regard
should be dismissed.
In the alternative, the petitioner claims that the defense should have
requested a separate jury hear the penalty phase of the case. The petitioner cites a
New Mexico state case in which a second jury was employed at sentencing, in
answer to concerns about the manner in which the death penalty is imposed. (See
AP at 179-181.) Apparently the petitioner is claiming that because the same jury
heard the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, the penalty phase verdict was likely
arbitrary, capricious and random in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (AP at
179-181.) The petitioner provides no basis to believe that trial counsel would have
been successful in convincing the Court to empanel a second jury to consider
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death penalty phase issues. There is no authority for such a request and it would
have been in direct contravention of the applicable statute. Idaho Code Section
19-2515(5)(b), provides that, "If the defendant's guilt was determined by a jury
verdict, the same jury shall hear the special sentencing proceeding..." and
precludes a second jury from being convened unless it is "impracticable to
reconvene the same jury to hear the special sentencing proceedings due to an
insufficient number ofjurors." (emphasis added).
In any event, trial counsel had moved for a mistrial based upon the fact that
the Court had declined to remove Jurors # 82 and 130 from the panel. Trial
counsel requested that a separate jury be impaneled to hear the penalty phase if the
Court were to decline to declare a mistrial. (See Tr. Vol. 11 at 5850, Ins. 12-16.)
In the present case, there was not an insufficient number of the originally
convened jury to proceed to the penalty phase of the trial. Had trial counsel made
this motion now suggested by the petitioner, the Court would have been
constrained to deny it. Trial counsel was not ineffective in choosing not to make a
motion in direct contravention of the applicable statute. Even if the Court
concludes such a motion should have been made, it could not have been granted
and therefore no prejudice can spring from the absence of such a motion.
Accordingly, this claim can merit no relief.
CONCLUSION
The petitioner must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant was prejudiced, and that the
outcome of the trial would have been different but for the deficient performance.
The petitioner has failed to do so in all regards. The State denies each and every
claim even if not specifically argued in the foregoing response. Therefore, the
State moves for dismissal of each and every claim, whether addressed in detail in
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the foregoing response or not. The State also respectfully requests the right to
further address any claims, which are not the subject of summary disposition.
DATED this 9 day ofAugust 2009.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~th.I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J day of August 2009, I caused to
be served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Amended Petition for
Post Conviction Relief (Hall II) upon the individual(s) named below in the manner
noted:
Name and address: State Appellate Public Defender's Office3647 Lake Harbor
Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703
~ By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, first class.
o By depositing copies ofthe same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available
for pickup at the Office ofthe Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number:
ANSWER TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (HALL II) Page 135
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By: an M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
   
               
               
              
 
          
    
             
   
           
             
          
               
       
     
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 W. Front Street, Room 366
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF



















COMES NOW, Respondent, the State of Idaho, by and through, Jan M. Bennetts,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court
for an order requiring the production of the entirety of trial counsel's files subject to any
provisions imposed by this Court and any terms agreed upon by the State and petitioner's
counsel. When referring to trial counsel in this Motion, the State is intending to refer to
Ami! Myshin and D.C. Carr, who handled this case initially, as well as Rob Chastain and
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II) Page 1
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Deborah Kristal who took over the above-entitled case after Hall I was tried by Amil
Myshin and D.C. Carr.
The State requests the following with regard to trial counsel: any and all work
product files, any and all files and communications, including emails, with any expert that
trial counsel consulted with; any and all files and communications of any investigators,
attorneys, and/or mitigation specialists that were consulted or utilized by trial counsel
related to their representation, preparation, defense and trial of the petitioner in this case;
any and all files, documents, notes, audio and/or video recordings, and communications,
including audio and/or video recordings, between trial counsel and current counsel for the
petitioner, which are in the possession of trial counselor available to trial counsel, or
which are in the possession of the petitioner, relating to their representation, preparation,
defense and trial of the petitioner.
Additionally, the State request notes, emails or other communication of trial
counsel regarding trial counsel's consultation with other attorneys who trial counsel may
have consulted with during this case related to their representation, preparation, defense
and trial of the petitioner in this case. The State also requests the notes, emails or other
communication of those attorneys who trial counsel may have consulted during their
representation, preparation, defense and trial in this case.
The State further requests the following regarding communication or interviews
with any witnesses, expert witnesses, investigators, or any other person who the petitioner
has interviewed; will proffer as a live witness; will seek to depose; has offered or will
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II) Page 2
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offer an affidavit as evidence; and/or otherwise utilize to provide evidence during these
proceedings: any written statements; any audio and/or video recordings; any notes
authored by anyone working as an agent of the petitioner's appellate counsel; and/or any
email communications between any of these people and appellate counselor appellate
counsel's agents.
Further, the Respondent requests any materials, documents or other evidence not
specifically set forth above that relates to trial counsel's representation, defense,
preparation and trial of the Petitioner in this case.
The State filed a Motion for an Order Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
above-entitled case on March 11, 2008. The Respondent hereby incorporates that Motion
for an Order Waiving Attorney-Client Privilege herein.
DATED this 7t!.ctay of August, 2009.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II) Page 3
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By: an M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
        
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
'1-&I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of August 2009, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing State's Motion for Discovery was served to Mark J. Ackley, Deputy
State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the
manner noted below:
~by depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.
CJ By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
CJ By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
CJ By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s)
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II) Page 4
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State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
















COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the
State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Honorable Court to order discovery.
Mr. Hall submits that the requested discovery is necessary to protect his substantial
rights, and relies on his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Idaho
Constitution, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., § 19-2719, I.C.R. 57(b), and I.R.C.P. 26(a), to order
discovery.l
I As additional support for this Motion for Discovery, Mr. Hall intends to file a
memorandum of law in the near future, as well as additional factual support for the
specific requests noted herein.
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This motion is divided into two parts. Part I involves requests for depositions.
Part II involves requests for the production of documents.
SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY
1.
DEPOSITIONS
Mr. Hall seeks to depose the core members of his trial-level defense team, i.e.,
those individuals primarily responsibility for the investigation, preparation, and
presentation of his defense during the underlying criminal proceedings. Without the
requested depositions, Mr. Hall will be denied due process as he will effectively be
prevented from fully and fairly developing the facts ofhis claims. See e.g., State v. Beam,
121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing capital post-conviction
proceedings protect a condemned person's federal and state right to due process);
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799,992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to
provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her
claims presented may be violative of due process"); Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541, 548
(11th Cir. 1983) (relying in part on the denial of depositions at the state post-conviction
level in finding that federal habeas petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity
to develop facts to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Jones v. Wood,
114 F3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse
of discretion when the discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim."
(Citation omitted)i
2 Both Coleman v. Zant and Jones v. Wood addressed the rules governing discovery in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 2
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